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jonatack merged 6 commits into from
May 19, 2026
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BIP 54: clarify 64-byte transactions item description and rationale #2159

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346f938
bip-0054: spell out in more places that 64 bytes is for witness-strip…
darosior May 12, 2026
5c67f90
bip-0054: clarify rationale for invalidating 64-byte txs
darosior May 14, 2026
8ae3af5
bip-0054: state explicitly fake inclusion proofs only concern SPV ver…
darosior May 15, 2026
47a2d72
bip-0054: less redundancy in 64-byte rationale, move caching risk to …
darosior May 15, 2026
9e8e357
bip-0054: disambiguate use of "mitigation"
darosior May 17, 2026
f1f1c36
bip-0054: add a footnote with known workarounds for SPV verifiers
darosior May 17, 2026
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56 changes: 34 additions & 22 deletions bip-0054.md
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Expand Up @@ -38,10 +38,13 @@ users, increasing the cost to independently fully validate the consensus rules.
be used by miners to attack their competition, creating perverse incentives, centralization
pressures and leading to reduced network security.

In computing a block's Merkle root, a 64-byte transaction can be interpreted both as an intermediate
node in the tree and as a leaf in the tree. This makes it possible to fake inclusion proofs by
pretending a 64-byte block transaction is an inner node, as well as to pretend the inner nodes on
one level of the tree are the actual block transactions.
In computing a block's Merkle root, a transaction with exactly 64 bytes of non-witness data can be
interpreted both as an intermediate node in the tree and as a leaf in the tree. This makes it
possible to trick an SPV verifier into accepting an inclusion proof for a transaction that is not
part of a block, by pretending a 64-byte block transaction is actually an inner node[^9]. Invalidating
64-byte transactions addresses this vulnerability without requiring users of SPV verifiers, or
any other user of Merkle proofs, to rely on one of the available workarounds[^13] or even to know one is
necessary in the first place.

Since [bip-0034][BIP34] activation, explicit [bip-0030][BIP30] validation is not necessary until
block height 1,983,702[^0]. Mandating new coinbase transactions be different from the early
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -102,17 +105,16 @@ increases the preparation cost of an attack, making it uneconomical for a miner[
2500 was chosen as the tightest value that did not make any non-pathological standard transaction
invalid[^7].

In the presence of 64-byte transactions a block header's Merkle root may be valid for different sets
of transactions. This is because, in the Merkle tree construction, a 64-byte value may be
interpreted either as a transaction or as the concatenation of two 32-byte hashes. The former allows faking a block inclusion proof and the latter makes
it such that for a valid block the Merkle root in the block header is not a unique identifier for
the corresponding list of valid transactions[^8]. 64-byte transactions can only contain a
scriptPubKey that lets anyone spend the funds, or one that burns them. 64-byte transactions have
also been non-standard since 2019. It was suggested that the known vulnerabilities could instead be
mitigated by committing to the Merkle tree depth in the header's version field[^9]. The authors
believe it is preferable to address the root cause by invalidating 64-byte transactions. This
approach also fixes the vulnerability without developers of SPV verifiers having to implement the
mitigation or to know it is necessary in the first place.
64-byte transactions can only contain a scriptPubKey that lets anyone spend the funds, or one that
burns them. They have also been non-standard since 2019 and never been used since 2016. Several
alternatives to invalidating them were previously proposed. Some believe the improvements for users
of Merkle proofs are too marginal to be worth introducing a discontinuity in the set of valid
witness-stripped transaction sizes. Others have suggested instead committing to the Merkle
tree depth in the header's version field[^8], which would make one workaround for a known
vulnerability easier to deploy. The authors believe it is preferable to address the root cause by
invalidating 64-byte transactions, fixing the vulnerability without Merkle proof users having to
rely on any workaround or even know one is necessary in the first place. See [this post][64 bytes
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@ariard ariard May 20, 2026

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"or even know one is necessary in the first place"

i think this is considering only one viewpoint of the discussion, namely in my understanding the fact that for a SPV verifier with the new 64-byte witness-stripped serialized size transaction rejection rule, there is no more necessary knowledge of the vulnerability in itself or the mitigation. this is correct for consensus validation purpose of chain data.

i don't think it's true for any class of usage leveraging pre-signed transactions among multi-party. for this class of usage, where a transaction malleable by a party with competing interest might have to be cached by a client, the software client for sanity purpose has a clear design requirement to now implement the new rejection rule. while it was indeed a matter of policy check and not consensus ones, failing to do so already provoked issues in the past for some lightning implem (e.g CVE-2020-26895).

so i don't think the statement is correct when it's saying the "users do not have to know about the vulnerability or its workaround in the first place". if you've a software client caching pre-signed transactions on top of a SPV client (e.g bip157 + lightning) carefulness about not accepting a transaction input vector turning the result as a 64 byte tx will become necessary, at least in my opinion. e.g influencing the multi-party tx size by playing on the ECDSA signature size.

debate] for an attempt at summarizing the arguments for both sides of this debate.

Several blocks prior to [bip-0034][BIP34] activation contain a coinbase transaction whose scriptSig
contains a valid [bip-0034][BIP34] commitment to a future block height. This offers an opportunity
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -146,7 +148,7 @@ Bitcoin Core version [30.0][Core 30.0] and later will not generate a block templ
transaction that violates the signature operations limit introduced in this BIP.

Bitcoin Core version [0.16.1][Core 0.16.1] and later will neither relay nor create block templates
that include 64-byte transactions.
that include transactions whose witness-stripped serialized size is exactly 64 bytes.

The coinbase transaction is usually crafted by mining pool software. To the best of the authors'
knowledge, there does not exist an open source reference broadly in use today for such software.
Expand Down Expand Up @@ -207,11 +209,14 @@ standard transaction size before running into the newly introduced limit. To run
introduced limit but not the transaction size a transaction would need to spend P2SH inputs with a
redeem script similar to `CHECKSIG DROP CHECKSIG DROP ...`. This type of redeem script serves no
purpose beyond increasing its validation cost, which is exactly what this proposal aims to mitigate.
[^8]: See [this writeup][Suhas Merkle] by Suhas Daftuar for an explanation as well as a discussion
of the consequences.
[^9]: By Sergio Demian Lerner in a [blog post][Sergio post] surfaced [by Eric Voskuil][Eric
version]. Eric also pushed back against the importance of fixing this issue. See [this post][64
bytes debate] for an attempt at summarizing the arguments for both sides of this debate.
[^8]: By Sergio Demian Lerner in a [blog post][Sergio post].
[^9]: Conversely, pretending that the inner nodes on one level of the tree are the actual block
transactions is another source of complexity for full node implementations, which previously
resulted in consensus bugs. For instance, Bitcoin Core versions between 0.13.0 and 0.13.2
implemented caching that made it vulnerable to this attack. See [this writeup][Suhas Merkle] by
Suhas Daftuar for a detailed explanation. Invalidating 64-byte transactions may avoid this risk, but
the issue is largely orthogonal to this proposal: it is fundamentally about caching validation
status for malleable blocks.
[^10]: See [here][BIP34 list] for a full list of the heights of historical blocks including a valid
bip-0034 height commitment and the corresponding future block height.
[^11]: Technically it could be argued a duplicate could in principle always be possible before block
Expand All @@ -223,6 +228,13 @@ notably of Bitcoin Core but also of all other implementations the authors are aw
where [bip-0034][BIP34] violations have been manually inspected (see [here][Core validation.cpp
BIP34]). Without the guarantee given by enforcing the timelock on coinbase transactions, this would
have to be perpetuated for the Consensus Cleanup.
[^13]: The authors are aware of three workarounds for SPV verifiers. The first is to request a
Merkle proof for the coinbase transaction in addition to the transaction of interest, to infer the
depth of the Merkle tree. The second is to reject Merkle proofs in which any inner node is also a
valid serialisation of a Bitcoin transaction. More details about these are available [here][Sergio
post]. A third workaround is to change the Merkle proof structure by requiring inner nodes to be
provided as the single-SHA256 of their preimage, instead of the double-SHA256. See [here][Sergio
MERKLEBLOCK] for a full description.

[BIP30]: https://github.com/bitcoin/bips/blob/master/bip-0030.mediawiki
[BIP-XXXX]: https://github.com/TheBlueMatt/bips/blob/7f9670b643b7c943a0cc6d2197d3eabe661050c2/bip-XXXX.mediawiki
Expand All @@ -238,7 +250,7 @@ have to be perpetuated for the Consensus Cleanup.
[ML thread validation time]: https://gnusha.org/pi/bitcoindev/VsltJ2PHqWfzG4BU9YETTXjL7fYBbJhjVXKZQyItemySIA1okvNee9kf0zAOyLMeJ4Nqv1VOrYbWns5nP4TANCWvPJYu1ew_yxQSaudizzk=@protonmail.com
[Suhas Merkle]: https://gnusha.org/pi/bitcoindev/CAFp6fsGtEm9p-ZQF_XqfqyQGzZK7BS2SNp2z680QBsJiFDraEA@mail.gmail.com
[Sergio post]: https://bitslog.com/2018/06/09/leaf-node-weakness-in-bitcoin-merkle-tree-design
[Eric version]: https://delvingbitcoin.org/t/great-consensus-cleanup-revival/710/37
[Sergio MERKLEBLOCK]: https://bitslog.com/2018/08/21/simple-change-to-the-bitcoin-merkleblock-command-to-protect-from-leaf-node-weakness-in-transaction-merkle-tree/
[64 bytes debate]: https://delvingbitcoin.org/t/great-consensus-cleanup-revival/710/41
[BIP34 list]: https://delvingbitcoin.org/t/great-consensus-cleanup-revival/710/4
[Harding nLockTime]: https://bitcoin.stackexchange.com/questions/90229/nlocktime-in-bitcoin-core
Expand Down