A game theoretic model of emergency department and ambulance service interactions

Michalis Panayides

CARDIFF UNIVERSITY
PRIFYSGOL CAERDYDD

THIS.

Supervisors:
Dr. Vince Knight,
Prof. Paul Harper

Game Theory

Game Theory

- Players
- Strategies
- Payoffs/Utilities

Rock-Paper-Scissors



$$\begin{bmatrix} (0,0) & (1,-1) & (-1,1) \\ (-1,1) & (0,0) & (1,-1) \\ (1,-1) & (-1,1) & (0,0) \end{bmatrix}$$



Repeated Games













Prisoner's Dilemma

P1 \ P2	D	C
D	1, 1	5, 0
C	0, 5	3, 3

Prisoner's Dilemma

P1 \ P2	D	C
D	1, 1	5, 0
C	0, 5	3, 3

1. If both players cooperate, they both get 3 points.
2. If both players defect, they both get 1 point.
3. If one player defects and the other cooperates, the one that defects gets 5 points and the one that cooperates gets 0 points.

Axelrod's Tournament - 14 strategies + 1 random

- Tit For Tat
- Tideman & Chieruzzi
- Nydegger
- Grofman
- Shubik
- Stein & Rapoport
- Grudger
- Davis
- Graaskamp
- FirstByDowning
- Feld
- Joss
- Tullock
- Unknown
- Random

Exploring the game

Nash equilibrium

- Lemke-Howson algorithm
- Support enumeration

Learning algorithms

- Fictitious play
- Replicator dynamics

Replicator Dynamics - Driving on the Left game

	R	L
R	1	-1
L	-1	1

Replicator Dynamics - Driving on the Left game

	R	L
R	1	−1
L	−1	1



Replicator Dynamics - Driving on the Left game

	R	L
R	1	−1
L	−1	1



Replicator Dynamics - Driving on the Left game

	R	L
R	1	−1
L	−1	1



Evolutionary Stable Strategies

Ambulance blockage problem in UK

Patients forced to wait for 24 hours in ambulances, data shows

Ambulance crews forced to wait outside A&Es for 24 hours, according to chiefs

Rebecca Thomas Health Correspondent • Tuesday 17 May 2022 08:26 • Comments

(AFP/Getty)

'Appalling' waits for ambulances in England leaving lives at risk

Exclusive: Royal College of Emergency Medicine president says NHS is breaking its agreement to treat sickest in a timely way

'For staff, this is heartbreaking': senior doctor's view on crisis
'I feel so let down': long waits for ambulances in south-west

Ambulance handover delays highest since start of winter

NHS 'on its knees' as ambulance response times for life-threatening calls rise to record high

Average response time to deal with Category 1 cases – such as cardiac arrests – is now nine minutes and 20 seconds with rises across all categories.

Queueing theory

$\times$

Game theory

Queueing representation of hospital



- λ_1: Arrival rate of non-ambulance patients
- λ_2: Arrival rate of ambulance patients
- μ: Service rate
- T: Threshold

Performance Measures

$$\bar{B} = \frac{\sum_{(u,v)\in S_A^{(2)}} \pi_{(u,v)}\ b(u,v)}{\sum_{(u,v)\in S_A^{(2)}} \pi_{(u,v)}}$$

$$\bar{W} = \frac{\sum_{(u,v)\in S_A^{(2)}} \pi_{(u,v)}\ w(u,v)}{\sum_{(u,v)\in S_A^{(2)}} \pi_{(u,v)}}$$

$$P(W < t) = \frac{\lambda_1 P_{L_1'}}{\lambda_2 P_{L_2'} + \lambda_1 P_{L_1'}} P(W^{(1)} < t) + \frac{\lambda_2 P_{L_2'}}{\lambda_2 P_{L_2'} + \lambda_1 P_{L_1'}} P(W^{(2)} < t)$$

The game



Players - Strategies - Objectives





$p_A, p_B \in [0, 1]$
$p_A + p_B = 1$



$T_A \in [1, N_A]$



$T_B \in [1, N_B]$

$\min \bar{B}$

$P(W^{(A)} < t) > 0.95$

$P(W^{(B)} < t) > 0.95$

Imperfect information extensive form game



Imperfect information extensive form game



Hospital's utility

$$U^{(i)}_{T_A,T_B} = 1 - \left[(P(W^{(i)} < t) - 0.95)^2\right]$$

$$A = \begin{pmatrix} U^A_{1,1} & U^A_{1,2} & \cdots & U^A_{1,N_B} \\ U^A_{2,1} & U^A_{2,2} & \cdots & U^A_{2,N_B} \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ U^A_{N_A,1} & U^A_{N_A,2} & \cdots & U^A_{N_A,N_B} \end{pmatrix}, \quad B = \begin{pmatrix} U^B_{1,1} & U^B_{1,2} & \cdots & U^B_{1,N_B} \\ U^B_{2,1} & U^B_{2,2} & \cdots & U^B_{2,N_B} \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ U^B_{N_A,1} & U^B_{N_A,2} & \cdots & U^B_{N_A,N_B} \end{pmatrix}$$

Nash Equilibrium

$$A = \begin{pmatrix} 8.39 & 8.39 & 8.39 & 8.39 \\ 8.96 & 8.85 & 8.65 & 8.45 \\ 9.95 & 9.87 & 9.6 & 9.2 \\ 4.37 & 5.11 & 8.6 & 9.91 \end{pmatrix} \qquad B = \begin{pmatrix} 8.39 & 8.96 & 9.95 & 4.37 \\ 8.39 & 8.85 & 9.87 & 5.11 \\ 8.39 & 8.65 & 9.6 & 8.6 \\ 8.39 & 8.45 & 9.2 & 9.91 \end{pmatrix}$$

Nash Equilibria:

A	B
$(0, 0, 1, 0)$	$(0, 0, 1, 0)$
$(0, 0, 0, 1)$	$(0, 0, 0, 1)$
$(0, 0, 0.4, 0.6)$	$(0, 0, 0.4, 0.6)$

Asymmetric replicator dynamics - $t = 1.5$





$T_A = 1$

$T_B = 2$

Asymmetric replicator dynamics - $t = 1.7$





$T_A = 3$

$T_B = 5$

Asymmetric replicator dynamics - $t = 2$





$T_A = 10$

$T_B = 10$

Thank you!

$ pip install ambulance_game

https://github.com/MichalisPanayides/AmbulanceDecisionGame

PanayidesM@cardiff.ac.uk

@Michalis_Pan

@MichalisPanayides