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Copy file name to clipboardExpand all lines: lectures/harrison_kreps.md
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text_representation:
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extension: .md
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format_name: myst
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format_version: 0.13
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jupytext_version: 1.17.1
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kernelspec:
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name: python3
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display_name: Python 3 (ipykernel)
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display_name: Python 3
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language: python
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name: python3
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---
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(harrison_kreps)=
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In addition to what's in Anaconda, this lecture uses following libraries:
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```{code-cell} ipython3
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:tags: [hide-output]
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```{code-cell} ipython
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---
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tags: [hide-output]
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---
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!pip install quantecon
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```
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Let's start with some standard imports:
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```{code-cell} ipython3
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import numpy as np
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```{code-cell} ipython
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import quantecon as qe
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import scipy.linalg as la
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import jax.numpy as jnp
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```
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### References
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> *A component of an asset price can be interpreted as a bubble when all investors agree that the current price of the asset exceeds what they believe the asset's underlying dividend stream justifies*.
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## Structure of the Model
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## Structure of the model
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The model simplifies things by ignoring alterations in the distribution of wealth
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among investors who have hard-wired different beliefs about the fundamentals that determine
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The stationary (i.e., invariant) distributions of these two matrices can be calculated as follows:
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```{code-cell} ipython3
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qa = np.array([[1/2, 1/2], [2/3, 1/3]])
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qb = np.array([[2/3, 1/3], [1/4, 3/4]])
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qa = jnp.array([[1/2, 1/2], [2/3, 1/3]])
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qb = jnp.array([[2/3, 1/3], [1/4, 3/4]])
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mca = qe.MarkovChain(qa)
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mcb = qe.MarkovChain(qb)
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mca.stationary_distributions
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Thus, a type $a$ investor is more pessimistic on average.
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### Ownership Rights
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### Ownership rights
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An owner of the asset at the end of time $t$ is entitled to the dividend at time $t+1$ and also has the right to sell the asset at time $t+1$.
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In case 2, both types of investors always hold at least some of the asset.
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### Short Sales Prohibited
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### Short sales prohibited
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No short sales are allowed.
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This matters because it limits how pessimists can express their opinions.
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* They **can** express themselves by selling their shares.
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* They **cannot** express themsevles more loudly by artificially "manufacturing shares" -- that is, they cannot borrow shares from more optimistic investors and then immediately sell them.
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* They *can* express themselves by selling their shares.
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* They *cannot* express themsevles more loudly by artificially "manufacturing shares" -- that is, they cannot borrow shares from more optimistic investors and then immediately sell them.
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### Optimism and Pessimism
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### Optimism and pessimism
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The above specifications of the perceived transition matrices $P_a$ and $P_b$, taken directly from Harrison and Kreps, build in stochastically alternating temporary optimism and pessimism.
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Remember that state $1$ is the high dividend state.
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* In state $0$, a type $a$ agent is more optimistic about next period's dividend than a type $b$ agent.
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* In state $1$, a type $b$ agent is more optimistic about next period's dividend than a type $a$ agaub is.
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* In state $1$, a type $b$ agent is more optimistic about next period's dividend than a type $a$ agnet is.
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However, the stationary distributions $\pi_a = \begin{bmatrix} .57 & .43 \end{bmatrix}$ and $\pi_b = \begin{bmatrix} .43 & .57 \end{bmatrix}$ tell us that a type $b$ person is more optimistic about the dividend process in the long run than is a type $a$ person.
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When investors choose whether to purchase or sell the asset at $t$, they also know $s_t$.
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## Solving the Model
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## Solving the model
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Now let's turn to solving the model.
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1. There are two types of agents differentiated only by their beliefs. Each type of agent has sufficient resources to purchase all of the asset (Harrison and Kreps's setting).
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1. There are two types of agents with different beliefs, but because of limited wealth and/or limited leverage, both types of investors hold the asset each period.
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### Summary Table
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### Summary table
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The following table gives a summary of the findings obtained in the remainder of the lecture
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(in an exercise you will be asked to recreate the table and also reinterpret parts of it).
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The row corresponding to $p_p$ would also apply if both types have enough resources to buy the entire stock of the asset but short sales are also possible so that temporarily pessimistic investors price the asset.
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### Single Belief Prices
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### Single belief prices
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We’ll start by pricing the asset under homogeneous beliefs.
# We know this is a contraction mapping, so we can iterate to conv
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for i in range(max_iter):
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p_old = p_new
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p_new = β * np.max([q @ p_old
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+ q @ dividend_payoff for q in transitions],
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axis=0)
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p_new = β * jnp.max(jnp.stack([q @ p_old
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+ q @ dividend_payoff for q in transitions]),
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1)
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# If we succeed in converging, break out of for loop
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if np.max(np.sqrt((p_new - p_old)**2)) < tol:
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if jnp.max(jnp.sqrt((p_new - p_old)**2)) < tol:
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break
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ptwiddle = β * np.min([q @ p_old
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+ q @ dividend_payoff for q in transitions],
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ptwiddle = β * jnp.min(jnp.stack([q @ p_old
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+ q @ dividend_payoff for q in transitions]),
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axis=0)
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phat_a = np.array([p_new[0], ptwiddle[1]])
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phat_b = np.array([ptwiddle[0], p_new[1]])
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phat_a = jnp.array([p_new[0], ptwiddle[1]])
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phat_b = jnp.array([ptwiddle[0], p_new[1]])
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return p_new, phat_a, phat_b
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```
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### Insufficient Funds
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### Insufficient funds
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Outcomes differ when the more optimistic type of investor has insufficient wealth --- or insufficient ability to borrow enough --- to hold the entire stock of the asset.
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# We know this is a contraction mapping, so we can iterate to conv
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for i in range(max_iter):
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p_old = p_new
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p_new = β * np.min([q @ p_old
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+ q @ dividend_payoff for q in transitions],
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axis=0)
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p_new = β * jnp.min(jnp.stack([q @ p_old
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+ q @ dividend_payoff for q in transitions]),
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axis=0)
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# If we succeed in converging, break out of for loop
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if np.max(np.sqrt((p_new - p_old)**2)) < tol:
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if jnp.max(jnp.sqrt((p_new - p_old)**2)) < tol:
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break
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return p_new
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```
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### Further Interpretation
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### Further interpretation
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Jose Scheinkman {cite}`Scheinkman2014` interprets the Harrison-Kreps model as a model of a bubble --- a situation in which an asset price exceeds what every investor thinks is merited by his or her beliefs about the value of the asset's underlying dividend stream.
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He emphasizes how limiting short sales and limiting leverage have opposite effects.
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## Exercises
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```{exercise-start}
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:label: hk_ex1
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```
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investors are optimistic or pessimistic.
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```{code-cell} ipython3
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qa = np.array([[1/2, 1/2], [2/3, 1/3]]) # Type a transition matrix
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qb = np.array([[2/3, 1/3], [1/4, 3/4]]) # Type b transition matrix
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qa = jnp.array([[1/2, 1/2], [2/3, 1/3]]) # Type a transition matrix
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qb = jnp.array([[2/3, 1/3], [1/4, 3/4]]) # Type b transition matrix
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```{solution-end}
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```
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[^f1]: By assuming that both types of agents always have "deep enough pockets" to purchase all of the asset, the model takes wealth dynamics off the table. The Harrison-Kreps model generates high trading volume when the state changes either from 0 to 1 or from 1 to 0.
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[^f1]: By assuming that both types of agents always have "deep enough pockets" to purchase all of the asset, the model takes wealth dynamics off the table. The Harrison-Kreps model generates high trading volume when the state changes either from 0 to 1 or from 1 to 0.
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