fix: the database engine specs make http requests to... in impala.py#40454
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fix: the database engine specs make http requests to... in impala.py#40454orbisai0security wants to merge 1 commit into
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Comment on lines
211
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216
| impala_host = query.database.url_object.host | ||
| url = f"http://{impala_host}:25000/cancel_query?query_id={cancel_query_id}" | ||
| url = "http://{}:25000/cancel_query?query_id={}".format( | ||
| requests.utils.quote(impala_host, safe=""), | ||
| requests.utils.quote(cancel_query_id, safe=""), | ||
| ) | ||
| response = requests.post(url, timeout=3) |
Contributor
There was a problem hiding this comment.
🔴 Architect Review — CRITICAL
ImpalaEngineSpec.cancel_query still issues an HTTP POST directly to query.database.url_object.host without any destination validation; URL-encoding the host and query ID only escapes characters and does not restrict which hosts (including loopback, RFC1918, or metadata IPs) can be targeted, so the SSRF channel remains open under adversarial database connection settings.
Suggestion: Before constructing and calling the cancel URL, validate the scheme and host against an explicit policy (eg, allowlisted hosts/schemes or a check that rejects loopback/private/link-local/metadata ranges), failing closed when validation fails, and centralize this URL/network validation so all outbound engine-spec HTTP calls share the same enforcement.
Fix in Cursor | Fix in VSCode Claude
(Use Cmd/Ctrl + Click for best experience)
Prompt for AI Agent 🤖
This is an **Architect / Logical Review** comment left during a code review. These reviews are first-class, important findings — not optional suggestions. Do NOT dismiss this as a 'big architectural change' just because the title says architect review; most of these can be resolved with a small, localized fix once the intent is understood.
**Path:** superset/db_engine_specs/impala.py
**Line:** 211:216
**Comment:**
*CRITICAL: ImpalaEngineSpec.cancel_query still issues an HTTP POST directly to query.database.url_object.host without any destination validation; URL-encoding the host and query ID only escapes characters and does not restrict which hosts (including loopback, RFC1918, or metadata IPs) can be targeted, so the SSRF channel remains open under adversarial database connection settings.
Validate the correctness of the flagged issue. If correct, How can I resolve this? If you propose a fix, implement it and please make it concise.
If a suggested approach is provided above, use it as the authoritative instruction. If no explicit code suggestion is given, you MUST still draft and apply your own minimal, localized fix — do not punt back with 'no suggestion provided, review manually'. Keep the change as small as possible: add a guard clause, gate on a loading state, reorder an await, wrap in a conditional, etc. Do not refactor surrounding code or expand scope beyond the finding.
Once fix is implemented, also check other comments on the same PR, and ask user if the user wants to fix the rest of the comments as well. if said yes, then fetch all the comments validate the correctness and implement a minimal fix
Comment on lines
+1
to
+110
| import { describe, test, expect, jest, beforeEach, afterEach } from '@jest/globals'; | ||
|
|
||
| /** | ||
| * Security Property: | ||
| * The Impala engine spec must never make HTTP POST requests to URLs derived from | ||
| * user-controllable connection parameters that point to internal/private network | ||
| * addresses, SSRF targets, or otherwise unauthorized destinations. | ||
| * | ||
| * WHAT MUST ALWAYS BE TRUE: | ||
| * - URLs constructed from user-supplied connection parameters must be validated | ||
| * against an allowlist of permitted hosts/schemes before any HTTP request is made. | ||
| * - Internal network addresses (loopback, RFC1918, metadata services) must be rejected. | ||
| * - Non-HTTP(S) schemes must be rejected. | ||
| * - Redirects to internal services must not be followed blindly. | ||
| */ | ||
|
|
||
| // Simulated URL validator that represents the security control that MUST exist | ||
| // in the Impala engine spec before making any HTTP POST request. | ||
| function validateImpalaKillQueryUrl(url: string): { valid: boolean; reason?: string } { | ||
| let parsed: URL; | ||
|
|
||
| try { | ||
| parsed = new URL(url); | ||
| } catch { | ||
| return { valid: false, reason: 'Invalid URL format' }; | ||
| } | ||
|
|
||
| // Only allow http and https schemes | ||
| if (!['http:', 'https:'].includes(parsed.protocol)) { | ||
| return { valid: false, reason: `Disallowed scheme: ${parsed.protocol}` }; | ||
| } | ||
|
|
||
| const hostname = parsed.hostname.toLowerCase(); | ||
|
|
||
| // Block loopback addresses | ||
| if ( | ||
| hostname === 'localhost' || | ||
| hostname === '127.0.0.1' || | ||
| hostname === '::1' || | ||
| hostname.startsWith('127.') | ||
| ) { | ||
| return { valid: false, reason: 'Loopback address not allowed' }; | ||
| } | ||
|
|
||
| // Block RFC1918 private ranges | ||
| const privateRanges = [ | ||
| /^10\.\d+\.\d+\.\d+$/, | ||
| /^172\.(1[6-9]|2\d|3[01])\.\d+\.\d+$/, | ||
| /^192\.168\.\d+\.\d+$/, | ||
| ]; | ||
| for (const range of privateRanges) { | ||
| if (range.test(hostname)) { | ||
| return { valid: false, reason: 'Private network address not allowed' }; | ||
| } | ||
| } | ||
|
|
||
| // Block cloud metadata services | ||
| const blockedHosts = [ | ||
| '169.254.169.254', // AWS/GCP/Azure metadata | ||
| 'metadata.google.internal', | ||
| 'metadata.internal', | ||
| '100.100.100.200', // Alibaba Cloud metadata | ||
| '192.0.2.1', // TEST-NET | ||
| '0.0.0.0', | ||
| ]; | ||
| if (blockedHosts.includes(hostname)) { | ||
| return { valid: false, reason: 'Blocked host (metadata service or reserved)' }; | ||
| } | ||
|
|
||
| // Block IPv6 link-local | ||
| if (hostname.startsWith('fe80') || hostname === '[::1]') { | ||
| return { valid: false, reason: 'IPv6 link-local or loopback not allowed' }; | ||
| } | ||
|
|
||
| // Block URLs with credentials embedded | ||
| if (parsed.username || parsed.password) { | ||
| return { valid: false, reason: 'Credentials in URL not allowed' }; | ||
| } | ||
|
|
||
| return { valid: true }; | ||
| } | ||
|
|
||
| // Simulated function that represents what the Impala spec does when killing a query | ||
| function impalaKillQuery(connectionHost: string, connectionPort: number, queryId: string): { | ||
| urlAttempted: string; | ||
| requestMade: boolean; | ||
| blocked: boolean; | ||
| reason?: string; | ||
| } { | ||
| // Simulate URL construction from connection parameters (as in the vulnerable code) | ||
| const url = `http://${connectionHost}:${connectionPort}/cancel_query?query_id=${encodeURIComponent(queryId)}`; | ||
|
|
||
| const validation = validateImpalaKillQueryUrl(url); | ||
|
|
||
| if (!validation.valid) { | ||
| return { | ||
| urlAttempted: url, | ||
| requestMade: false, | ||
| blocked: true, | ||
| reason: validation.reason, | ||
| }; | ||
| } | ||
|
|
||
| // Only if validation passes would we make the actual HTTP POST | ||
| return { | ||
| urlAttempted: url, | ||
| requestMade: true, | ||
| blocked: false, | ||
| }; | ||
| } |
Contributor
There was a problem hiding this comment.
🟠 Architect Review — HIGH
The added "regression test" is Jest-style TypeScript/JavaScript in a .py file that defines its own simulate functions (validateImpalaKillQueryUrl/impalaKillQuery) and never imports or invokes superset.db_engine_specs.impala.ImpalaEngineSpec.cancel_query; additionally, its filename invariant_impala.test.py does not match the pytest python_files patterns (test.py, test.py, *_tests.py), so it is never collected or run and the intended security invariant is not enforced in CI.
Suggestion: Replace this with a real Python pytest under the existing naming conventions (eg, in tests/unit_tests/db_engine_specs/test_impala.py or a sibling file) that imports ImpalaEngineSpec.cancel_query, uses a mocked requests.post, and asserts that loopback/private/metadata/redirect targets are rejected according to the security invariant, ensuring it runs under the repo's pytest configuration.
Fix in Cursor | Fix in VSCode Claude
(Use Cmd/Ctrl + Click for best experience)
Prompt for AI Agent 🤖
This is an **Architect / Logical Review** comment left during a code review. These reviews are first-class, important findings — not optional suggestions. Do NOT dismiss this as a 'big architectural change' just because the title says architect review; most of these can be resolved with a small, localized fix once the intent is understood.
**Path:** tests/invariant_impala.test.py
**Line:** 1:110
**Comment:**
*HIGH: The added "regression test" is Jest-style TypeScript/JavaScript in a .py file that defines its own simulate functions (validateImpalaKillQueryUrl/impalaKillQuery) and never imports or invokes superset.db_engine_specs.impala.ImpalaEngineSpec.cancel_query; additionally, its filename invariant_impala.test.py does not match the pytest python_files patterns (*_test.py, test_*.py, *_tests.py), so it is never collected or run and the intended security invariant is not enforced in CI.
Validate the correctness of the flagged issue. If correct, How can I resolve this? If you propose a fix, implement it and please make it concise.
If a suggested approach is provided above, use it as the authoritative instruction. If no explicit code suggestion is given, you MUST still draft and apply your own minimal, localized fix — do not punt back with 'no suggestion provided, review manually'. Keep the change as small as possible: add a guard clause, gate on a loading state, reorder an await, wrap in a conditional, etc. Do not refactor surrounding code or expand scope beyond the finding.
Once fix is implemented, also check other comments on the same PR, and ask user if the user wants to fix the rest of the comments as well. if said yes, then fetch all the comments validate the correctness and implement a minimal fix
Comment on lines
+212
to
+215
| url = "http://{}:25000/cancel_query?query_id={}".format( | ||
| requests.utils.quote(impala_host, safe=""), | ||
| requests.utils.quote(cancel_query_id, safe=""), | ||
| ) |
Contributor
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Suggestion: This change still builds the outbound cancellation URL directly from query.database.url_object.host without any SSRF guardrails (no allowlist, no private/loopback rejection, no DNS/IP validation). URL-encoding the host does not enforce destination safety, so a user-controlled database host can still target internal services. Add strict host/scheme validation before issuing the POST. [ssrf]
Severity Level: Critical 🚨
- ❌ /api/v1/query/stop can POST to internal hosts.
- ❌ Impala cancel_query issues SSRF to arbitrary configured hosts.
- ⚠️ Attackers with DB creation pivot into internal network.Steps of Reproduction ✅
1. Configure an Impala database connection whose host points to an internal/private
address (for example `127.0.0.1` or `10.0.0.1`) so that `query.database.url_object.host`
resolves to that value when a query runs; `ImpalaEngineSpec.cancel_query` at
`superset/db_engine_specs/impala.py:22-33` uses `query.database.url_object.host` (line 32)
as the `impala_host`.
2. Execute a SQL Lab query against this Impala database so a `Query` ORM row is created
(model defined in `superset/models/sql_lab.py:27-55`) with its `database` field pointing
at the Impala `Database` configuration that carries the attacker-controlled host.
3. From a client (or via tests), invoke the stop-query API `POST /api/v1/query/stop` which
is wired in integration test `tests/integration_tests/queries/api_tests.py:19-37` and
handled by `QueryDAO.stop_query` at `superset/daos/query.py:1-23`; this method looks up
the `Query` row and calls `sql_lab.cancel_query(query)` at `superset/sql_lab.py:8-22`.
4. Inside `sql_lab.cancel_query` ( `superset/sql_lab.py:8-43` ), Superset obtains a
SQLAlchemy engine and cursor and dispatches to
`query.database.db_engine_spec.cancel_query(cursor, query, cancel_query_id)` at lines
35-43; in the Impala implementation, `ImpalaEngineSpec.cancel_query` builds `url =
"http://{}:25000/cancel_query?query_id={}".format(requests.utils.quote(impala_host,
safe=""), ...)` at `superset/db_engine_specs/impala.py:31-36` and immediately calls
`requests.post(url, timeout=3)` (line 37) with no
allowlist/loopback/private-range/metadata-service validation, so the attacker-controlled
database host fully controls the HTTP destination (potential SSRF into internal services).Fix in Cursor | Fix in VSCode Claude
(Use Cmd/Ctrl + Click for best experience)
Prompt for AI Agent 🤖
This is a comment left during a code review.
**Path:** superset/db_engine_specs/impala.py
**Line:** 212:215
**Comment:**
*Ssrf: This change still builds the outbound cancellation URL directly from `query.database.url_object.host` without any SSRF guardrails (no allowlist, no private/loopback rejection, no DNS/IP validation). URL-encoding the host does not enforce destination safety, so a user-controlled database host can still target internal services. Add strict host/scheme validation before issuing the POST.
Validate the correctness of the flagged issue. If correct, How can I resolve this? If you propose a fix, implement it and please make it concise.
Once fix is implemented, also check other comments on the same PR, and ask user if the user wants to fix the rest of the comments as well. if said yes, then fetch all the comments validate the correctness and implement a minimal fix| @@ -0,0 +1,324 @@ | |||
| import { describe, test, expect, jest, beforeEach, afterEach } from '@jest/globals'; | |||
Contributor
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Suggestion: This regression test will not be executed by the repo's configured test runners: pytest only collects *_test.py/test_*.py style Python tests, and Jest is configured for JS/TS files under superset-frontend paths. As a result, this security check provides no CI protection. Move it to the appropriate JS/TS test location (or convert to a Python test that matches pytest patterns). [incomplete implementation]
Severity Level: Major ⚠️
- ⚠️ SSRF security invariant test never runs in CI.
- ⚠️ Future Impala changes lack automated SSRF regression guard.Steps of Reproduction ✅
1. Inspect the added regression test file `tests/invariant_impala.test.py` and note that
line 1 contains JavaScript/TypeScript syntax: `import { describe, test, expect, jest,
beforeEach, afterEach } from '@jest/globals';` (shown in the PR hunk and in the file at
`tests/invariant_impala.test.py:1`), which is not valid Python syntax and therefore cannot
be imported by pytest as a backend test.
2. Run a code search for `invariant_impala` across the repository using ripgrep; the only
match reported is in `graphify-out/graph.json`, and there are no references in any Python
files or in other JS/TS files under `superset-frontend`, meaning no existing test runner
or module import path references `tests/invariant_impala.test.py`.
3. Backend tests are discovered by pytest over `tests/*.py` (as evidenced by extensive
`.py` tests under `tests/unit_tests` and `tests/integration_tests` that import Superset
modules); attempting to import `tests/invariant_impala.test.py` under pytest would hit a
`SyntaxError` at line 1 due to the `import { ... }` syntax, consistent with the
static-analysis finding `syntax-error` on this file.
4. Because the file is invalid Python, not referenced by any Jest configuration or JS/TS
test harness (no imports or matches for this filename/path in the JS tree), and resides in
the backend `tests/` tree instead of the `superset-frontend` JS test locations, the
intended security regression test is not executed by either the Python pytest suite or the
frontend Jest suite, leaving the SSRF invariant un-enforced in CI.Fix in Cursor | Fix in VSCode Claude
(Use Cmd/Ctrl + Click for best experience)
Prompt for AI Agent 🤖
This is a comment left during a code review.
**Path:** tests/invariant_impala.test.py
**Line:** 1:1
**Comment:**
*Incomplete Implementation: This regression test will not be executed by the repo's configured test runners: pytest only collects `*_test.py`/`test_*.py` style Python tests, and Jest is configured for JS/TS files under `superset-frontend` paths. As a result, this security check provides no CI protection. Move it to the appropriate JS/TS test location (or convert to a Python test that matches pytest patterns).
Validate the correctness of the flagged issue. If correct, How can I resolve this? If you propose a fix, implement it and please make it concise.
Once fix is implemented, also check other comments on the same PR, and ask user if the user wants to fix the rest of the comments as well. if said yes, then fetch all the comments validate the correctness and implement a minimal fix
Comment on lines
+84
to
+110
| function impalaKillQuery(connectionHost: string, connectionPort: number, queryId: string): { | ||
| urlAttempted: string; | ||
| requestMade: boolean; | ||
| blocked: boolean; | ||
| reason?: string; | ||
| } { | ||
| // Simulate URL construction from connection parameters (as in the vulnerable code) | ||
| const url = `http://${connectionHost}:${connectionPort}/cancel_query?query_id=${encodeURIComponent(queryId)}`; | ||
|
|
||
| const validation = validateImpalaKillQueryUrl(url); | ||
|
|
||
| if (!validation.valid) { | ||
| return { | ||
| urlAttempted: url, | ||
| requestMade: false, | ||
| blocked: true, | ||
| reason: validation.reason, | ||
| }; | ||
| } | ||
|
|
||
| // Only if validation passes would we make the actual HTTP POST | ||
| return { | ||
| urlAttempted: url, | ||
| requestMade: true, | ||
| blocked: false, | ||
| }; | ||
| } |
Contributor
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Suggestion: The test validates a local simulation instead of invoking the real Impala engine implementation, so it can pass even when production cancellation logic remains vulnerable. Replace the mocked impalaKillQuery flow with an integration/unit test that exercises ImpalaEngineSpec.cancel_query (or its immediate call path) directly. [incomplete implementation]
Severity Level: Major ⚠️
- ⚠️ Test doesn't exercise ImpalaEngineSpec.cancel_query production path.
- ⚠️ Passing test may hide real SSRF vulnerabilities.Steps of Reproduction ✅
1. Open `tests/invariant_impala.test.py` and locate the helper `impalaKillQuery` defined
at lines 84-110: it constructs a URL with `const url =
\`http://${connectionHost}:${connectionPort}/cancel_query?query_id=${encodeURIComponent(queryId)}\`;`
(line 91), validates it with `validateImpalaKillQueryUrl(url)` (lines 93-100), and returns
a synthetic object indicating whether a request would be made.
2. Note that this file contains only local functions `validateImpalaKillQueryUrl` and
`impalaKillQuery` plus Jest-style tests defined via `describe`/`test` blocks (lines
112-250), and it does not import any Superset backend modules such as
`superset.db_engine_specs.impala` or `superset.sql_lab`, nor does it reference
`ImpalaEngineSpec.cancel_query` anywhere.
3. Compare this to the actual production cancellation path: `QueryDAO.stop_query` in
`superset/daos/query.py:1-23` calls `superset.sql_lab.cancel_query(query)`;
`superset/sql_lab.py:8-43` then calls `query.database.db_engine_spec.cancel_query(cursor,
query, cancel_query_id)`; finally `ImpalaEngineSpec.cancel_query` in
`superset/db_engine_specs/impala.py:21-41` builds the real cancellation URL and issues
`requests.post(url, timeout=3)`. None of these production functions are invoked by the
JS/TS helper `impalaKillQuery`.
4. Even if this file were wired into an appropriate Jest test suite, all assertions would
exercise only the simulated helper `impalaKillQuery` (lines 84-110) and its pure-logic
validator, so the tests could pass while `ImpalaEngineSpec.cancel_query` or the SQL Lab
cancellation flow remained vulnerable (for example continuing to POST to internal/private
hosts), meaning the regression test does not actually cover the real production
cancellation implementation.Fix in Cursor | Fix in VSCode Claude
(Use Cmd/Ctrl + Click for best experience)
Prompt for AI Agent 🤖
This is a comment left during a code review.
**Path:** tests/invariant_impala.test.py
**Line:** 84:110
**Comment:**
*Incomplete Implementation: The test validates a local simulation instead of invoking the real Impala engine implementation, so it can pass even when production cancellation logic remains vulnerable. Replace the mocked `impalaKillQuery` flow with an integration/unit test that exercises `ImpalaEngineSpec.cancel_query` (or its immediate call path) directly.
Validate the correctness of the flagged issue. If correct, How can I resolve this? If you propose a fix, implement it and please make it concise.
Once fix is implemented, also check other comments on the same PR, and ask user if the user wants to fix the rest of the comments as well. if said yes, then fetch all the comments validate the correctness and implement a minimal fix![bito-code-review[bot]](https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/in/1061978?s=60&v=4){kind=small}
Contributor
There was a problem hiding this comment.
Code Review Agent Run #50f6a2
Actionable Suggestions - 2
-
tests/invariant_impala.test.py - 2
- CWE-20: Wrong Test Runner for File Location · Line 1-324
- Rule 6262: Testing Simulated Code Instead of Actual Logic · Line 1-324
Additional Suggestions - 1
-
tests/invariant_impala.test.py - 1
-
Missing Apache License Header · Line 1-3The file lacks the required Apache Software Foundation license header. Per dev-standard.mdc, new files require ASF license headers to comply with open source licensing requirements.
-
Review Details
-
Files reviewed - 2 · Commit Range:
3a583e4..a2708c2- superset/db_engine_specs/impala.py
- tests/invariant_impala.test.py
-
Files skipped - 0
-
Tools
- Whispers (Secret Scanner) - ✔︎ Successful
- Detect-secrets (Secret Scanner) - ✔︎ Successful
- MyPy (Static Code Analysis) - ✔︎ Successful
- Astral Ruff (Static Code Analysis) - ✔︎ Successful
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Comment on lines
+1
to
+324
| import { describe, test, expect, jest, beforeEach, afterEach } from '@jest/globals'; | ||
|
|
||
| /** | ||
| * Security Property: | ||
| * The Impala engine spec must never make HTTP POST requests to URLs derived from | ||
| * user-controllable connection parameters that point to internal/private network | ||
| * addresses, SSRF targets, or otherwise unauthorized destinations. | ||
| * | ||
| * WHAT MUST ALWAYS BE TRUE: | ||
| * - URLs constructed from user-supplied connection parameters must be validated | ||
| * against an allowlist of permitted hosts/schemes before any HTTP request is made. | ||
| * - Internal network addresses (loopback, RFC1918, metadata services) must be rejected. | ||
| * - Non-HTTP(S) schemes must be rejected. | ||
| * - Redirects to internal services must not be followed blindly. | ||
| */ | ||
|
|
||
| // Simulated URL validator that represents the security control that MUST exist | ||
| // in the Impala engine spec before making any HTTP POST request. | ||
| function validateImpalaKillQueryUrl(url: string): { valid: boolean; reason?: string } { | ||
| let parsed: URL; | ||
|
|
||
| try { | ||
| parsed = new URL(url); | ||
| } catch { | ||
| return { valid: false, reason: 'Invalid URL format' }; | ||
| } | ||
|
|
||
| // Only allow http and https schemes | ||
| if (!['http:', 'https:'].includes(parsed.protocol)) { | ||
| return { valid: false, reason: `Disallowed scheme: ${parsed.protocol}` }; | ||
| } | ||
|
|
||
| const hostname = parsed.hostname.toLowerCase(); | ||
|
|
||
| // Block loopback addresses | ||
| if ( | ||
| hostname === 'localhost' || | ||
| hostname === '127.0.0.1' || | ||
| hostname === '::1' || | ||
| hostname.startsWith('127.') | ||
| ) { | ||
| return { valid: false, reason: 'Loopback address not allowed' }; | ||
| } | ||
|
|
||
| // Block RFC1918 private ranges | ||
| const privateRanges = [ | ||
| /^10\.\d+\.\d+\.\d+$/, | ||
| /^172\.(1[6-9]|2\d|3[01])\.\d+\.\d+$/, | ||
| /^192\.168\.\d+\.\d+$/, | ||
| ]; | ||
| for (const range of privateRanges) { | ||
| if (range.test(hostname)) { | ||
| return { valid: false, reason: 'Private network address not allowed' }; | ||
| } | ||
| } | ||
|
|
||
| // Block cloud metadata services | ||
| const blockedHosts = [ | ||
| '169.254.169.254', // AWS/GCP/Azure metadata | ||
| 'metadata.google.internal', | ||
| 'metadata.internal', | ||
| '100.100.100.200', // Alibaba Cloud metadata | ||
| '192.0.2.1', // TEST-NET | ||
| '0.0.0.0', | ||
| ]; | ||
| if (blockedHosts.includes(hostname)) { | ||
| return { valid: false, reason: 'Blocked host (metadata service or reserved)' }; | ||
| } | ||
|
|
||
| // Block IPv6 link-local | ||
| if (hostname.startsWith('fe80') || hostname === '[::1]') { | ||
| return { valid: false, reason: 'IPv6 link-local or loopback not allowed' }; | ||
| } | ||
|
|
||
| // Block URLs with credentials embedded | ||
| if (parsed.username || parsed.password) { | ||
| return { valid: false, reason: 'Credentials in URL not allowed' }; | ||
| } | ||
|
|
||
| return { valid: true }; | ||
| } | ||
|
|
||
| // Simulated function that represents what the Impala spec does when killing a query | ||
| function impalaKillQuery(connectionHost: string, connectionPort: number, queryId: string): { | ||
| urlAttempted: string; | ||
| requestMade: boolean; | ||
| blocked: boolean; | ||
| reason?: string; | ||
| } { | ||
| // Simulate URL construction from connection parameters (as in the vulnerable code) | ||
| const url = `http://${connectionHost}:${connectionPort}/cancel_query?query_id=${encodeURIComponent(queryId)}`; | ||
|
|
||
| const validation = validateImpalaKillQueryUrl(url); | ||
|
|
||
| if (!validation.valid) { | ||
| return { | ||
| urlAttempted: url, | ||
| requestMade: false, | ||
| blocked: true, | ||
| reason: validation.reason, | ||
| }; | ||
| } | ||
|
|
||
| // Only if validation passes would we make the actual HTTP POST | ||
| return { | ||
| urlAttempted: url, | ||
| requestMade: true, | ||
| blocked: false, | ||
| }; | ||
| } | ||
|
|
||
| describe("Security Property: Impala engine spec must not make HTTP POST requests to SSRF/internal targets derived from user-controlled connection parameters", () => { | ||
| const adversarialPayloads: Array<{ | ||
| description: string; | ||
| host: string; | ||
| port: number; | ||
| queryId: string; | ||
| expectBlocked: boolean; | ||
| }> = [ | ||
| // SSRF via loopback | ||
| { | ||
| description: "loopback IPv4 localhost", | ||
| host: "127.0.0.1", | ||
| port: 25000, | ||
| queryId: "abc123", | ||
| expectBlocked: true, | ||
| }, | ||
| { | ||
| description: "loopback hostname localhost", | ||
| host: "localhost", | ||
| port: 25000, | ||
| queryId: "abc123", | ||
| expectBlocked: true, | ||
| }, | ||
| { | ||
| description: "loopback 127.x.x.x range", | ||
| host: "127.0.0.2", | ||
| port: 25000, | ||
| queryId: "abc123", | ||
| expectBlocked: true, | ||
| }, | ||
| // SSRF via private RFC1918 ranges | ||
| { | ||
| description: "RFC1918 10.x.x.x range", | ||
| host: "10.0.0.1", | ||
| port: 8080, | ||
| queryId: "abc123", | ||
| expectBlocked: true, | ||
| }, | ||
| { | ||
| description: "RFC1918 172.16.x.x range", | ||
| host: "172.16.0.1", | ||
| port: 8080, | ||
| queryId: "abc123", | ||
| expectBlocked: true, | ||
| }, | ||
| { | ||
| description: "RFC1918 172.31.x.x range", | ||
| host: "172.31.255.255", | ||
| port: 8080, | ||
| queryId: "abc123", | ||
| expectBlocked: true, | ||
| }, | ||
| { | ||
| description: "RFC1918 192.168.x.x range", | ||
| host: "192.168.1.1", | ||
| port: 8080, | ||
| queryId: "abc123", | ||
| expectBlocked: true, | ||
| }, | ||
| // Cloud metadata service SSRF | ||
| { | ||
| description: "AWS/GCP/Azure metadata service IP", | ||
| host: "169.254.169.254", | ||
| port: 80, | ||
| queryId: "abc123", | ||
| expectBlocked: true, | ||
| }, | ||
| { | ||
| description: "GCP metadata hostname", | ||
| host: "metadata.google.internal", | ||
| port: 80, | ||
| queryId: "abc123", | ||
| expectBlocked: true, | ||
| }, | ||
| { | ||
| description: "Alibaba Cloud metadata service", | ||
| host: "100.100.100.200", | ||
| port: 80, | ||
| queryId: "abc123", | ||
| expectBlocked: true, | ||
| }, | ||
| // SSRF via 0.0.0.0 | ||
| { | ||
| description: "0.0.0.0 wildcard bind address", | ||
| host: "0.0.0.0", | ||
| port: 25000, | ||
| queryId: "abc123", | ||
| expectBlocked: true, | ||
| }, | ||
| // Query ID injection attempts | ||
| { | ||
| description: "query ID with URL injection attempt", | ||
| host: "10.0.0.1", | ||
| port: 25000, | ||
| queryId: "abc@evil.com/steal?token=secret", | ||
| expectBlocked: true, | ||
| }, | ||
| { | ||
| description: "query ID with path traversal", | ||
| host: "192.168.0.1", | ||
| port: 25000, | ||
| queryId: "../../etc/passwd", | ||
| expectBlocked: true, | ||
| }, | ||
| // Legitimate external host (should NOT be blocked) | ||
| { | ||
| description: "legitimate external Impala host", | ||
| host: "impala.example.com", | ||
| port: 25000, | ||
| queryId: "valid-query-id-123", | ||
| expectBlocked: false, | ||
| }, | ||
| { | ||
| description: "legitimate public IP", | ||
| host: "203.0.113.10", | ||
| port: 25000, | ||
| queryId: "valid-query-id-456", | ||
| expectBlocked: false, | ||
| }, | ||
| ]; | ||
|
|
||
| test.each(adversarialPayloads)( | ||
| "enforces security boundary for: $description", | ||
| ({ host, port, queryId, expectBlocked, description }) => { | ||
| const result = impalaKillQuery(host, port, queryId); | ||
|
|
||
| if (expectBlocked) { | ||
| // SECURITY INVARIANT: Requests to internal/SSRF targets MUST be blocked | ||
| expect(result.requestMade).toBe(false); | ||
| expect(result.blocked).toBe(true); | ||
| expect(result.reason).toBeDefined(); | ||
| expect(result.reason!.length).toBeGreaterThan(0); | ||
| } else { | ||
| // Legitimate targets should be allowed through | ||
| expect(result.requestMade).toBe(true); | ||
| expect(result.blocked).toBe(false); | ||
| } | ||
| } | ||
| ); | ||
|
|
||
| test("URL validator rejects non-HTTP schemes that could be used for SSRF", () => { | ||
| const dangerousSchemes = [ | ||
| "file:///etc/passwd", | ||
| "ftp://internal-server/data", | ||
| "gopher://127.0.0.1:25/", | ||
| "dict://127.0.0.1:11211/", | ||
| "sftp://internal-host/", | ||
| "ldap://internal-ldap/", | ||
| "jar:http://evil.com/evil.jar!/", | ||
| "netdoc:///etc/passwd", | ||
| ]; | ||
|
|
||
| for (const url of dangerousSchemes) { | ||
| const result = validateImpalaKillQueryUrl(url); | ||
| expect(result.valid).toBe(false); | ||
| expect(result.reason).toBeDefined(); | ||
| } | ||
| }); | ||
|
|
||
| test("URL validator rejects URLs with embedded credentials", () => { | ||
| const urlsWithCredentials = [ | ||
| "http://admin:password@internal-service:8080/cancel_query", | ||
| "http://user:secret@10.0.0.1:25000/cancel_query", | ||
| "https://root:root@192.168.1.1/api", | ||
| ]; | ||
|
|
||
| for (const url of urlsWithCredentials) { | ||
| const result = validateImpalaKillQueryUrl(url); | ||
| expect(result.valid).toBe(false); | ||
| expect(result.reason).toContain("Credentials"); | ||
| } | ||
| }); | ||
|
|
||
| test("URL validator rejects malformed URLs that could bypass validation", () => { | ||
| const malformedUrls = [ | ||
| "", | ||
| "not-a-url", | ||
| "http://", | ||
| "://missing-scheme", | ||
| "http:///no-host", | ||
| "\x00http://evil.com", | ||
| "http://evil.com\x00.trusted.com", | ||
| ]; | ||
|
|
||
| for (const url of malformedUrls) { | ||
| const result = validateImpalaKillQueryUrl(url); | ||
| // Malformed URLs must either be rejected or, if parsed, must pass all checks | ||
| // The key invariant: they must not silently allow SSRF | ||
| if (!result.valid) { | ||
| expect(result.reason).toBeDefined(); | ||
| } | ||
| } | ||
| }); | ||
|
|
||
| test("security invariant: no HTTP request is ever made to a private/internal address", () => { | ||
| const internalHosts = [ | ||
| "127.0.0.1", | ||
| "localhost", | ||
| "10.0.0.1", | ||
| "172.16.0.1", | ||
| "192.168.1.1", | ||
| "169.254.169.254", | ||
| "0.0.0.0", | ||
| ]; | ||
|
|
||
| for (const host of internalHosts) { | ||
| const result = impalaKillQuery(host, 25000, "test-query"); | ||
| // INVARIANT: requestMade MUST be false for all internal addresses | ||
| expect(result.requestMade).toBe(false); | ||
| expect(result.blocked).toBe(true); | ||
| } | ||
| }); | ||
| }); No newline at end of file |
Contributor
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CWE-20: Wrong Test Runner for File Location
This test file uses TypeScript/Jest syntax (import from '@jest/globals', describe, test, function validateImpalaKillQueryUrl) but is located in the tests/ directory which pytest.ini configures to only discover Python test files (python_files = *_test.py test_*.py *_tests.py). The file will never execute as part of the test suite. Either convert to Python/pytest or move to superset-frontend/ where Jest is configured. (See also: CWE-20)
Rule 6262: Testing Simulated Code Instead of Actual Logic
Per adaptive rule 6262, tests must verify actual business logic. The current tests validate a simulated 'validateImpalaKillQueryUrl' function rather than the real cancel_query in superset/db_engine_specs/impala.py. The actual SSRF-vulnerable code at lines 211-216 makes HTTP POST requests without any URL validation. The test does not test the code that needs fixing.
Code Review Run #50f6a2
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Automated security fix generated by OrbisAI Security
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Contributor
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Code Review Agent Run #b5e020
Actionable Suggestions - 1
-
superset/db_engine_specs/impala.py - 1
- CWE-918: SSRF Check Incomplete · Line 214-214
Review Details
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Files reviewed - 1 · Commit Range:
06c0140..06c0140- superset/db_engine_specs/impala.py
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| """ | ||
| try: | ||
| impala_host = query.database.url_object.host | ||
| resolved = ipaddress.ip_address(socket.gethostbyname(impala_host)) |
Contributor
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CWE-918: SSRF Check Incomplete
SSRF check only validates the first DNS result; an attacker controlling DNS could bypass by placing a public IP first. Use socket.getaddrinfo() to enumerate all resolved IPs. (See also: CWE-918)
Code Review Run #b5e020
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Summary
Fix high severity security issue in
superset/db_engine_specs/impala.py.Vulnerability
V-002superset/db_engine_specs/impala.py:213Description: The database engine specs make HTTP requests to URLs that may be derived from user-configured database connection parameters. In superset/db_engine_specs/impala.py:213 and superset/db_engine_specs/base.py:813-815, requests.post() is called with URLs that could be influenced by database connection configurations. If an authenticated user with database creation privileges can control the URL, they can force the server to make requests to internal services.
Changes
superset/db_engine_specs/impala.pyVerification
Automated security fix by OrbisAI Security