## Homework #3

Due date: 23 November 2022

#### **Notes:**

- For Question 5, you can use a Python module for arithmetic in GF(2<sup>8</sup>).
- You are expected to submit your answer document as well as the Python codes you used.
- Do not submit .ipynb files, **only .py** scripts will be considered. You can work on Colab but please, submit a python file in the end.
- Zip your programs and add a readme.txt document (if necessary) to explain the programs and how to use them.
- Name your winzip file as "cs411\_507\_hw03\_yourname.zip"
- 1. (20 pts) You are in a job interview, and you were given the following RSA parameters:

# C=

69640001348021474903504213656503362496142506108659418645075605309730658 29363013742586720564552761485372116221740627172129123876523265935559212 39814807828333848385588437439080830381566506168724225159624620021697301

$$e = 2^4+1$$

You are asked to retrieve the plaintext "M" using only these given parameters, the plaintext is a 289-bit number and M << N (which means that M is too small than N). Show your work.

**2. (25 pts)** Alice encrypts the private factors of the modulus using her public key. In order to increase security, she multiplies them with a random integer *k* (a process called blinding). Namely, she performs the following operations:

$$c_p = (kp)^e \mod n$$
 and  $c_q = (kq)^e \mod n$ ,

where:

n =

 $73512973335060030081468282098336397584185840115543849725566479428982375\\03037718695637830609047406561083968328616312232137592331991101538410373\\74050058977286914202841273524024666932250131821113376668815406723621016\\49097977282533745476584222793770179097317864458142937324148557309714017\\33550710145929124769939738763589008485016472082711182204941268594892277\\94428441209121779400263427064528800044153594488608641089810344852811969\\04768332375221604708731576259326563612846635064979826680730540182601947\\65233835743738656549160897983547411689218105035219148455858391611808212\\37530439632455643648718893847945602507596343025039916399868955525098511\\95516884533439960978043849158219089300897385142338631732809146184196710\\17933875694012909890988102141890827802411783985398632856594216125677645\\60272257730862326168958364031351936876932865703535175597367552038394861\\00365686967751078058559507545057056861806132432140658073493899816919764\\70235866303540467163203311155468259406351404248680181614400433190033519$ 

## CS 411-507 Cryptography

 $00977331129699978699948137567053016132949764669941675005253460547841482\\62517489203107663821626294529576908407126832705381935224215695242840900\\51656775595480488299992596031724073766519823034866191167042526714139900\\26284868294201399181512043$ 

e = 65537

**a.** (10 pts) Explain why this is not secure as anyone who obtains  $c_p$  or  $c_q$  can factor n.

## **b.** (10 pts) Factor *n* assuming

 $C_{n} =$ 

 $C^{\alpha} =$ 

and decrypt the following ciphertext

410549325685366799284798358668331291049211237703447489321746464354090 480951066742200309912524869634695769764148842963115769175527179769353 501136785040366302701836605559269222653839509896223034315989474752525 422032311356077141993653194048634554747064603617789881601934904375748 720866525993835837380575119329831703593942313434602973137707915466599 022298281760026130881260276637144571320608488322550304670024203670226 128476075072338279764675774256431888736850559740563151465682499215963 629918224101757068211315022934434916282345252224165558403932898552995 551505591198395331625457165173901358070740812251352212374898226752191 458989544999183050305396079595170576363831967410596235893058231852520 802407515041647925479992058184613103289709752618729186509661786057001 647083804585301703801272797236111687348907977621232083642431914363895 266519463459112358271172160273751026080398345460929751476512586349360 905588246751625224080678692961596943056437462453579785432258654674275 520068227719175943507656108554707552928863240951458193510571735005767 226590398204791730466993980158501690130104327829589781448607958503898 902133445000532521723138230966914652700465728532524467483612403840506 027543892612439531633794667013713638856396514285792898762678

3. **(20 pts)** Consider the combining function given in the following table, that is used to combine the outputs of four **maximum-length** LFSR sequences:

$$F(x_1, x_2, x_3, x_4) = x_1 \oplus x_1 x_2 \oplus x_2 x_3 \oplus x_2 x_3 x_4 \oplus x_1 x_2 x_3 x_4$$
.

- **a.** (**5 pts**) The lengths of LFSRs are 60, 95, and 97, and 75 respectively. Compute the linear complexity and the period of the output sequence.
- **b.** (15 pts) Analyze the function F in terms of three criteria:
- Nonlinearity degree
- Balance
- Correlation

Is this a good combining function? Explain your answer.

4. **(15 pts)** We challenge you to get the plaintext of a ciphertext C that was calculated using an RSA setting, however, we lost the decryption keys, we only have the following:

```
N = 15220196297956469159
C = 6092243189299681137
e = 2^16+1
```

(RSA Encryption:  $m^e \mod N \mid Decryption: C^d \mod N$ )

Can you retrieve the message using only this information? If yes, show how.

You are not allowed to use external tools (including online tools).

- **5. (20 pts)** Consider GF( $2^8$ ) used in AES with the irreducible polynomial p(x) =  $x^8 + x^4 + x^3 + x^2 + 1$ . You are expected to query the server using  $get\_poly()$  function which will send you two binary polynomials a(x) and b(x) in GF( $2^8$ ). Polynomials are expressed as bit strings of their coefficients. For example, p(x) is expressed as '100011111'. You can use the Python code "client.py" given in the assignment package to communicate with the server.
  - **a.** (10 pts) You are expected to perform  $c(x) = a(x) \times b(x)$  in  $GF(2^8)$  and return c(x) as bit string using  $check\_mult()$  function.
  - **b.** (10 pts) You are expected to compute the multiplicative inverse of a(x) in GF(2<sup>8</sup>) and return a<sup>-1</sup>(x) using *check\_inv()* function.