

Proof of type correctness and safety of *Lamport's* distributed mutual-exclusion algorithm.

EXTENDS *LamportMutex*, *SequenceTheorems*, *TLAPS*

USE DEF *Clock*

Proof of type correctness.

LEMMA *BroadcastType* \triangleq

ASSUME $network \in [Proc \rightarrow [Proc \rightarrow Seq(Message)]]$,

NEW $s \in Proc$, NEW $m \in Message$

PROVE $Broadcast(s, m) \in [Proc \rightarrow Seq(Message)]$

BY *AppendProperties* DEF *Broadcast*

LEMMA *TypeCorrect* $\triangleq Spec \Rightarrow \Box TypeOK$

$\langle 1 \rangle 1. Init \Rightarrow TypeOK$

BY DEF *Init*, *TypeOK*

$\langle 1 \rangle 2. TypeOK \wedge [Next]_{vars} \Rightarrow TypeOK'$

$\langle 2 \rangle$ SUFFICES ASSUME *TypeOK*,
 $[Next]_{vars}$

PROVE *TypeOK'*

OBVIOUS

$\langle 2 \rangle$.USE DEF *TypeOK*

$\langle 2 \rangle 1.$ ASSUME NEW $p \in Proc$,
 $Request(p)$

PROVE *TypeOK'*

BY $\langle 2 \rangle 1$, *BroadcastType*, *Zenon* DEF *Request*, *Message*

$\langle 2 \rangle 2.$ ASSUME NEW $p \in Proc$,
 $Enter(p)$

PROVE *TypeOK'*

BY $\langle 2 \rangle 2$ DEF *Enter*

$\langle 2 \rangle 3.$ ASSUME NEW $p \in Proc$,
 $Exit(p)$

PROVE *TypeOK'*

BY $\langle 2 \rangle 3$, *BroadcastType*, *Zenon* DEF *Exit*, *Message*

$\langle 2 \rangle 4.$ ASSUME NEW $p \in Proc$,
NEW $q \in Proc \setminus \{p\}$,
 $ReceiveRequest(p, q)$

PROVE *TypeOK'*

$\langle 3 \rangle$.DEFINE $m \triangleq Head(network[q][p])$
 $c \triangleq m.clock$

$\langle 3 \rangle 1. \wedge network[q][p] \neq \langle \rangle$

$\wedge m.type = "req"$

$\wedge req' = [req \text{ EXCEPT } ![p][q] = c]$

$\wedge clock' = [clock \text{ EXCEPT } ![p] = \text{IF } c > clock[p] \text{ THEN } c + 1 \text{ ELSE } @ + 1]$

$\wedge network' = [network \text{ EXCEPT } ![q][p] = Tail(@),$

$$\begin{array}{l}
! [p][q] = \text{Append}(@, \text{AckMessage}) \\
\wedge \text{UNCHANGED } \langle \text{ack}, \text{crit} \rangle \\
\text{BY } \langle 2 \rangle 4 \text{ DEF } \text{ReceiveRequest} \\
\langle 3 \rangle 2. m \in \text{Message} \\
\text{BY } \langle 3 \rangle 1 \\
\langle 3 \rangle 3. m \in \{ \text{ReqMessage}(cc) : cc \in \text{Clock} \} \\
\text{BY } \langle 3 \rangle 1, \langle 3 \rangle 2 \text{ DEF } \text{Message}, \text{AckMessage}, \text{RelMessage} \\
\langle 3 \rangle 4. \wedge \text{clock}' \in [\text{Proc} \rightarrow \text{Clock}] \\
\wedge \text{req}' \in [\text{Proc} \rightarrow [\text{Proc} \rightarrow \text{Nat}]] \\
\text{BY } \langle 3 \rangle 1, \langle 3 \rangle 3 \text{ DEF } \text{ReqMessage} \\
\langle 3 \rangle 5. \text{network}' \in [\text{Proc} \rightarrow [\text{Proc} \rightarrow \text{Seq}(\text{Message})]] \\
\langle 4 \rangle. \text{DEFINE } nw \triangleq [\text{network} \text{ EXCEPT } ![q][p] = \text{Tail}(@)] \\
\langle 4 \rangle 1. nw \in [\text{Proc} \rightarrow [\text{Proc} \rightarrow \text{Seq}(\text{Message})]] \\
\text{BY } \langle 3 \rangle 1 \\
\langle 4 \rangle. \text{HIDE DEF } nw \\
\langle 4 \rangle 2. \text{AckMessage} \in \text{Message} \\
\text{BY DEF } \text{Message} \\
\langle 4 \rangle 3. [nw \text{ EXCEPT } ![p][q] = \text{Append}(@, \text{AckMessage})] \in [\text{Proc} \rightarrow [\text{Proc} \rightarrow \text{Seq}(\text{Message})]] \\
\text{BY } \langle 4 \rangle 1, \langle 4 \rangle 2 \\
\langle 4 \rangle. \text{QED BY } \langle 3 \rangle 1, \langle 4 \rangle 3, \text{Zenon DEF } nw \\
\langle 3 \rangle 6. \wedge \text{ack}' \in [\text{Proc} \rightarrow \text{SUBSET } \text{Proc}] \\
\wedge \text{crit}' \in \text{SUBSET } \text{Proc} \\
\text{BY } \langle 3 \rangle 1 \\
\langle 3 \rangle. \text{QED BY } \langle 3 \rangle 4, \langle 3 \rangle 5, \langle 3 \rangle 6, \text{Zenon} \\
\langle 2 \rangle 5. \text{ASSUME NEW } p \in \text{Proc}, \\
\text{NEW } q \in \text{Proc} \setminus \{p\}, \\
\text{ReceiveAck}(p, q) \\
\text{PROVE } \text{TypeOK}' \\
\text{BY } \langle 2 \rangle 5 \text{ DEF } \text{ReceiveAck} \\
\langle 2 \rangle 6. \text{ASSUME NEW } p \in \text{Proc}, \\
\text{NEW } q \in \text{Proc} \setminus \{p\}, \\
\text{ReceiveRelease}(p, q) \\
\text{PROVE } \text{TypeOK}' \\
\text{BY } \langle 2 \rangle 6 \text{ DEF } \text{ReceiveRelease} \\
\langle 2 \rangle 7. \text{CASE UNCHANGED } \text{vars} \\
\text{BY } \langle 2 \rangle 7 \text{ DEF } \text{vars} \\
\langle 2 \rangle 8. \text{QED BY } \langle 2 \rangle 1, \langle 2 \rangle 2, \langle 2 \rangle 3, \langle 2 \rangle 4, \langle 2 \rangle 5, \langle 2 \rangle 6, \langle 2 \rangle 7 \text{ DEF } \text{Next} \\
\langle 1 \rangle. \text{QED BY } \langle 1 \rangle 1, \langle 1 \rangle 2, \text{PTL DEF } \text{Spec}
\end{array}$$

Inductive invariants for the algorithm.

We start the proof of safety by defining some auxiliary predicates:

- *Contains*(s, mt) holds if channel s contains a message of type mt .
- *AtMostOne*(s, mt) holds if channel s holds zero or one messages of type mt .

- $\text{Precedes}(s, mt1, mt2)$ holds if in channel s , any message of type $mt1$ precedes any message of type $mt2$.

$\text{Contains}(s, mtype) \triangleq \exists i \in 1 \dots \text{Len}(s) : s[i].type = mtype$

$\text{AtMostOne}(s, mtype) \triangleq \forall i, j \in 1 \dots \text{Len}(s) :$

$s[i].type = mtype \wedge s[j].type = mtype \Rightarrow i = j$

$\text{Precedes}(s, mt1, mt2) \triangleq \forall i, j \in 1 \dots \text{Len}(s) :$

$s[i].type = mt1 \wedge s[j].type = mt2 \Rightarrow i < j$

LEMMA $\text{NotContainsAtMostOne} \triangleq$

ASSUME NEW $s \in \text{Seq}(\text{Message})$, NEW $mtype$, $\neg \text{Contains}(s, mtype)$

PROVE $\text{AtMostOne}(s, mtype)$

BY DEF $\text{Contains}, \text{AtMostOne}$

LEMMA $\text{NotContainsPrecedes} \triangleq$

ASSUME NEW $s \in \text{Seq}(\text{Message})$, NEW $mt1$, NEW $mt2$, $\neg \text{Contains}(s, mt2)$

PROVE $\wedge \text{Precedes}(s, mt1, mt2)$

$\wedge \text{Precedes}(s, mt2, mt1)$

BY DEF $\text{Contains}, \text{Precedes}$

LEMMA $\text{PrecedesHead} \triangleq$

ASSUME NEW $s \in \text{Seq}(\text{Message})$, NEW $mt1$, NEW $mt2$,

$s \neq \langle \rangle$,

$\text{Precedes}(s, mt1, mt2), \text{Head}(s).type = mt2$

PROVE $\neg \text{Contains}(s, mt1)$

BY DEF $\text{Precedes}, \text{Contains}$

LEMMA $\text{AtMostOneTail} \triangleq$

ASSUME NEW $s \in \text{Seq}(\text{Message})$, NEW $mtype$,

$s \neq \langle \rangle$, $\text{AtMostOne}(s, mtype)$

PROVE $\text{AtMostOne}(\text{Tail}(s), mtype)$

BY DEF AtMostOne

LEMMA $\text{ContainsTail} \triangleq$

ASSUME NEW $s \in \text{Seq}(\text{Message})$, $s \neq \langle \rangle$,

NEW $mtype$, $\text{AtMostOne}(s, mtype)$

PROVE $\text{Contains}(\text{Tail}(s), mtype) \equiv \text{Contains}(s, mtype) \wedge \text{Head}(s).type \neq mtype$

BY DEF $\text{Contains}, \text{AtMostOne}$

LEMMA $\text{AtMostOneHead} \triangleq$

ASSUME NEW $s \in \text{Seq}(\text{Message})$, NEW $mtype$,

$\text{AtMostOne}(s, mtype)$, $s \neq \langle \rangle$, $\text{Head}(s).type = mtype$

PROVE $\neg \text{Contains}(\text{Tail}(s), mtype)$

$\langle 1 \rangle$.SUFFICES ASSUME NEW $i \in 1 \dots \text{Len}(\text{Tail}(s))$, $\text{Tail}(s)[i].type = mtype$

PROVE FALSE

BY $\text{Tail}(s) \in \text{Seq}(\text{Message})$, *Isa* DEF Contains

$\langle 1 \rangle$.QED BY $\text{HeadTailProperties}$ DEF AtMostOne

LEMMA *ContainsSend* \triangleq
 ASSUME NEW $s \in Seq(Message)$, NEW $mttype$, NEW $m \in Message$
 PROVE $Contains(Append(s, m), mttype) \equiv m.type = mttype \vee Contains(s, mttype)$
 BY DEF *Contains*

LEMMA *NotContainsSend* \triangleq
 ASSUME NEW $s \in Seq(Message)$, NEW $mttype$, $\neg Contains(s, mttype)$, NEW $m \in Message$
 PROVE $\wedge AtMostOne(Append(s, m), mttype)$
 $\wedge m.type \neq mttype \Rightarrow \neg Contains(Append(s, m), mttype)$
 BY DEF *Contains*, *AtMostOne*

LEMMA *AtMostOneSend* \triangleq
 ASSUME NEW $s \in Seq(Message)$, NEW $mttype$, $AtMostOne(s, mttype)$,
 NEW $m \in Message$, $m.type \neq mttype$
 PROVE $AtMostOne(Append(s, m), mttype)$
 BY DEF *AtMostOne*

LEMMA *PrecedesSend* \triangleq
 ASSUME NEW $s \in Seq(Message)$, NEW $mt1$, NEW $mt2$,
 NEW $m \in Message$, $m.type \neq mt1$
 PROVE $Precedes(Append(s, m), mt1, mt2) \equiv Precedes(s, mt1, mt2)$
 BY DEF *Precedes*

LEMMA *PrecedesTail* \triangleq
 ASSUME NEW $s \in Seq(Message)$, NEW $mt1$, NEW $mt2$, $Precedes(s, mt1, mt2)$
 PROVE $Precedes(Tail(s), mt1, mt2)$
 BY DEF *Precedes*

LEMMA *PrecedesInTail* \triangleq
 ASSUME NEW $s \in Seq(Message)$, $s \neq \langle \rangle$,
 NEW $mt1$, NEW $mt2$, $mt1 \neq mt2$,
 $Head(s).type = mt1 \vee Head(s).type \notin \{mt1, mt2\}$,
 $Precedes(Tail(s), mt1, mt2)$
 PROVE $Precedes(s, mt1, mt2)$
 BY *SMTT*(30) DEF *Precedes*

In order to prove the safety property of the algorithm, we prove two inductive invariants. Our first invariant is itself a conjunction of two predicates: - The first one states that each channel holds at most one message of each type. Moreover, no process ever sends a message to itself.

- The second predicate describes how request, acknowledgement, and release messages are exchanged among processes, but does not refer to clock values held in the clock and *req* variables.

NetworkInv(p, q) \triangleq
 LET $s \triangleq network[p][q]$
 IN $\wedge AtMostOne(s, "req")$

$$\begin{aligned}
& \wedge \text{AtMostOne}(s, \text{"ack"}) \\
& \wedge \text{AtMostOne}(s, \text{"rel"}) \\
& \wedge \text{network}[p][p] = \langle \rangle
\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
\text{CommInv}(p) & \triangleq \\
& \vee \wedge \text{req}[p][p] = 0 \wedge \text{ack}[p] = \{\} \wedge p \notin \text{crit} \\
& \wedge \forall q \in \text{Proc} : \neg \text{Contains}(\text{network}[p][q], \text{"req"}) \wedge \neg \text{Contains}(\text{network}[q][p], \text{"ack"}) \\
& \vee \wedge \text{req}[p][p] > 0 \wedge p \in \text{ack}[p] \\
& \wedge p \in \text{crit} \Rightarrow \text{ack}[p] = \text{Proc} \\
& \wedge \forall q \in \text{Proc} : \\
& \quad \text{LET } pq \triangleq \text{network}[p][q] \\
& \quad \quad qp \triangleq \text{network}[q][p] \\
& \quad \text{IN } \vee \wedge q \in \text{ack}[p] \\
& \quad \quad \wedge \neg \text{Contains}(pq, \text{"req"}) \wedge \neg \text{Contains}(qp, \text{"ack"}) \wedge \neg \text{Contains}(pq, \text{"rel"}) \\
& \quad \vee \wedge q \notin \text{ack}[p] \wedge \text{Contains}(qp, \text{"ack"}) \\
& \quad \quad \wedge \neg \text{Contains}(pq, \text{"req"}) \wedge \neg \text{Contains}(pq, \text{"rel"}) \\
& \quad \vee \wedge q \notin \text{ack}[p] \wedge \text{Contains}(pq, \text{"req"}) \\
& \quad \quad \wedge \neg \text{Contains}(qp, \text{"ack"}) \wedge \text{Precedes}(pq, \text{"rel"}, \text{"req"})
\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
\text{BasicInv} & \triangleq \\
& \wedge \forall p, q \in \text{Proc} : \text{NetworkInv}(p, q) \\
& \wedge \forall p \in \text{Proc} : \text{CommInv}(p)
\end{aligned}$$

THEOREM *BasicInvariant* $\triangleq \text{Spec} \Rightarrow \Box \text{BasicInv}$

$\langle 1 \rangle 1. \text{Init} \Rightarrow \text{BasicInv}$

BY DEF *Init*, *BasicInv*, *CommInv*, *NetworkInv*, *Contains*, *AtMostOne*

$\langle 1 \rangle 2. \text{TypeOK} \wedge \text{BasicInv} \wedge [\text{Next}]_{\text{vars}} \Rightarrow \text{BasicInv}'$

$\langle 2 \rangle$ SUFFICES ASSUME *TypeOK*, *BasicInv*, $[\text{Next}]_{\text{vars}}$

PROVE *BasicInv'*

OBVIOUS

$\langle 2 \rangle$.USE DEF *TypeOK*

$\langle 2 \rangle 1.$ ASSUME NEW $n \in \text{Proc}$, *Request*(n)

PROVE *BasicInv'*

$\langle 3 \rangle 1. \wedge \text{req}[n][n] = 0$

$\wedge \text{req}' = [\text{req} \text{ EXCEPT } ![n][n] = \text{clock}[n]]$

$\wedge \text{network}' = [\text{network} \text{ EXCEPT } ![n] = \text{Broadcast}(n, \text{ReqMessage}(\text{clock}[n]))]$

$\wedge \text{ack}' = [\text{ack} \text{ EXCEPT } ![n] = \{n\}]$

$\wedge \text{crit}' = \text{crit}$

BY $\langle 2 \rangle 1$ DEF *Request*

$\langle 3 \rangle. \wedge \text{ReqMessage}(\text{clock}[n]) \in \text{Message}$

$\wedge \text{ReqMessage}(\text{clock}[n]).\text{type} = \text{"req"}$

BY DEF *ReqMessage*, *Message*

$\langle 3 \rangle \text{a. } \neg(\text{req}[n][n] > 0)$

BY $\langle 3 \rangle 1$

$\langle 3 \rangle 2. \wedge n \notin \text{crit}$

$\wedge \forall q \in \text{Proc} : \neg \text{Contains}(\text{network}[n][q], \text{"req"}) \wedge \neg \text{Contains}(\text{network}[q][n], \text{"ack"})$

BY $\langle 3 \rangle a$ DEF *BasicInv*, *CommInv*
 $\langle 3 \rangle 3$. ASSUME NEW $p \in Proc$, NEW $q \in Proc$
 PROVE *NetworkInv*(p, q)'
 BY $\langle 3 \rangle 1$, $\langle 3 \rangle 2$, $\langle 3 \rangle 3$, *NotContainsSend*, *AtMostOneSend* DEF *Broadcast*, *BasicInv*, *NetworkInv*
 $\langle 3 \rangle 4$. ASSUME NEW $p \in Proc$
 PROVE *CommInv*(p)'
 $\langle 4 \rangle 1$. CASE $p = n$
 $\langle 5 \rangle$. $\wedge req'[p][p] > 0 \wedge p \in ack'[p]$
 $\wedge p \notin crit'$
 BY $\langle 3 \rangle 1$, $\langle 3 \rangle 2$, $\langle 4 \rangle 1$
 $\langle 5 \rangle$. $\wedge \neg Contains(network'[p][n], "req")$
 $\wedge \neg Contains(network'[n][p], "ack")$
 $\wedge \neg Contains(network'[p][n], "rel")$
 BY $\langle 3 \rangle 3$, $\langle 4 \rangle 1$ DEF *NetworkInv*, *Contains*
 $\langle 5 \rangle$. ASSUME NEW $q \in Proc \setminus \{n\}$
 PROVE $\wedge q \notin ack'[p]$
 $\wedge Contains(network'[p][q], "req")$
 $\wedge \neg Contains(network'[q][p], "ack")$
 BY $\langle 3 \rangle 1$, $\langle 3 \rangle 2$, $\langle 4 \rangle 1$, *ContainsSend* DEF *Broadcast*
 $\langle 5 \rangle$. $\forall q \in Proc \setminus \{n\} : Precedes(network[p][q], "rel", "req")$
 BY $\langle 3 \rangle 2$, $\langle 4 \rangle 1$, *NotContainsPrecedes*
 $\langle 5 \rangle$. $\forall q \in Proc \setminus \{n\} : Precedes(network'[p][q], "rel", "req")$
 BY $\langle 3 \rangle 1$, $\langle 4 \rangle 1$, *PrecedesSend* DEF *Broadcast*
 $\langle 5 \rangle$. QED BY DEF *CommInv*
 $\langle 4 \rangle 2$. CASE $p \neq n$
 $\langle 5 \rangle$. *CommInv*(p)
 BY DEF *BasicInv*
 $\langle 5 \rangle$. UNCHANGED $\langle req[p][p], ack[p], crit \rangle$
 BY $\langle 3 \rangle 1$, $\langle 4 \rangle 2$
 $\langle 5 \rangle$. $\forall q \in Proc : \text{UNCHANGED } network[p][q]$
 BY $\langle 3 \rangle 1$, $\langle 4 \rangle 2$
 $\langle 5 \rangle$. $\wedge \forall q \in Proc \setminus \{n\} : \text{UNCHANGED } network[q][p]$
 $\wedge p = n \Rightarrow \text{UNCHANGED } network[n][p]$
 BY $\langle 3 \rangle 1$, $\langle 4 \rangle 2$ DEF *Broadcast*
 $\langle 5 \rangle$. $n \neq p \Rightarrow Contains(network'[n][p], "ack") \equiv Contains(network[n][p], "ack")$
 BY $\langle 3 \rangle 1$, $\langle 4 \rangle 2$, *ContainsSend* DEF *Broadcast*
 $\langle 5 \rangle$. QED BY DEF *CommInv*
 $\langle 4 \rangle$. QED BY $\langle 4 \rangle 1$, $\langle 4 \rangle 2$
 $\langle 3 \rangle$. QED BY $\langle 3 \rangle 3$, $\langle 3 \rangle 4$ DEF *BasicInv*
 $\langle 2 \rangle 2$. ASSUME NEW $n \in Proc$, *Enter*(n)
 PROVE *BasicInv*'
 BY $\langle 2 \rangle 2$ DEF *Enter*, *BasicInv*, *NetworkInv*, *CommInv*
 $\langle 2 \rangle 3$. ASSUME NEW $n \in Proc$, *Exit*(n)
 PROVE *BasicInv*'
 $\langle 3 \rangle 1$. $\wedge req[n][n] > 0$

$\wedge \text{ack}[n] = \text{Proc}$
 $\wedge \forall q \in \text{Proc} : \wedge \neg \text{Contains}(\text{network}[n][q], \text{"req"})$
 $\quad \wedge \neg \text{Contains}(\text{network}[q][n], \text{"ack"})$
 $\quad \wedge \neg \text{Contains}(\text{network}[n][q], \text{"rel"})$
 $\wedge \text{network}' = [\text{network} \text{ EXCEPT } ![n] =$
 $\quad [q \in \text{Proc} \mapsto \text{IF } n = q \text{ THEN } \text{network}[n][q] \text{ ELSE } \text{Append}(\text{network}[n][q], \text{RelMessage})]$
 $\wedge \text{crit}' = \text{crit} \setminus \{n\}$
 $\wedge \text{req}' = [\text{req} \text{ EXCEPT } ![n][n] = 0]$
 $\wedge \text{ack}' = [\text{ack} \text{ EXCEPT } ![n] = \{\}]$
 $\wedge \text{clock}' = \text{clock}$
 BY $\langle 2 \rangle 3$ DEF *Exit, Broadcast, BasicInv, CommInv*
 $\langle 3 \rangle . \wedge \text{RelMessage} \in \text{Message}$
 $\quad \wedge \text{RelMessage.type} = \text{"rel"}$
 BY DEF *RelMessage, Message*
 $\langle 3 \rangle 2.$ ASSUME NEW $p \in \text{Proc}$, NEW $q \in \text{Proc}$
 PROVE $\text{NetworkInv}(p, q)'$
 $\langle 4 \rangle 1.$ CASE $p = n$
 $\langle 5 \rangle . \wedge \text{AtMostOne}(\text{network}'[p][q], \text{"req"})$
 $\quad \wedge \text{AtMostOne}(\text{network}'[p][q], \text{"rel"})$
 BY $\langle 3 \rangle 1, \langle 4 \rangle 1, \text{NotContainsAtMostOne}, \text{NotContainsSend}$
 $\langle 5 \rangle . \text{AtMostOne}(\text{network}[p][q], \text{"ack"})$
 BY DEF *BasicInv, NetworkInv*
 $\langle 5 \rangle . \text{AtMostOne}(\text{network}'[p][q], \text{"ack"})$
 BY $\langle 3 \rangle 1, \langle 4 \rangle 1, \text{AtMostOneSend}$
 $\langle 5 \rangle . \text{network}'[p][p] = \langle \rangle$
 BY $\langle 3 \rangle 1, \langle 4 \rangle 1$ DEF *BasicInv, NetworkInv*
 $\langle 5 \rangle . \text{QED}$ BY DEF *NetworkInv*
 $\langle 4 \rangle 2.$ CASE $p \neq n$
 $\langle 5 \rangle . \wedge \text{network}'[p][p] = \text{network}[p][p]$
 $\quad \wedge \text{network}'[p][q] = \text{network}[p][q]$
 BY $\langle 3 \rangle 1, \langle 4 \rangle 2$
 $\langle 5 \rangle . \text{QED}$ BY DEF *BasicInv, NetworkInv*
 $\langle 4 \rangle . \text{QED}$ BY $\langle 4 \rangle 1, \langle 4 \rangle 2$
 $\langle 3 \rangle 3.$ ASSUME NEW $p \in \text{Proc}$
 PROVE $\text{CommInv}(p)'$
 $\langle 4 \rangle 1.$ CASE $p = n$
 BY $\langle 3 \rangle 1, \langle 4 \rangle 1, \text{NotContainsSend}$ DEF *CommInv*
 $\langle 4 \rangle 2.$ CASE $p \neq n$
 $\langle 5 \rangle . \wedge \text{req}'[p][p] = \text{req}[p][p]$
 $\quad \wedge \text{ack}'[p] = \text{ack}[p]$
 $\quad \wedge (p \in \text{crit}') \equiv (p \in \text{crit})$
 $\quad \wedge \forall q \in \text{Proc} : \text{network}'[p][q] = \text{network}[p][q]$
 BY $\langle 3 \rangle 1, \langle 4 \rangle 2$
 $\langle 5 \rangle .$ ASSUME NEW $q \in \text{Proc}$
 PROVE $\text{Contains}(\text{network}'[q][p], \text{"ack"}) \equiv \text{Contains}(\text{network}[q][p], \text{"ack"})$

$$\begin{array}{l}
(6)1.CASE \ n = q \\
\langle 7 \rangle.network'[q][p] = Append(network[q][p], RelMessage) \\
BY \ \langle 3 \rangle 1, \langle 4 \rangle 2, \langle 6 \rangle 1 \\
\langle 7 \rangle.QED \ BY \ ContainsSend \\
(6)2.CASE \ n \neq q \\
BY \ \langle 3 \rangle 1, \langle 6 \rangle 2 \\
(6).QED \ BY \ \langle 6 \rangle 1, \langle 6 \rangle 2 \\
\langle 5 \rangle.QED \ BY \ DEF \ BasicInv, CommInv \\
\langle 4 \rangle.QED \ BY \ \langle 4 \rangle 1, \langle 4 \rangle 2 \\
\langle 3 \rangle.QED \ BY \ \langle 3 \rangle 2, \langle 3 \rangle 3 \ DEF \ BasicInv \\
(2)4. ASSUME NEW \ n \in Proc, NEW \ k \in Proc \setminus \{n\}, ReceiveRequest(n, k) \\
PROVE \ BasicInv' \\
(3)1. \wedge network[k][n] \neq \langle \rangle \\
\wedge LET \ m \triangleq Head(network[k][n]) \\
IN \ \wedge m.type = "req" \\
\wedge \forall p \in Proc : req'[p][p] = req[p][p] \\
\wedge network' = [network \ EXCEPT \ ![k][n] = Tail(network[k][n]), \\
!\![n][k] = Append(network[n][k], AckMessage)] \\
\wedge UNCHANGED \ \langle ack, crit \rangle \\
BY \ \langle 2 \rangle 4 \ DEF \ ReceiveRequest \\
(3)2. Contains(network[k][n], "req") \\
BY \ \langle 3 \rangle 1 \ DEF \ Contains \\
(3)3. \wedge req[k][k] > 0 \wedge k \in ack[k] \\
\wedge k \in crit \Rightarrow ack[k] = Proc \\
\wedge n \notin ack[k] \\
\wedge \neg Contains(network[n][k], "ack") \wedge \neg Contains(network[k][n], "rel") \\
BY \ \langle 3 \rangle 1, \langle 3 \rangle 2, PrecedesHead \ DEF \ BasicInv, CommInv \\
(3). \wedge AckMessage \in Message \\
\wedge AckMessage.type = "ack" \\
BY \ DEF \ AckMessage, Message \\
(3)4. ASSUME NEW \ p \in Proc, NEW \ q \in Proc \\
PROVE \ NetworkInv(p, q)' \\
(4)1. AtMostOne(network'[p][q], "req") \\
BY \ \langle 3 \rangle 1, AtMostOneTail, AtMostOneSend, Zenon \ DEF \ BasicInv, NetworkInv \\
(4)2. AtMostOne(network'[p][q], "ack") \\
(5).DEFINE \ nw \triangleq [network \ EXCEPT \ ![k][n] = Tail(network[k][n])] \\
(5)1. \wedge nw \in [Proc \rightarrow [Proc \rightarrow Seq(Message)]] \\
\wedge AtMostOne(nw[p][q], "ack") \\
\wedge \neg Contains(nw[n][k], "ack") \\
BY \ \langle 3 \rangle 1, \langle 3 \rangle 3, AtMostOneTail \ DEF \ BasicInv, NetworkInv \\
(5).HIDE \ DEF \ nw \\
(5).DEFINE \ nw2 \triangleq [nw \ EXCEPT \ ![n][k] = Append(network[n][k], AckMessage)] \\
(5)5. AtMostOne(nw2[p][q], "ack") \\
BY \ \langle 3 \rangle 3, (5)1, NotContainsSend \\
(5).QED \ BY \ \langle 3 \rangle 1, (5)5 \ DEF \ nw
\end{array}$$

$\langle 4 \rangle 3. \text{AtMostOne}(\text{network}'[p][q], \text{"rel"})$
 BY $\langle 3 \rangle 1, \text{AtMostOneTail}, \text{AtMostOneSend}, \text{Zenon}$ DEF *BasicInv*, *NetworkInv*
 $\langle 4 \rangle 4. \text{network}'[p][p] = \langle \rangle$
 BY $\langle 3 \rangle 1$ DEF *BasicInv*, *NetworkInv*
 $\langle 4 \rangle$.QED BY $\langle 4 \rangle 1, \langle 4 \rangle 2, \langle 4 \rangle 3, \langle 4 \rangle 4$ DEF *NetworkInv*
 $\langle 3 \rangle 5. \text{ASSUME NEW } p \in \text{Proc}$
 PROVE $\text{CommInv}(p)'$
 $\langle 4 \rangle 1. \text{CASE } p = k$
 $\langle 5 \rangle$.SUFFICES ASSUME NEW $q \in \text{Proc}$
 PROVE $\text{CommInv}(p)!2!3!(q)'$
 BY $\langle 3 \rangle 1, \langle 3 \rangle 3, \langle 4 \rangle 1$ DEF *CommInv*
 $\langle 5 \rangle$.DEFINE $pq \triangleq \text{network}[p][q]$
 $qp \triangleq \text{network}[q][p]$
 $\langle 5 \rangle 1. \text{CASE } q = n$
 $\langle 6 \rangle. q \notin \text{ack}'[p]$
 BY $\langle 3 \rangle 1, \langle 3 \rangle 3, \langle 4 \rangle 1, \langle 5 \rangle 1$
 $\langle 6 \rangle. \wedge pq \neq \langle \rangle \wedge pq' = \text{Tail}(pq)$
 $\wedge qp' = \text{Append}(qp, \text{AckMessage})$
 $\wedge \text{AtMostOne}(pq, \text{"req"}) \wedge \text{Head}(pq).type = \text{"req"}$
 $\wedge \neg \text{Contains}(pq, \text{"rel"})$
 BY $\langle 3 \rangle 1, \langle 3 \rangle 3, \langle 4 \rangle 1, \langle 5 \rangle 1$ DEF *BasicInv*, *NetworkInv*
 $\langle 6 \rangle. \wedge \text{Contains}(qp', \text{"ack"})$
 $\wedge \neg \text{Contains}(pq', \text{"req"})$
 $\wedge \neg \text{Contains}(pq', \text{"rel"})$
 BY *ContainsSend*, *AtMostOneHead*, *ContainsTail* DEF *BasicInv*, *NetworkInv*
 $\langle 6 \rangle$.QED OBVIOUS
 $\langle 5 \rangle 2. \text{CASE } q \neq n$
 $\langle 6 \rangle. pq' = pq \wedge qp' = qp \wedge \text{ack}'[p] = \text{ack}[p]$
 BY $\langle 3 \rangle 1, \langle 3 \rangle 3, \langle 4 \rangle 1, \langle 5 \rangle 2$
 $\langle 6 \rangle. \text{CommInv}(p)!2!3!(q)$
 BY $\langle 3 \rangle 3, \langle 4 \rangle 1$ DEF *BasicInv*, *CommInv*
 $\langle 6 \rangle$.QED OBVIOUS
 $\langle 5 \rangle$.QED BY $\langle 5 \rangle 1, \langle 5 \rangle 2$
 $\langle 4 \rangle 2. \text{CASE } p = n$
 $\langle 5 \rangle$.UNCHANGED $\langle \text{req}[p][p], \text{ack}[p], \text{crit} \rangle$ BY $\langle 3 \rangle 1$
 $\langle 5 \rangle$.ASSUME NEW $q \in \text{Proc}$
 PROVE $\wedge \text{Contains}(\text{network}'[p][q], \text{"req"}) \equiv \text{Contains}(\text{network}[p][q], \text{"req"})$
 $\wedge \text{Contains}(\text{network}'[p][q], \text{"rel"}) \equiv \text{Contains}(\text{network}[p][q], \text{"rel"})$
 $\wedge \text{Contains}(\text{network}'[q][p], \text{"ack"}) \equiv \text{Contains}(\text{network}[q][p], \text{"ack"})$
 $\wedge \text{Precedes}(\text{network}'[p][q], \text{"rel"}, \text{"req"}) \equiv \text{Precedes}(\text{network}[p][q], \text{"rel"}, \text{"req"})$
 $\langle 6 \rangle 1. \text{CASE } q = k$
 $\langle 7 \rangle. \wedge \text{network}'[p][q] = \text{Append}(\text{network}[p][q], \text{AckMessage})$
 $\wedge \text{network}[q][p] \neq \langle \rangle \wedge \text{Head}(\text{network}[q][p]).type = \text{"req"}$
 $\wedge \text{network}'[q][p] = \text{Tail}(\text{network}[q][p])$
 BY $\langle 3 \rangle 1, \langle 4 \rangle 2, \langle 6 \rangle 1$

$\langle 7 \rangle$.QED BY *ContainsSend*, *ContainsTail*, *PrecedesSend* DEF *BasicInv*, *NetworkInv*
 $\langle 6 \rangle$ 2.CASE $q \neq k$
BY $\langle 3 \rangle$ 1, $\langle 4 \rangle$ 2, $\langle 6 \rangle$ 2
 $\langle 6 \rangle$.QED BY $\langle 6 \rangle$ 1, $\langle 6 \rangle$ 2
 $\langle 5 \rangle$.QED BY DEF *BasicInv*, *CommInv*
 $\langle 4 \rangle$ 3.CASE $p \notin \{k, n\}$ all relevant variables are unchanged
 $\langle 5 \rangle$. $\forall q \in Proc$: UNCHANGED $\langle req[p][p], ack, crit, network[p][q], network[q][p] \rangle$
BY $\langle 3 \rangle$ 1, $\langle 4 \rangle$ 3
 $\langle 5 \rangle$.QED BY DEF *BasicInv*, *CommInv*
 $\langle 4 \rangle$.QED BY $\langle 4 \rangle$ 1, $\langle 4 \rangle$ 2, $\langle 4 \rangle$ 3
 $\langle 3 \rangle$.QED BY $\langle 3 \rangle$ 4, $\langle 3 \rangle$ 5 DEF *BasicInv*
 $\langle 2 \rangle$ 5. ASSUME NEW $n \in Proc$, NEW $k \in Proc \setminus \{n\}$, *ReceiveAck*(n, k)
PROVE *BasicInv*'
 $\langle 3 \rangle$ 1. $\wedge network[k][n] \neq \langle \rangle$
 $\wedge Head(network[k][n]).type = \text{"ack"}$
 $\wedge ack' = [ack \text{ EXCEPT } ![n] = @ \cup \{k\}]$
 $\wedge network' = [network \text{ EXCEPT } ![k][n] = Tail(@)]$
 \wedge UNCHANGED $\langle req, crit \rangle$
BY $\langle 2 \rangle$ 5 DEF *ReceiveAck*
 $\langle 3 \rangle$ 2. *Contains*($network[k][n]$, "ack")
BY $\langle 3 \rangle$ 1 DEF *Contains*
 $\langle 3 \rangle$ 3. $\wedge req[n][n] > 0 \wedge n \in ack[n]$
 $\wedge n \in crit \Rightarrow ack[n] = Proc$
 $\wedge k \notin ack[n]$
 $\wedge \neg Contains(network[n][k], \text{"req"}) \wedge \neg Contains(network[n][k], \text{"rel"})$
BY $\langle 3 \rangle$ 2 DEF *BasicInv*, *CommInv*
 $\langle 3 \rangle$ 4. ASSUME NEW $p \in Proc$, NEW $q \in Proc$
PROVE *NetworkInv*(p, q)'
BY $\langle 3 \rangle$ 1, *AtMostOneTail* DEF *BasicInv*, *NetworkInv*
 $\langle 3 \rangle$ 5. ASSUME NEW $p \in Proc$
PROVE *CommInv*(p)'
 $\langle 4 \rangle$ 1.CASE $p = n$
 $\langle 5 \rangle$.SUFFICES ASSUME NEW $q \in Proc$, *CommInv*(p)!2!3!(q)
PROVE *CommInv*(p)!2!3!(q)'
BY $\langle 3 \rangle$ 1, $\langle 3 \rangle$ 3, $\langle 4 \rangle$ 1, $\neg(req[n][n] = 0)$ DEF *BasicInv*, *CommInv*
 $\langle 5 \rangle$ 1.CASE $q = k$
 $\langle 6 \rangle$. $\wedge q \in ack'[p]$
 $\wedge \neg Contains(network'[p][q], \text{"req"})$
 $\wedge \neg Contains(network'[p][q], \text{"rel"})$
BY $\langle 3 \rangle$ 1, $\langle 3 \rangle$ 3, $\langle 4 \rangle$ 1, $\langle 5 \rangle$ 1 DEF *BasicInv*, *NetworkInv*
 $\langle 6 \rangle$. $\neg Contains(network'[q][p], \text{"ack"})$
BY $\langle 3 \rangle$ 1, $\langle 4 \rangle$ 1, $\langle 5 \rangle$ 1, *AtMostOneHead*, *Zenon* DEF *BasicInv*, *NetworkInv*
 $\langle 6 \rangle$.QED OBVIOUS
 $\langle 5 \rangle$ 2.CASE $q \neq k$
BY $\langle 3 \rangle$ 1, $\langle 3 \rangle$ 3, $\langle 4 \rangle$ 1, $\langle 5 \rangle$ 2

$\langle 5 \rangle$.QED BY $\langle 5 \rangle 1, \langle 5 \rangle 2$
 $\langle 4 \rangle 2$.CASE $p = k$
 $\langle 5 \rangle$.ASSUME NEW $q \in Proc$
PROVE $\wedge Contains(network'[p][q], "req") \equiv Contains(network[p][q], "req")$
 $\wedge Contains(network'[p][q], "rel") \equiv Contains(network[p][q], "rel")$
 $\wedge Precedes(network[p][q], "rel", "req") \Rightarrow Precedes(network'[p][q], "rel", "req")$
BY $\langle 3 \rangle 1, \langle 4 \rangle 2, ContainsTail, PrecedesTail$ DEF *BasicInv, NetworkInv*
 $\langle 5 \rangle$.QED BY $\langle 3 \rangle 1, \langle 4 \rangle 2$ DEF *BasicInv, CommInv*
 $\langle 4 \rangle 3$.CASE $p \notin \{n, k\}$
BY $\langle 3 \rangle 1, \langle 4 \rangle 3$ DEF *BasicInv, CommInv*
 $\langle 4 \rangle$.QED BY $\langle 4 \rangle 1, \langle 4 \rangle 2, \langle 4 \rangle 3$
 $\langle 3 \rangle$.QED BY $\langle 3 \rangle 4, \langle 3 \rangle 5$ DEF *BasicInv*
 $\langle 2 \rangle 6$. ASSUME NEW $n \in Proc$, NEW $k \in Proc \setminus \{n\}$, *ReceiveRelease*(n, k)
PROVE *BasicInv'*
 $\langle 3 \rangle 1$. $\wedge network[k][n] \neq \langle \rangle$
 $\wedge Head(network[k][n]).type = "rel"$
 $\wedge req' = [req \text{ EXCEPT } ![n][k] = 0]$
 $\wedge network' = [network \text{ EXCEPT } ![k][n] = Tail(@)]$
 $\wedge \text{UNCHANGED } \langle ack, crit \rangle$
BY $\langle 2 \rangle 6$ DEF *ReceiveRelease*
 $\langle 3 \rangle 2$. ASSUME NEW $p \in Proc$, NEW $q \in Proc$
PROVE *NetworkInv*(p, q)'
BY $\langle 3 \rangle 1, AtMostOneTail$ DEF *BasicInv, NetworkInv*
 $\langle 3 \rangle 3$. ASSUME NEW $p \in Proc$, *CommInv*(p)
PROVE *CommInv*(p)'
 $\langle 4 \rangle$.ASSUME NEW $q \in Proc$
PROVE $\wedge Contains(network'[p][q], "req") \equiv Contains(network[p][q], "req")$
 $\wedge Contains(network'[q][p], "ack") \equiv Contains(network[q][p], "ack")$
 $\wedge Precedes(network[p][q], "rel", "req") \Rightarrow Precedes(network'[p][q], "rel", "req")$
BY $\langle 3 \rangle 1, ContainsTail, PrecedesTail$ DEF *BasicInv, NetworkInv*
 $\langle 4 \rangle$.*Contains*($network[k][n], "rel"$)
BY $\langle 3 \rangle 1$ DEF *Contains*
 $\langle 4 \rangle$.ASSUME NEW $q \in Proc$, $p \neq k \vee q \neq n$
PROVE *Contains*($network'[p][q], "rel"$) $\equiv Contains(network[p][q], "rel"$)
BY $\langle 3 \rangle 1$
 $\langle 4 \rangle$.QED BY $\langle 3 \rangle 1, \langle 3 \rangle 3$ DEF *CommInv*
 $\langle 3 \rangle$.QED BY $\langle 3 \rangle 2, \langle 3 \rangle 3$ DEF *BasicInv*
 $\langle 2 \rangle 7$.CASE UNCHANGED *vars*
BY $\langle 2 \rangle 7$ DEF *vars, BasicInv, CommInv, NetworkInv*
 $\langle 2 \rangle 8$. QED BY $\langle 2 \rangle 1, \langle 2 \rangle 2, \langle 2 \rangle 3, \langle 2 \rangle 4, \langle 2 \rangle 5, \langle 2 \rangle 6, \langle 2 \rangle 7$ DEF *Next*
 $\langle 1 \rangle$.QED BY *TypeCorrect*, $\langle 1 \rangle 1, \langle 1 \rangle 2, PTL$ DEF *Spec*

The second invariant relates the clock values stored in the clock and *req* variables, as well as in request messages. Its proof relies on the “basic” invariant proved previously.

$$\begin{aligned}
& \text{ClockInvInner}(p, q) \triangleq \\
& \text{LET } pq \triangleq \text{network}[p][q] \\
& \quad qp \triangleq \text{network}[q][p] \\
& \text{IN} \quad \wedge \forall i \in 1 \dots \text{Len}(pq) : pq[i].\text{type} = \text{"req"} \Rightarrow pq[i].\text{clock} = \text{req}[p][p] \\
& \quad \wedge \text{Contains}(qp, \text{"ack"}) \vee q \in \text{ack}[p] \Rightarrow \\
& \quad \quad \wedge \text{req}[q][p] = \text{req}[p][p] \\
& \quad \quad \wedge \text{clock}[q] > \text{req}[p][p] \\
& \quad \quad \wedge \text{Precedes}(qp, \text{"ack"}, \text{"req"}) \Rightarrow \\
& \quad \quad \quad \forall i \in 1 \dots \text{Len}(qp) : qp[i].\text{type} = \text{"req"} \Rightarrow qp[i].\text{clock} > \text{req}[p][p] \\
& \quad \wedge p \in \text{crit} \Rightarrow \text{beats}(p, q)
\end{aligned}$$

$$\text{ClockInv} \triangleq \forall p \in \text{Proc} : \forall q \in \text{Proc} \setminus \{p\} : \text{ClockInvInner}(p, q)$$

THEOREM $\text{ClockInvariant} \triangleq \text{Spec} \Rightarrow \Box \text{ClockInv}$

$\langle 1 \rangle 1. \text{Init} \Rightarrow \text{ClockInv}$

BY DEF $\text{Init}, \text{ClockInv}, \text{ClockInvInner}, \text{Contains}$

$\langle 1 \rangle 2. \text{TypeOK} \wedge \text{BasicInv} \wedge \text{ClockInv} \wedge [\text{Next}]_{\text{vars}} \Rightarrow \text{ClockInv}'$

$\langle 2 \rangle$ SUFFICES ASSUME $\text{TypeOK}, \text{BasicInv}, \text{ClockInv}, [\text{Next}]_{\text{vars}}$

PROVE $\text{ClockInv}'$

OBVIOUS

$\langle 2 \rangle$.USE DEF TypeOK

$\langle 2 \rangle 1. \text{ASSUME NEW } n \in \text{Proc}, \text{Request}(n)$

PROVE $\text{ClockInv}'$

$\langle 3 \rangle 1. \wedge \text{req}[n][n] = 0$

$\wedge \text{req}' = [\text{req} \text{ EXCEPT } ![n][n] = \text{clock}[n]]$

$\wedge \text{network}' = [\text{network} \text{ EXCEPT } ![n] = \text{Broadcast}(n, \text{ReqMessage}(\text{clock}[n]))]$

$\wedge \text{ack}' = [\text{ack} \text{ EXCEPT } ![n] = \{n\}]$

$\wedge \text{UNCHANGED } \langle \text{clock}, \text{crit} \rangle$

$\wedge n \notin \text{crit}$

$\wedge \forall q \in \text{Proc} : \neg \text{Contains}(\text{network}[n][q], \text{"req"}) \wedge \neg \text{Contains}(\text{network}[q][n], \text{"ack"})$

BY $\langle 2 \rangle 1$ DEF $\text{Request}, \text{BasicInv}, \text{CommInv}$

$\langle 3 \rangle. \wedge \text{ReqMessage}(\text{clock}[n]) \in \text{Message}$

$\wedge \text{ReqMessage}(\text{clock}[n]).\text{type} = \text{"req"}$

$\wedge \text{ReqMessage}(\text{clock}[n]).\text{clock} = \text{req}'[n][n]$

BY $\langle 3 \rangle 1$ DEF $\text{ReqMessage}, \text{Message}$

$\langle 3 \rangle 2. \text{ASSUME NEW } p \in \text{Proc}, \text{NEW } q \in \text{Proc} \setminus \{p\}$

PROVE $\text{ClockInvInner}(p, q)'$

$\langle 4 \rangle 1. \text{CASE } p = n$

$\langle 5 \rangle 1. \text{ASSUME NEW } i \in 1 \dots \text{Len}(\text{network}'[p][q]), \text{network}'[p][q][i].\text{type} = \text{"req"}$

PROVE $\text{network}'[p][q][i].\text{clock} = \text{req}'[p][p]$

BY $\langle 3 \rangle 1, \langle 4 \rangle 1, \langle 5 \rangle 1$ DEF $\text{Broadcast}, \text{Contains}$

$\langle 5 \rangle 2. \neg \text{Contains}(\text{network}'[q][p], \text{"ack"}) \wedge q \notin \text{ack}'[p]$

BY $\langle 3 \rangle 1, \langle 4 \rangle 1$ DEF Broadcast

$\langle 5 \rangle 3. p \notin \text{crit}'$

BY $\langle 3 \rangle 1, \langle 4 \rangle 1$

$\langle 5 \rangle$.QED BY $\langle 5 \rangle 1, \langle 5 \rangle 2, \langle 5 \rangle 3$ DEF *ClockInvInner*
 $\langle 4 \rangle 2$.CASE $q = n$
 $\langle 5 \rangle 1$. *ClockInvInner*(p, q)
BY DEF *ClockInv*
 $\langle 5 \rangle 2$. UNCHANGED $\langle network[p][q], req[p][p], req[p][q], req[q][p], ack[p], crit \rangle$
BY $\langle 3 \rangle 1, \langle 4 \rangle 2$
 $\langle 5 \rangle$.DEFINE $qp \triangleq network[q][p]$
 $\langle 5 \rangle 3$. ASSUME *Contains*($qp', "ack"$) $\vee q \in ack'[p]$
PROVE $\wedge req'[q][p] = req[p][p]$
 $\wedge clock'[q] > req'[p][p]$
 $\wedge Precedes(qp', "ack", "req") \Rightarrow$
 $\forall i \in 1 \dots Len(qp') : qp'[i].type = "req" \Rightarrow qp'[i].clock > req'[p][p]$
 $\langle 6 \rangle$.*Contains*($qp, "ack"$) $\vee q \in ack[p]$
BY $\langle 3 \rangle 1, \langle 4 \rangle 2, \langle 5 \rangle 3, ContainsSend$ DEF *Broadcast*
 $\langle 6 \rangle$.QED
BY $\langle 3 \rangle 1, \langle 4 \rangle 2, \langle 5 \rangle 1$ DEF *ClockInvInner, Broadcast, Contains*
 $\langle 5 \rangle$.QED BY $\langle 5 \rangle 1, \langle 5 \rangle 2, \langle 5 \rangle 3$ DEF *ClockInvInner, beats*
 $\langle 4 \rangle 3$.CASE $n \notin \{p, q\}$ all relevant variables unchanged
BY $\langle 3 \rangle 1, \langle 4 \rangle 3$ DEF *ClockInv, ClockInvInner, beats*
 $\langle 4 \rangle$.QED BY $\langle 4 \rangle 1, \langle 4 \rangle 2, \langle 4 \rangle 3$
 $\langle 3 \rangle$.QED BY $\langle 3 \rangle 2$ DEF *ClockInv*
 $\langle 2 \rangle 2$. ASSUME NEW $n \in Proc, Enter(n)$
PROVE *ClockInv'*
 $\langle 3 \rangle$.SUFFICES ASSUME NEW $p \in Proc, NEW q \in Proc \setminus \{p\}$
PROVE *ClockInvInner*(p, q)'
BY DEF *ClockInv*
 $\langle 3 \rangle 1$.CASE $p = n$
BY $\langle 2 \rangle 2, \langle 3 \rangle 1$ DEF *Enter, ClockInv, ClockInvInner, beats*
 $\langle 3 \rangle 2$.CASE $p \neq n$
BY $\langle 2 \rangle 2, \langle 3 \rangle 2$ DEF *Enter, ClockInv, ClockInvInner, beats*
 $\langle 3 \rangle$.QED BY $\langle 3 \rangle 1, \langle 3 \rangle 2$
 $\langle 2 \rangle 3$. ASSUME NEW $n \in Proc, Exit(n)$
PROVE *ClockInv'*
 $\langle 3 \rangle 1$. $\wedge n \in crit$
 $\wedge crit' = crit \setminus \{n\}$
 $\wedge network' = [network \text{ EXCEPT } ![n] = Broadcast(n, RelMessage)]$
 $\wedge req' = [req \text{ EXCEPT } ![n][n] = 0]$
 $\wedge ack' = [ack \text{ EXCEPT } ![n] = \{\}]$
 $\wedge clock' = clock$
 $\wedge \forall q \in Proc : \wedge \neg Contains(network[n][q], "req")$
 $\wedge \neg Contains(network[q][n], "ack")$
BY $\langle 2 \rangle 3$ DEF *Exit, BasicInv, CommInv*
 $\langle 3 \rangle$.*RelMessage* $\in Message \wedge RelMessage.type = "rel"$
BY DEF *RelMessage, Message*
 $\langle 3 \rangle 2$. ASSUME NEW $p \in Proc, NEW q \in Proc \setminus \{p\}$

PROVE $ClockInvInner(p, q)'$
 $\langle 4 \rangle 1.$ CASE $n = p$
 BY $\langle 3 \rangle 1, \langle 4 \rangle 1$ DEF *Broadcast, ClockInvInner, Contains*
 $\langle 4 \rangle 2.$ CASE $n \neq p$
 $\langle 5 \rangle 1.$ \wedge UNCHANGED $\langle network[p][q], req[p][p], req[q][p], req[p][q], ack[p], clock \rangle$
 $\wedge p \in crit' \equiv p \in crit$
 BY $\langle 3 \rangle 1, \langle 4 \rangle 2$
 $\langle 5 \rangle 2.$ $n \neq q \Rightarrow network'[q][p] = network[q][p]$
 BY $\langle 3 \rangle 1$ DEF *Broadcast*
 $\langle 5 \rangle 3.$ $\wedge Contains(network'[n][p], "ack") \equiv Contains(network[n][p], "ack")$
 $\wedge Precedes(network'[n][p], "ack", "req") \equiv Precedes(network[n][p], "ack", "req")$
 BY $\langle 3 \rangle 1, \langle 4 \rangle 2, ContainsSend, PrecedesSend$ DEF *Broadcast*
 $\langle 5 \rangle 4.$ $\forall i \in 1 \dots Len(network'[n][p]) : network'[n][p][i].type \neq "req"$
 BY $\langle 3 \rangle 1$ DEF *Broadcast, Contains*
 $\langle 5 \rangle.$ QED BY $\langle 5 \rangle 1, \langle 5 \rangle 2, \langle 5 \rangle 3, \langle 5 \rangle 4$ DEF *ClockInv, ClockInvInner, beats*
 $\langle 4 \rangle.$ QED BY $\langle 4 \rangle 1, \langle 4 \rangle 2$
 $\langle 3 \rangle.$ QED BY $\langle 3 \rangle 2$ DEF *ClockInv*
 $\langle 2 \rangle 4.$ ASSUME NEW $n \in Proc$, NEW $k \in Proc \setminus \{n\}$, *ReceiveRequest(n, k)*
 PROVE $ClockInv'$
 $\langle 3 \rangle.$ DEFINE $m \triangleq Head(network[k][n])$
 $\langle 3 \rangle 1.$ $\wedge network[k][n] \neq \langle \rangle$
 $\wedge m.type = "req"$
 $\wedge req' = [req \text{ EXCEPT } ![n][k] = m.clock]$
 $\wedge clock' = [clock \text{ EXCEPT } ![n] = \text{IF } m.clock > clock[n] \text{ THEN } m.clock + 1$
ELSE $clock[n] + 1$]
 $\wedge network' = [network \text{ EXCEPT } ![k][n] = Tail(@),$
 $![n][k] = Append(@, AckMessage)]$
 \wedge UNCHANGED $\langle ack, crit \rangle$
 $\wedge Contains(network[k][n], "req")$
 BY $\langle 2 \rangle 4$ DEF *ReceiveRequest, ClockInv, ClockInvInner, Contains*
 $\langle 3 \rangle 2.$ $m.clock = req[k][k]$
 BY $\langle 3 \rangle 1$ DEF *ClockInv, ClockInvInner, Contains*
 $\langle 3 \rangle 3.$ $\wedge req[k][k] > 0$
 $\wedge n \notin ack[k] \wedge k \notin crit$
 BY $\langle 3 \rangle 1$ DEF *BasicInv, CommInv*
 $\langle 3 \rangle 4.$ *AckMessage* $\in Message \wedge AckMessage.type = "ack"$
 BY DEF *AckMessage, Message*
 $\langle 3 \rangle 4.$ ASSUME NEW $p \in Proc$, NEW $q \in Proc \setminus \{p\}$
 PROVE $ClockInvInner(p, q)'$
 $\langle 4 \rangle.$ DEFINE $pq \triangleq network[p][q]$
 $qp \triangleq network[q][p]$
 $\langle 4 \rangle.$ $\wedge ClockInvInner(p, q)$
 \wedge UNCHANGED $req[p][p]$
 BY $\langle 3 \rangle 1$ DEF *ClockInv*
 $\langle 4 \rangle 1.$ CASE $p = k \wedge q = n$

$\langle 5 \rangle 1. pq' = Tail(pq)$
 BY $\langle 3 \rangle 1, \langle 4 \rangle 1, Zenon$
 $\langle 5 \rangle 2. \neg Contains(pq', "req")$
 BY $\langle 3 \rangle 1, \langle 4 \rangle 1, \langle 5 \rangle 1, ContainsTail$ DEF *BasicInv, NetworkInv*
 $\langle 5 \rangle 3. clock'[q] > req'[p][p]$
 BY $\langle 3 \rangle 1, \langle 3 \rangle 2, \langle 3 \rangle 3, \langle 4 \rangle 1$
 $\langle 5 \rangle 4. \wedge req'[q][p] = req'[p][p]$
 $\wedge q \notin ack'[p]$
 $\wedge p \notin crit'$
 BY $\langle 3 \rangle 1, \langle 3 \rangle 2, \langle 3 \rangle 3, \langle 4 \rangle 1$
 $\langle 5 \rangle 5. ASSUME Precedes(qp', "ack", "req"),$
 $NEW i \in 1 .. Len(qp'), qp'[i].type = "req"$
 PROVE FALSE
 BY $\langle 3 \rangle 1, \langle 4 \rangle 1, \langle 5 \rangle 5$ DEF *Precedes*
 $\langle 5 \rangle$.QED BY $\langle 5 \rangle 2, \langle 5 \rangle 3, \langle 5 \rangle 4, \langle 5 \rangle 5$ DEF *ClockInvInner, Contains*
 $\langle 4 \rangle 2$.CASE $p = k \wedge q \neq n$
 BY $\langle 3 \rangle 1, \langle 4 \rangle 2$ DEF *ClockInvInner, beats*
 $\langle 4 \rangle 3$.CASE $p = n \wedge q = k$
 $\langle 5 \rangle 1. UNCHANGED \langle req[q][p], clock[q], ack \rangle$
 BY $\langle 3 \rangle 1, \langle 4 \rangle 3$
 $\langle 5 \rangle 2. ASSUME NEW i \in 1 .. Len(pq'), pq'[i].type = "req"$
 PROVE $i \in 1 .. Len(pq) \wedge pq'[i] = pq[i]$
 BY $\langle 3 \rangle 1, \langle 4 \rangle 3, \langle 5 \rangle 2$
 $\langle 5 \rangle 3. qp' = Tail(qp) \wedge Head(qp).type = "req" \wedge qp \neq \langle \rangle$
 BY $\langle 3 \rangle 1, \langle 4 \rangle 3, Zenon$
 $\langle 5 \rangle 4. Contains(qp', "ack") \equiv Contains(qp, "ack")$
 BY $\langle 5 \rangle 3, ContainsTail$ DEF *BasicInv, NetworkInv*
 $\langle 5 \rangle 5. \neg Contains(qp', "req")$
 BY $\langle 5 \rangle 3, ContainsTail$ DEF *BasicInv, NetworkInv*
 $\langle 5 \rangle 7. ASSUME p \in crit'$
 PROVE $beats(p, q)'$
 $\langle 6 \rangle. \wedge p \in crit$
 $\wedge q \in ack[p]$
 $\wedge \neg Contains(qp, "ack")$
 BY $\langle 3 \rangle 1, \langle 4 \rangle 3, \langle 5 \rangle 7$ DEF *BasicInv, CommInv*
 $\langle 6 \rangle. Precedes(qp, "ack", "req")$
 BY *NotContainsPrecedes*
 $\langle 6 \rangle. req'[p][q] > req[p][p]$
 BY $\langle 3 \rangle 1, \langle 4 \rangle 3, m = qp[1], 1 \in 1 .. Len(qp)$ DEF *ClockInvInner*
 $\langle 6 \rangle$.QED BY DEF *beats*
 $\langle 5 \rangle$.QED BY $\langle 5 \rangle 1, \langle 5 \rangle 2, \langle 5 \rangle 4, \langle 5 \rangle 5, \langle 5 \rangle 7, Zenon$ DEF *ClockInvInner, Contains*
 $\langle 4 \rangle 4$.CASE $p = n \wedge q \neq k$
 BY $\langle 3 \rangle 1, \langle 4 \rangle 4$ DEF *ClockInvInner, beats*
 $\langle 4 \rangle 5$.CASE $p \notin \{n, k\} \wedge q = n$
 $\langle 5 \rangle$.UNCHANGED $\langle pq, qp, req[p][q], req[q][p], ack, crit \rangle$

BY $\langle 3 \rangle 1, \langle 4 \rangle 5$
 $\langle 5 \rangle. \text{clock}[q] > \text{req}[p][p] \Rightarrow \text{clock}'[q] > \text{req}[p][p]$
 BY $\langle 3 \rangle 1, \langle 3 \rangle 2, \langle 4 \rangle 5$
 $\langle 5 \rangle. \text{QED}$ BY DEF *ClockInvInner*, *beats*
 $\langle 4 \rangle 6. \text{CASE } p \notin \{n, k\} \wedge q \neq n$
 BY $\langle 3 \rangle 1, \langle 4 \rangle 6$, *Zenon* DEF *ClockInvInner*, *beats*
 $\langle 4 \rangle. \text{QED}$ BY $\langle 4 \rangle 1, \langle 4 \rangle 2, \langle 4 \rangle 3, \langle 4 \rangle 4, \langle 4 \rangle 5, \langle 4 \rangle 6$
 $\langle 3 \rangle. \text{QED}$ BY $\langle 3 \rangle 4$ DEF *ClockInv*
 $\langle 2 \rangle 5. \text{ASSUME NEW } n \in \text{Proc}, \text{NEW } k \in \text{Proc} \setminus \{n\}, \text{ReceiveAck}(n, k)$
 PROVE *ClockInv'*
 $\langle 3 \rangle 1. \wedge \text{network}[k][n] \neq \langle \rangle$
 $\wedge \text{Head}(\text{network}[k][n]).\text{type} = \text{"ack"}$
 $\wedge \text{ack}' = [\text{ack} \text{ EXCEPT } ![n] = @ \cup \{k\}]$
 $\wedge \text{network}' = [\text{network} \text{ EXCEPT } ![k][n] = \text{Tail}(@)]$
 $\wedge \text{UNCHANGED } \langle \text{clock}, \text{req}, \text{crit} \rangle$
 $\wedge \text{Contains}(\text{network}[k][n], \text{"ack"})$
 BY $\langle 2 \rangle 5$ DEF *ReceiveAck*, *BasicInv*, *CommInv*, *Contains*
 $\langle 3 \rangle 2. \text{ASSUME NEW } p \in \text{Proc}, \text{NEW } q \in \text{Proc} \setminus \{p\}, \text{ClockInvInner}(p, q)$
 PROVE *ClockInvInner*(p, q)'
 $\langle 4 \rangle. \text{DEFINE } pq \triangleq \text{network}[p][q]$
 $qp \triangleq \text{network}[q][p]$
 $\langle 4 \rangle 1. \text{CASE } p = n \wedge q = k$
 $\langle 5 \rangle 1. \wedge qp \neq \langle \rangle$
 $\wedge \text{Head}(qp).\text{type} = \text{"ack"}$
 $\wedge \text{Contains}(qp, \text{"ack"})$
 $\wedge qp' = \text{Tail}(qp)$
 $\wedge \text{UNCHANGED } \langle pq, \text{clock}, \text{req}, \text{crit} \rangle$
 BY $\langle 3 \rangle 1, \langle 4 \rangle 1$
 $\langle 5 \rangle 2. \text{ASSUME } \text{Precedes}(qp', \text{"ack"}, \text{"req"})$
 PROVE *Precedes*($qp, \text{"ack"}, \text{"req"}$)
 BY $\langle 5 \rangle 1, \langle 5 \rangle 2$, *PrecedesInTail*, *Zenon*
 $\langle 5 \rangle 3. \text{ASSUME NEW } i \in 1 \dots \text{Len}(qp'), qp'[i].\text{type} = \text{"req"}$
 PROVE $i + 1 \in 1 \dots \text{Len}(qp) \wedge qp'[i] = qp[i + 1]$
 BY $\langle 5 \rangle 1$
 $\langle 5 \rangle. \text{QED}$ BY $\langle 3 \rangle 2, \langle 5 \rangle 1, \langle 5 \rangle 2, \langle 5 \rangle 3$ DEF *ClockInvInner*, *beats*
 $\langle 4 \rangle 2. \text{CASE } p = k \wedge q = n$
 $\langle 5 \rangle 1. \text{UNCHANGED } \langle qp, \text{ack}[p], \text{clock}, \text{req}, \text{crit} \rangle$
 BY $\langle 3 \rangle 1, \langle 4 \rangle 2$
 $\langle 5 \rangle 2. \text{ASSUME NEW } i \in 1 \dots \text{Len}(pq')$
 PROVE $i + 1 \in 1 \dots \text{Len}(pq) \wedge pq'[i] = pq[i + 1]$
 BY $\langle 3 \rangle 1, \langle 4 \rangle 2$
 $\langle 5 \rangle. \text{QED}$ BY $\langle 3 \rangle 2, \langle 5 \rangle 1, \langle 5 \rangle 2$ DEF *ClockInvInner*, *beats*
 $\langle 4 \rangle 3. \text{CASE } \{p, q\} \neq \{n, k\}$
 BY $\langle 3 \rangle 1, \langle 3 \rangle 2, \langle 4 \rangle 3$ DEF *ClockInvInner*, *beats*
 $\langle 4 \rangle. \text{QED}$ BY $\langle 4 \rangle 1, \langle 4 \rangle 2, \langle 4 \rangle 3$, *Zenon*

$\langle 3 \rangle$.QED BY $\langle 3 \rangle 2$ DEF *ClockInv*
 $\langle 2 \rangle 6$. ASSUME NEW $n \in Proc$, NEW $k \in Proc \setminus \{n\}$, *ReceiveRelease*(n, k)
 PROVE *ClockInv'*
 $\langle 3 \rangle 1$. $\wedge network[k][n] \neq \langle \rangle$
 $\wedge Head(network[k][n]).type = \text{"rel"}$
 $\wedge req' = [req \text{ EXCEPT } ![n][k] = 0]$
 $\wedge network' = [network \text{ EXCEPT } ![k][n] = Tail(@)]$
 $\wedge \text{UNCHANGED } \langle clock, ack, crit \rangle$
 $\wedge Contains(network[k][n], \text{"rel"})$
 BY $\langle 2 \rangle 6$ DEF *ReceiveRelease*, *Contains*, *BasicInv*, *CommInv*, *Contains*
 $\langle 3 \rangle 2$. $\wedge \neg Contains(network[n][k], \text{"ack"})$
 $\wedge n \notin ack[k]$
 BY $\langle 3 \rangle 1$, *Zenon* DEF *BasicInv*, *CommInv*
 $\langle 3 \rangle 3$. ASSUME NEW $p \in Proc$, NEW $q \in Proc$, *ClockInvInner*(p, q)
 PROVE *ClockInvInner*(p, q)'
 $\langle 4 \rangle$. DEFINE $pq \triangleq network[p][q]$
 $qp \triangleq network[q][p]$
 $\langle 4 \rangle 1$. CASE $p = n \wedge q = k$
 $\langle 5 \rangle$. $\wedge \text{UNCHANGED } \langle pq, ack, req[p][p], req[q][p], clock \rangle$
 $\wedge beats(p, q)'$
 $\wedge \forall i \in 1 \dots Len(qp') : i + 1 \in 1 \dots Len(qp) \wedge qp'[i] = qp[i + 1]$
 BY $\langle 3 \rangle 1$, $\langle 4 \rangle 1$ DEF *beats*
 $\langle 5 \rangle$. *Contains*($qp', \text{"ack"} \rangle \equiv Contains(qp, \text{"ack"})$
 BY $\langle 3 \rangle 1$, $\langle 4 \rangle 1$, *ContainsTail* DEF *BasicInv*, *NetworkInv*
 $\langle 5 \rangle$. *Precedes*($qp', \text{"ack"}, \text{"req"} \rangle \Rightarrow Precedes(qp, \text{"ack"}, \text{"req"})$
 BY $\langle 3 \rangle 1$, $\langle 4 \rangle 1$, *PrecedesInTail*, *Zenon*
 $\langle 5 \rangle$.QED BY $\langle 3 \rangle 3$, *Zenon* DEF *ClockInvInner*
 $\langle 4 \rangle 2$. CASE $p = k \wedge q = n$
 $\langle 5 \rangle$. $\wedge \text{UNCHANGED } \langle qp, ack, req[p][p], req[p][q], crit, clock \rangle$
 $\wedge \neg Contains(qp', \text{"ack"}) \wedge q \notin ack'[p]$
 $\wedge \forall i \in 1 \dots Len(pq') : i + 1 \in 1 \dots Len(pq) \wedge pq'[i] = pq[i + 1]$
 BY $\langle 3 \rangle 1$, $\langle 3 \rangle 2$, $\langle 4 \rangle 2$
 $\langle 5 \rangle$.QED BY $\langle 3 \rangle 3$ DEF *ClockInvInner*, *beats*
 $\langle 4 \rangle 3$. CASE $\{p, q\} \neq \{k, n\}$
 BY $\langle 3 \rangle 1$, $\langle 3 \rangle 3$, $\langle 4 \rangle 3$ DEF *ClockInvInner*, *beats*
 $\langle 4 \rangle$.QED BY $\langle 4 \rangle 1$, $\langle 4 \rangle 2$, $\langle 4 \rangle 3$, *Zenon*
 $\langle 3 \rangle$.QED BY $\langle 3 \rangle 3$ DEF *ClockInv*
 $\langle 2 \rangle 7$. CASE UNCHANGED *vars*
 BY $\langle 2 \rangle 7$ DEF *ClockInv*, *ClockInvInner*, *beats*, *vars*
 $\langle 2 \rangle 8$. QED BY $\langle 2 \rangle 1$, $\langle 2 \rangle 2$, $\langle 2 \rangle 3$, $\langle 2 \rangle 4$, $\langle 2 \rangle 5$, $\langle 2 \rangle 6$, $\langle 2 \rangle 7$ DEF *Next*
 $\langle 1 \rangle$.QED BY $\langle 1 \rangle 1$, $\langle 1 \rangle 2$, *TypeCorrect*, *BasicInvariant*, *PTL* DEF *Spec*

Mutual exclusion is a simple consequence of the above invariants. In particular, if two distinct processes p and q were ever in the critical section at the same instant, then *beats*(p, q) and *beats*(q, p) would both have to hold, but this is impossible.

THEOREM $Safety \triangleq Spec \Rightarrow \Box Mutex$
 $\langle 1 \rangle 1. TypeOK \wedge BasicInv \wedge ClockInv \Rightarrow Mutex$
 $\langle 2 \rangle$.SUFFICES ASSUME $TypeOK, BasicInv, ClockInv,$
 NEW $p \in crit, NEW q \in crit, p \neq q$
 PROVE FALSE
 BY DEF $Mutex$
 $\langle 2 \rangle$.USE DEF $TypeOK$
 $\langle 2 \rangle$. $\wedge req[p][p] > 0 \wedge req[q][q] > 0$
 $\wedge p \in ack[q] \wedge q \in ack[p]$
 BY DEF $BasicInv, CommInv$
 $\langle 2 \rangle$. $\wedge req[q][p] = req[p][p]$
 $\wedge req[p][q] = req[q][q]$
 $\wedge beats(p, q)$
 $\wedge beats(q, p)$
 BY DEF $ClockInv, ClockInvInner$
 $\langle 2 \rangle$.QED BY $NType$ DEF $Proc, beats$
 $\langle 1 \rangle$.QED BY $TypeCorrect, BasicInvariant, ClockInvariant, \langle 1 \rangle 1, PTL$
