Add timeout-minutes to all workflow jobs#19
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Default GitHub Actions job timeout is 360 minutes. With these caps, a fork PR that tries to abuse compute (crypto mining via build.rs or test code) gets cut off at 10-15 min instead of 6 hours. Limits are ~4x the observed cold-cache durations: conformance: 15 min (observed ~2m25s warm) all other CI: 10 min (observed <1 min warm, ~2 min cold) CLAAssistant: 5 min (API calls only, observed ~7s)
rpb-ant
approved these changes
Mar 30, 2026
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Caps job runtime to make compute-abuse via fork PRs less attractive. Default GitHub Actions timeout is 360 min (6 hours); this cuts it to 10-15 min per job.
Headroom is ~4× observed cold-cache durations so legitimate PRs should never hit the cap.
Context: prep for relaxing the fork-PR approval requirement from "all external contributors" to "first-time contributors". The
pull_requestCI is already sandboxed (no secrets, read-only GITHUB_TOKEN, cache-isolated), so the residual risk is compute abuse — this bounds that.