| Version | Supported |
|---|---|
| 2.0.x | ✅ |
| 1.x | ❌ |
If you discover a security vulnerability in Vestige, please report it responsibly:
- DO NOT open a public GitHub issue
- Email the maintainer directly (see GitHub profile)
- Include:
- Description of the vulnerability
- Steps to reproduce
- Potential impact
- Suggested fix (if any)
You can expect a response within 48 hours.
Vestige is a local MCP server designed to run on your machine with your user permissions:
- Trusted: The MCP client (Claude Code/Desktop) that connects via stdio
- Untrusted: Content passed through MCP tool arguments (validated before use)
- ❌ Make network requests (except first-run model download from Hugging Face)
- ❌ Execute shell commands
- ❌ Access files outside its data directory
- ❌ Send telemetry or analytics
- ❌ Phone home to any server
All data is stored locally in SQLite:
| Platform | Location |
|---|---|
| macOS | ~/Library/Application Support/com.vestige.core/vestige.db |
| Linux | ~/.local/share/vestige/core/vestige.db |
| Windows | %APPDATA%\vestige\core\vestige.db |
Default: Data is stored in plaintext with owner-only file permissions (0600).
For database-level encryption, build with SQLCipher:
cargo build --no-default-features --features encryption,embeddings,vector-searchSet VESTIGE_ENCRYPTION_KEY environment variable. SQLCipher encrypts all database files including the WAL journal. Alternatively, use OS-level encryption (FileVault, BitLocker, LUKS).
All MCP tool inputs are validated:
- Content size limit: 1MB max
- Query length limit: 1000 characters
- FTS5 queries are sanitized to prevent injection
- All SQL uses parameterized queries (
params![]macro)
We use well-maintained dependencies and run cargo audit regularly. Current status:
- Vulnerabilities: 0
- Warnings: 2 (unmaintained transitive dependencies with no known CVEs)
- No hardcoded secrets
- Parameterized SQL queries
- Input validation on all tools
- No command injection vectors
- No unsafe Rust code
- Dependencies audited