Production-ready Sigma detection rules developed from analysis of 196,071 Sysmon events in the MITRE ATT&CK Evaluations APT29 dataset.
This repository contains validated detection rules for adversary behaviors observed during APT29 simulation. Each rule was tested against the actual attack data, converted to Splunk SPL, and validated for false positives.
Analysis published at: Detection Desk
| MITRE Technique | Rule Name | Severity | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| T1003.001 | LSASS Process Access with Full Permissions | High | Tested |
| T1059.001, T1027 | Suspicious PowerShell Execution Patterns | High | Tested |
LSASS Process Access with Full Permissions
- Detects: PowerShell or cmd.exe accessing lsass.exe with GrantedAccess 0x1fffff
- MITRE: T1003.001 (Credential Dumping)
- Validated Against: APT29 credential dumping at 23:05:16, ProcessID 3852
- False Positives: Low (security tools, antivirus)
Splunk Query: View SPL
Suspicious PowerShell Execution Patterns
- Detects: PowerShell with encoding, Office-spawned PowerShell with evasion or network activity
- MITRE: T1059.001 (PowerShell), T1027 (Obfuscation), T1566.001 (Phishing)
- Validated Against: APT29 dataset EventID 1 PowerShell executions
- False Positives: Medium (legitimate automation, software deployment)
Splunk Query: View SPL
sigma convert -t splunk -p sysmon https://github.com/Manishrawat21/SOC_Dectection_Rules/blob/main/Suspicious_Powershell_Commands/Detection_Rule.yamlsigma convert -t elasticsearch -p sysmon https://github.com/Manishrawat21/SOC_Dectection_Rules/blob/main/Suspicious_Powershell_Commands/Detection_Rule.yaml- Deploy to SIEM test environment
- Monitor for 7 days
- Document false positives
- Add exclusions as needed
- Promote to production
Each rule was tested using:
- MITRE ATT&CK Evaluations APT29 dataset (196,071 events)
- Splunk Free Tier with Sysmon logs
- ProcessID and ProcessGuid correlation
- Network traffic validation
- Parent-child process tree analysis
I analyzed the complete APT29 attack simulation to understand how advanced persistent threats operate in real environments. The goal was to write detection rules that catch actual adversary behavior, not theoretical attacks.
Analysis series:
- Part 1: Initial Access and Steganography
- Part 2: Credential Dumping and Collection
- Part 3: Complete Execution Chain
- Part 4: Lateral Movement via PsExec
These rules are shared for the security community. If you:
- Find false positives in your environment
- Improve detection logic
- Add conversions for other SIEMs
Submit a pull request or open an issue.
Manish Rawat
- LinkedIn: linkedin.com/in/rawat-manish-mr2000
- Substack: Detection Desk
- Email: rawatmanish21@outlook.com
Detection Engineer | Threat Hunter | CompTIA Security+ & CEH Certified
MIT License - Use freely, attribution appreciated# SOC_Dectection_Rules Written some detection rules to catch some abnormal activites. These are writen after my APT29 detection series, I hope these works for as they did for myself.