v0.2.0

Validated container escape from a fully unprivileged pod to node-level code execution — now on Alibaba Cloud ACK, Amazon EKS, and Google GKE.

An unprivileged pod corrupts the page cache of shared image layers via CVE-2026-31431, weaponizing the privileged kube-proxy DaemonSet to execute attacker-supplied code with full node access. No capabilities, no hostPath, no privileged flag required on the attacker pod.

Highlights

• ☁️ GKE support — new payload with COS/Ubuntu device auto-detection for Google GKE nodes, validated on Container-Optimized OS (kernel 6.12.68) with read-only root filesystem and writable stateful partition
• 🎯 Three major cloud platforms — ACK, EKS, and GKE all confirmed vulnerable; the exploit generalizes to any managed Kubernetes with shared image layers and privileged DaemonSets
• 🛡️ Mitigation examples — added references to vArmor copy-fail-mitigation (AppArmor/BPF) and copyfail-ebpf-k8s (eBPF)
• 📦 Pre-built binaries — download copyfail-linux-amd64 (ACK/upstream), copyfail-eks-linux-amd64 (EKS), or copyfail-gke-linux-amd64 (GKE) below

GKE-Specific Notes

• GKE kube-proxy uses a provider-managed Artifact Registry image; the PoC builds directly FROM the exact GKE kube-proxy image tag to guarantee layer sharing
• Container-Optimized OS mounts root read-only — the payload writes to /mnt/stateful_partition/copyfail-res via the writable /dev/sda1 partition
• Full walkthrough: docs/gke-poc.md

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Full Changelog: v0.1.0...v0.2.0