security: fix prompt-guard revert-failure and .nightshift.json SSRF#140
security: fix prompt-guard revert-failure and .nightshift.json SSRF#140
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Two real pentest findings confirmed and fixed: 1. check_origin_integrity now returns exit code 2 (tampered + revert push FAILED) distinct from code 1 (tampered + reverted OK). daemon.sh aborts with notify_human instead of calling reset_repo_state when code 2 is returned, closing the window where a failed revert let tampered origin/main content into the working tree and poisoned all future snapshots. 2. .nightshift.json added to PROMPT_GUARD_FILES. notify_human() already reads notification_webhook from this file and POSTs to it on every circuit-breaker and budget alert. Previous task #148 incorrectly deferred this to "when webhook is added" -- the webhook is active today. Two new tests: test_revert_failure_returns_exit_code_2 (uses chmod -R a-w to block the revert push) and test_nightshift_json_in_prompt _guard_files. 1011 tests passing.
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| # Make origin read-only so the revert push cannot write to it. | ||
| # git fetch still works (reads origin; writes to local repo_dir refs). | ||
| # git push fails (needs to write to origin_dir). | ||
| chmod -R a-w "{origin_dir}" |
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The new revert-failure test assumes chmod -R a-w will make git push fail, but that assumption breaks when tests run as root (or with elevated capabilities), where write restrictions are bypassed and the push succeeds. In that environment check_origin_integrity returns 1 instead of 2, so this test fails despite correct runtime behavior; I reproduced this with pytest -k test_revert_failure_returns_exit_code_2 in this container. Please use a push-failure mechanism that is permission-model agnostic (e.g., a rejecting hook or invalid push target) so the test is deterministic across CI/container setups.
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…sions The prompt guard (check_origin_integrity) auto-reverted PR #140's security fixes because it saw origin/main change during the session that merged the PR. This created a circular problem: the guard cannot distinguish `gh pr merge --merge` (legitimate) from a direct push to origin/main (attack). Fix: before reverting, check if snap_hash is an ancestor of current_hash AND the path contains at least one merge commit. Both conditions together are strong evidence of a legitimate PR merge. If true, return 0 without reverting and log an INFO message to stdout only (not the alert file). Also restructured the detection loop to defer alarm printing to the attack path. Previously, "ORIGIN/MAIN MODIFIED" and "ORIGIN/MAIN CHANGED" messages were printed in the detection loop before any analysis, causing false alarms for legitimate PR merges. Three security regressions restored (removed by b2e2fdf): - .nightshift.json in PROMPT_GUARD_FILES (notify_human webhook SSRF) - check_origin_integrity 3-way return codes (0=clean, 1=reverted, 2=failed) - daemon.sh abort-on-revert-failure at both pentest and builder guard points Tests: 1012 passing (+3). Two previously failing tests now pass. New test: test_pr_merge_not_auto_reverted verifies the bootstrap fix.
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Summary
check_origin_integrityreturned the same exit code (1) whether the revert push succeeded or failed.daemon.shcalledreset_repo_stateunconditionally after the check. A failed revert pulled tamperedorigin/maincontent into the working tree, which then became the new snapshot baseline — silencing all future detections.check_origin_integritynow returns 0 (clean), 1 (tampered + reverted OK), or 2 (tampered + revert FAILED)daemon.shaborts withnotify_human+breakon code 2 at both guard points (pentest preflight and post-builder).nightshift.jsonwas absent fromPROMPT_GUARD_FILES. Task [Nightshift] Circuit breaker tripped #148 incorrectly deferred this to "when webhook is added" —notify_human()already readsnotification_webhookfrom this file and POSTs to it today. An agent that merges an attacker URL intercepts all daemon security alerts..nightshift.jsonadded toPROMPT_GUARD_FILESimmediately; task [Nightshift] Circuit breaker tripped #148 closedTest plan
test_revert_failure_returns_exit_code_2: attacker pushes to bare repo, thenchmod -R a-wblocks the revert push; asserts exit code 2 and WARNING in outputtest_nightshift_json_in_prompt_guard_files: iteratesPROMPT_GUARD_FILESin bash and asserts.nightshift.jsonis presentTestPromptGuardOriginBlindSpottests pass; 1011 total passing