docs: add advisory guidance for external tool connectors#20
Conversation
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Small follow-up update: I corrected the contributor entry in |
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Thank you @Hinotoi-agent. Please allow me some time to look at the changes and get back. |
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Thanks for this contribution, @Hinotoi-agent. External tool connectors (MCP servers, plugins, remote browsers) are a real trust boundary gap that APTS doesn't currently address, and the advisory format is the right approach for this. The content is well-structured, the cross-references to TP-006, TP-017, SC-020, MR-022, and MR-023 all check out, and the Practice Description covers the right areas (connector inventory, credential isolation, enforcement layer, treating connector output as untrusted). A few things to address before this can merge:
Once these are sorted, this should be good to go. |
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Thanks — I addressed the requested updates on the PR branch and rebased it onto Changes now on the branch:
Latest push:
Validation run locally:
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@Hinotoi-agent Thank you, this is good. On the ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS.md change, the individual disclaimer is fine for now. We may add a general disclaimer to the acknowledgements section in a future update so that individual entries can stay simple. Approving. |
Summary
Why
APTS already covers dependency vetting, action allowlists, and agent/runtime containment, but it does not yet give implementation guidance specific to externally hosted tool connectors and protocol bridges. That gap is becoming more relevant as autonomous pentest platforms adopt remote browsers, plugins, retrieval connectors, and MCP-style tool servers.
This PR keeps the addition intentionally lightweight by making it an advisory practice rather than a new normative requirement.
The acknowledgement entry was also corrected to remove the email address and use the requested EY attribution/disclaimer wording.
Affected sections
Contributing.md checklist
git diff --checkBest-practice references
This advisory addition is aligned with neutral protocol- and risk-oriented references rather than any single vendor implementation. The common thread across these references is that external tool connectors expand the agent's reachable action surface and create distinct trust boundaries that should be governed explicitly.
References:
Notes