fix(ng-dev): prevent shell command injection in git push command#3735
Merged
alan-agius4 merged 1 commit intoJun 5, 2026
Merged
Conversation
This escapes the branch name before interpolating it into the manual git push command printed to the console, preventing a copy-paste command injection vulnerability.
![gemini-code-assist[bot]](https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/in/956858?s=60&v=4){kind=small}
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Code Review
This pull request introduces escaping for the git branch name and the --force-with-lease flag to safely handle special characters (such as single quotes) in shell commands. The reviewer suggested a cleaner, more idiomatic approach of quoting the entire argument (e.g., 'HEAD:branch' and '--force-with-lease=branch:oid') rather than using partial quoting, and provided code suggestions to implement this across both modified files.
alan-agius4
approved these changes
Jun 5, 2026
This file contains hidden or bidirectional Unicode text that may be interpreted or compiled differently than what appears below. To review, open the file in an editor that reveals hidden Unicode characters.
Learn more about bidirectional Unicode characters
Sign up for free
to join this conversation on GitHub.
Already have an account?
Sign in to comment
2 participants
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.This suggestion is invalid because no changes were made to the code.Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is closed.Suggestions cannot be applied while viewing a subset of changes.Only one suggestion per line can be applied in a batch.Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.Applying suggestions on deleted lines is not supported.You must change the existing code in this line in order to create a valid suggestion.Outdated suggestions cannot be applied.This suggestion has been applied or marked resolved.Suggestions cannot be applied from pending reviews.Suggestions cannot be applied on multi-line comments.Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is queued to merge.Suggestion cannot be applied right now. Please check back later.
This PR mitigates a command injection vulnerability where a malicious PR branch name could lead to arbitrary shell command execution when copy-pasting the printed ng-dev checkout or rebase commands.