Recovering from inefficiencies in queueing systems with two consecutive waiting zones

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Queues - M/M/1





Ambulance blockage problem in UK

Patients forced to wait for 24 hours in ambulances, data shows

Ambulance crews forced to wait outside A&Es for 24 hours, according to chiefs

Rebecca Thomas Health Correspondent . Tuesday 17 May 2022 08:26 . (5) Comments









Exclusive: Royal College of Emergency Medicine president says Tor staff, this is hearthreaking: senior doctor's view on crisis "Ifeel so let down' long waits for ambulances in south-west



Ambulance handover delays highest since start of winter



NHS 'on its knees' as ambulance response times for lifethreatening calls rise to record

Iverage response time to deal with Category I cases – such as cardiac arrests - is now nine minutes and 20 seconds with rises across all






Queues - Custom network of queues



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Parameters:

 \blacktriangleright λ_1 : Arrival rate of type 1 individuals


 \triangleright λ_2 : Arrival rate of type 2 individuals


 \blacktriangleright μ : Service rate


C: Number of servers


► T: Threshold


Markov Chain - Custom network






























Steady state probabilities - Generator matrix



Steady state probabilities - Generator matrix (Q)


$$\pi = \begin{bmatrix} \pi_{(0,0)} & \pi_{(0,1)} & \pi_{(0,2)} & \dots & \pi_{(2,3)} & \pi_{(2,4)} \end{bmatrix}, \qquad \sum \pi_{(u,v)} = 1$$

$$\frac{d\pi}{dt} = \pi Q = 0$$


Game - Definition



Game - Players and objectives




Game - Players and objectives




Performance Measures - Blocking time

$$B = \frac{\sum_{(u,v)\in S_A^{(2)}} \pi_{(u,v)} \ b(u,v)}{\sum_{(u,v)\in S_A^{(2)}} \pi_{(u,v)}}$$




Performance Measures - Proportion within target

$$P(W < t) = \frac{\lambda_1 P_{L'_1}}{\lambda_2 P_{L'_2} + \lambda_1 P_{L'_1}} P(W^{(1)} < t) + \frac{\lambda_2 P_{L'_2}}{\lambda_2 P_{L'_2} + \lambda_1 P_{L'_1}} P(W^{(2)} < t)$$



Game - Players and objectives



Game - Strategies














 $p_A, p_B \in [0, 1]$ $p_A + p_B = 1$

 $T_A \in [1, N_A]$

 $T_B \in [1, N_B]$

Game - Formulation



Hospital's utility

$$U_{T_A, T_B}^{(i)} = 1 - \left[(P(W^{(i)} < t) - 0.95)^2 \right]$$

Game - Payoff matrices

$$A = \begin{pmatrix} U_{1,1}^A & U_{1,2}^A & \dots & U_{1,N_B}^A \\ U_{2,1}^A & U_{2,2}^A & \dots & U_{2,N_B}^A \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ U_{N_A,1}^A & U_{N_A,2}^A & \dots & U_{N_A,N_B}^A \end{pmatrix}, \quad B = \begin{pmatrix} U_{1,1}^B & U_{1,2}^B & \dots & U_{1,N_B}^B \\ U_{2,1}^B & U_{2,2}^B & \dots & U_{2,N_B}^B \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ U_{N_A,1}^B & U_{N_A,2}^B & \dots & U_{N_A,N_B}^B \end{pmatrix}$$


$$R = \begin{pmatrix} p_{1,1} & p_{1,2} & \dots & p_{1,N_B} \\ p_{2,1} & p_{2,2} & \dots & p_{2,N_B} \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ p_{N_A,1} & p_{N_A,2} & \dots & p_{N_A,N_B} \end{pmatrix}$$

Asymmetric Replicator Dynamics

$$\frac{dx}{dt_i} = x_i((f_x)_i - \phi_x), \quad \text{for all } i$$

$$\frac{dy}{dt_i} = y_i((f_y)_i - \phi_y), \quad \text{for all } i$$

Learning algorithms - Asymmetric replicator dynamics



Inefficiencies can be learned and emerge naturally


Learning algorithms - Asymmetric replicator dynamics




Targeted incentivisation of


Targeted incentivisation of behaviours can help escape

learned inefficiencies
















Thank you!

\$ pip install ambulance_game
https://github.com/11michalis11/AmbulanceDecisionGame

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