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🛡️ Sentinel: [CRITICAL] Fix buffer overflow in ead-client#24

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manupawickramasinghe merged 5 commits intomainfrom
sentinel-ead-client-overflow-fix-12674283411948643174
Mar 22, 2026
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🛡️ Sentinel: [CRITICAL] Fix buffer overflow in ead-client#24
manupawickramasinghe merged 5 commits intomainfrom
sentinel-ead-client-overflow-fix-12674283411948643174

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@ManupaKDU ManupaKDU commented Mar 22, 2026

This PR fixes a critical security vulnerability in ead-client.c where an unbounded string length is passed to ead_encrypt_message. By capping the strlen(command) correctly, we prevent out-of-bounds memory accesses and buffer overflows.

I've also logged this finding in .jules/sentinel.md as instructed.

PR created automatically by Jules for task 12674283411948643174 started by @manupawickramasinghe

@google-labs-jules @manupawickramasinghe
ead: 🛡️ Sentinel: [CRITICAL] Fix buffer overflow in ead-client
0761c38 
🚨 Severity: CRITICAL
💡 Vulnerability: Buffer overflow / Out-of-bounds Read/Write in `ead-client` when `strlen(command)` exceeds 1024 bytes.
🎯 Impact: A malicious or excessively long command-line argument can cause memory corruption (heap/BSS overflow) and read/write past the allocated message buffer during encryption.
🔧 Fix: Bounded the length of `command` to a maximum of 1023 bytes (leaving room for the null terminator) before string copying and encryption processing.
✅ Verification: Tested manually with a 2000-character payload to verify it does not crash or exhibit out-of-bounds behavior.

Signed-off-by: Jules Agent <jules@example.com>

Co-authored-by: manupawickramasinghe <73810867+manupawickramasinghe@users.noreply.github.com>
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google-labs-jules bot commented Mar 22, 2026

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google-labs-jules bot and others added 4 commits March 22, 2026 01:55
@google-labs-jules @manupawickramasinghe
ead: 🛡️ Sentinel: [CRITICAL] Fix buffer overflow in ead-client
7fa046e 
🚨 Severity: CRITICAL
💡 Vulnerability: Buffer overflow / Out-of-bounds Read/Write in `ead-client` when `strlen(command)` exceeds 1024 bytes.
🎯 Impact: A malicious or excessively long command-line argument can cause memory corruption (heap/BSS overflow) and read/write past the allocated message buffer during encryption.
🔧 Fix: Bounded the length of `command` to a maximum of 1023 bytes (leaving room for the null terminator) before string copying and encryption processing.
✅ Verification: Tested manually with a 2000-character payload to verify it does not crash or exhibit out-of-bounds behavior.

Signed-off-by: google-labs-jules[bot] <161369871+google-labs-jules[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

Co-authored-by: manupawickramasinghe <73810867+manupawickramasinghe@users.noreply.github.com>
@google-labs-jules @manupawickramasinghe
ead: 🛡️ Sentinel: [CRITICAL] Fix buffer overflow in ead-client
d1fd35c 
🚨 Severity: CRITICAL
💡 Vulnerability: Buffer overflow / Out-of-bounds Read/Write in `ead-client` when `strlen(command)` exceeds 1024 bytes.
🎯 Impact: A malicious or excessively long command-line argument can cause memory corruption (heap/BSS overflow) and read/write past the allocated message buffer during encryption.
🔧 Fix: Bounded the length of `command` to a maximum of 1023 bytes (leaving room for the null terminator) before string copying and encryption processing.
✅ Verification: Tested manually with a 2000-character payload to verify it does not crash or exhibit out-of-bounds behavior.

Signed-off-by: google-labs-jules[bot] <161369871+google-labs-jules[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

Co-authored-by: manupawickramasinghe <73810867+manupawickramasinghe@users.noreply.github.com>
@google-labs-jules @manupawickramasinghe
ead: 🛡️ Sentinel: [CRITICAL] Fix buffer overflow in ead-client
09e66f7 
🚨 Severity: CRITICAL
💡 Vulnerability: Buffer overflow / Out-of-bounds Read/Write in `ead-client` when `strlen(command)` exceeds 1024 bytes.
🎯 Impact: A malicious or excessively long command-line argument can cause memory corruption (heap/BSS overflow) and read/write past the allocated message buffer during encryption.
🔧 Fix: Bounded the length of `command` to a maximum of 1023 bytes (leaving room for the null terminator) before string copying and encryption processing.
✅ Verification: Tested manually with a 2000-character payload to verify it does not crash or exhibit out-of-bounds behavior.

Signed-off-by: google-labs-jules[bot] <161369871+google-labs-jules[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>

Co-authored-by: manupawickramasinghe <73810867+manupawickramasinghe@users.noreply.github.com>
@manupawickramasinghe
Merge branch 'main' into sentinel-ead-client-overflow-fix-12674283411…
e462414 
…948643174

Signed-off-by: M.N Wickramasinghe <73810867+manupawickramasinghe@users.noreply.github.com>
@manupawickramasinghe manupawickramasinghe merged commit 600e15c into main Mar 22, 2026
6 of 11 checks passed
@manupawickramasinghe manupawickramasinghe deleted the sentinel-ead-client-overflow-fix-12674283411948643174 branch March 22, 2026 09:32
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