Limit the boundary of ocsp response string from memory size to actual payload size#39
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markt-asf merged 1 commit intoapache:mainfrom Feb 13, 2026
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Code review: Using actual ocsp response payload size.
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That would require a corrupt payload. If the payload is corrupt, it can crash the decoder regardless of length. That said, I don't see the harm in limiting the copy size as proposed. |
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Code review: Using actual ocsp response payload size.
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Code review: Using actual ocsp response payload size.
Then buf[1689...2047] were filled with uninitialized memory data.
(Particular DER payload + uninitialized memory) could lead to potential DER decoder crash in #d2i_OCSP_RESPONSE_bio.