Security: Command injection via shell=True in emulator process management#425
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veadex merged 2 commits intoOpenWSGR:mainfrom Apr 13, 2026
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The macOS emulator manager builds shell commands with f-strings and executes them with `shell=True` (e.g., `pgrep -f {self._process_name}`, `open -a {self._path}`, `pkill -9 -f {self._process_name}`, and MuMu tool invocations). If `self._process_name`, `self._path`, or related config-derived values are attacker-controlled (directly or via a malicious config file), this can lead to arbitrary command execution on the host.
Signed-off-by: tomaioo <203048277+tomaioo@users.noreply.github.com>
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Summary
Security: Command injection via shell=True in emulator process management
Problem
Severity:
High| File:autowsgr/emulator/os_control/macos.py:L22The macOS emulator manager builds shell commands with f-strings and executes them with
shell=True(e.g.,pgrep -f {self._process_name},open -a {self._path},pkill -9 -f {self._process_name}, and MuMu tool invocations). Ifself._process_name,self._path, or related config-derived values are attacker-controlled (directly or via a malicious config file), this can lead to arbitrary command execution on the host.Solution
Avoid
shell=Trueand pass argument lists tosubprocess(subprocess.run([...], check=True)). Strictly validate/allowlist executable paths and process names from config. Reject values containing shell metacharacters and resolve paths safely before execution.Changes
autowsgr/emulator/os_control/macos.py(modified)