CS6053 - Network Security

Stack Attack

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1 Maintaining Security

In order to maintain a secure connection with the monitor we have implemented a few different algorithms: Diffie-Hellman, Karn Symmetric Cyrptosystem, and the Fiat-Shamir Algorithm.

1.1 Diffie-Hellman

In order to authenticate with the Monitor we first needed to implement a shared secret key. We did this by implementing the Diffie-Hellman protocol. The Diffie-Hellman key exchange works as shown below:




Figure 1: Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange

In the image above, we can see that g, p are just the generator and the modulo prime number respectively. A is calculated using the function, $K(g^a \mod p)$; this is then sent over to Bob. Note that g, p, and A are all seen by everyone. The trick here is that Alice and Bob both generate there own secret key locally (this key is never sent across a network). The way we can authenticate can be shown in the example below:

$$A = g^a \mod p,$$

$$B = g^b \mod p,$$

$$A = 3^{15} \mod 17 \equiv 6$$

$$B = 3^{13} \mod 17 \equiv 12$$

```
where a = 15 (Alice's secret key), g = 3, p = 17 and where b = 13 (Bob's secret key), g = 3, p = 17
```

Therefore, Bob receives this value from Alice along with p and g. Now Bob computes his result and sends 12 to Alice. Now the heart of the trick lies here: Alice will take Bob's key and use her private key to get the correct message from Bob and Bob does the same with Alice's key:

$$A = 12^{15} \mod 17 \equiv 10$$

 $B = 6^{13} \mod 17 \equiv 10$

The reason this works is because when you take an exponent to another exponent, these values get multiplied:

$$3^{13^{15}} \mod 17 \equiv 3^{15^{13}} \mod 17$$

Therefore, even if Eve performed a man-in-the-middle attack, all Eve would have is just the encrypted message and the prime and the generator number—making it rather difficult to decrypt the message via brute-forcing due to the discrete logarithm problem.

1.2 Karn Symmetric Cryptosystem

After implementing the Diffie-Hellman protocol we then needed to implement the Karn encryption scheme. The Karn encryption scheme uses the Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA-1) in order to generate the message digests. This algorithm uses the shared keys generated by the Diffie-Hellman protocol. It initially splits the bits of the shared secret key into two halves: a left and a right half. The encryption algorithm works as described below:

- Add "guard" byte of value 42,
- During each block of plaintext, divide block of plaintext into left/right half,
- Find the message digest of the concatenation of the left plaintext half and the left key half,
- XOR the digest with the right plaintext half. (This produces the right ciphertext half),
- Find the message digest of the ciphertext right half concatenated with the key right half,
- XOR the digest with the plaintext left half.

Once this is complete we have both halves, allowing us to output both the left and right half of the ciphertext. In order to decrypt the message we needed to follow the steps shown below:

- Strip guard byte,
- For each ciphertext block, split the block into a left half and a right half,
- Find the message digest of the ciphertext right half concatenated with the key right half,
- XOR the result with the ciphertext left half to obtain the plaintext left half,
- Find the message digest of the plaintext left half and the key left half,
- XOR the result with the ciphertext right half to get the plaintext right half.

One interesting problem we came across is that the monitor is using a Java BigInteger type to store its key and the BigInteger is signed so Java adds a pad byte to maintain its signedness. This results in a key that is one byte longer than we expect. Since we are using Python we have to manually add the extra pad byte. This should really be fixed in the monitor (monitor/Cipher.java:87) so that the pad byte is ignored.

1.3 Zero-Knowledge Proof

A zero-knowledge proof is a proof that will prove a given statement without giving out the "answer." It only gives out the "postulates/theorems" to convince the server that the statement is true without having the server learn anything about the given statement. One example of a zero-knowledge proof is the Fiat-Shamir heuristic algorithm. A simple example can be descibed below:

Alice (prover) will not need to have a shared key with Bob (verifier); all Alice needs to do is convince Bob that this is truly her without Bob having the key. Alice will prove the knowledge of the secret to Bob in t executions. The probability is found to be 2^{-t} . Therefore, the more iterations Alice tries to prove to Bob, the harder it is for an attacker to "impersonate" Alice.

The protocol can be described below:

- Initially, A will select two primes p, q, and multiply them together to generate the public key (n).
- A will then select s coprime to n, where $1 \le s \le$,
- A will then compute v:

$$v \equiv s^2 \bmod n$$

- A chooses random commitment $r, 1 \le r \le n-1$
- A sends B:

$$x \equiv r^2 \bmod n$$

- B then sends A a random e, $\{0,1\}$
- A sends B:

$$y \equiv r * s^e \bmod n$$

Once A has tried to prove to B that this is the correct user, B must verify. The verification process is shown below:

- B rejects if y = 0,
- B accepts if:

$$y^2 \equiv x * v^e \mod n,$$

rejects otherwise

We initially had a hard time implementing this and ended up closely following AJ Alts and Ryan Childs implementation [2] from a few years ago.

2 Attacking Accounts

We entered this competition from a purely defensive standpoint, mostly due to the fact that we didn't have our code fully working until a few days before the competition. When the competition began we waited for a while to see what the activity of the other players would be. After seeing basically not activity for almost an hour we decided to just start our script that would transfer funds between our accounts. As other players connected we manually recorded their cookies (later wrote a script to harvest them) in anticipation of being able to use them later. It wasn't long before somehow our password was changed. At the time this was really baffling because we had never sent our password to the monitor and you need the old password to create a new one. As we later found out the team that got root on gauss had full control of the monitor. At this point we were unable to do much. We added the functionality to parse the logs for our latest cookie and password in an attempt to recover our accounts. This was fruitless, however, being that every time the other team logged in with our account they immediately changed the password again causing the cookie to change. We left our script running anyway in the hopes that maybe their strategy would change and we would be able to grab the new password to our account. Needless to say we were never able to recover our account and the points we had accrued early in the competition were taken back by the monitor over time as our server was not able to respond to the alive requests.

Figure 2: Screenshot of script transferring points between our three accounts

3 Appendix

3.1 Python Code

```
import sys
 2
      import socket
      import argparse
      from printer import Printer
      from config import Config
      from diffie_hellman import DHE
      from karn import Karn
      from fiat import Prover
 9
      from base32 import base32
     import parse_log
     config = Config()
      printer = Printer("client")
13
      dhe = DHE()
      prover = Prover()
      authenticated = False
      \mathsf{karn} \, = \, \mathsf{None}
17
      {\tt transfer} \, = \, {\sf None}
      {\sf exit} \, = \, {\sf False}
      only_do_alive = False
22
      def generate_response(line):
            global karn
            global authenticated
            global transfer
26
            global exit
27
            line = line.strip()
directive, args = [x.strip() for x in line.split(':', 1)]
29
30
            if directive = "REQUIRE":
                                                                    return "IDENT %s %s" % (Config.ident, dhe.public_key)
return "PASSWORD %s" % Config.password
return "ALIVE %s" % Config.cookie
return "HOST_PORT %s %s" % (Config.server_ip, Config.server_port)
return "PUBLIC_KEY %s %s" % (base32(prover.v), base32(prover.n))
return "AUTHORIZE_SET %s" % prover.authorize_set()
return "SUBSET_J %s" % prover.subset_j()
return "SUBSET_K %s" % prover.subset_k()
printer.error("Unknown require: " + line)
31
                  if args == "IDENT"
32
                   elif args == "PASSWORD":
33
                   elif args == "ALIVE":
34
                   elif args = "HOST_PORT"
35
                   elif args == "PUBLIC_KEY":
36
                   elif args == "AUTHORIZE_SET":
37
                   elif args = "SUBSET_J":
38
                   elif args = "SUBSET_K":
39
40
                  else:
             elif directive = "RESULT":
41
                  args = args.split(' ', 1) if args[0] == "IDENT":
42
43
                         dhe.monitor_key(args[1])
44
                         karn = Karn(dhe.secret)
45
                  printer.info("Setup secret key")
elif args[0] == "PASSWORD":
46
                  Config.cookie = args[1]
printer.info("Got cookie: " + Config.cookie)
elif args[0] == "HOST_PORT":
47
48
49
50
                         printer.info("Login successful! (%s)" % args[1]) if transfer is None and not manual_mode:
51
52
                               exit = True return ""
53
54
                   elif args[0] = "ALIVE" and args[1] = "Identity has been verified.": printer.info("Alive verified")
55
56
                         authenticated = True
57
58
                         if only_do_alive:
                               exit = True
return ""
60
                   {\tt elif args[0] == "TRANSFER\_REQUEST":}
61
                   \begin{array}{ll} & \text{printer.info} \, (\text{"Transfer was \%s" \% args} \, [1]) \\ \text{elif args} \, [0] \, = \, \text{"ROUNDS"} \, : \end{array}
62
                   prover.rounds = int(args[1])
elif args[0] == "SUBSET_A":
64
65
                   prover.subset.a = [int(x) for x in args[1].split()] elif args[0] = "TRANSFER_RESPONSE" and not manual_mode:
66
             printer.error("Unknown result: \%s (args: \%r)" \% (line, args)) \\ elif directive == "WAITING": 
                   if transfer and authenticated:
73
                         rt = "TRANSFER_REQUEST %s %s FROM %s\n" % tuple(transfer)
                         transfer = None
```

```
76
                      return rt
77
                 if manual_mode and authenticated:
78
                      return raw_input('Command:
           elif directive = "COMMENT":
79
           \begin{array}{c} {\sf pass} \\ {\sf elif \ directive == "COMMAND\_ERROR"} : \end{array}
 80
 81
 82
                 exit = True
 83
                 printer.error(line)
                 return
 85
           else:
                 exit = True
                 printer.error("Unknown directive: " + line)
           return None
 91
      if __name__ == "__main__":
           parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
           parser = algrarise : Algument ('—ident', default="mtest16")
parser.add_argument ('—transfer', nargs=3, metavar=('TO', 'AMOUNT', 'FROM'))
parser.add_argument ('—manual', action='store_true')
parser.add_argument ('—alive', action='store_true')
parser.add_argument ('—logfile', default="/home/httpd/html/final.log.8180")
95
96
97
99
100
           args = parser.parse_args()
101
           manual_mode = args.manual
102
           transfer = args.transfer
103
           only_do_alive = args.alive
104
105
           if args.ident not in Config.accounts:
106
                 print "Invalid ident"
107
                 sys . exit (1)
108
109
           Config.ident = args.ident
110
           {\sf Config.server\_port} \ = \ {\sf Config.accounts[args.ident].port}
111
112
           {\tt parse\_log.parse} \, (\, {\tt args.logfile} \, )
113
           Config.cookie = parse_log.cookies[args.ident.lower()]
Config.password = parse_log.passes[args.ident.lower()]
114
115
116
           print "Using cookie: '%s'" % Config.cookie
117
118
           sock = socket.create_connection((Config.monitor_ip, Config.monitor_port))
119
120
           for line in sock.makefile():
121
122
                # check if this line is encrypted if line.startswith('1a'):
123
124
125
                      line = karn.decrypt(line)
126
                      if line is None: continue
                      printer.\,directive\,(\,line\,\,,\,\,encrypted{=}True\,)
127
128
                 else:
                      printer . directive (line)
129
130
131
                # generate the response for this line
132
                 response = generate_response(line)
133
134
                # if there is no response go get another line
                if response is None: continue
135
136
137
                 printer.command(response + '\n', encrypted=karn)
138
                 \# if we have a valid karn we can encrypt the response
139
140
141
                      response = karn.encrypt(response)
142
                # add the newline and send the response
143
144
145
                sock.send(response)
146
                 if exit: break
147
148
149
           sock.close()
```

Listing 1: Client

import argparse
import sys

```
import socket
import SocketServer
 3
     import platform
     import subprocess
     from config import Config
     from config import checksums
     from printer import Printer
     from diffie_hellman import DHE
10
     from karn import Karn
12
     from fiat import Verifier
    import parse_log
     {\color{red} \textbf{class}} \hspace{0.1in} \textbf{tcp\_handler(SocketServer.StreamRequestHandler):} \\
          def setup(self):
17
               self.dhe = DHE()
               self.karn = None
               self.verifier = Verifier()
22
               self.printer = Printer("server")
               self.exit = False
26
               SocketServer. StreamRequestHandler. setup (self)
27
          def finish (self):
29
30
               SocketServer. StreamRequestHandler. finish (self)
31
32
          def generate_response(self, line):
33
34
               line = line.strip()
35
               directive, args = [x.strip() for x in line.split(':', 1)]
36
37
               if directive == "REQUIRE":
38
                    if args == "IDENT
39
                         return "IDENT %s %s" % (Config.ident, self.dhe.public_key)
40
                    elif args = "ALIVE":
return "ALIVE %s" % Config.cookie
41
42
                     elif args == "ROUNDS"
43
                         return "ROUNDS %s" % Config.num_rounds
44
                    elif args = "SUBSET_A":
return "SUBSET_A %s" % '
                    return "SUBSET_A %s" % ' '.join(str(x) for x in self.verifier.subset_a)
elif args == "TRANSFER_RESPONSE":
if colf we do:
45
46
47
                         if self.verifier.good():
48
                              return "TRANSFER_RESPONSE ACCEPT"
49
                         else ·
50
                    return "TRANSFER_RESPONSE DECLINE" elif args = "QUIT":
51
52
                         return "QUIT'
53
54
                    else:
                         self.printer.error("Unknown require: " + line)
55
               \mathbf{elif}\ \mathsf{directive} = "\mathsf{RESULT"}
56
57
                    args = args.split('
                    if args[0] = "IDENT":
59
                         self.dhe.monitor_key(args[1])
                    self.karn = Karn(self.dhe.secret)
self.printer.info("Setup secret key")
elif args[0] = "ALIVE" and args[1] = "Identity has been verified.":
self.printer.info("Alive verified")
elif args[0] = "QUIT":
60
61
63
64
                    self.printer.info("server has quit")
elif args[0] == "SUBSET_K":
65
67
                         self.verifier.subset_k = [int(x) for x in args[1].split()]
                     elif args[0] = "SUBSET_J"
                     \begin{array}{lll} & \text{self.verifier.subset-j} = [\text{int(x) for x in args[1].split()}] \\ & \text{elif args[0]} = "\text{PUBLIC_KEY"}: \end{array} 
69
                         self.verifier.v = int(args[1].split()[0], 32)
                         self.verifier.n = int(args[1].split()[1], 32)
                    elif args [0] = "AUTHORIZE_SET"
73
                         self.verifier.authorize_set = [int(x) for x in args[1].split()]
                    else:
                         self.printer.error("Unknown result")
               elif directive = "PARTICIPANT_PASSWORD_CHECKSUM":
                    self.printer.info("Got checksum: %s" % args)
78
79
                    if args not in checksums:
                         self.printer.error("INVALID CHECKSUM")
80
                         {\tt self.exit} \, = \, {\sf True}
81
                         return ""
82
83
               elif directive == "WAITING":
```

```
\begin{array}{c} \text{pass} \\ \text{elif directive} \implies \text{"COMMENT"}: \end{array}
 84
 85
 86
                     pass
 87
                else:
                     self.printer.error("Unknown directive: " + line)
 89
                return None
 90
91
           def handle(self):
93
                for line in self.rfile:
 94
 95
                     # check if this line is encrypted
                     if line.startswith('1a'):
 97
                           line = self.karn.decrypt(line)
                           if line is None: continue
 99
                           self.printer.directive(line, encrypted=True)
100
101
102
                           self.printer.directive(line)
103
104
                     # generate the response for this line
                     response = self.generate_response(line)
105
106
                     # if there is no response go get another line
107
                     if response is None: continue
108
109
                     self.printer.command(response + '\n', encrypted=self.karn)
110
111
                     # if we have a valid karn we can encrypt the response
112
                     if self.karn:
113
                          response = self.karn.encrypt(response)
114
115
                     # add the newline and send the response
116
                     response +=
117
                     self.wfile.write(response)
118
119
                     if self.exit:
120
                          self.printer.error("Exiting!")
121
                          break
122
123
      if __name__ = "__main__":
124
125
           parser \, = \, argparse \, . \, Argument Parser \, ( \, )
126
           parser.add_argument('—ident', default="mtest16")
parser.add_argument('—logfile', default="/home/httpd/html/final.log.8180")
127
128
           args = parser.parse_args()
129
130
           if args.ident not in Config.accounts:
    print "Invalid ident"
131
132
                sys.exit(1)
133
134
135
           Config.ident
                                 = Config.accounts[args.ident].ident
136
           Config.server\_port = Config.accounts[args.ident].port
137
138
           parse_log.parse(args.logfile)
           Config.cookie = parse_log.cookies[args.ident.lower()]
Config.password = parse_log.passes[args.ident.lower()]
print "Using cookie: '%s'" % Config.cookie
139
140
141
142
           print "Starting server on %s:%s" % (Config.server_ip , Config.server_port)
server = SocketServer.ThreadingTCPServer((Config.server_ip , Config.server_port), tcp_handler)
143
144
           server.serve_forever()
145
```

Listing 2: Server

```
15
            Generate a new private key if it wasn't given
16
17
            if (key):
18
19
                self.private_key = int(key, 32)
20
            else:
                self.private_key = getrandbits(512)
21
22
            Public Key = g**x \% p
24
25
26
            self.public_key = base32(pow(self.g, self.private_key, self.p))
28
        def monitor_key(self, key):
29
            Takes in the monitors public key in Base 32
30
            self.secret = pow(int(key,32), self.private_key, self.p)
```

Listing 3: Diffie Hellman

```
Karn Symmetric Key Cryptosystem
    from hashlib import sha1
    from itertools import izip_longest
    import struct
    import base64
    import string
from printer import Printer
10
11
    BLOCK_SIZE = 40
12
    GUARD_BYTE = 42
13
14
    class Karn:
15
16
         def __init__(self, key):
17
18
              # Convert the integer key into a hex string
19
              # If the length of it is odd we need to left pad a '0'
20
              key_hex = '%x' % key
21
              if len (key_hex) & 1:
key_hex = '0' + key_hex
22
23
24
              # Convert the hex key string into byte array
25
              key = bytearray.fromhex(key_hex)
26
27
              # java BigInteger.toByteArray() is signed so it pads if MSB is 1
28
             # http://stackoverflow.com/a/8544521/253650 if key [0] & (1<<7):
29
30
                  key = bytearray([0]) + key
31
32
              # Split key into two halfs
33
              # Monitor drops last byte if len is odd (monitor/Cipher.java:87)
self.key_left = key [:len(key)/2]
34
35
              self.key_right = key[len(key)/2:(len(key)/2)*2]
36
37
38
              self.printer = Printer("karn")
39
40
         def encrypt(self, message):
41
42
              # Start the output with the guard byte
              output = bytearray([GUARD_BYTE])
43
44
              \# Break message into blocks and process each one for block in self._grouper(message, BLOCK_SIZE, '\0'):
45
46
47
                   # Convert the block into an array of bytes
                  block = bytearray(block)
49
                  # Divide block into left and right half block_left = block[:BLOCK_SIZE/2]
51
                  block_right = block BLOCK_SIZE /2:
53
54
                  # Hash the left plaintext plus the left key
                   digest = sha1(block_left + self.key_left).digest()
56
                  # XOR the digest with the right plaintext
58
```

```
cipher_right = bytearray([ord(d)^b for d,b in zip(digest, block_right)])
 59
 60
 61
                   # Hash the right cipher plus the right key
                   digest = sha1(cipher_right + self.key_right).digest()
 62
 63
                   # XOR the digest with the left plaintext
 64
                    cipher_left = bytearray([ord(d)^b for d,b in zip(digest, block_left)])
 65
 66
                   output \mathrel{+}= cipher\_left
 68
                   output += cipher_right
              # Convert output to a hex string
 70
              output = '0x'+''.join('\%02X'\% x for x in output)
              # Convert the hex string to an integer and then conver to base 32
73
               return self._baseN(int(output, 16), 32)
 74
          def decrypt(self, message):
              # Convert the message from base 32 to hex message = '%x' % int(message, 32)
 78
               if len (message) & 1:
 80
                   message = '0' + message
 81
 82
83
              # Convert the hex string to a byte array
 84
              message = bytearray.fromhex(message)
85
                 If the first byte isn't the guard byte we are done
86
               if message[0] != GUARD_BYTE:
87
                    self.printer.error("Did not find guard_byte!")
 88
                    return None
 89
90
              # Remove the guard byte
91
              message = message[1:]
92
93
94
              output = bytearray()
95
              # Break message into blocks and process each one
96
              for block in self._grouper(message, BLOCK_SIZE, ' \setminus 0'):
97
98
                   # Convert the block into an array of bytes
99
                    block = bytearray(block)
100
101
                   # Divide block into left and right half
block_left = block[:BLOCK_SIZE/2]
102
103
                   block_right = block[BLOCK_SIZE/2:]
104
105
                   # Find digest of cipher right and key right
digest = sha1(block_right + self.key_right).digest()
106
107
108
                   # XOR the digest with cipher left
109
110
                   text_left = bytearray([ord(d)^b for d,b in zip(digest, block_left)])
111
                   # Find the digest of text left and key left
112
113
                   digest = sha1(text_left + self.key_left).digest()
114
115
                   # XOR the digest with cipher right
116
                   text_right = bytearray([ord(d)^b for d,b in zip(digest, block_right)])
117
                   output \mathrel{+}= text\_left
118
119
                   output += text_right
120
121
              # Remove the padding
              output = str(output). split('\0')[0]
122
123
124
              # Make sure the plaintext is normal printable text
               if not all(x in string.printable for x in output):
    self.printer.error("Unable to decrypt: %r" % output)
125
127
                    return None
128
129
               return output
130
          def _grouper(self , iterable , n , fillvalue=None):
131
132
               Collect data into fixed—length chunks or blocks grouper ('ABCDEFG', 3, 'x') \Longrightarrow ABC DEF Gxx http://docs.python.org/2/library/itertools.html#recipes
133
134
135
136
               args = [iter(iterable)] * n
137
               return izip_longest(fillvalue=fillvalue, *args)
138
139
```

```
def _baseN(self, num,b,numerals="0123456789abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz"):
140
141
               Return 'num' in base 'b'
142
               http://\,stackoverflow.com/a/2267428
143
144
                return \ ((num = 0) \ and \ numerals \ [0]) \ or \ (self.\_baseN(num \ // \ b, \ b, \ numerals). \ lstrip(numerals \ [0]) \ + \ numerals \ [numerals] 
145
146
147
     if __name__ == "__main__":
148
          text = "this is a test"
149
          \mathsf{key} \, = \, 123456789
150
151
          enc = "1avfbcuej96oo1m2vc04rnlin6rpurc2pu7ac8h42dhr8l13ahdfcbev3a5sj74o85"
          k = Karn(key)
153
154
          print "--- Testing Correct --
155
          e = k.encrypt(text)
156
157
          assert e == enc
158
          d = k.decrypt(e)
159
          \mathsf{assert}\ \mathsf{d} = \mathsf{text}
160
          print "--- Testing No Guard Byte ---"
e = '0' + enc[1:]
161
162
          d = k.decrypt(e)
163
164
          assert d == None
165
          print "--- Testing Corrupted Message ---"
166
          e = enc[:10] + "00000" + enc[15:]
167
          d = k.decrypt(e)
168
          assert d = None
169
170
          print "--- Done ---
171
```

Listing 4: Karn

```
.....
1
    Fiat-Shamir Zero Knowledge Authentication
2
3
    import random
5
    from config import Config
6
    class Prover:
9
10
         http://pages.swcp.com/~mccurley/talks/msri2/node24.html
11
         http://friedo.szm.com/krypto/AC/ch21/21-01.html
12
13
14
        p \ = \ 18446744073709551253
15
         q = 18446744073709551557
16
17
         n \,=\, p \,\,*\,\, q
18
         def __init__(self):
19
20
              {\tt self.s} \, = \, {\tt random.randrange}(2{<}{<}64)
21
22
              self.v = pow(self.s, 2, self.n)
23
              self.subset_a = []
24
              self.r_set = []
25
              self.rounds = 10
26
27
         def authorize_set(self):
28
             # generate the random set
              self.r_set = [random.randrange(2<<64) for _ in range(self.rounds)]
29
             # calculate the authorize set
31
              auth\_set = [pow(r, 2, self.n) for r in self.r\_set]
             # return it as a string
return ' '.join(str(x) for x in auth_set)
32
         def subset_k(self):
35
             k = [(self.s * self.r_set[i]) % self.n for i in self.subset_a]
              return ' '.join(str(x) for x in k)
39
         def subset_j(self):
             j = [self.r_set[i] % self.n for i in set(range(self.rounds)) - set(self.subset_a)]
return ' '.join(str(x) for x in j)
40
41
42
    class Verifier:
44
```

```
45
46
         def __init__(self):
47
48
             self.rounds = Config.num\_rounds
49
             self.v\,=\,0
50
             self.n\,=\,0
51
52
             self.authorize\_set = []
             self.subset_{-j} = []
54
             self.subset_k = []
             self.subset_a = sorted(random.sample(range(self.rounds), self.rounds // 2))
58
         def good(self):
             # check that the public key is our own
60
             if self.n != Prover.n:
    print "public keys dont match!"
61
                  return False
64
             j = iter(self.subset_j)
               = iter(self.subset_k)
66
             for i in range (self.rounds):
                 if i in self.subset_a:
68
                      if pow(next(k), 2, self.n) != (self.v * self.authorize_set[i]) % self.n:
69
                          return False
70
                  elif pow(next(j), 2, self.n) != self.authorize_set[i]:
71
                      return False
72
73
             return True
```

Listing 5: Fiat-Shamir - Zero Knowledge Proof

```
2
    Prints colored and properly formatted messages to stdout
3
    from config import Config
5
6
    class Printer:
        BOLD
                 = ' \ 033[1m']
9
        BLACK
                = ' \ 033 \ 30m'
10
                = '\033[31m
        RED
11
        GREEN
                = '\033|32m
12
        YELLOW =
                   '\033[33m
13
                = ' \ 033[34m]
        BLUE
14
                   '\033[35m
        PURPLE =
15
                = '\033[36m'
        CYAN
16
                = '\033[37m
        WHITE
17
        DEFAULT = ' \setminus 033[0m']
18
19
        def __init__(self , who=""):
20
             s\,e\,l\,f\,.\,who\,=\,who
21
22
23
        if encrypted:
    label = "<E<</pre>
24
25
26
             else:
                 label = "<<<"
27
             {\tt self.\_print} \, \big( \, {\tt string} \, \, , \, \, \, {\tt label} \, , \, \, \, {\tt self.GREEN} \big)
28
29
30
        def command(self, string, encrypted=False):
             if encrypted:
    label = ">E>"
31
32
33
             else:
                 label = ">>>>"
34
35
             self.\_print(string, label, self.BLUE)
37
        def error(self, string):
             39
        def info(self, string):
41
             42
43
44
        def _print(self, string, label, color):
45
             string = string.strip()
46
```

```
Listing 6: Printer
    def base32(num):
1
         return _baseN(num, 32)
    def _baseN(num, b, numerals="0123456789abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz"):
         Return 'num' in base 'b'
         http://\,stackoverflow.com/a/2267428
         Listing 7: Base 32
    import hashlib
    import socket
    checksums = []
    class Account:
         def __init__(self, ident, password, cookie, port):
              global checksums
              self.ident = ident
              {\tt self.password} \ = \ {\tt password}
10
              self.cookie = cookie
              self.port = port
              checksums.append(hashlib.sha1(password).hexdigest())
13
    class Config:
15
         monitor_dns = "gauss.ececs.uc.edu"
16
         monitor_ip = socket.gethostbyname(monitor_dns)
17
         monitor_port = 8180
18
         server_ip = socket.gethostbyname(socket.getfqdn())
19
         server_port = 20167
20
         \begin{array}{ll} {\tt accounts} = \{ & \\ {\tt "EDSNOWDEN"} : & \end{array}
21
                                        \textbf{Account ("EDSNOWDEN", "8Y6]\%D[:T\%2!.P^\$6AGDEHMCZICN;OOX-]UOJU=^G-", "ATPL5QCPINFHAWYQWXN"}  
22
                   "GROUND_WATER": Account("GROUND_WATER", "Y9JUY8A L?+;RK9O$;SWRLO_M'I – [9MP)IK=*|4-E!", "QNU0DWVPNQFGOSDITCG"
"CORNHOLIO": Account("CORNHOLIO", "-S_:9 J7R9X*/&7UDL'SX-'2?R=FOW2!T'I8.Q7F?PA", "W6M2D5OCZAJZWTOV3M8",
"mtest16": Account("mtest16", "12345", "C5K8GNM22KQ5XCFKVHF", 11121),
"mtest17": Account("mtest17", "12345", "J98Q82H1C458X6YAKAI", 11122),
"mtest18": Account("mtest18", "12345", "MGYKSTOKL4T106N0175", 11123),
23
24
25
26
27
         }
28
29
         ident = ""
30
         password = ""
31
         cookie = ""
32
33
         num rounds = 5
34
```

Listing 8: Configuration File

References

- $[1] \ \texttt{http://www.cs.princeton.edu/courses/archive/fall07/cos433/lec15.pdf}$
- [2] https://github.com/ajalt/PWNmlete-2011/blob/master/fiat_shamir.py