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Security Features
MatrixTM26 edited this page Jun 19, 2026
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This page summarizes the security mechanisms built into TOMCAT-C2 to protect C2 traffic and agent authentication during an engagement.
- AES-256-GCM — All agent-to-server communication is encrypted end-to-end using AES-256 in Galois/Counter Mode, providing both confidentiality and integrity (authenticated encryption).
- Mutual TLS (mTLS) — Agents authenticate to the server using client certificates stored in PKCS12 keystores, and the server authenticates to agents in turn. This prevents unauthorized clients from establishing a session even if they discover the listener.
- See Certificate Management for the full CA → Server → Agent certificate lifecycle.
These are general good practices for operators running any C2 infrastructure, not specific claims about this codebase:
- Per-engagement infrastructure — Use a fresh CA, server certificate, and agent certificates for every engagement. Never reuse keystores between clients.
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Restrict listener exposure — Bind (
-S) to the narrowest interface necessary; avoid0.0.0.0on infrastructure exposed to the public internet unless required. -
Enable mTLS in production engagements — Always pass
-T, --mtlsoutside of local lab/testing scenarios. - Secure the Web Panel — If using Web Panel mode, place it behind a VPN or restrict access by firewall/IP allowlist rather than exposing it directly.
- Clean up after engagements — Destroy certificates, keystores, and session logs once the engagement and reporting phase are complete, in line with your RoE and data retention agreement with the client.
If you discover a security issue in TOMCAT-C2 itself (as opposed to issues in target systems it's used against), please report it responsibly via the Issues page or directly to the maintainer, rather than disclosing it publicly first.