fix(dlp): scan tool_use.input and tool_result.content for secrets#333
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4 commits merged intomainfrom Apr 28, 2026
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April 28, 2026 22:41
CI re-runs the full test suite (incl. doctests) on every PR via the .github/workflows/ci.yml tests job, so local pre-push duplication adds ~20 min per push without catching anything new. Pre-push hooks should be fast-fail; expensive checks belong on the CI server. Closes audit finding: silent productivity tax (pre-push duplication).
Documents the three-state intent (true/false/absent) of ProviderConfig.is_enabled and the dependency on deny_unknown_fields (added in the next commit) to reject typos like enbaled = false at parse time. Behaviour is unchanged; this is purely contractual clarity to support the silent-typo-killer audit. Closes audit finding: silent typo killer on provider config.
Adds #[serde(deny_unknown_fields)] to AppConfig and the major sub-structs (ProviderConfig, ModelConfig, TierConfig, RouterConfig, ScoringConfig, CacheConfig, BudgetConfig, DlpConfig, SecurityConfig). Without this guard, a typo like enbaled = false in a [[providers]] block silently parses (the unknown key is dropped) and the provider remains enabled with the wrong intent. With the guard, parsing fails loudly and the operator gets an actionable error pointing at the offending key. Tested with the full nextest suite (1268 tests) plus all doctests: no fixture, preset or example carries a stale field, so this is a pure tightening with no migration cost. Closes audit finding: silent typo killer on TOML config.
Each entry in DENIED_SECTIONS / DENIED_KEYS now carries a short justification table covering why it can not be hot-reloaded — either because the data is sensitive (credentials, DLP rules) or because the consumer is constructed once at process start (TLS listener, secret backend, TEE attestation, FIPS gate). Adds tee, fips, server.tls and secrets.backend to the deny-list so the documented "static-init" rationale matches actual behaviour. Also emits an INFO log on every denied attempt telling the operator to restart instead of expecting the silent reload to apply. Adds two unit tests covering the new deny entries (tee/fips sections and server.tls / secrets.backend keys) and asserts that sibling keys in the same sections remain editable. Closes audit finding: hot-reload UX (silent ignore of denied edits).
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Summary
Closes the DLP audit gap on chained tool calls. Previously the engine scanned only top-level message text, so secrets that flow through
tool_use.input(tool arguments) ortool_result.content(tool output that flows back into the next provider call) were invisible — chained agent loops could quietly leak secrets across turns.DlpEngine::sanitize_tool_io_requestwalks everytool_use.input(serde_json::Value, serialised) and everytool_result.content(string OR array of content blocks) in the request. Default mode rejects the request and emits aToolIoBlockedaudit entry;[dlp] mode = "redact"redacts in-place and continues.DlpEngine::sanitize_tool_io_responsedoes the same for the upstream provider response, so a model that echoes a leaked secret into a tool argument is caught before the response leaves the proxy.DlpBlockError::SecretInToolIo { stage, tool_name, reason }— stage is"input"(requesttool_use.input),"result"(requesttool_result.content), or"output"(upstream-responsetool_use.input).AuditEvent::ToolIoBlockedvariant; the existingdlp_rules_triggeredfield carriesstage=…,tool=…, and the rule name.ProviderLoopAction::DlpBlockedpropagates upstream-response blocks past the provider fallback cascade (no sibling retry on a poisoned response).[dlp]mode = "block" | "redact"config (defaultblock).grob_dlp_tool_io_total{stage,rule,outcome}metric.Honors existing
[dlp]enabled/scan_input/scan_outputflags.Test plan
dlp_blocks_secret_in_tool_use_inputdlp_blocks_secret_in_tool_result_content(covers the array-of-content-blocks branch)dlp_blocks_secret_in_upstream_response_tool_use_inputdlp_redacts_when_mode_redact_in_tool_input(asserts the raw token does not survive in the serialized request)dlp_audit_log_records_tool_io_block(round-trips the new variant through the signing pipeline)dlp_passes_clean_tool_io_unchanged(byte-for-byte unchanged on clean input/result/output)cargo fmt --check,cargo clippy --all-targets --all-features -- -D warnings,cargo nextest run --tests --all-features(1307 tests, all green)