fix: harden GitHub Actions workflows#37
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- Fix template injection vulnerabilities by using environment variables instead of direct expression interpolation in shell commands - Pin all third-party actions to full-length commit SHAs - Add top-level permissions blocks to restrict token scope - Add persist-credentials: false to checkout steps - Add zizmor.yml configuration file Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Ryan Eberhardt (reberhardt7)
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Note: The PR Preview workflow for this project has been failing since this Dependabot PR was merged ~9 months ago, but should not be blocking for the purposes of this PR. |
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Summary
${{ }}expression interpolation in shell commands with environment variables to prevent script injection attacks (inrelease.yml)actions/checkout,actions/setup-python,pypa/gh-action-pypi-publish,actions/github-script) are now pinned to full-length commit SHAs instead of mutable tagspermissionsblocks to all workflows, applying least-privilege token scopespersist-credentials: falseto allactions/checkoutstepszizmor.yml: Configuration file for the zizmor GitHub Actions security linter