

SSL Trust - Missing "Authority Key Identifier"

[The problem](#)

[The solution](#)

[Root-cause issue resolution](#)

[\(Dirty\) workarounds](#)

[Ignore strict validation and ssl verification entirely](#)

[Downgrade or use another client](#)

[Do SSL interception yourself](#)

[MacOS](#)

[Windows](#)

The problem

Some Engineers are experiencing issues with SSL Forward Inspections for ANY clients with

`X509_STRICT` validation... For instance, `python 3.13 +`


```
e.g. python3 -c 'import requests;  
print(requests.get("https://github.com").status_code)' would  
return urllib3.exceptions.SSLError: [SSL:  
CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED]  
certificate verify failed: Missing Authority Key Identifier  
(_ssl.c:1028)
```

The problem is **not** related to going through a proxy or not. It is not either related to SSL certificate or whether or not "an internal Root CA is added to a pem file (CA Store)".

If your issue is related to Proxy or SSL Trust issues, see this : [Proxy and SSL Certificate issue](#)

 The problem is, our SSL forward inspection Root CAs are not compliant with RFC 5280.
Also we SSL Inspect most traffic, even the SSL traffic not going through proxies (This is easily verifyable with github.com which is direct (not proxied), and yet is SSL intercepted...)

 More specifically, both prisma3rsa and prisma2025ecdsa are missing that a x509v3 property or Subject Key Identifier as defined here : [RFC 5280: Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List \(CRL\) Profile](#)



prisma3rsa.cba and prisma2025ecdsa are missing **Authority Key Identifier**

Note, CBAInternalRootCA is not affected...

The issue is only reproducible with clients or CLI using X509_STRICT validation.

So far that is only Python 3.13 and a few others but probably more to come...

- ✖ Now the real concern is if other clients like mainstream browsers (Chrome/Edge) perform strict x509 validation (like python 3.13), because then **all web requests** would fail...

The solution

Root-cause issue resolution

- ✓ Reissue Prisma Root CAs with the right x509 properties (**Authority Key Identifier**, and possible X509v3 Basic Constraints: "**critical**" as well): **Recommended** but the Palo Alto team will need to re-issue the RootCAs and the SOE teams (SCCM/JAMF) will need to push it to endpoint to trust it (Keychain/MMC Certs)|

The issue has been escalated via multiple channels... Stay alert for an update!

- [UAA-2472: Prisma Forward Trust Certificates are not compliant with Python 3.13+ OPEN](#)
- [Python 3.13 SSL Errors](#) posted in ES-Python User Group / General Discussion on 28 May
- [Florian Bidabe on Viva Engage: New-Prisma-Forward-Inspection.is.partially-broken...](#) Posted in Global Protect on May 28, 2025 & [Florian Bidabe on Viva Engage: We.have.an.issue.with.the.intercepting.Root.CA.\(prisma\).T.hey-lack-x509v3.flag-for-Authority-Key-Identifier-which-isn't-compliant-with-the-RFC.Current...](#) Posted in Cyber Security team on May 30, 2025

(Dirty) workarounds

Ignore strict validation and ssl verification entirely

- Ignore **Strict** Checks: **PAINFUL** because that implies disruption and time spent on troubleshooting and finding what argument to pass or config file for a client to avoid x509 strict checks.
- Ignore SSL verification: e.g. **--no-verify** **INSECURE** ... likely what Engineers will resort to doing!

Downgrade or use another client

- Use older clients not doing strict validation: **PAINFUL**, downgrading often comes with a bunch of compatibility issues. Alternative clients might not exist or introduce other issues...

Do SSL interception yourself

MacOS

- Use a MITM Proxy like Charles (It's on JAMF Self-Service and licensed)

BEST TACTICAL SOLUTION but far from ideal: **Web Debugging**

- Install Charles and trust its Root CA (It's on JAMF SelfService and Group licensed)

- Pass Charles traffic to


Alpaca/CNTLM (**localhost:3128**) or Prisma

(**cba.proxy.prismaaccess.com:8080**)

- Set your proxy var to Charles so Python SDK knows where to go **export**

{all,http,https}_proxy=http://localhost:8888

- Set all this to auto-start or create Daemons so you don't have to run it manually everytime after reboot: **Charles in the Background**



Windows

- Use a MITM Proxy like Fiddler (It's on Software Center)
- In Options, Enable Decryption, and Trust the Root CA ([requires local admin](#))
- On your problematic client, set the proxy to <http://localhost:8888>

⚠ Unfortunately, if you are a standard user, you're stuck in a tough spot. Software Center (SCCM) only offers Python 3.13 for installation. While Fiddler can be installed, enabling decryption requires local admin access on your Windows SOE. This is necessary for Fiddler to add its Signing Root CA certificate to the **System** Root certificate store to be trusted. As a result, you have a few options:

- Request local admin access to either:
 - Use Python 3.12 instead (e.g., in a virtual environment)
 - Trust the Fiddler CA so it can validate Python 3.13's RFC-compliant certificate
- Wait for the Prisma team to issue new RFC5280 compliant certificates
- Wait for the provisioning team (SCCM) to package Python 3.12 in the Software Center

```
> openssl x509 -in ~/Downloads/FiddlerRoot.cer -noout -text
Certificate:
    Data:
        Version: 3 (0x2)
        Serial Number:
            29:01:a3:63:77:3e:38:ad:4f:90:50:97:74:ca:ed:4e
        Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
        Issuer: OU=Created by http://www.fiddler2.com, O=DOD
        Validity
            Not Before: Jun  6 10:45:16 2025 GMT
            Not After : Sep  4 10:45:16 2027 GMT
        Subject: OU=Created by http://www.fiddler2.com, O=DOD
        Subject Public Key Info:
            Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption
            Public-Key: (2048 bit)
                Modulus:
                    00:b1:fb:2e:a6:2f:ba:1d:5b:a0:70:ec:16:a
                    85:fc:81:a1:df:b4:ab:25:29:14:fe:ab:7f:0
                    54:3c:52:85:ef:fd:57:d7:4d:df:54:91:26:9
                    09:ff:bb:7d:3e:d0:47:5d:38:f9:95:ea:ab:6
                    12:45:bc:44:ee:91:42:0a:4c:22:3e:78:6e:7
                    35:a9:64:02:fc:fc:7d:20:28:66:25:18:92:6
                    ba:04:4c:dd:17:ad:5b:29:2a:c6:f7:ec:c6:8
                    63:0b:aa:3d:5d:d5:e6:68:16:91:2d:a5:04:2
                    77:6e:1c:97:1e:00:cd:eb:21:b8:2a:70:83:b
                    0c:93:b0:aa:7f:c7:5c:23:32:2a:2d:45:df:0
                    b0:19:3e:d6:30:ad:ef:1e:7:f:2e:01:3a:9a:1
                    4c:b3:bf:80:ed:98:b2:86:24:e1:19:e2:6b:4
                    a1:63:b8:c8:81:82:62:dd:6c:04:c0:f3:af:8
                    d3:ac:c4:09:ec:8c:49:f3:e2:cc:9a:63:cd:1
                    be:fc:af:cb:72:03:bf:bd:19:86:82:3f:68:5
                    b1:27:7e:f9:bc:70:13:d7:51:54:d2:d6:bf:0
                    67:6a:d1:83:b9:93:02:a9:9d:74:10:b4:30:9
                    26:69
                Exponent: 65537 (0x10001)
    X509v3 extensions:
        X509v3 Extended Key Usage:
            TLS Web Server Authentication
        X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical
            CA:TRUE, pathlen:0
        X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
            BD:CB:82:40:86:54:6E:7F:FA:D9:8B:6A:27:2E:37
        X509v3 Key Usage: critical
            Certificate Sign, CRL Sign
        Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
        Signature Value:
            8c:e3:b9:56:e6:5a:f0:b1:0b:5c:4c:12:9d:32:ea:cd:88:0
            c4:01:72:8e:6d:ba:79:ab:b6:8d:c5:59:13:f1:17:ad:ad:3
```

As you can see, a Fiddle Root CA cert is also compliant.
It contains the X509 properties Strict validation requires.
But you need to be able to trust it in your system with your _adm

✉ Helpful? Drop me a thanks on [Achievers](#)! And if you've got knowledge to share, don't hold back - we all grow when we learn from each other 💡