feat(ocap-kernel): restrict kernel services to system subclusters#833
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feat(ocap-kernel): restrict kernel services to system subclusters#833
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Tag each kernel service as restricted or unrestricted at registration time. When launching a user subcluster, throw if it requests a restricted service. System subclusters can access all services. The kernelFacet is now registered as restricted, preventing user subclusters from accessing this privileged capability. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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FUDCo
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Feb 11, 2026
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FUDCo
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One philosophical thing I prefer to see adjusted. If you have strong feelings to the contrary, let me know and I'll approve the PR.
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| if (service.systemOnly && !isSystem) { | ||
| throw Error( | ||
| `kernel service '${name}' is restricted to system subclusters`, | ||
| ); | ||
| } |
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I think in this case I'd throw the "no registered kernel service" error, rather than leaking information about system internals and that there's a thing there that's none of your business.
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Closes #832
Note
Medium Risk
Introduces new authorization checks around kernel service exposure that can break subcluster launches/reloads if configs depend on previously-unrestricted services; correctness is security-relevant because it prevents privilege escalation.
Overview
Kernel services can now be marked as system-only and are blocked from user subclusters.
KernelServiceManager.registerKernelServiceObjectgains asystemOnlyoption (defaultfalse) and stores this flag onKernelService.SubclusterManager.launchSubclusteradds anisSystemlaunch option and validates requestedconfig.services, throwing if a service is missing or issystemOnlyfor non-system launches; the same validation is applied during subcluster reload and reload-all flows, and system subcluster launches are explicitly flagged as system.Kernel.provideFacet()registerskernelFacetwith{ systemOnly: true }, and tests are updated/added to cover flag defaults, retrieval, and the new access restriction behavior.Written by Cursor Bugbot for commit f8c4b5c. This will update automatically on new commits. Configure here.