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@benoitc benoitc released this 14 Apr 23:34
· 26 commits to main since this release
0.3.0
ec9ee86

Third review pass + h2spec interop; behaviour-visible spec fixes across the whole state machine. No breaking API change, but callers that matched on specific error atoms may see different values on edge cases (ALPN, ENABLE_PUSH, IWS).

Added

  • External interop suite test/h2_interop_SUITE.erl drives the server from h2spec. Six groups: TLS generic/HPACK, h2c plaintext generic/HPACK, small-window (forced flow-control fragmentation), --strict mode. 146/146 generic+HPACK cases pass. Skips cleanly when h2spec is not on $PATH.
  • .github/workflows/interop.yml: CI runs h2spec v2.6.0 on every push/PR; logs uploaded on failure.
  • .github/workflows/ci.yml: now runs h2_compliance_SUITE in addition to eunit; CT logs uploaded on failure.
  • PING/RST_STREAM flood mitigation (RFC 9113 §10.5): per-second counters per connection, GOAWAY(ENHANCE_YOUR_CALM) on overflow.
  • Extended CONNECT (RFC 8441): server opt-in via h2:start_server(Port, #{enable_connect_protocol => true, ...}) advertises SETTINGS_ENABLE_CONNECT_PROTOCOL=1. Client uses h2:request(Conn, Headers, #{protocol => <<"websocket">>}). New errors: {error, extended_connect_disabled}, {error, extended_connect_method}. Inbound: server rejects :protocol with stream PROTOCOL_ERROR if it has not opted in.
  • h2:start_server honors transport => tcp (cleartext h2c prior-knowledge listener with gen_tcp acceptor pool).
  • h2:connect/3 top-level verify and cacerts options merged into SSL options.
  • Owner event {h2, Conn, {informational, StreamId, Status, Headers}} for 1xx interim responses (excluding 101).
  • Send-side header validation runs before HPACK encode on send_request, send_request_headers, send_response, and send_trailers.
  • README: "Using with Ranch" and "Coexisting with HTTP/1.1" sections with code sketches.

Changed

  • SETTINGS_ENABLE_PUSH default is now 0 (was 1). Server advertises 0; inbound PUSH_PROMISE on either side is a connection PROTOCOL_ERROR (RFC 9113 §6.5.2 / §8.4).
  • TLS connect/2,3 requires ALPN h2. Previously fell through silently on protocol_not_negotiated; now returns {error, alpn_not_negotiated} (§3.3).
  • Connection-level receive window fixed at 65535 regardless of SETTINGS_INITIAL_WINDOW_SIZE (§6.9.2). IWS now only adjusts stream windows.
  • Request builder no longer injects :authority = "" when the caller omits host. Non-CONNECT requests without host now send no :authority; CONNECT without host returns {error, missing_authority} (§8.3.1).
  • Trailers from the peer transition the stream to half_closed_remote (was closed), so a handler mid-response isn't surprised by invalid_stream_state when the peer pipelines body+trailers (§5.1).
  • closing state proactively closes the TCP/TLS socket on entry (§5.4) instead of waiting up to 5 s for the peer.
  • Closed-stream error classification: closed-reason retained in a compact id → reason side map bounded at 10 000 entries. Late DATA/HEADERS on a recently-closed stream is scoped exactly (connection vs stream) regardless of whether the full record has been evicted from the 100-entry window.
  • Owner event {h2, Conn, {goaway, LastStreamId}} is now {goaway, LastStreamId, ErrorCode}.
  • Per-stream events (data, trailers, stream_reset) routed to the registered stream handler when set; connection owner receives them only as fallback.
  • HEADERS whose encoded block exceeds peer SETTINGS_MAX_FRAME_SIZE are split into HEADERS + CONTINUATION chain (§4.2).
  • Body-less responses (HEAD / 204 / 304) emit a trailing {data, Sid, <<>>, true} event so callers waiting for end-of-stream don't hang.
  • HPACK: Huffman encode/decode tables precomputed once via persistent_term + -on_load; dynamic table caches length and uses a single lists:reverse on eviction.

Fixed

  • HEADERS/DATA on a stream closed via END_STREAM: connection STREAM_CLOSED (was stream-scoped RST) (§5.1).
  • HEADERS/DATA on a stream closed via RST_STREAM: stream-scoped STREAM_CLOSED (was connection-scoped).
  • CONTINUATION without an outstanding pending HEADERS: connection PROTOCOL_ERROR (§6.10).
  • PRIORITY self-dependency on both the PRIORITY frame and inline HEADERS priority: stream PROTOCOL_ERROR (§5.3.1).
  • PRIORITY frame with length != 5: stream FRAME_SIZE_ERROR (was connection) (§6.3).
  • WINDOW_UPDATE on an idle stream: connection PROTOCOL_ERROR (was silently ignored) (§5.1).
  • Unknown frame types: ignored per §4.1 (previously function_clause-crashed the connection).
  • Inbound MAX_CONCURRENT_STREAMS enforced: peer HEADERS over our advertised limit now get RST_STREAM(REFUSED_STREAM) (§5.1.2).
  • SETTINGS_ENABLE_PUSH=1 received as client: connection PROTOCOL_ERROR (§6.5.2).
  • SETTINGS_INITIAL_WINDOW_SIZE above 2³¹−1: connection FLOW_CONTROL_ERROR (was PROTOCOL_ERROR) (§6.9.2).
  • Body-less responses (HEAD/204/304): accept content-length > 0 with END_STREAM (RFC 9110 §9.3.2); reject when END_STREAM is absent on the header block.
  • in_closed_stream_range was asymmetric in client mode (only matched peer-initiated ids); now mirrors server mode.
  • HPACK decoder: truncated literal returns {error, incomplete_string} instead of function_clause.
  • 1xx interim responses with END_STREAM or Content-Length → stream PROTOCOL_ERROR (§8.1, RFC 9110 §15.2).
  • CONNECT tunnel flag no longer pre-set on the request; the stream becomes a tunnel only when the 2xx response is sent/received. Non-2xx CONNECT responses permit trailers and enforce body rules (RFC 7540 §8.3).
  • :authority containing userinfo (user@host) rejected with PROTOCOL_ERROR on both inbound and outbound paths (§8.3.1); check_authority_host runs for CONNECT requests too.
  • Extended CONNECT :protocol value validated as an RFC 7230 token (RFC 8441 §4).
  • :scheme pseudo-header follows the actual transport (http on TCP, https on TLS).
  • :method = CONNECT outbound: trailers rejected with {error, tunnel_no_trailers}.
  • WINDOW_UPDATE with increment 0 on a non-zero stream → stream RST_STREAM(PROTOCOL_ERROR) (§6.9.1).
  • :status parsing: malformed values trigger stream PROTOCOL_ERROR instead of crashing the gen_statem.
  • :status = 101 rejected on both send and receive (§8.6).
  • Padding counted against receive flow control (§6.1). Connection-level receive window consumed on DATA for closed or unknown streams (§5.1).
  • Content-Length enforcement (§8.1.1): duplicate/mismatched/non-numeric/negative values → PROTOCOL_ERROR; DATA overshoot or END_STREAM mismatch → stream RST.
  • Server-side request trailers: trailing HEADERS without END_STREAM → PROTOCOL_ERROR.
  • Field name validation tightened to RFC 7230 tchar (rejects SP, HTAB, colon in regular headers, other controls, DEL, non-ASCII). Field values: leading/trailing SP/HTAB rejected in addition to NUL/CR/LF.
  • SETTINGS_MAX_HEADER_LIST_SIZE enforced in both directions: outbound exceed → {error, header_list_too_large}; inbound exceed → stream PROTOCOL_ERROR.

Docs

  • docs/features.md: PRIORITY metadata is parsed and self-dep rejected, but no scheduler is implemented (RFC 9218 supersedes RFC 7540 priorities).
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