fix(sandbox): treat literal IP in policy host as implicit allowed_ips#570
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johntmyers merged 1 commit intomainfrom Mar 24, 2026
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fix(sandbox): treat literal IP in policy host as implicit allowed_ips#570johntmyers merged 1 commit intomainfrom
johntmyers merged 1 commit intomainfrom
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When a policy endpoint specifies a literal IP address as the host (e.g. host: 192.168.86.157), the user has explicitly declared intent to allow that destination. The SSRF guard requiring allowed_ips was redundant for this case and forced users to duplicate the IP. Synthesize an implicit allowed_ips entry when the host parses as an IP address, so the existing allowlist-validation path is used instead of the blanket internal-IP rejection. Loopback and link-local addresses remain blocked by resolve_and_check_allowed_ips. Applies to both the CONNECT and FORWARD proxy paths. Refs: #567
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The implicit allowed_ips fix is in PR #570, not this branch. FWD-2 must expect 403 until that fix is merged. The OVL-1 and OVL-2 tests (overlapping policies) are independent and remain unchanged.
drew
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johntmyers
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SSRF-6: Private IP with literal IP host now gets implicit allowed_ips from PR #570, so CONNECT returns 200 instead of 403. SSRF-3: Loopback is still blocked but via the always-blocked path (implicit allowed_ips is synthesized, then resolve_and_check_allowed_ips catches it). Log message says 'always-blocked' instead of 'internal address'.
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SSRF-6: Private IP with literal IP host now gets implicit allowed_ips from PR #570, so CONNECT returns 200 instead of 403. SSRF-3: Loopback is still blocked but via the always-blocked path (implicit allowed_ips is synthesized, then resolve_and_check_allowed_ips catches it). Log message says 'always-blocked' instead of 'internal address'.
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…ision with overlapping policies (#571) * fix(sandbox,server): fix chunk merge duplicates and OPA variable collision with overlapping policies Two related bugs triggered when a draft rule approval creates a second policy entry for the same host:port: 1. merge_chunk_into_policy looked up existing rules by chunk.rule_name (auto-generated as allow_{host}_{port}), which never matched the user's original rule name. Now scans all network_policies entries for a host:port endpoint match before falling back to insertion, and merges allowed_ips into the existing endpoint. 2. The Rego allow_request rule and _matching_endpoint_configs comprehension used 'some ep; ep := policy.endpoints[_]' which caused regorus to error with 'duplicated definition of local variable ep' when multiple policies covered the same host:port. Refactored to isolate endpoint iteration inside helper functions (_policy_allows_l7, _policy_endpoint_configs) so variables are scoped per-policy evaluation. Refs: #567 * test(e2e): add overlapping policy tests and update FWD-2 for implicit allowed_ips - Update FWD-2 (test_forward_proxy_denied_without_allowed_ips -> test_forward_proxy_allows_private_ip_host_without_allowed_ips): literal IP host no longer requires explicit allowed_ips, expects 200. - Add OVL-1: overlapping L4 policies for same host:port must not crash OPA and should allow forward proxy connections. - Add OVL-2: overlapping L7 policies for same host:port must not crash OPA and should allow CONNECT tunnel establishment. Refs: #567 * style: apply cargo fmt formatting * test(e2e): update SSRF-3 and SSRF-6 for implicit allowed_ips behavior SSRF-6: Private IP with literal IP host now gets implicit allowed_ips from PR #570, so CONNECT returns 200 instead of 403. SSRF-3: Loopback is still blocked but via the always-blocked path (implicit allowed_ips is synthesized, then resolve_and_check_allowed_ips catches it). Log message says 'always-blocked' instead of 'internal address'. * fix(e2e): use negative assertion for SSRF-6 when nothing listens on target port When the SSRF check passes but nothing listens on the target port, recv() returns empty bytes. Use 'assert 403 not in' (matching SSRF-4 pattern) instead of 'assert 200 in'. * fix(e2e): update provider tests for redacted credential values PR #569 changed credential redaction from clearing the map to replacing values with 'REDACTED'. Update e2e assertions to expect credential keys with REDACTED values instead of an empty map.
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Summary
When a policy endpoint uses a literal IP address as the host (e.g.
host: 192.168.86.157), the SSRF guard no longer requires a redundantallowed_ipsentry. The user has already explicitly declared intent to allow that destination.Related Issue
Refs #567
Changes
implicit_allowed_ips_for_ip_hosthelper that synthesizes anallowed_ipsentry when the host parses as an IP addressallowed_ipsresolve_and_check_allowed_ipsRoot Cause
The SSRF protection in the proxy rejects connections to RFC 1918 addresses unless
allowed_ipsis explicitly set on the endpoint. This makes sense for hostname-based endpoints (DNS rebinding risk), but is redundant when the policy host is already a literal IP — there is no DNS resolution to exploit and the user has explicitly declared the destination.Users hitting this saw
FORWARD blocked: internal IP without allowed_ipseven though their policy clearly listed the IP address.Testing
mise run pre-commitpassesimplicit_allowed_ips_for_ip_hostcargo test -p openshell-sandboxpasses (313 tests)host: 192.168.x.x(noallowed_ips) now connects successfullyChecklist