


3.1 The corruption threshold that would satisfy validity is $\frac{n}{4}$. Since by round 3, each player i checks whether the received some message m from at least $\frac{3n}{4}$, if not, they will output \perp . Here's an attack. Let sender be honest and sent a message m . If F , the set of faulty players, is larger than $\frac{n}{4}$, and they output some message m' , then all the honest i would see there are less than $\frac{3n}{4}$ output m , they will output \perp , which contradicts validity.

3.2 The protocol does not satisfy consistency. Let's consider a scenario where there are 4 players and only the sender is faulty, meaning the sender S can send different values to different players.



Including the votes themselves. Player 1 would see there are 2 votes for $b1$ and 2 votes for $b2$ and therefore output \perp . And player 2 and 3 will see there are 1 player vote $b1$, and 3 players votes $b2$, which is greater and equal to $\frac{3n}{4}$, and therefore output $b2$. In the end $b2$ is not equal to \perp , 2 honest players output different values, thus contradicts consistency.

3.Bonus: The protocol satisfies the weak form of consistency.

Assume $< \frac{n}{2}$ players are faulty. If in some round r , honest player i, j sees $\frac{3n}{4}$ votes for b_i and b_j . Then $b_i = b_j$.

Proof by contradiction: We assume $b_i \neq b_j$. Let S_i be the set of players send player i a vote for b_i . We define S_j analogously. By assumption:

$$|S_i| + |S_j| \geq \frac{3n}{4} + \frac{3n}{4} = \frac{3n}{2}$$

Recall that honest players vote a unique bit each time. No honest players can be in both S_i and S_j , thus they can contribute at most $n - |F|$ to above sum. Faulty players however, can be in both S_i , and S_j , thus contribute at most $2|F|$.

$$|S_i| + |S_j| \leq n - |F| + 2|F| = n + |F| < n + \frac{n}{2} = \frac{3n}{2}$$

Which is a contradiction. So $b_i = b_j$ complies with consistency.