Security and Recovery

Security and Recovery

Current boundary

Helix is a private alpha. Source previews default to loopback. The Compose example can expose an exact private-LAN address through a constrained gateway, but public internet exposure has not passed review. A private Tailscale route may use a separately constrained entry point. The built-in Hook can install and start the exact service on eligible Debian/Ubuntu hosts, but the owner still authenticates the tailnet and configures the gateway trust boundary. Install errors name the directory Helix refused, instead of a generic ownership line.

The current owner flow uses:

• a random, single-use, short-lived local setup token;
• Argon2id password hashing and revocable bounded sessions;
• HttpOnly, host-only, SameSite=Strict cookies;
• a session-bound CSRF proof required for protected reads and writes;
• exact capabilities enforced by the API; and
• bounded authentication work and generic failures without secret details.

helixd remains unprivileged. Root-required operations go to helix-privd over a group-protected Unix socket as a closed, length-bounded request enum. The broker has no general shell endpoint, but its socket boundary still relies on filesystem/group isolation rather than an independent peer-credential check. That and full clean-host sandbox testing remain release gates.

The optional terminal is separate from the root broker. It runs as one normal Linux user and requires a fresh Helix password for each 30-second one-use ticket. Its distinct socket group also checks the dashboard UID through Linux SO_PEERCRED. Helix records only authorization/lifecycle events, not commands or output. Normal sudo policy still applies inside that shell.

Host reboot requires exact hostname confirmation, acknowledgement, workload preflight, a delay, and a cancellable systemd timer. Firewall writes affect only exact Helix-owned UFW rules. A separate flow can enable inactive UFW after preserving a verified listening SSH port; it never resets or changes defaults. Exact selected APT candidates have a guarded update path with no rollback claim. Helix self-update remains unavailable.

Security center

The Security page is host-first. Cards cover firewall, SSH, kernel, Fail2ban, NTP, AppArmor, and Docker live-restore, plus short recommendations for a private game box. Helix-only items (CSRF, LAN bind, start-after-boot, Minecraft auto-forward, typed broker) live under the Helix filter.

Writable switches still require typing an exact confirmation phrase:

• start Helix after host boot;
• forward Minecraft ports when creating a server;
• enable or disable unattended-upgrades when that unit is already installed;
• enable or disable Fail2ban when that unit is already installed;
• enable or disable systemd-timesyncd when that unit is already installed.

Helix will not disable UFW from this page, rewrite sshd, or offer a root shell. Sysctl values are observed, not rewritten. CSRF pairing, the private LAN bind, AppArmor, SSH directives, ASLR, and Docker live-restore are explained, not casual toggles. The page reads those facts directly (UFW status, the two Helix container restart policies, the Minecraft create-forward flag) instead of waiting on the full Host or Network inventories.

Data and recovery

Critical state and replaceable metrics use separate durability domains. Native console archives and backups are bounded on disk; backup deletion moves exact known artifacts into recoverable trash. File deletion also uses configured trash rather than claiming an irreversible delete.

helixctl backup-state creates a verified critical-state snapshot. Native backup creation and restore exist, but complete clean-host, interrupted-write, disk-full, and off-host recovery drills are not finished. Helix must not be the only copy of valuable state or worlds.

Read the full security model and recovery contract.

Report vulnerabilities through GitHub private vulnerability reporting, never a public issue.