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Security: arshad-shah/Kit

Security

SECURITY.md

Security Policy

Supported versions

Each package follows independent semver. The latest minor of the latest major is supported with security fixes. Older majors are only patched at the maintainer's discretion.

Package Supported
@arshad-shah/store-kit latest 1.x
@arshad-shah/fetch-kit latest 1.x
@arshad-shah/log-kit latest 1.x
@arshad-shah/config-kit latest 1.x

Reporting a vulnerability

Please do not open a public issue for security problems.

Use GitHub's private vulnerability reporting on this repo, or email security@arshadshah.com.

You'll receive an acknowledgment within 72 hours and a remediation plan or rejection rationale within 7 days. Coordinated disclosure: once a fix is released, the advisory is published with a CVE if appropriate.

Supply chain hardening

  • OIDC trusted publishing: every release is published from a hardened GitHub Actions workflow using a short-lived npm credential exchanged for a GitHub OIDC token. No long-lived NPM_TOKEN lives in CI after bootstrap. See apps/docs/src/content/docs/ops/security.md for the trusted-publisher setup.
  • Provenance attestations: every tarball is published with --provenance, cryptographically linking it to the commit SHA, the workflow file, and the runner. Verify with npm audit signatures.
  • SHA-pinned actions: every third-party GitHub Action is pinned to a commit SHA, not a floating tag. Updates flow through Dependabot.
  • pnpm audit --audit-level=high runs as a dedicated CI job on every PR; high or critical advisories fail the build.
  • CodeQL scans the TypeScript surface on every PR and on a weekly schedule.
  • CODEOWNERS require maintainer review on every CI workflow, lockfile, and published package.json.
  • Dependabot raises grouped weekly PRs for non-security updates and immediate PRs for security advisories.

What is in scope

  • Runtime vulnerabilities in published dist/ output of any of the four packages.
  • Build/publish pipeline vulnerabilities that could lead to unauthorized package publication.
  • Vulnerabilities in pnpm-lock.yaml (transitive deps) that affect production code.

What is out of scope

  • Vulnerabilities only reproducible in the dev/test/build toolchain (Vitest, Stryker, Astro, etc.) without a path to production code.
  • Issues in the docs site that don't expose data.
  • Theoretical attacks requiring write access to the repo or maintainer credentials.

There aren't any published security advisories