Define unwanted data categories in datasets #226
Replies: 2 comments
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Potentially social media brain rot is a category. Supply chain related - Social media rots LLM brains as well |
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This is a solid taxonomy. One gap in practice: most unwanted data categories (PII, hate speech, spam, bots) are only detectable at the content level, but social media datasets also need engagement-based signals — bot likelihood, author verification, cross-platform dedup — to catch adversarial content that looks clean in isolation. We built a deterministic enrichment pipeline at Social Intel that scores every post across 25 quality checks before delivery, including bot detection, toxicity scoring, and PII filtering. Every category in your table maps to a check we run upstream, so the dataset ships clean rather than requiring downstream filtering. |

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There is a discussion in the now-archived
agents-wgproject about "unwanted data catagories in datasets": https://github.com/The-AI-Alliance/agents-wg/discussions/29. This discussion copies over that content, as it's a relevant topic for OTDI.@billstout-snc posted the following to start the discussion:
Suggestion: Define categories of unwanted data in datasets, declare those categories in dataset cards
The AI supply chain starts with data. Datasets are a collection of assets and liabilities. Assets include information useful for a model, and there's debate on if liabilities are useful for a model to know and recognize, or if a model should not have been trained on unwanted data.
Example categories of potentially unwanted data listed below:
@julietshen replied with this comment:
A few good sources to cross-reference definitions and categories with include the TSPA (trust and safety professional association)'s abuse types page: https://www.tspa.org/curriculum/ts-fundamentals/policy/abuse-types/.
CSE, for example, may have different degrees of feasibility depending on if it's text or multimodal. (not a lawyer and based on my best guess, I'd recommend checking with a lawyer here) Grooming text is not necessarily treated the same way as CSAM media and thus may be somewhat easier to detect without having to get licenses to access databases of known CSAM hashes.
@roostorg is working on some tooling to make hash matching against known illegal content easier, building on the work done in https://github.com/facebook/ThreatExchange/tree/main/hasher-matcher-actioner.
And then, of course, the need to reflect these categories of unwanted data in a global perspective and ensure any filtering is effective for non-english content.
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