


3.1 The corruption threshold that would satisfy validity is  $\frac{n}{4}$ . Since by round 3, each player  $i$  checks whether they received some message  $m$  from at least  $\frac{3n}{4}$ , if not, they will output  $\perp$ . Here's an attack. Let sender be honest and send a message  $m$ . If  $F$ , the set of faulty players, is larger than  $\frac{n}{4}$ , and they output some message  $m'$ , then all the honest  $i$  would see there are less than  $\frac{3n}{4}$  output  $m$ , they will output  $\perp$ , which contradicts validity.

3.2 The protocol does not satisfy consistency. Let's consider a scenario where there are 4 players and only the sender is faulty, meaning the sender  $S$  can send different values to different players.



Player 1 would see there are 2 votes for  $b1$  and 2 votes for  $b2$  and therefore output  $\perp$ . And player 2 and 3 will see there are 1 player vote  $b1$ , and 3 players votes  $b2$  and therefore output  $b2$ . In the end  $b2$  is not equal to  $\perp$ , 2 honest players output different values, thus contradicts consistency.

3.Bonus: The protocol satisfies the weak form of consistency.

Assume  $< \frac{n}{2}$  players are faulty. If in some round  $r$ , honest player  $i, j$  sees  $\frac{3n}{4}$  votes for  $b_i$  and  $b_j$ . Then  $b_i = b_j$ .

Proof by contradiction: We assume  $b_i \neq b_j$ . Let  $S_i$  be the set of players send player  $i$  a vote for  $b_i$ . We define  $S_j$  analogously. By assumption:

$$|S_i| + |S_j| \geq \frac{3n}{4} + \frac{3n}{4} = \frac{3n}{2}$$

Recall that honest players vote a unique bit each time. No honest players can be in both  $S_i$  and  $S_j$ , thus they can contribute at most  $n - |F|$  to above sum. Faulty players however, can be in both  $S_i$ , and  $S_j$ , thus contribute at most  $2|F|$ .

$$|S_i| + |S_j| \leq n - |F| + 2|F| = n + |F| < n + \frac{n}{2} = \frac{3n}{2}$$

Which is a contradiction. So  $b_i = b_j$  complies with consistency.