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Local Security Pass Vault — open-source, offline-first password manager.
Zero cloud. Zero telemetry. 8 layers of protection between your data and an attacker.
| Guide | Description |
|---|---|
| Getting Started | Install, create vault, system tray, quick unlock |
| Feature Guide | All features: TOTP, custom fields, folders, trash, health report, CSV |
| Browser Extension | Chrome / Edge / Firefox auto-fill setup |
| Backup & Recovery | BIP-39 mnemonic, export .vbk, restore, 3-2-1 strategy |
| Security Architecture | 8-layer crypto model, what is stored where, threat model |
| Build from Source | Prerequisites, compile, dev mode, CI |
| FAQ | Common questions and troubleshooting |
| Security Review Checklist | Code-verified audit of all security properties |
A password manager that runs entirely on your machine. The vault is an encrypted SQLite database on your disk. The master password never leaves your RAM — it is used to derive keys via Argon2id and then immediately zeroed.
No account. No cloud. No subscription. No telemetry.
Layer 1 — Key Derivation Argon2id (256 MB RAM, 4 iter) → 3 independent keys
Layer 2 — Vault Key Enc. XChaCha20-Poly1305, unique nonce per save
Layer 3 — Record Encryption XChaCha20-Poly1305, unique nonce per record per save
Layer 4 — Database SQLCipher AES-256 per page
Layer 5 — OS Keychain DPAPI / libsecret / Keychain — quick unlock, deleted on lock
Layer 6 — Memory Safety mlock() + zeroize, PR_SET_DUMPABLE=0, no swap
Layer 7 — Clipboard 30s TTL, CF_EXCLUDEFROMCLOUDCLIPBOARD
Layer 8 — Backup BIP-39 + Argon2id 4 GB + XChaCha20-Poly1305 + BLAKE3
Every master password runs through Argon2id (m=256 MB, t=4, p=4) to produce three independent 32-byte keys: one for SQLCipher, one to decrypt the Vault Key, one for the search index HMAC.
The Vault Key is a random 256-bit key generated once at vault creation. It encrypts every individual record with XChaCha20-Poly1305 (a fresh 192-bit random nonce per save). Changing your master password re-encrypts only the Vault Key — all records stay untouched.
Memory discipline: keys are mlock()-ed (OS cannot page them to disk) and zeroed via sodium_memzero() on every lock. All MAC comparisons use sodium_memcmp() (constant-time).
Vault writes go through tmp → fsync → rename() — an atomic sequence that survives power loss. The file is never partially written.
Before opening, lstat() + O_NOFOLLOW reject symlinks. A honeypot file detects unauthorized external writes (ransomware indicator). PR_SET_DUMPABLE=0 is called at startup on Linux — no core dumps, no ptrace attach from other processes.
The extension has connect-src 'none' in its CSP — it literally cannot make a network request. All data flows via a local named pipe (Native Messaging) to the desktop process, which holds the keys.
Every IPC response is signed with the desktop's Ed25519 private key. The extension verifies the signature before acting. Each request carries a UUID nonce — replay attacks are rejected.
Domain matching uses tldts for eTLD+1 comparison: accounts.google.com matches google.com, google.com.evil.ru does not.
A 24-word BIP-39 mnemonic (256 bits entropy) is the backup encryption key. LSPV shows it once and never stores it. The backup KDF is a hardened Argon2id profile: 4 GB RAM, 10 iterations — deliberately brutal to make GPU brute-force of a stolen .vbk file economically impossible.
Auto-backup: each manual export also saves a timestamped copy to app_data/backups/. The 7 most recent copies are kept automatically.
| Attack | Mitigation |
|---|---|
| Stolen vault.db | SQLCipher + XChaCha20 — unreadable without password |
| RAM dump (locked) | zeroize + mlock — keys wiped on lock() |
| RAM dump (unlocked) | mlock prevents swap; per-record AEAD limits exposure |
| Brute-force password | Argon2id 256 MB ≈ 2-4 sec/attempt on RTX 4090 |
| DLL/SO hijacking | libsodium statically linked |
| GPU VRAM residue | sodium_mlock + PR_SET_DUMPABLE=0 |
| Supply chain (XZ-style) | cargo audit in CI, minimal deps |
| Windows Cloud Clipboard | CF_EXCLUDEFROMCLOUDCLIPBOARD |
| Ransomware | Honeypot file triggers immediate lock |
| Symlink attack | lstat() + O_NOFOLLOW |
| Extension XSS | connect-src 'none' CSP |
| IPC replay | Ed25519 + UUID nonce per request |
Full threat model: docs/threat-model.md
LSPV is maintained without funding. If it's useful, consider a Bitcoin donation:
bc1qwnkyez3nv86dry54dqfjjtav29qqq72h69pevw
A GitHub star also helps the project get discovered.