Skip to content

Security: agentralabs/agentic-planning

Security

SECURITY.md

Security Policy

Supported Versions

Version Supported
0.1.x Yes

Reporting Vulnerabilities

Please report security issues privately to security@agentralabs.tech.

Do not open public issues for security vulnerabilities. We aim to acknowledge reports within 48 hours and provide a fix or mitigation plan within 7 days for critical issues.

Security Model

File Integrity

  • .aplan files use BLAKE3 checksums over all entity data
  • Atomic writes via temp file + fsync + rename prevent partial writes
  • Crash recovery detects orphaned .aplan.tmp files and promotes or discards them
  • The integrity footer marker (PLANEND\0) validates file completeness

MCP Server

  • All tool inputs are validated before processing — no raw unwrap() on user input
  • JSON-RPC 2.0 protocol errors return proper error codes (not panics)
  • Unknown tools return -32803 (TOOL_NOT_FOUND)
  • Optional token-based authentication via AGENTIC_AUTH_TOKEN environment variable
  • Server binds to stdio by default; HTTP mode requires explicit --transport http

FFI Boundary

  • All FFI functions accept and return C-compatible types
  • Null pointer checks on every function entry
  • UTF-8 validation on all string parameters
  • Errors returned as AplanResult codes (never panics across FFI boundary)
  • aplan_last_error() provides human-readable error details

Input Validation

  • Goal titles must be non-empty
  • Priority values must be 1-5
  • Progress percentages must be 0-100
  • Entity IDs are validated UUIDs
  • State transitions are enforced (cannot complete a Draft goal, cannot crystallize a Crystallized decision)

Threat Model

In Scope

  • Data corruption via malformed .aplan files
  • Denial of service via large or malicious MCP inputs
  • Information leakage through error messages
  • Unauthorized state modification via unprotected MCP server

Out of Scope

  • Network-level attacks (TLS is the transport layer's responsibility)
  • Operating system compromise
  • Physical access to the machine
  • Attacks on sister systems connected via bridges (each sister handles its own security)

There aren’t any published security advisories