

Intent-based approach to detect Email Account Compromise

Presented by:

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Abhishek Singh



Research and Engineering Leader



Led research and detection engineering at FireEye, Microsoft, Cisco's Security Business Group



Holds 35+ patents on detection algorithms and security technologies, authored books in information security.



2019 Reboot Leadership Award (Innovators Category): SC Media, Nominee for Prestigious Virus Bulletin's 2018 Péter Szőr Award.



Double MS in Computer Science & Info Security from Georgia Tech, B.Tech. in EE from IIT-BHU, Master of Engineering Leadership program from UC Berkley, Post Graduation certification in AI from IIT Guwahati

Fahim Abbasi, Ph.D.



Sr. Research Scientist Engineer



Cybersecurity Researcher and Data Science enthusiast

- 10+ of cybersecurity research experience



- Cisco Email Security technologies like ETD, ESA
- Detection algorithms: BEC, Phishing, Scams
- Based in Auckland, New Zealand



Security Researcher

- Trustwave (Mailmarsh): Email, BEC, Phishing and Scams
- FireEye (NX): Malicious URL, Phishing



Published several industry blogs, patents and academic journals and papers

Email Account Compromise (EAC)

- EAC is a highly **sophisticated** cyber threat, affecting businesses globally.
- Threat actors gain **unauthorized** access to **legitimate** email accounts via
 - Phishing, Malware, Password Cracking etc
- Targets: personal, corporate, partner and customer **emails**
- Goal
 - Become **You** – the account owner
 - **Financial crime**: steal money
 - **Data crime**: steal data or sensitive information
- BEC/EAC attacks resulted in \$2.7 Billion in losses FBI 2022 IC3 report

BEC vs EAC

BEC is a type of EAC, but not all EAC attacks are BEC attacks.

BEC

- A type of EAC that targets businesses
- Impersonate a trusted individual
- Conversational payload targeting businesses – e.g., fraud emails requesting payroll change, W-2 forms, aging reports or gift cards etc; impersonate a C-level executive requesting money transfers;
- Goal is to trick employees into sending money or sensitive information, redirect payments, change bank account information

EAC

- Any unauthorized access to any email account
- Becomes you – the account owner
- Leverage compromised corporate accounts to send phishing, scam, BEC and malware email lures, both internally and externally, to personal, and corporate contacts including partners and customers
- Goal is to steal money, steal personal information, send phishing, spam, malware, pivot and move laterally in an organization

EAC Challenges from a SEG

Most SEGs don't scan
internal emails

- Defenses deployed at the **perimeter** for **incoming** emails makes it challenging.

Emails from
compromised accounts

- **originate** from **authenticated** employees of the organization
- sent to **internal** employees (move laterally) or **outbound** to partners and customers
- Headers are **legit**, difficult to detect
- Authentication checks **pass** as mostly coming from Microsoft
 - bypasses controls like SPF, DKIM and DMARC.

Without Analysis of Emails:


- **Anomalies** in 0365 Login events features such as *UserId, UserAgent, ClientIP and Operation* are used to detect EAC e.g., changes in geolocation and user agent

Solution to Detect EAC

With Email Analysis:

- **Intent-based approach:** detect EAC by isolating suspicious intent (phishing, scam, BEC etc) from internal and outbound emails. Sender's behavior is computed and correlated with features from emails to detect compromised account
- **Leveraging XDR:** Retrospective verdicts of Phishing URLs in emails can be compared with web gateway logs to detect if a POST request was sent, to determine the account got compromised.

Intent Based Email Account Compromise



Prefilter

Intent	Examples of the High-Frequency Key Phrases
BEC	(Update change switch need assist) my (direct deposit banking paycheck) information, next (payroll salary), (text send) me your (cell mobile number), (need purchase surprise).*(employee staff) with (gift card), are you available, need (favor assistance), (send email). *(aging W2 recieveable), wire transfer
SCAM	Mutual benefit, good opportunity, invest. *(million thousand hundred), reply with your (name address email phone), (recieve secure) (money ATM fund), (loan finance) money, business (venture partnership), compensation for (scam victim), (late deceased) (husband wife father\mother), unclaimed (inheritance fund package), send payment to my (BTC bitcoin wallet), hacked your (computer laptop webcam), suffer terminal (cancer disease), donate (money fund), won (jackpot lottery lotto), (United Nation FBI) Fraud Claim, Covid (refund settlement fund), next of kin, invest fund, compensate scam victim, work from home, online job opportunity
Phishing	(Update Change keep) password here, your account will terminate, (outlook 0365 mailbox) (storage reached access outlook account upgrade), password (change reset reactivate account), follow activation link, (update payment verify) account

- **Objective:** Filter suspicious emails from internal and outbound traffic for further investigation
- **NLP Based Approach:** n-gram analysis to extract the top keywords and phrases mapping to the intent of threat actor such as
 - Urgency, Call to Action etc.
 - Money transfer request
 - BEC scams such as direct deposit, initial lure
 - Phishing lures with links
 - SCAM lures
- **Volume:** Fine-tuned to minimize the volume of prefiltered emails.
 - Isolates around 4000 suspicious emails from 20 M(0.000005% of emails are getting isolated)

Retrospective Behavior Engine – IP Analyzer

- **EAC-IP**

- Compare 3-tuple IP, Country and Subdivision of detected message with historical messages
- Calculate a score between 0-mal and 1-benign

- **Suspicious Country**


- Sender IP from suspicious countries like RU and IR

- **Anomaly Detection**

- Use anomaly detection technique like clustering to detect anomalous IPs from any given user
- IP, Geography and ASN used as features.

- **Too Fast Too Soon**

- Sender IPs are changing too fast too soon.
- Changing IPs are not from the same ASN
- Changing IPs from far away geographies
- Calculate miles per hour required to logon physically from source IP addresses



IP Anomaly Detection -GMM


- Detect anomalies in sender's IP
- Build Clusters on retro sender IP's from last 90 days
- Suspicious IP not matching these clusters is considered an anomaly or outlier.
- Unique approach that uses IPs, Country code and ASN as features.
- Uses an unsupervised learning algorithm called Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM) clustering algorithm that is more suited for this IP data

Form clusters on IPs from last 90 days till yesterday

- Cluster 0: 89.212.157.101-118
- Cluster 1: 78.68.172.205-210
- Cluster 2: 5.158.217.169-175

Test all IP's seen today against known clusters, if not then its an anomaly

Anomaly: 195.178.120.219




Too Fast Too Soon

Detect if email sender's IP changes too fast too soon between subsequent emails.


- **FAST:** Sender IPs are changing too fast too soon
 - Calculate time between changed sender source IP and distance in miles per hour
 - Calculate miles per hour required to logon physically from source IP addresses to determine if two logons are "geoinfeasible" based on distance and time
- **ASN:** Flag if ASN change detected
- **DISTANCE:** Changing IPs from far away geographies > 1000 miles
- **Criteria:** FAST + ASN + DISTANCE

Retrospective Behavior Engine – Recipient Analyzer



- **Retrospective Relationship Graph**
 - Build relationship graph of suspected user by harvesting historical email data mainly **To, CC, BCC** fields from the last 90 days.
- **Relationship Graph of suspected email**
 - Compute list of recipients from the suspicious email's **To, CC, BCC** fields
- Compare **suspected** email recipients with relationship graph recipients to flag any **new** relation/conversation

Retrospective Behavior Engine – Sender Stats



Volumetric Analysis


- Profile user's past email sending behavior and compare with today's behavior.
- Number of email sent today
- Avg number of email sent in the last 90 days
- Ratio of emails sent today compared to the past

$$\text{Average number of emails sent} = \frac{\text{Total number of emails sent in the past } X \text{ days}}{X}$$

$$\text{Vratio} = \frac{\text{Total number of emails sent on the day suspicious email was detected}}{\text{Average number of emails sent}}$$

URL Analyzer

- **Extracts** all URLs from suspicious emails
- Detects **Suspicious** URLs using domain and URL algorithms
- Suspicious **Domain** detection
 - Exclude domains matching top 1 Million **Umbrella** list
 - *Domain Whois information checks*
 - *recently created < 6 months*
 - *expiring soon < 6 months*
 - *valid registrant org*
 - **SSL Certificate** checks
 - Stolen or Expired Certificate
 - Certificate issuing authority (cPanel, Let's Encrypt etc)
 - Expiry time of certificate < 6 months
- Suspicious **URL** Detection
 - URL contains an email as plain or base64 encoded
 - URL on file-sharing services like google forms, draw, drive, DocuSign, JotForm etc., or on cloud hosting
 - URL shorteners like Bitly, TinyURL, goo. Gl
 - Evasive feature in URL, such as google redirect



EAC : Verdict Consolidation

- **Consolidate** output from multiple modules like volumetric analysis, recipient analysis, IP analysis, and URL analysis are correlated to give the verdict as malicious or benign
- Can be implemented as an **expert system** (human) or an **AI/ML** system
- 3 Verdicts: Benign, Suspicious and Malicious
- Multiple **conditions** to give Malicious and Suspicious verdicts after statistical analysis and manual fine-tuning
- **Scalable** solution to handle millions of internal emails per day

Malicious


- $\text{ratio} > 2$ and $\text{eac} < 0.5$ and ($\text{anom} > 0$ or $\text{tfts} == \text{'Suspicious'}$) and ($\text{phish} == 1$ or $\text{cloud} == 1$ or $\text{redirect} == 1$) and ($\text{ip_rep} == 1$ or $\text{susp} == 1$)
- **Ratio** > 2 : user has sent twice as many emails as in the past.
- **eac** < 0.5 : sender's geo-location and IP address changed
- **Anom**: IP is anomalous not seen before
- **TFTS**: Too fast too soon triggered
- **phish** $== 1$: phishing URL present
- **IP** belongs to **suspicious** country with bad **reputation**

Preview inside EAC Cases


Threat Actors Intent

- **Sophisticated vs Unsophisticated**
 - Targeted vs spray-and-pray
 - ~80% spray-and-pray
 - Sophisticated Phishing URLs.
- Intent by **Attack Type**
 - Scam email: 82%
 - Phishing: 16%
 - BEC: 2%
 - Main Intent to collect credentials and personal information


Complexity of EAC Email



Types of EAC Emails Detected




Sophisticated EAC Attack - BEC Example



- **Client:** ABC SCHOOL DISTRICT
- **Compromised account:** john.doe@schooldistrict.org
- **Sending IP** belongs to suspicious country
- **IP Reputation:** Suspicious
- Sending IP **Anomalies** detected: Yes, 10 anomalies found corresponding to 10 emails sent one of which was BEC
- Historic IPs changing **Too Fast Too Soon:** False, only 1 IP used to send out all these emails
- **Avg. Emails** sent per day by this user in last 90 days: 0.7emails/day
- **Emails Sent** Today: 10
- Email Sent **Ratio:** 14 (email_count/avg_email)
- Uniq **historical IPs** seen prior to today: 17
- **Prefilter:** EAC_Prefilter_BEC


EAC Phishing ITHelpdesk Example



- **Client:** ABC STATE UNIVERSITY
- **Compromised account:** john.doe@stateuni.edu
- **Avg. Emails** sent/day by this user in last 90 days: 0.9emails/day
- **Emails Sent** Today: 78
- Email Sent **Ratio**: 86 (email_count/avg_email)
- **Sending IP** belongs to suspicious country
- Sending IP **Anomalies** detected: Yes, 78 anomalies found
- Historic IPs changing **Too Fast Too Soon**: True
- **IP Reputation**: Suspicious
- **Prefilter**: EAC_Prefilter_Phishing
- **Final Verdict**: Malicious

EAC Attack Trends - Phishing

- Majority phishing lures were sent out to large org groups in a **spray-and-pray** strategy.
- Most lures were **Office 365** account termination or upgrade/renewal lures.
- Other lures include **Fake DocuSign**, **fake Sharepoint** etc
- Phishing URLs mostly pointed to **data collection** services like Google Forms, Jotform, Office forms etc
- Some campaigns targeting academia asked the victims to supply credentials of their **current** and **prior** school/university



Complexity of Phishing Links

Data collection forms

- `hxxps[:]//docs.google[.]com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLSeVJ38UInmc7lX6_sSSlIVyahq2b0k2jkRNKUgklv-LMNWMWQ/viewform?usp=pp_url`
- `hxxps[:]//forms[.]gle/73KLav2zFGX9r4kS7`
- `hxxps[:]//docs.google[.]com/drawings/d/1gqRAYNczxrmn9rN5-0e3xLNeUyXJFDoloocuZihgFQ/preview`
- `hxxps[:]//forms.office[.]com/r/kvXQU27PLV`

Redirects

- `hxxps[:]//www.google[.]com/url?q=https%3A%2F%2Fnaughtymilfl5vj.com%2F%3Futm_source%3DRgVunY3DTnByC7%26utm_campaign%3Dren&s a=D&sntz=1&usg=AOvVaw0Tty-URzTvXXWirDtwHI3o`
- `https[:]//www.bing.com/ck/a?!&&p=6e9a1f3929ba4ff2JmltdHM9MTY4NTkyMzlwMCZpZ3VpZD0xNGQyOGJiMS0wNDI5LTZyZTEtMTQ1Yy05ODk3MDU5YTYyZWUmaW5zaWQ9NTE3Nw&ptn=3&hsh=3&fclid=14d28bb1-0429-63e1-145c-9897059a62ee&u=a1aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuZm9yZXN0YmF0aGluZ3N1ZmZvbGsuY29tL21vdmluZ3NwYWNILW1vdmVtZW50LWNsYXNzZXM#aMphbmRyYWluQGJ1dHRlcmJhbGwuY29t`

Free hosting providers

- `hxxps[:]//outlookfacepage.webly[.]com`

URL Shorteners

- `hxxp[:]//bit[.]ly/SOMEUNI_EDU`

EAC Attack Trends -Scam



Majority scams were **Job** scams luring students and financially vulnerable victims to provide their personal data and use them as money mules.



Romance Scams make up the other big category, followed by smaller advance fee scams



Job, Romance and advance fee scams are sent with a **spray-and-pray** strategy with the goal to maximize reach.



BEC Payroll Scam attacks were targeted.

EAC - Scams

Hello!
I understand that we do not know each other, but I decided to take a chance and write you a letter.
I hope my letter reached you and you don't mind receiving the message.
I am writing to you with the hope of meeting an interesting person or finding a new friend.
I noticed that we have a lot in common in our interests, and I would like to get to know you better.
Let me share with you a few words about myself:
My name is Simona, I am 30 years old, I work as a photographer and love to travel.
I like to spend time in nature and cook delicious meals
In addition, I really appreciate smart and polite people, and I think that you can be one of them.
I hope that my letter will not cause you any unpleasant feelings.
I'm not used to making the first move, but I couldn't pass up the opportunity to write to you.
I have been living here for about four months.
All my friends are related to work, and when we meet, we talk only about it.
And I need to find not just a friend, but a person with whom we can spend our free time
That is why I decided to try to find new friends on the Internet, where I think you can find people with similar interests and hobbies.
And I believe that you are a decent and kind man who I liked :)
If you don't mind, I suggest starting an acquaintance on the site in order to avoid unpleasant situations.
For me, and for you, safety is very important, I think you will agree with me
It's very easy to find me. Here is all the information about me [Snowflake_lady](#)
I am waiting for your response on the site
and I hope we will have more than just friendship

UNICEF Part-time Job opportunity
To: [REDACTED]@unicef-jobs.org> Bcc: & 91 more Details

Good morning and Happy New Year.

I am sharing a winter job opportunity with anyone who might be interested in a paid temporary job over the break and in the new year with a weekly pay of \$500.00 (USD).

Attached is further information about the employment details. Kindly follow the steps in the attached document and send a message with your alternate/non-school email address (i.e., Gmail, Yahoo, Hotmail, etc.). For more details on the job,

Take note: this is strictly a work-from-home position.

Hello!

This is to notify you about an available part-time vacancy. Mr. Mike Kem needs a part-time Personal Assistant Position in your area.

He offers to pay five hundred dollars (\$500) weekly. Please send your Full Name and Phone Number to (mikekemfortross@hotmail.com) for more information. Remember to email Him with your private email or your school email when applying.

Thanks

AD THIS EXTRA OFFER IS FOR YOU!!

[REDACTED].edu> [REDACTED].edu>

Good Day !!!

During this time that we are in, working from home would be great. Therefore, you have been offered a campus employment office Job Opportunity which serves as a gateway to pay all expenses incurred on campus.

This opportunity should be done at leisure taking at most 7 Hours Weekly and earn \$500 Weekly. It is a Flexible Opportunity where you will determine your working time.

All the tasks are work from home/on campus job, you do not need to travel, you do not need to have a car to get started. You can be in any location and work from your home/school.

If you are interested in working with her Kindly email her (olsonmary899@gmail.com).

Kindly include your private email and cellphone number when applying for direct contact.

Please Note: This position is available on a first come, first served basis.

Sincerely,

Take Aways



- Intent based approach identifies both set of victims, person whose **account** has been compromised and person who **receives** emails from compromised accounts.



- With each detected attempt of **exploitation, intent** of the threat actor (Phishing, SPAM, BEC etc.) also gets captured which aids in additional remediation
 - Such as blocking Phishing Links
 - Correlating Phishing links with Web gateway logs to detect additional compromised accounts.



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