Xapt Package Updates

xapt Package Updates

xapt is XAIOS's native, deliberately small package updater. It distributes complete XAIOS application ELFs rather than source packages or Linux/FreeBSD binaries. Applications can be installed, upgraded, removed, or rolled back without replacing the OS. A system update is streamed into the inactive A/B slot and takes effect only after reboot.

Operator commands

xapt update
xapt list
xapt list --upgradable
xapt search APP
xapt show APP
xapt install APP
xapt upgrade APP
xapt rollback APP
xapt remove APP
xapt os-upgrade

APP is a package name returned by the signed catalog. The current production catalog contains no optional applications; a newly published application is offered by xapt list without requiring an OS-image update.

xapt update fetches and activates the catalog only after signature, architecture, and monotonic-generation validation. Install and upgrade are explicit confirmation actions; there is no dependency resolver and no automatic background update. A newly installed application is available by name immediately and is not started automatically.

Compatibility and integrity

Each application manifest binds:

• application name and semantic version;
• target architecture;
• minimum XAIOS version and ABI version;
• exact capability mask;
• payload size and SHA-256 digest;
• Ed25519 signer identity and signature.

Catalogs are signed separately, architecture-specific, and generation monotonic. XAIOS rejects incompatible, downgraded, malformed, oversized, or corrupted content before activation. Current and previous versions are stored separately so xapt rollback NAME is one-step and atomic. Failed staging does not change the active application.

System records bind version, architecture, monotonic system generation, byte size, SHA-256, signed update metadata, and image path. xapt os-upgrade rejects the current or an older version, streams the image in bounded chunks, verifies it in the inactive slot, and marks that slot pending. The boot lifecycle retains the existing verified fallback behavior.

Storage layout

/etc/xapt.conf              image default
/state/xapt/config          administrator override
/state/xapt/catalog         last verified catalog
/update/xapt/               non-authoritative staging
/apps/NAME/current.elf      active application
/apps/NAME/current.manifest active signed metadata
/apps/NAME/previous.*       one rollback version

The default development origin is 91.99.176.243:8443. Configuration is plain text, but transport security is mandatory:

host=91.99.176.243
port=8443
base=/
tls=required
tls_rsa_modulus=OPERATOR_RSA_MODULUS_HEX

xapt uses TLS 1.2 with an exact operator-managed RSA public-key pin and fail-closed entropy. Signed catalogs/manifests and payload hashes remain the content authenticity layer. The client requires HTTP/1.1 with Content-Length; transfer encoding, compression, mirrors, proxies, deltas, dependencies, and unattended upgrades are not supported.

The signing trust chain is independent of the TLS identity. Monotonic signed trust records rotate the active Ed25519 release key and revoke the previous key. A separately pinned offline recovery key can publish a later recovery record. XAIOS retains the previous verified trust/catalog pair and restores it after an interrupted activation; replayed generations, revoked signers, and mismatched trust/catalog generations fail closed.

Build and publish a development repository

make xapt-repository
./scripts/publish-xapt-repository.sh

The first command creates and verifies both architecture trees under build/xapt/repository. The publisher re-verifies locally, synchronizes to /var/xaios_updater, validates the repository Caddy configuration, and reloads Caddy on TLS port 8443. Override the destination with XAIOS_UPDATE_HOST and XAIOS_UPDATE_ROOT.

Publishing requires XAIOS_XAPT_TLS_CERT and XAIOS_XAPT_TLS_KEY; the script refuses to publish without an operator-managed identity. The public fixture may be selected only for disposable tests with XAIOS_ALLOW_TEST_TLS_FIXTURE=1. The configured tls_rsa_modulus must match the deployed certificate key. Caddy exposes only the TLS listener on port 8443.

The repository shape is:

catalog-aarch64.txt
catalog-x86_64.txt
apps/ARCH/NAME/VERSION/{NAME.elf,manifest.txt,record.json}
os/ARCH/VERSION/{kernel.elf,record.json}

Use tools/xaios_xapt_repo.py for focused package, system, catalog, and verify operations. Publishing a newer catalog requires a strictly higher generation.

Security boundary

The checked-in Ed25519 signing keys and TLS certificate/key are deterministic test fixtures and their private material is public. They exist so builds and QEMU tests are reproducible. The implementation covers signing-root rotation, revocation, offline recovery, interrupted-activation rollback, TLS pin rejection, and payload corruption. Production use remains blocked until maintainers provision private operator keys and define custody, authorization, recovery, and release-audit procedures.

The app loader remains capability-based and does not add a package-manager syscall. xapt uses the existing filesystem, network, clock, and control protocol surface. Eight new administrative control operations fit inside the existing control syscall, so the XAIOS syscall count remains 50.

Evidence

make xapt-test
make qemu-xapt-gate

The dual-architecture QEMU gate proves pinned TLS transport, signed catalog refresh, signing-root rotation/revocation/recovery, interrupted activation recovery, independent app install and argv execution, upgrade, one-step rollback, tamper rejection, streamed A/B OS delivery, reboot persistence, and removal. QEMU does not prove physical-device durability, Internet-scale availability, or production key security.

See Applications, Administration, Testing XAIOS, and Security Model.