Only the latest v1.x release receives security fixes. Older majors are
unsupported once a new major ships.
| Version | Supported |
|---|---|
| 1.x | ✅ |
| < 1.0 | ❌ |
Please do not open a public GitHub issue for security problems. Instead, report privately via GitHub's "Report a vulnerability" flow on this repository (Security tab, then "Advisories", then "Report a vulnerability"). That opens a private advisory visible only to maintainers.
If for some reason you cannot use the GitHub flow, email the repository owner directly through the address on their GitHub profile.
Expect an initial acknowledgement within 5 business days. Fixes are released as
patch versions and the moving v1 tag is updated to point at them.
In scope:
- The action itself (
dist/index.js,src/,action.yml). - The bundled sync and lint scripts under
scripts/. - The test harness under
test/.
Out of scope:
- Vulnerabilities in JFrog Artifactory, the JFrog CLI, or
actions/python-versions. Report those to their upstream projects. - Vulnerabilities in the Python interpreters this action installs. The tarballs
are produced by the upstream
actions/python-versionsbuild pipeline and not modified by this action. Report Python vulnerabilities to https://www.python.org/dev/security/.
The artifactory-token input is a bearer token sent in the Authorization
header on every request to your Artifactory instance. To minimize blast radius:
- Use a scoped access token, not your personal API key. In Artifactory,
mint a token whose permissions are limited to read on the repo holding the
Python tarballs and manifest. The action only performs
GETagainst<artifactory-url>/<artifactory-repo>/.... - Store it as a GitHub Actions secret, not as a
vars.*value. Pass it viasecrets.ARTIFACTORY_TOKENso it never appears in workflow logs. - Rotate on a schedule. Artifactory access tokens accept an
expires_inparameter. Mint with a finite TTL (e.g. 90 days) and rotate via your secret manager. - Restrict the source IP range in Artifactory if your runners have stable egress IPs. This is independent of the action and the strongest defense if the token leaks.
The action does not log the token, does not write it to disk, and does not
forward it to any host other than the configured artifactory-url. If you
observe behavior that contradicts that, please report it as a vulnerability.