| Version | Supported |
|---|---|
| 0.1.x | Yes |
Please report security issues privately to security@agentralabs.tech.
Do not open public issues for security vulnerabilities. We aim to acknowledge reports within 48 hours and provide a fix or mitigation plan within 7 days for critical issues.
.aplanfiles use BLAKE3 checksums over all entity data- Atomic writes via temp file + fsync + rename prevent partial writes
- Crash recovery detects orphaned
.aplan.tmpfiles and promotes or discards them - The integrity footer marker (
PLANEND\0) validates file completeness
- All tool inputs are validated before processing — no raw
unwrap()on user input - JSON-RPC 2.0 protocol errors return proper error codes (not panics)
- Unknown tools return
-32803(TOOL_NOT_FOUND) - Optional token-based authentication via
AGENTIC_AUTH_TOKENenvironment variable - Server binds to stdio by default; HTTP mode requires explicit
--transport http
- All FFI functions accept and return C-compatible types
- Null pointer checks on every function entry
- UTF-8 validation on all string parameters
- Errors returned as
AplanResultcodes (never panics across FFI boundary) aplan_last_error()provides human-readable error details
- Goal titles must be non-empty
- Priority values must be 1-5
- Progress percentages must be 0-100
- Entity IDs are validated UUIDs
- State transitions are enforced (cannot complete a Draft goal, cannot crystallize a Crystallized decision)
- Data corruption via malformed
.aplanfiles - Denial of service via large or malicious MCP inputs
- Information leakage through error messages
- Unauthorized state modification via unprotected MCP server
- Network-level attacks (TLS is the transport layer's responsibility)
- Operating system compromise
- Physical access to the machine
- Attacks on sister systems connected via bridges (each sister handles its own security)