security(dci): fail closed on unresolved search sender + cap page_size#260
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gonzalesedwin1123 wants to merge 3 commits into
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security(dci): fail closed on unresolved search sender + cap page_size#260gonzalesedwin1123 wants to merge 3 commits into
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DCI search reached an unscoped sudo res.partner search whenever no active sender was resolved: with sender=None/False, DCIConsentAdapter disengages (build_consented_domain returns the base domain unchanged), so full PII is returned. Three routes funnel into this: the sync search route, the async search route, and bulk upload (all via DCISocialSearchService / transaction.process_async_search). page_size was also unbounded (schema only enforces > 0), enabling whole-registry enumeration in one request. Fail closed across the shared sink and the request paths: - routers/search.py: reject (403) when the verified sender doesn't resolve to an active registered sender; never run with sender=None (removed `or None`). - middleware/signature.py: verify_dci_signature requires an active sender, so a deactivated sender cannot authenticate (keeps verify and resolution in sync). - models/transaction.py: process_async_search refuses (rejected, no search) when the transaction has no resolved sender -- the shared sink guard that protects the async and bulk paths even before their route-level checks. - routers/async_router.py: async_search rejects (403) an unresolved sender instead of persisting sender_id=False and queuing an unscoped job. - search_service.py: clamp page_size to dci.max_page_size (default 100). The report's literal claim (service built without a sender) was already fixed by 0944b7f; this closes the residual fail-open resolution + unbounded page_size. Separately tracked follow-ups: bulk_upload accepts an UNSIGNED, caller-asserted sender_id (impersonation -- needs signature binding), and the dead consent domain (status=="active" matches nothing for require_consent senders; functional, fail-closed). Tests: unresolved/inactive sender -> 403 (sync + async) / 401 (signature); sink refuses sender-less transaction; page_size clamped. spp_dci_server 325/325, spp_dci_server_social 75/75.
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Code Review
This pull request implements a fail-closed security mechanism by requiring an active registered sender for both synchronous and asynchronous search requests, preventing potential PII leaks. It also introduces a configurable maximum page size limit to prevent registry enumeration, alongside comprehensive unit tests. The review feedback highlights two important improvements: explicitly checking self.sender_id.active in the transaction model to prevent deactivated senders from bypassing checks due to Odoo's Many2one behavior, and wrapping the dci.max_page_size integer conversion in a try-except block to handle potential database misconfigurations gracefully.
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## 19.0 #260 +/- ##
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+ Coverage 74.75% 75.22% +0.46%
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Files 1090 1092 +2
Lines 64813 64900 +87
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+ Hits 48453 48818 +365
+ Misses 16360 16082 -278
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- pre-commit (semgrep): ruff-format had wrapped the signature.py sudo lookup across lines, pushing the nosemgrep off the matched `.sudo()` line. Keep `.sudo()` on a single line with the nosemgrep directly above (and likewise for the new search_service config read). Semgrep passes locally. - transaction.py (Gemini security-high): a Many2one still dereferences a DEACTIVATED record, and process_async_search runs asynchronously, so a sender deactivated after the transaction was created would slip past `if not self.sender_id`. Check `not self.sender_id.active` too (fail closed). - search_service.py (Gemini medium): a misconfigured dci.max_page_size (empty/non-integer) would crash int(); wrap in try/except, fall back to 100. Tests: add a sink test for a deactivated sender -> refused. spp_dci_server 326/326, spp_dci_server_social 75/75.
A non-positive dci.max_page_size (0 or negative) previously skipped the page_size clamp entirely, silently disabling the cap and letting a client pull an arbitrarily large page. Treat such a misconfiguration as the default (100) so the cap can never be turned off by accident. Addresses staff-review nit on PR #260.
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Summary
DCI search could reach an unscoped
sudores.partnersearch whenever no active sender was resolved. Withsender=None/False,DCIConsentAdapterdisengages (build_consented_domainreturns the base domain unchanged), so full registrant PII (identifiers, names, birth dates, addresses, phones, emails, members) is returned with no consent/legal-basis check. Three routes funnel into this sink (DCISocialSearchService/transaction.process_async_search): sync search, async search, and bulk upload. Separately,page_sizehad no upper bound (the schema only enforces> 0), enabling whole-registry enumeration in one request.The report's literal claim (service constructed without a sender) was already fixed by
0944b7ff; this PR closes the residual fail-open resolution and the unbounded page_size, and hardens the shared sink so every path is covered.Fix (fail closed across the shared sink + request paths)
routers/search.py— reject (403) when the verified sender doesn't resolve to an active registered sender; never run withsender=None(removedor None).middleware/signature.py—verify_dci_signaturenow requires an active sender record, so a deactivated sender can't authenticate (keeps verification and resolution in sync; previously verify omitted theactivefilter).models/transaction.py—process_async_searchrefuses (rejected, no search) when the transaction has no resolved sender. This is the shared-sink guard that protects the async and bulk paths even independent of their route-level checks.routers/async_router.py—async_searchrejects (403) an unresolved sender instead of persistingsender_id=Falseand queuing an unscoped job (closes the dev/unsigned-mode residual).services/search_service.py— clamppage_sizetodci.max_page_size(system param, default 100) so one request can't enumerate the registry.Found by post-implementation review; tracked as separate follow-ups (not this PR)
bulk_upload.pyaccepts an UNSIGNED, caller-assertedsender_id(Form(...), noverify_dci_signature) → impersonation risk; needs signature binding. (Its unscoped-dump path — unresolved sender →False— is closed here by the sink guard; the impersonation/auth-design gap is the follow-up.)build_consented_domainappends("consent_ids.status","=","active"), and there is noactivestatus, sois_require_consentsenders match nothing (functional, fail-closed — not a leak). Make it a correct consent domain.Tests
Unresolved/inactive sender → 403 (sync + async) and 401 (signature middleware); the shared sink refuses a sender-less transaction;
page_sizeclamped (1000 → cap). All green:spp_dci_server325/325 ·spp_dci_server_social75/75. Lint-clean.A post-implementation adversarial review of the sync fix verdict'd it safe and surfaced the sibling sink/async/bulk exposure (the sink + async hardening here implement its recommendation; bulk-auth deferred as above).