




The Evolving Nature of EU Integration

Issue embedding in the EP election online campaign communication

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1. Overview



Overview

► How issues around EU integration shape party competition

Research Questions

Across online campaign communication:

- Which parties are the main drivers behind the salience of the EU issue?
- ► How do parties link (embed) the EU to other political issues?



EU Salience - The role of challenger parties

- EU issues (Polity vs. Policy)
- Salience of these these issues has increased over time (De Vries, 2018; Braun and Grande, 2021; Bakker et al., 2018)
- ► EU salience previously driven by challenger parties (De Vries and Hobolt, 2020; Hobolt and de Vries, 2015; Ehin and Talving, 2021)
- Some evidence of a shift in this pattern
 - Mainstream parties increasingly likely to engage with EU issue (Eugster et al., 2021; Braun and Grande, 2021; Fazekas et al., 2020)



EU Issue Embedding - Polity or Policy?

- Gradual shift from challenger parties outward hostility to EU, towards calls for reform (Braun et al., 2016; Brack, 2020; Treib, 2021)
 - Shift in strategy to link the EU to core issue ownership.
- Dominant parties general focus on EU policy
 - But post-Brexit, shift towards emphasising positives of the EU project (Hobolt et al., 2022)
 - Challenger parties are more likely to embed EU policy issues than dominant parties.



EU issues - Polity or Policy?

- H2a Green parties are more likely to **embed EU policy issues** than dominant parties.
- H2b Far-right eurosceptic parties are more likely to focus on EU **polity debates** than dominant parties.
- H2c Far-left & moderate eurosceptic parties are more likely to **embed EU policy issues** than dominant parties.

2. Theory



EU Policy Issue - Embedding Style

How many other issues do parties link to EU policy debates?

- Challenger parties
 - Can link EU to their core issue owned at the national level
 - Thereby boosting its relevance
- Dominant parties
 - Broad embedding allows for transferring broad public appeal from national level
 - Can help accommodate intra-party dissent



EU policy issues - Type of embedding

- H3B Dominant parties have **broader policy appeals** in their EU related communication in comparison to challenger parties.
- H3B Among challenger parties, we expect far-right eurosceptic parties to have the broadest policy appeals in their EU communication

4. Data



Data

- ► EP 2019 Political campaigning on twitter dataset (Stier et al., 2020)
 - ▶ All tweets by MEP candidates, as well as public replies, mentions, and retweets
 - ► 16 million tweets
 - 28 countries, 31 languages
 - ► 500,000 MEP candidate tweets
 - 23 April 30 May 2019



Manual Coding

- ▶ 17 research assistants hired to code tweets across 11 languages
- 9,000 tweets per coder
- tweets split by candidate/public, then by country (for candidates), and language
- random sample taken for each language
 - weighted so that 75% candidate tweets, 25% public
- for languages with more than one coder, 2,000 of the tweets were coded by both for inter-coder reliability checks



Coding Process

- ▶ Coders were asked to label tweets across a range of features, including:
 - sentiment
 - communication style (broadcasting opinions, vs engaging with other users)
 - campaign messaging
 - political issues

For tweets that mentioned political issues, these were then grouped into 10 categories:

- 1. Economy
- 6. Support for democratic values
- 2. Environment
- 7. Opposition to democratic values
- 3. Immigration
- 8. Anti-elitism

Brexit

9. Crime and justice

5. EU

10. Other (transport, health, education)




Machine Learning Classifier

- For countries/languages where all tweets cannot be manually coded, we apply classification methods using the human coded training set
- Text pre-processing
- Binary classification models for each individual issue at the tweet level
 - Extreme Gradient Boosting (xgBoost) models
- Model performance varies across issues and languages, performing worst where we have limited human coded samples

The Issues Parties Mention when Discussing the EU

Tweets by 2019 MEP candidates that mention the EU



% of party EU tweets that mention each issue



Analysis

Dependent Variables

EU issue salience

Proportion of candidate tweets mentioning EU issue / All candidate tweets

EU issue embedding

Proportion of tweets that mention the EU + other issues / All EU issue tweets

Embedding style

- Normalised Shannon's H Information Entropy, ranges between 0-1
- Measures how tweets are distributed across different issues
- (0 = all tweets concentrated in single category, 1 = tweets evenly distributed across all issue categories)



Independent Variables

Dominant/Challenger party (dummy)

► Dominant = has ever been in government

Party Types

- Dominant (baseline)
- Greens
- Eurosceptic far-right parties
- Other Eurosceptic parties (far-left & moderate)
- Other challenger parties

Controls

- Country fixed effects
- ► Candidate incumbency, Party EU dissent, General issue attention diversity (embedding style)

Table: EU salience as proportion of all campaign Twitter communication

| | (1) All | (1) HC | (2) All | (2) HC |
|-------------------|---------|--------|---------|---------|
| Challenger party | -0.23* | -0.25 | | |
| | (0.11) | (0.13) | | |
| Eurosceptic party | | | -0.31* | -0.29* |
| | | | (0.12) | (0.14) |
| Green-challenger | | | -0.58* | -1.00** |
| 0.1 | | | (0.26) | (0.32) |
| Other challengers | | | -0.25 | -0.35 |
| | | | (0.20) | (0.23) |
| Politicians | 2235 | 1915 | 2235 | 1915 |
| Parties | 61 | 61 | 61 | 61 |
| Var: party | 0.14 | 0.19 | 0.13 | 0.16 |

 $^{^{***}\}rho <$ 0.001; $^{**}\rho <$ 0.01; $^{*}\rho <$ 0.05. Dominant mainstream as baseline.

Table: EU embedding as EU tweets including other issues from total EU tweets

| (1) All | (1) HC | (2) All | (2) HC |
|-------------|----------------|--|--|
| 0.09 (0.13) | 0.10 (0.16) | | |
| (5115) | (5115) | 0.42* | 0.35 |
| | | (0.20) | (0.24) |
| | | | -0.12 |
| | | , | (0.22) |
| | | | 1.45*** |
| | | , , | (0.43) |
| | | | -0.09 |
| | | (0.23) | (0.27) |
| 1842 | 1400 | 1842 | 1400 |
| 61 | 61 | 61 | 61 |
| 0.18 | 0.24 | 0.14 | 0.17 |
| | 0.09 (0.13) | 0.09 0.10 (0.13) (0.16) 1842 1400 61 61 | 0.09 0.10 (0.13) (0.16) 0.42* (0.20) -0.15 (0.18) 0.85** (0.31) -0.09 (0.23) 1842 1400 1842 61 61 61 |

^{***} $\rho <$ 0.001; ** $\rho <$ 0.01; * $\rho <$ 0.05. Dominant mainstream as baseline.

Table: Broadness of EU embedding as Normalized Shannon's H (politician level)

| | (1) All | (1) HC | (2) All | (2) HC |
|----------------------|---------|--------|---------|--------|
| Challenger party | -0.06 | -0.01 | | |
| | (0.04) | (0.03) | | |
| Eurosceptic party | | | 0.04 | 0.10* |
| | | | (0.06) | (0.05) |
| Eurosceptic FR party | | | -0.15** | -0.11* |
| | | | (0.05) | (0.04) |
| Green-challenger | | | -0.13 | -0.06 |
| | | | (80.0) | (0.07) |
| Other challengers | | | -0.02 | 0.00 |
| | | | (0.07) | (0.05) |
| Politicians | 1657 | 1174 | 1657 | 1174 |
| Parties | 61 | 61 | 61 | 61 |
| Var: party | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.00 |
| Var: residual | 0.06 | 0.05 | 0.06 | 0.05 |
| | | | | |

^{***}p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05. Dominant mainstream as baseline.



Results

Salience

- Substantial degree of cross-national variation
- Challenger parties, particularly Greens and Eurosceptics, dedicate less attention to the EU than dominant parties

Embedding

- No sig overall differences between dominant/challenger parties in terms of EU issue embedding (H1)
- No sig difference between far-right eurosceptic, and dominant parties likelihood of embedding EU issues (H2B)
- Greens and Non-far right eurosceptic parties more likely to embed policy issues with EU compared to dominant parties (H2A, H2C)

Embedding style

- No sig overall differences between dominant/challenger parties in terms of style of EU issue embedding (H3A)
- Far right eurosceptic parties seem to embed across a narrower range of issues than other parties (H3B)



Results

2019 EP Campaign Findings

- Substantial cross-national variation across all three items
- Dominant parties tend to be the main promoter of the EU issue
- Certain challenger parties more likely to embed EU policy issues
 - Greens, far-left & moderate eurosceptics
- ► Far-right eurosceptic parties seem to link the EU to a narrower set of issues than dominant parties

7. Next steps



Next Steps

- 1. Complete manual coding for all 11 languages
- 2. Extend analysis to all EU member states
- 3. Categorise opened ended 'other issue' cateogry
- Explore interplay between different types of candidates (viability, pro-anti EU position), and strategies of dominant/challenger parties
- 5. Decide on issue attention diversity aggregation method
- 6. Explore party EU position as well as/rather than dominant/challenger typology

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Sampling

Table: Tweet language distribution and sampling

| | | All tweets | | Sampled tweets | |
|-------------|-----------|------------|-----------|----------------|--------|
| Country | Language | Candidates | Public | Candidates | Public |
| UK | English | 131,332 | 5,113,760 | 13,500 | 4,500 |
| France | French | 62,403 | 2,911,611 | 13,500 | 4,500 |
| Spain | Spanish | 52,824 | 2,328,691 | 13,500 | 4,500 |
| Italy | Italian | 17,826 | 1,834,711 | 13,500 | 4,500 |
| Poland | Polish | 43,770 | 1,048,559 | 13,500 | 4,500 |
| Ireland | English | 14,697 | 0 | 6,000 | 0 |
| Netherlands | Dutch | 13,793 | 433,309 | 7,500 | 2,750 |
| Germany* | German | 13,156 | 371,372 | 13,156 | 4,500 |
| Greece* | Greek | 4,349 | 72,301 | 4,349 | 32,000 |
| Hungary* | Hungarian | 326 | 2,118 | 326 | 2,118 |

^{*} All candidate tweets were manually coded for these countries

7. Next steps




Descriptives

Table: Issue Salience - Country summaries

| | Personal | Other political | EU alone | EU embedded |
|-------------|----------|-----------------|----------|-------------|
| France | 0.05 | 0.88 | 0.02 | 0.05 |
| Germany | 0.12 | 0.71 | 0.10 | 0.06 |
| Greece | 0.13 | 0.79 | 0.04 | 0.05 |
| Hungary | 0.16 | 0.69 | 0.07 | 0.07 |
| Ireland | 0.11 | 0.83 | 0.03 | 0.02 |
| Italy | 0.01 | 0.96 | 0.01 | 0.02 |
| Netherlands | 0.07 | 0.84 | 0.05 | 0.03 |
| Poland | 0.08 | 0.88 | 0.03 | 0.01 |
| Spain | 0.02 | 0.95 | 0.01 | 0.01 |
| UK | 0.11 | 0.67 | 0.18 | 0.04 |
| | | | | |

Political Issues Discussed by 2019 EP Candidates on Twitter

Tweets by 2019 MEP candidates that mention at least one political issue



% of country tweets that mention each issue

30 40 50

10 20 30

0 10 20

0 10 20 30

40 50