Remove code to send messages without intended recipient fingerprint

src/pgp.rs

@@ -128,13 +128,7 @@ pub async fn pk_encrypt(
                 hashed.push(Subpacket::critical(SubpacketData::SignatureCreationTime(
                     pgp::types::Timestamp::now(),
                 ))?);
-                // Test "elena" uses old Delta Chat.
-                let skip = private_key_for_signing.dc_fingerprint().hex()
-                    == "B86586B6DEF437D674BFAFC02A6B2EBC633B9E82";
                 for key in &public_keys_for_encryption {
-                    if skip {
-                        break;
-                    }
                     let data = SubpacketData::IntendedRecipientFingerprint(key.fingerprint());
                     let subpkt = match private_key_for_signing.version() < KeyVersion::V6 {
                         true => Subpacket::regular(data)?,

src/receive_imf/receive_imf_tests.rs

@@ -5108,97 +5108,75 @@ async fn test_dont_verify_by_verified_by_unknown() -> Result<()> {
     Ok(())
 }
 
+/// Tests that second device assigns outgoing encrypted messages
+/// to 1:1 chat with key-contact even if the key of the contact is unknown.
 #[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread", worker_threads = 2)]
 async fn test_recv_outgoing_msg_before_securejoin() -> Result<()> {
     let mut tcm = TestContextManager::new();
     let bob = &tcm.bob().await;
-    let a0 = &tcm.elena().await;
-    let a1 = &tcm.elena().await;
+    let a0 = &tcm.alice().await;
+    let a1 = &tcm.alice().await;
 
     tcm.execute_securejoin(bob, a0).await;
     let chat_id_a0_bob = a0.create_chat_id(bob).await;
     let sent_msg = a0.send_text(chat_id_a0_bob, "Hi").await;
-    bob.recv_msg(&sent_msg).await;
-    let msg_a1 = a1.recv_msg(&sent_msg).await;
-    assert!(msg_a1.get_showpadlock());
-    let chat_a1 = Chat::load_from_db(a1, msg_a1.chat_id).await?;
-    assert_eq!(chat_a1.typ, Chattype::Group);
-    assert!(!chat_a1.is_encrypted(a1).await?);
-    assert_eq!(
-        chat::get_chat_contacts(a1, chat_a1.id).await?,
-        [a1.add_or_lookup_address_contact_id(bob).await]
-    );
-    assert_eq!(
-        chat_a1.why_cant_send(a1).await?,
-        Some(CantSendReason::NotAMember)
-    );
 
-    let sent_msg = a0.send_text(chat_id_a0_bob, "Hi again").await;
-    bob.recv_msg(&sent_msg).await;
+    // Device a1 does not have Bob's key.
+    // Message is still received in an encrypted 1:1 chat with Bob.
+    // a1 learns the fingerprint of Bob from the Intended Recipient Fingerprint packet,
+    // but not the key.
     let msg_a1 = a1.recv_msg(&sent_msg).await;
     assert!(msg_a1.get_showpadlock());
-    assert_eq!(msg_a1.chat_id, chat_a1.id);
-    let chat_a1 = Chat::load_from_db(a1, msg_a1.chat_id).await?;
-    assert_eq!(
-        chat_a1.why_cant_send(a1).await?,
-        Some(CantSendReason::NotAMember)
-    );
-
-    let msg_a1 = tcm.send_recv(bob, a1, "Hi back").await;
-    assert!(msg_a1.get_showpadlock());
     let chat_a1 = Chat::load_from_db(a1, msg_a1.chat_id).await?;
     assert_eq!(chat_a1.typ, Chattype::Single);
     assert!(chat_a1.is_encrypted(a1).await?);
-    // Weird, but fine, anyway the bigger problem is the conversation split into two chats.
+
+    // Cannot send because a1 does not have Bob's key.
+    assert!(!chat_a1.can_send(a1).await?);
     assert_eq!(
         chat_a1.why_cant_send(a1).await?,
-        Some(CantSendReason::ContactRequest)
+        Some(CantSendReason::MissingKey)
     );
 
-    let a0 = &tcm.alice().await;
-    let a1 = &tcm.alice().await;
-    tcm.execute_securejoin(bob, a0).await;
-    let chat_id_a0_bob = a0.create_chat_id(bob).await;
-    let sent_msg = a0.send_text(chat_id_a0_bob, "Hi").await;
-    bob.recv_msg(&sent_msg).await;
-    let msg_a1 = a1.recv_msg(&sent_msg).await;
-    assert!(msg_a1.get_showpadlock());
-    let chat_a1 = Chat::load_from_db(a1, msg_a1.chat_id).await?;
-    assert_eq!(chat_a1.typ, Chattype::Single);
-    assert!(chat_a1.is_encrypted(a1).await?);
     assert_eq!(
         chat::get_chat_contacts(a1, chat_a1.id).await?,
-        [a1.add_or_lookup_contact_id(bob).await]
+        [a1.add_or_lookup_contact_id_no_key(bob).await]
     );
-    assert!(chat_a1.can_send(a1).await?);
+    assert!(!chat_a1.can_send(a1).await?);
+
+    let a1_chat_id = a1.create_chat_id(bob).await;
+    assert_eq!(a1_chat_id, msg_a1.chat_id);
     Ok(())
 }
 
+/// Tests that outgoing message cannot be assigned to 1:1 chat
+/// without the intended recipient fingerprint.
 #[tokio::test(flavor = "multi_thread", worker_threads = 2)]
-async fn test_recv_outgoing_msg_before_having_key_and_after() -> Result<()> {
+async fn test_recv_outgoing_msg_no_intended_recipient_fingerprint() -> Result<()> {
     let mut tcm = TestContextManager::new();
-    let a0 = &tcm.elena().await;
-    let a1 = &tcm.elena().await;
-    let bob = &tcm.bob().await;
+    let alice = &tcm.alice().await;
+
+    let payload = include_bytes!(
+        "../../test-data/message/alice_to_bob_no_intended_recipient_fingerprint.eml"
+    );
+
+    // Alice does not have Bob's key.
+    // Message is encrypted, but is received in ad hoc group with Bob's address.
+    let rcvd_msg = receive_imf(alice, payload, false).await?.unwrap();
+    let msg_alice = Message::load_from_db(alice, rcvd_msg.msg_ids[0]).await?;
+
+    assert!(msg_alice.get_showpadlock());
+    let chat_alice = Chat::load_from_db(alice, msg_alice.chat_id).await?;
+    assert_eq!(chat_alice.typ, Chattype::Group);
+    assert!(!chat_alice.is_encrypted(alice).await?);
+
+    // Cannot send because Bob's key is unknown.
+    assert!(!chat_alice.can_send(alice).await?);
+    assert_eq!(
+        chat_alice.why_cant_send(alice).await?,
+        Some(CantSendReason::NotAMember)
+    );
 
-    tcm.execute_securejoin(bob, a0).await;
-    let chat_id_a0_bob = a0.create_chat_id(bob).await;
-    let sent_msg = a0.send_text(chat_id_a0_bob, "Hi").await;
-    let msg_a1 = a1.recv_msg(&sent_msg).await;
-    assert!(msg_a1.get_showpadlock());
-    let chat_a1 = Chat::load_from_db(a1, msg_a1.chat_id).await?;
-    assert_eq!(chat_a1.typ, Chattype::Group);
-    assert!(!chat_a1.is_encrypted(a1).await?);
-
-    // Device a1 somehow learns Bob's key and creates the corresponding chat. However, this doesn't
-    // help because we only look up key contacts by address in a particular chat and the new chat
-    // isn't referenced by the received message. This is fixed by sending and receiving Intended
-    // Recipient Fingerprint subpackets which elena doesn't send.
-    a1.create_chat_id(bob).await;
-    let sent_msg = a0.send_text(chat_id_a0_bob, "Hi again").await;
-    let msg_a1 = a1.recv_msg(&sent_msg).await;
-    assert!(msg_a1.get_showpadlock());
-    assert_eq!(msg_a1.chat_id, chat_a1.id);
     Ok(())
 }
 

src/test_utils.rs

@@ -118,7 +118,6 @@ impl TestContextManager {
     }
 
     /// Returns new elena's "device".
-    /// Elena doesn't send Intended Recipient Fingerprint subpackets to simulate old Delta Chat.
     pub async fn elena(&mut self) -> TestContext {
         TestContext::builder()
             .configure_elena()
@@ -894,7 +893,7 @@ impl TestContext {
     ///
     /// If the contact does not exist yet, a new contact will be created
     /// with the correct fingerprint, but without the public key.
-    async fn add_or_lookup_contact_id_no_key(&self, other: &TestContext) -> ContactId {
+    pub async fn add_or_lookup_contact_id_no_key(&self, other: &TestContext) -> ContactId {
         let primary_self_addr = other.ctx.get_primary_self_addr().await.unwrap();
         let addr = ContactAddress::new(&primary_self_addr).unwrap();
         let fingerprint = self_fingerprint(other).await.unwrap();

test-data/message/alice_to_bob_no_intended_recipient_fingerprint.eml

@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+Content-Type: multipart/encrypted; protocol="application/pgp-encrypted";
+	boundary="189f5bdd65baabe1_1081b3a339e9a68e_ec024374690079d2"
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+From: <alice@example.org>
+To: "hidden-recipients": ;
+Subject: [...]
+Date: Wed, 18 Mar 2026 14:03:13 +0000
+Message-ID: <4bc40798-0029-42ef-b34a-77866db439a5@localhost>
+Chat-Version: 1.0
+
+
+--189f5bdd65baabe1_1081b3a339e9a68e_ec024374690079d2
+Content-Type: application/pgp-encrypted; charset="utf-8"
+Content-Description: PGP/MIME version identification
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
+
+Version: 1
+
+--189f5bdd65baabe1_1081b3a339e9a68e_ec024374690079d2
+Content-Type: application/octet-stream; name="encrypted.asc";
+	charset="utf-8"
+Content-Description: OpenPGP encrypted message
+Content-Disposition: inline; filename="encrypted.asc";
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
+
+-----BEGIN PGP MESSAGE-----
+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+=2p4+
+-----END PGP MESSAGE-----
+
+
+--189f5bdd65baabe1_1081b3a339e9a68e_ec024374690079d2--