


# THE ARCHITECTURAL REVIEW



**The Cover** The crystalline object in the centre can be viewed either as a cube seen from above or as the inside corner of a box looking up. The two smaller drawings below give the clue to these alternative views. The environment in which we live, landscape and townscape, can also be viewed in two alternative ways. Either functionally, in which the front door means home, or objectively where the front door is a rectangle of colour. The wider implications of the second view have lain dormant since the eighteenth century and the article Townscape Casebook on p. 363 is an attempt to revive this way of looking and, by implication, to establish an art of environment.

344 The Arcimboldi Man

345 Gloucester and London in the Fourteenth Century by J. M. Hastings

In a previous article in the REVIEW ('The Court Style,' January, 1949) Dr. Hastings showed how far from the truth is the widely held belief that the English Perpendicular was suddenly 'invented' at Gloucester about the middle of the fourteenth century—the truth being that it sprang from the Court of London and, more precisely, from St. Stephen's Chapel within the Palace of Westminster and went to Gloucester with the burial there of Edward II. Once this is granted, a number of problems result which are of considerable importance to an understanding of fourteenth century architecture.

350 Cinema and Hotel in Sao Paulo  
Architect: Rino Levi

354 Townscape by I. de Wolfe 'As things stand today,' writes the author of this article, 'while every teacup gets itself documented by some famous expert, the

J. M. Richards  
Editors  
Nikolaus Pevsner  
Osbert Lancaster  
H. de C. Hastings  
Assistant Editor  
Ian McCallum  
Assistant  
Editors: production, G. Bensusan,  
art, Gordon Cullen, research, S.  
Lang, literary, Marcus Whiffen,  
Editorial Secretary, Whitehall 0611-19

Volume 100 Number 636 December 1949

greatest question our society has to face involving the way of life for the whole community, goes by default, isn't even put down for discussion, just because there are no terms to discuss it with.' That question is, of course, the question of our whole physical surroundings as perceived by the eye—in short, landscape. Pointing out that there is a *prima facie* case for expecting politics and landscape to reveal what Hoffmann called 'an essential concordance,' I. de Wolfe compares the French conception of democracy, which assumes universal truths and thus in the long run tends to establish universal conformity, with what he calls the radical canon of English democracy, based on the belief in individualism *per se*, and asks whether the same distinction may be drawn in the sphere of landscape. This he finds to be so, the radical canon being represented by the Picturesque doctrines of Sir Uvedale Price, based on entirely different premises from the earlier landscape movement of Kent and Capability Brown (who conceived it their duty to *improve* the environment rather than to make it *more itself*). It is this radical tradition, lying outside both the classical and the romantic movements, which Mr. de Wolfe, and THE ARCHITECTURAL REVIEW with him, believes must be developed today.

363 Townscape Casebook by Gordon Cullen Our physical environment can be seen in two ways, which may be called the associational and the objective. But the objective view, which particularly to the town planner is of first importance, has become the unfamiliar one and to recapture it demands a mental reorientation. This article with its drawings and photographs is an attempt to revive the objective way of looking, and to establish a basis for an art of environment founded on that way.

375 Blockages and Shop-built Housing by Richard Neutra In this extract from his forthcoming book, *Survival through Design*, Richard Neutra examines the causes underlying the slow progress made in the United States towards prefabricated or shop-built housing.

381 House at Santa Monica Architect: Richard Neutra

385 The End by Barbara Jones In this last article of her series on popular art in Britain (which is to be published with additional material in book form by The Architectural Press) Barbara Jones discusses funeral pomps, decorations and monuments.

391 Sir William Temple and Sharawaggi by S. Lang and N. Pevsner The 250th anniversary of the death of Sir William Temple is made the occasion for a discussion of the origin of the word sharawaggi or sharawadgi, introduced by him into England (if not indeed invented by him), and of the possible sources of his revolutionary suggestion regarding asymmetrical planning in the celebrated passage in *Upon the Gardens of Epicurus* where the word occurs.

394 Tea Rooms in Paris Architects: Misha Black and Broniek Katz

397 Hyde Park Corner by Dorothy Stroud The fact of its being the main entrance to the West End has assured Hyde Park Corner of the attention of town-planning architects from John Gwynn in 1766 onwards. Yet it remains a scene of considerably more endeavour than achievement. Dorothy Stroud here relates the history of the successive attempts to make Hyde Park Corner what it never became, in an article illustrated with hitherto unpublished drawings in Sir John Soane's Museum.

399 Surrealism in the Sixteenth Century

400 World

401 Books

403 Anthology

403 Marginalia

403 Intelligence

408 Correspondence

410 Acknowledgments


**The Authors** Richard Joseph Neutra, architect. Born in Vienna, 1892. Educated at University of Vienna, and in Zurich under Otto Wagner. 1923, went to U.S.A.; 1929 naturalized. 1923-25, associated with Holabird and Frank Lloyd Wright. 1926, established his own practice in Los Angeles. Is consultant architect to the U.S. Government, the U.S. Federal Authority and to the Government of Porto Rico. His published work includes *How America Builds* (1926); *New Building of the World, America* (1929). Dorothy Stroud. After several years on the staff of *Country Life*, joined the *National Buildings Record* from its inception in 1941 until 1945. Was then appointed Inspector and Assistant Curator at Sir John Soane's Museum.

**SUBSCRIPTION RATE:** The annual post free subscription rate, payable in advance, is £2 sterling, in U.S.A. and Canada \$6.50. An index is issued every six months, covering the period January to June and July to December, and can be obtained without charge on application to the publishers:

THE ARCHITECTURAL REVIEW

9-13 Queen Anne's Gate, Westminster, S.W.1 · Whitehall 0611

THREE SHILLINGS AND SIXPENCE



**OWNSCAPE** The granite sets break in waves against the cliff of the curb, the bicyclist throws a cloak of shadow as of a cloud upon the sea, the drain-cover awaits the shower that will suck heedless match-ends through fifteen avid little mouths into the sinister underground organization that underlies the city. Of such elements does the field of human vision consist. To such is the conventional town-planner almost completely blind. Yet these are the elements—the trivia of the visual scene—which in fact determine the character or pattern of the urban landscape. A truth which, according to the article opposite, the Picturesque Movement of the eighteenth century has devised to bring home in its own field, the park, to landscape gardeners. In this sense the Picturesque philosophy has a contemporary message. It exhorts the visual planner—particularly the English visual planner—to preoccupy himself with the vast field of anonymous design and unacknowledged pattern which still lies entirely outside the terms of reference of official town-planning routine.

*Xmas I de Wolfe AR DEC 1949 Vol 106  
GERDOTT LULLEN*

# TOWNSCAPE

In 1794 Sir Uvedale Price published his Essay on the Picturesque. This, it is argued here, was a key-moment in art-history since Price actually succeeded, despite the handicap of eighteenth-century art-jargon, in isolating what had not been isolated before—a way of looking at the world that might be called perennially English. So regarded the Picturesque Movement<sup>1</sup> has a significance far transcending its local position in landscape-gardening history, for acknowledgment in our own day of the existence of a perennially English visual philosophy could revolutionize our national contribution to architecture and town-planning by making possible our own regional development of the International style, as a result of our own self-knowledge—technics given in marriage to psychology. This is Mr. de Wolfe's case. His method or lack of it is demonstrated in miniature in the section which follows the article.

## A Plea for an English Visual Philosophy founded on the true rock of Sir Uvedale Price

IF WE EXCEPT LOUDON, the universal provider, no serious effort has been made since the eighteenth century to create a literature of landscape. This is, if you think of it, astounding. Every jiggly little craft—gardening itself—has a literature and a terminology; most have long terminologies and vast literatures; alone amongst the major human activities, landscape-gardening, the art of OUT THERE, which incorporates and co-ordinates, which orientates and makes sense of all the other arts—without which the other arts are, ultimately, redundant—remains a dead-letter. Result, the brickish-a-brackish mid-twentieth century world of barbed wire, pig-wire, steel-wire, wire-mesh, telephone wire, electric cables on crazy fir standards, through which as through a cage darkly we are permitted to get an eyeful of lone villas, poultry farms, Radar stations, motor-car graveyards, Homes for Incurables—all clipt around with plantations of larch and fields of surprised looking wheat.

It is not only the decay of rurality, it is the waste, in the towns and outside them, the clutter, the vast areas of No-Man's-Land. We foul our nest. The contemporary world is a kind of visual refuse heap, if not insanitary, inelegant, with the shameless utter inelegance of an upset dustbin. Nor can those who feel deeply the inelegance of the contemporary world, communicate their distress to others since there exists no literature or vocabulary of landscape. And in the absence of a literature, of a vocabulary even, of a few rules of thumb even, how is anyone to make the necessary comparisons between a civilized and a barbarous landscape? How, in the absence not merely of any theory but of any reference to it in any quarter, can even the literate public be expected to guess that an art of landscape exists at all?

As things stand to-day while every teacup gets itself documented by some famous expert, the greatest question our society has to face, involving the way of life of the whole community, goes by default, isn't even put down for discussion, just because there are no terms to discuss it with.

wanted, an expertise

Here is the anomaly which this article sets out, if not to cure, to hold so to say a protest meeting about. Some means must be found of getting round the limitations imposed by the lack of a vocabulary of landscape—after all it isn't the only art to have suffered from that trouble. But the first requirement, the creation of a vocabulary, isn't a thing the artist himself ought to have to struggle with alone; it is rather a matter for the art critic, the historian, the poet—in fact, the man of letters—upon whom, since the Jesuits came into disrepute in the eighteenth century, the responsibility for the higher education of the race has fallen. That, anyway, was Lord Morley's view. And when the contribution made by, for instance, Baudelaire to the vocabulary and thus the appreciation of the fine arts is taken into account, one sees what he meant.

Baudelaire it was who spotted the immense significance of the German writer E. T. A. Hoffmann's surprising confession that when he 'breathed the odour

<sup>1</sup> 'It is of some importance to our present purpose to determine the true meaning of this expression, as it is now generally used; for there is a principle to be developed from that use which, while it has occultly been the ground of much that is true and just in our judgment of art, has never been so far understood as to become definitely serviceable. Probably no word in the language (exclusive of theological expressions) has been the subject of so frequent or so prolonged dispute; yet none remain more vague in their acceptance, and it seems to me to be a matter of no small interest to investigate the essence of that idea. . . .'

Ruskin on the term 'picturesque.' *The Seven Lamps of Architecture* (The Lamp of Memory).

of red or brown nasturtiums' he seemed to hear 'afar off, the grave deep note of an oboe.' Not, one might have thought, more than a private matter between a man and his nose. Yet, in point of fact, no oboe in the nineteenth century let out a more rewarding toot, providing, as it did at one blow, the basis for exactly the kind of vocabulary the arts had always needed and never had. For it indicated in Hoffmann's words an 'essential concordance' between colours, sounds and smells; on which foundation, and fortified with Fourier's analogies, Swedenborg's *correspondences* and large quantities of hasheesh, Baudelaire set out to make all Europe correspondence-conscious. All phenomena are allegories, went the argument, transparent symbols of a greater ONE which is revealed in the correspondences perceptible between things.

A thesis with a history that goes back a long way—to Plotinus perhaps. However that may be the moment when brown nasturtiums looked like the sound of an oboe can be regarded as emblematic of a discovery which revolutionized art journalism; made possible that flowering of evocative criticism on which the literary weeklies have grown fat; started the wonderfully misleading yet richly rewarding game of analysing one art in the terms of another, enriching thereby the vocabularies of all; under which—to take the most elementary examples—music acquires texture, colours sing, stories are blue, plots smell, words burn, rustic gnomes leave a bad taste in the mouth. And whether or not we go all the way with Hoffmann most of us agree more readily with Baudelaire that human activities are curiously interrelated than with Marx that one determines another. Nor need one stop at the arts. Politics can smell too, can't it?

So that is the first thing. Men of letters have to be invited, have to be politely pressed, to do for landscape what Baudelaire did for art criticism. Granted that the language of one trade can be used for that of another, isn't there, they have to be asked, an existing vocabulary landscape, the dumb, the inarticulate, art could borrow? Probably it could borrow or steal from most: one, however—politics—might be expected to yield a particular reward since it is the trade whose decisions so visibly affect the surface of the land . . . let us come clean at this point and say the argument is that there is a *prima facie* case for expecting politics and landscape to reveal Hoffmann's 'essential concordance.'

However, discussion of the larger correspondence between landscape and politics must wait; what this article sets out to do is to take, for reasons which will become clear later, a specimen case—Picturesque Theory—and by relating it to its political background try whether there isn't some correspondence which would permit the terminology of the one to be used for the better understanding of the other. If, in the process, one seems to be writing not about town planning and landscape but about democracy, and liberalism, that is only to be expected; that is, so to speak, describing red nasturtiums in terms of grave, deep oboe notes.

#### freedom and free forms

The comparison, needless to say, isn't new—isn't even as new as Mr. Hoffmann and his oboe. Many have

had things to say about, for example, the incompatibility between Continental despotism with its preoccupation with arbitrary symmetry in the environment, and the democratic freedom of the English Landscape movement. 'Independency,' said George Mason of the British in his *Essay of 1768*, 'has been as strongly asserted in matters of taste as in religion and government.' To the good patriot how nice it is to think of the Landscape-gardening Movement with its 'free forms' as one more example of the English passion for political 'independency.' Unfortunately, however, the identification of freedom with free forms overlooks, though George Mason could hardly be expected to foresee, the fact that free institutions when they arrived in, for instance, France, the home of despotism, disturbed hardly at all the Frenchman's simple faith in the *Grand Manner*. Far from getting rid of their avenues with their kings the French liberal democrats—in which they are followed by their American dittos—built bigger and better avenues,<sup>2</sup> built or anyway consolidated, the *Beaux Arts* tradition. And if an inclination was disclosed amongst the ultra-moderns of the nineteenth century to moon romantically in the nearest *Jardin Anglais* the mere continued existence of that article establishes the free-form garden as an exception to the rule.

Which suggests that to find the cause of the English break-away from formal landscape—from the *Grand Manner*—from what the French called the Latin tradition—we must look deeper than the division of French and English into Victims of Despotism and Sons of Liberty. To come to the point, the contention here is that the difference lies not as Mason suggested between democracy and tyranny but between two kinds of temperament which revealed their dissimilarity first perhaps under two kinds of tyranny, and then when the time came, in two types of democracy or, if you prefer, two types of liberalism, a French kind and an English kind. More than a pious reference to the antithesis between Voltaire and Rousseau is required to get this clear. We have to go back for a moment to the rebirth of the democratic idea.

#### democracy

The first political scientist to rescue political thought from mediæval theological argument—from the mere swopping of texts from the scriptures—the first secular political writer was, of course, Machiavelli whose *Prince* fell notoriously, but in view of the date and the novelty of the Machiavellian theme, excusably, short of laying down an acceptable secular ethic.

For this he has been unjustly accused of lack of moral scruple. The truth was Machiavelli was a good 150 years in front of his subject; and it was not until the English Civil War that the *Prince* was furnished in the shape of the *Leviathan* with a solid secular political principle to get a perch on. Born at the time of the Armada, Hobbes was 54 when in the Civil War he published his theory of the social contract. This seemed, on the face of it, to provide an excellent new rationale for absolutism, for as an efficiency expert Hobbes made it clear he favoured the idea of the

<sup>2</sup> With certain well-known exceptions.

absolute monarch—the managing director who could both manage and direct. He went on to suggest, however, that the principle of absolutism held good for other—for all<sup>3</sup>—kinds of government, thereby accepting tacitly the possibility of kinds of government other than that of the absolute monarch reigning by divine right—a subtle distinction the royalists of the day might have been expected to overlook in their gratification at this handsome plug for absolutism, so lately and so rudely raspberryed by the head of King Charles. But their instinct was true; it was a disguised attack on the principle of divine right; and Hobbes, Royalist, Cavalier, member of an exiled Court, found himself suddenly a Roundhead in London, the companion of regicides. Locke, the prophet of the Revolution of 1688, by postulating the idea of limited and constitutional government made it possible for the People to rob the monarch of the sovereign power, and Rousseau, who took his ideas of the social contract from Hobbes and Locke rather than from Montesquieu, developed the doctrine of active democracy to the point where the Sovereign People, spurning any form of alienation or delegation of rights, actually participate individually in the government by act of assembly, a sticking up of hands. A procedure suitable, obviously, only for city-states, like the Greek, or his home-town, Geneva, where it was physically possible, though—in view of the reigning oligarchy—extremely unlikely, for the whole citizenry to be called to vote in the town square.

The point to note is that while the democratic idea keeps bulking larger, the other idea of sovereign or absolute power doesn't grow less; is transferred, rather, like a sceptre—or a dumb-bell—from one party to another; from the monarch to the sovereign people. Thus under democracy the ultimate appeal is still to some absolute monarch, the Sovereign People. The vulgar idea that democracy means freedom, and freedom comes in where despotism goes out—the popular antithesis between democracy and tyranny—is a mere colloquialism. The tyrant goes on, though in a hydra-headed form that may or may not be more lethal. What in the first stirrings of the democratic ideal in fact we see is (something quite different from the tear-jerking sentiment preached to-day) the Renaissance conception of the sovereignty of Reason which gradually gains the mastery over the emotional reactions and routines of the Middle Ages and develops in the process that new conception of the Prerogative of the Intellect (a counter-emotional move) under which the pursuit of the truth—which is ONE—inevitably evokes the democratic idea. For if Reason will show man the truth, and there is only one truth, and if man is a rational being, which the Renaissance allowed him to be, his social fulfilment can only come through political forms which encourage equality of opportunity to exercise reason. Furthermore, the exercise of reason does not permit of inequalities in the units of reason. Egalitarianism, in short, in the sense of one man being free of another so that he is free to walk in the light of reason rather than the path of expediency, or (through being 'kept down') ignorance, is primarily a rational rather than emotional conception.

<sup>3</sup> He boiled them down to three.

How right, then, that with the first great political thinker to substitute the rational for the emotional argument—Hobbes—we are able to observe the democratic idea getting itself re-born. Nor was it permitted to die. The truth shall set you free (from, amongst other things, autocratic monarchs and proud prelates) was the theme explicit or implicit of Voltaire, of d'Alembert, of Diderot, of Helvetius and the rest of the Club Holbachique; it was the underlying credo of the whole Enlightenment. It was the belief which inspired ardent early nineteenth century liberal sovereigns like Ludwig I of Bavaria, who in his diary for January 1, 1815, wrote, 'Let every man have the right to say and write what he thinks as long as propriety is preserved. If opinions can be freely expressed, Truth must in time prevail.'

Very liberal, this, and supposed at the time to be very English. Indeed the anglomania set going by Voltaire, and cropping up from time to time right up to the middle period of Jules Verne, with Clarissa Harlowe as its first love and Phileas Fogg as its pretty well last, identified every democratic and liberal *démarche* via the Sage of Ferney or the Citizen of Geneva with English singularity and independence. Yet if with Ludwig's New Year resolution one compares, say, a sentence of Humboldt taken at random, a contradiction develops in the definition of liberty which seems to have no rational explanation—seems to grow as one watches, from a mere crack to an irreconcilable chasm.

Says Humboldt 'The State is a necessary evil; its powers must be limited in such a way that it hinders the free individual development as little as possible.' At first sight that sentiment seems complementary, merely to Ludwig's 'if opinions can be freely expressed truth must in time prevail.' It is only on analysis that the contradiction begins to reveal itself between the man who wants liberty because it will leave men free to be rational, i.e., come to common conclusions about life and society, and the man who wants liberty so that men can be free to differ, *be themselves*, cock a snook at their fellow democrats.

The existence of this second attitude admits not of question, it so happens, since the middle years of the eighteenth century saw it elaborated in a big way by none other than J.-J. Rousseau—one of the great snookcockers of all time—who electrified the cultural world with a completely new star, the Man of Feeling. For in his religion of the heart it was independence rather than equality that Rousseau hymned as the quintessence of freedom, the Humboldtian rather than the Ludwigian theme, preoccupied as he was with the awakening self and its needs if it was to *feel* adequately—if it was to begin to spread its wings—of personal independence, which is only one kind of freedom.

the English contribution

What Rousseau hymned matters here only in so far as it clears up our problem. His particular genius lay less in framing new ideas than in isolating and amplifying existing emotional states which for some reason or other had remained in the Unconscious until he got to work on them. Thus in this case it is simpler to go to Rousseau for a dramatic, a definitive statement of the new faith than to its authors, the English puritans,

who, while giving lip-service to liberty, freedom, etc., as all men do, had been interpreting it in one particular sense among many, which Rousseau was the first to isolate and express in significant terms as personal independence. *Be Thyself*. This characteristic it was which determined their politics, religion, institutions — individualism — independence — not equality at all. Yet so quick-fire was the fashion that swept Europe, so attractive the word liberty, so appealing (and so vague) the liberal idea, that few stopped to consider what distinctions there really were in the possible interpretations of the meaning of freedom. By an accident of timing and the failure of the French Revolution it was taken that there was only one kind of freedom and thus only one kind of democracy, and good democrats all the world over were fain to believe that England, with its cuckoo-in-the-nest, the U.S.A., was setting the model for the world to follow. And not only England but Europe, the Americas, the East, civilization in general, was thought to be marching towards one political goal, the slow perfecting of responsible parliamentary government with which was identified the democratic principle. Under its benevolent but inactive eye the Peoples concerned were supposed to construct their national life upon the competitive endeavours of private enterprise (i.e., the whimsical self-assertion of individuals), treating the state as no more than a referee, present on the field to see fair play between rivals; not regarding it as an authority equipped to organize the national effort. The Humboldtian ideal, in other words, from which the Victorian political theorists deduced that with the gradual extension of the franchise, the perfecting of the parliamentary machine, and the acquisition by nations new to responsible parliamentary government of experience in its use, the world problem of political structure would be settled—everywhere—for good and all.

Why it was that parliamentary government, except in the Anglo-American commonwealth, never became responsible, no not even in profoundly democratic France—least of all in France—nobody bothered to answer.

Nor is it for us here to point out the unpleasantness this Victorian misapprehension brought on the world. Enough to say that it was a delusion. What they were seeing was the evolution of a kind of democracy, as unique and idiosyncratic as cricket . . . which after all perhaps is no more than the distinction between Voltaire and Rousseau—between levelling intellectualism and the anti-intellectualist reaction. Yet without saying just a bit more, how is one to take the next step? For critics, while paying lip-service to the distinction, never (as far as I know) drive the implications to their conclusion which involves nothing less than the distinction, basic and not to be ignored, between the identifying and the differentiative principle, both manifesting as 'freedom movements' under the banner of the democratic idea. To distinguish between them let us confine the term *rational liberal* to the French side of the Channel, where it was born, and call the other the Rousseau-esque or English form, by the specific English label *radical liberal*. The one looks to found the social structure upon the basis of

the unanimity ultimately predictable of all individual minds in virtue of the ultimate identity of reason; the other seeks the higher social organization in the differentiation of the individual from the mass. One cultivates the universal, the other the particular. The pattern and the atom philosophy.

Out of rational liberalism springs all that we mean by French classicism; out of the temperamental radicalism of the English springs, to choose at random, *laissez-faire*, protestantism, nonconformity, empirical philosophers, singular Englishmen, parliamentary government, the Common Law founded upon a multitude of single cases, the absence of a Constitution, the Balance of Power and the Whigs.

This doesn't, of course, mean anything so silly as that no Frenchmen are individualists, or that no Englishmen conform—national flags are wagged here merely for brevity's sake and because they do underline the fact that quite small differences of temperament in leading one society to occupy itself more with one than another aspect of the business of, say, democracy, may produce dissimilar mass results.

*out there*

Anyway we now have the rational canon of French democracy defined as the assumption that liberty by making the individual free to get at the truth, which is *one*, will end by establishing universal conformity; and on the other hand what for want of a better word I have called the radical canon, of English democracy, based on the belief in individualism *per se*; as a departure from conformity, as a means of differentiation in the biological sense—of achieving, that is, an increase in complexity, or organization, equivalent to that which occurs when differentiation takes place in the embryo and the organs appear.

At this point we come to the real purpose of this article. Everything so far has really been introductory; but now the great, the crucial question has to be posed. It is this. Supposing it to be agreed that these are some of the forces which dictate the pattern of politics, can they be distinguished in action *out THERE* on the surface of the land? Can the identifying and the differentiative principles be traced in the Landscape pattern?

For if they could be, if the land pattern could be found to reflect the political pattern, if we could translate political opposites into landscape opposites, then it follows, does it not, that we ought to be able to identify two editions of *OUT THERE*, edition one being the conforming or unifying, edition two, the Radical or differentiating principle. We can. And if, as we have grounds for thinking, the *OUT THERE* of the Latin or French tradition—the Grand Manner—may be identified with the former, how tempting to identify the latter with the Landscape movement, the English revolt from the Latin tradition!

This, however, would require of the Landscape movement that it should reveal in actual performance the radical outlook, to which the passion of its founder, Anthony Ashley-Cooper, third Earl of Shaftesbury, for 'things of a natural kind' seems, on the surface, to point. But unfortunately for our argument, Shaftesbury's conception of Nature, which looks outwardly so *Be-thyselfish*, reveals upon closer inspection a

most un-radical, not to say Latin, preoccupation with ideal forms, created after the pattern of 'Nature's genuine order'; in contradistinction, this, to the 'common nature' familiar to the Picturesque professors and indeed to ourselves. This 'common nature' the early landscapists were by Shaftesbury bidden 'correct and amend' so that they might represent the world rather as it was 'first created' than in terms of 'mere phænomenæ'. *Thyself*, as conceived by Shaftesbury, was likewise an ideal self; the genius of the place a quintessential non-differentiating genius; to which no doubt one can attribute the special character of the early gardens of Kent and his friends, founded on the Platonic idealism of Shaftesbury and the Ideal Landscapes of Claude. If any movement could be said to belong to the Latin tradition this, you would have said, was it.

It may be, of course, that this dive into the Platonic no more represented the true philosophical than the cult of Palladianism the true aesthetic taste of the artists, prophets and smart alecs who made them fashionable, except in so far as they found themselves vulnerable, to an exciting and irresistible degree, to the romantic associations, so potent at that precise moment in history, of the Classical Age. If so, perhaps we can interpret Shaftesbury's Platonism with Burlington's Palladianism as what it seems, a mere classical top-dressing—an 'artificial'—temporarily and romantically overlaying the soil of English nominalism. Nevertheless it is there and creates, or would but for one particular circumstance, an obstacle our argument can ill afford. The circumstance, however, is exactly the event required by the argument—the very one we should expect if Shaftesbury and Burlington had overplayed the Classic hand; a reaction therefrom.

I mean, of course, the cult of the Picturesque. The Picturesque though generally treated as a mere frivolous embroidery (of rustic motifs) practised by men of levity, though also of sensibility, upon the Landscape-gardening movement, is, in fact, it is here suggested, just exactly the opposite, a reaction *against* that movement—a reaction, that is to say, against the Ideal landscapes of Kent, the naturalistic 'system' of Capability Brown, and what Price acidly called the Race of Improvers, amateur and professional, who stemmed from them. Of that reaction the picturesque rusticities were merely a by-product, for in fact the rivalry exhibited in the sparring bouts of Humphry Repton (defending Brown) and Sir Uvedale Price (attacking Brown) expressed a genuine cleavage between two rival philosophies. Clothed as it is in eighteenth century art-jargon this cleavage isn't exactly easy to bring out into the light of day, though one can compare easily enough Shaftesbury's view of, say, Vanbrugh with Uvedale Price's, but in fact the point of difference is crystallized in the very word that became the slogan of the movement: the *Picturesque*.

Listen to Price himself. In the 'progress of society towards refinement, as new distinctions arise new terms are invented; and it is in a great measure from their abundance, or their scarcity, that the richness, or the poverty of any language is estimated, while its precision no less depends on the accuracy with which they are employed.'

He goes on to argue that the term *Beauty*, when used to describe both the ideal beauty of Greek sculpture and the piquant beauty of an eye with a slight cast, becomes so broad as to be meaningless, and it would be convenient, he maintains, if the term *beauty* could be used in a 'confined' rather than a general sense to express those regular qualities with which it is generally associated, while another term (the *picturesque*) could be coined for those irregular charms which are sometimes said to create 'character.' The people who argued that the picturesque is only a 'mode of beauty' were using the word *beauty* in the general sense he deprecated.

So far so good. True, when he set out to define his terms in their 'confined' or specialized sense he got into plenty of trouble since his almost schoolboy enthusiasm for the cause landed him in a number of absurd and indefensible positions from which it is unnecessary to try to dig him out. What matters to us is the principle underlying his distinction between the beautiful and the picturesque, between on the one hand, smoothness, and on the other irregularity. The question boils down to this: what signified the adjective *irregular*? Not want of form. Most specifically and deliberately Price identifies 'want of form, that unshapen lumpish appearance' which would follow, for instance, if one were to 'clog and fill up' the modelling of the head of a Venus or Apollo, with ugliness, the ugly being the 'lumpish' and 'unformed.' No. Grecian sculpture affords us 'the most generally acknowledged models of beauty of form, in its most exquisitely finished state,' and ugliness is the reverse of this state.

But were an artist, on the other hand, 'to model, in a soft material, a head from the Venus or the Apollo, and then by way of experiment to make the nose longer or sharper; rising more suddenly towards the middle; or strongly aquiline; were he to give a striking projection to the eyebrow, or to interrupt by some marked deviation the flowing outline of the face—though he might destroy beauty, yet he might create character; and something grand or picturesque, might be produced by such a trait.' Again 'a degree of cast in the eyes, but so slight as only to give archness and peculiarity of countenance—this without altering the proportion of the features, would take off from beauty, what it gave to character and picturesqueness. Thus the French will say of a woman *que sans être belle elle est piquante*—a word, by the bye,' says Price, 'that in many points answers very exactly to picturesque.' He adds 'the whole of this applies most exactly to improvements,' and to buildings ('the ugliest buildings are those which have no feature, no character.')

The thing to note is the identification of ugliness with absence of character, and the identification of 'character' with the Picturesque—more and more Price was forced to identify the Picturesque with character rather than with mere patina. If we dwell on the phrases he constantly uses, it becomes obvious that what he was trying to say was that there is an accepted ideal of beauty represented by Greek art, and there is another kind of beauty, distinguished by its departure from 'that perfection of ideal beauty so diligently sought after.' There is a beauty that identi-

fies with an ideal and one that differentiates from it.

Deny this interpretation and the rage of Knight and Price against the earlier Landscape-Gardeners seems to me incomprehensible. Admit it and one is presented with the key not only to the motive of the Price-Knight offensive against mounds, clumps and belts—against Kent and Capability Brown—but to the real significance of the Picturesque Movement, a more portentous phenomenon far than its surface appearance suggests or its apologists seem to allow. According to Price the system of Capability Brown far from contributing to the nonconformist platform sought under the faintest of disguises none other than the re-establishment of the unified, the universal, the ideal picture. Far from setting out to debunk the Grand Manner it amounted in effect to no more than an effort to New-Look it.<sup>4</sup>

At once the inveteracy, to use a word coined by Queen Anne, of Brown's enemies becomes understandable, revealing as it does their sudden realization that within that section of the new Landscape movement dominated by Brown a conspiracy had disclosed itself to re-stylize what had started, or rather what under Picturesque theory had turned into, a revolt against stylization—a situation we ourselves are not unfamiliar with to-day in the action for and reaction against the International Style.

Thus the meaning of the Picturesque offensive as a reaction, a revolt, against the ideal is clear. For that was what it was, a revolt against that old bore Plato, a protest against merely ideal Beauty which, together with frightening beauty (the sublime), up to that highly psychological moment, had been the eighteenth century's password to the visible Humanities.

#### *the wider implications*

Here then is the point of departure from Shaftesbury, for though Shaftesbury favoured a return to nature it was to an ideal nature conceived on Greek principles, a nature more ideal because no longer obstructed by man's art and caprice. However, the battle of the Beautiful v. Picturesque, an essentially local eighteenth century squabble, though not without its own glamour claims attention here solely on account of its bearing on our current problems. Has it meaning for us to-day? The answer to that is that it has an urgent meaning. According to the present thesis the full implications of the modern movement with all its baffling ambiguities *can only be brought out by reference to the eighteenth century*, in which, and not the nineteenth, were set up those basic contradictions which form the stuff of the modern dilemma.

For the purpose of this article I would state the issue as follows: that with Picturesque Theory as developed by the anti-Brown, anti-Repton gang we attend the delivery of the first Western *radical aesthetic*, under which Be-thyself comes to mean not be more

<sup>4</sup> 'Formerly everything was in squares and parallelograms; now everything is in segments of circles and ellipses; the formality still remains; the character of that formality alone is changed.' Sir Uvedale Price: *Essay on the Picturesque*.

'The intention of the new improvers was certainly meritorious; for they meant to banish formality, and to restore nature, but it must be remembered that strongly marked, distinct and regular curves, unbroken and undisguised, are hardly less unnatural or formal, though much less grand and simple, than straight lines; and that independently of monotony, the continual and indiscriminate use of such curves has an appearance of affectation and of studied grace, which always creates disgust.' *Ibid.*

quintessential but be more unique. By calling the Picturesque movement 'romantic' one gets nowhere at all; the moment it is seen as radical in the sense we have used it it can be identified as the product of the individualizing impulse traditionally associated with the English outlook; with the differentiating as against the universalizing tendency. *Be thyself* translated into Picturesque Theory becomes the *genius loci* in the non-archetypal sense, the sense we use to-day, as opposed to the sense in which Shaftesbury used it. French rational liberalism—the Grand Manner—becomes the theory that seeks the one in the manifold and radical theory—the Picturesque—that which demonstrates the manifold nature of the one.

Fine words. Can they be turned into anything like a working principle for the practising planner?

#### *the new approach to nature*

The first principle of all is Rousseau's great maxim—*Be Thyself*. It states the philosophy of both political and aesthetic radicalism in two profound words; for Picturesque Theory it says all that Uvedale Price took three volumes and a letter from Humphry Repton to say. Supposing 'you' to be a physical object it states your first rule of conduct; the freedom, better still, the duty, to differentiate biologically; to be the hill, the street, the shape of tree it is your unique mission to be; on the understanding that when things or people are allowed to be themselves they disclose fresh potentialities—higher powers of organization—of team-work even—so that relationships that have never been foreseen spring suddenly into being between dissimilar or even hostile objects, between tree and tree, sky and bare hill, sward and waste. Such relationships, first revealed by accident, become next the motifs of a self-conscious art, aimed at reconciling by accentuating varieties of form, and establishing, in resolving that conflict, the conditions for a democracy of things.

#### *the modern picturesque theory*

For us to-day the moral is easier to draw if one focuses on the interior rather than the exterior of the cave. Nine people out of ten are surrounded in the home by household gods whose arrangement is as capricious as their origin is various: a Biedermeier escritoire, The Lion Slayer, a Buhl cabinet, an act of Parliament clock by Tribe of Petworth, Daniel prints of Abyssinia, a dead collection, a horsehair chair covered in chintz, an Aalto table, or a less arty assortment from Great Aunts, the Near East and Oxford Street. Looked at from the point of view of those Parisian flats in which ageing couples live in a flawless Louis milieu, the bric-à-brac of the average home is anarchist, appalling. True. And true again the children's golf clubs and overcoats may upset the ensemble. Yet the taste can be extremely high that quite ordinary tasteless philistines show in the disposition and relationship of their bits and pieces even when those pieces are intrinsically worthless. There are thousands of homes of families-in-the-street which can offer satisfying arrangements of objects simply because their owners pursue quite unselfconsciously the Picturesque philosophy of giving every object the best possible chance to be itself.

This natural understanding (Uvedale Price's phrase), this sensibility to the relations between differences,

this surrealism, is the quality which cries out to be transferred from the interior to the exterior of the cave. There are exceptions (like Bath), even in England, but in general an easy anarchy, pleasant or unpleasant as luck dictates, reigns in our streets as in our homes. Missing in the streets, however, is the controlling hand found inside the home—which makes exactly all the difference between conscious purpose, veiled though it may be even to the party executing it, and chaos that may or may not be amusing, but is inexorably accident (or the Unconscious at work) and thus not in our power to control. Step to the front door, and take a look at the market square outside.

It is a country town and the principal building, or anyway the one that takes the eye, is the solicitor's house, a large square lichenized early eighteenth century stone building with buff window architraves, thick white glazing bars, and a monumental wistaria draped over the dummy window. Backed up as it is by several other Georgian buildings, the eighteenth century provides the keynote for the square.

But what have we next door? None other than a Venetian Gothic chemist built originally of white brick but now over-painted a mixture of mid-purple brown and golden brown, windows and woodwork white, advertising antacid powders in an ornamented Grecian. Are we to tear this down and put up a Queen Anne Chemist with buff architraves and white glazing bars, antacid powders advertised in Tragan and of course a wistaria?—the answer isn't an outright yea or nay; nor is it 'let's compromise and put up a Tudor chemist with blackletter legends'; it is, *for the town planner as opposed to the architect*, rather a question. What do the Venetian Gothic chemist and the Georgian solicitor's houses do to each other, the lichen, the buff, the mid-purple brown? There is a possibility that they may do something nice. As a matter of fact, in the case I am thinking of, they do. Are we then going to accept Spec. Builders' Venetian? As *architects*, no; as *town planners*, yes. Yes, we are. Whatever the elements out of which the scene is built, it is on purely visual and not on professional architectural grounds that we as radical planners shall admit or spurn them, and when Venetian Gothic does a useful visual job, let it be given a run for its money.

How does one decide? How does one decide on the disposition of the bric-à-brac in one's room or the worthwhileness of one's friends? A matter of personal taste obviously, but that avoids the issue. The approach (transferring ourselves swiftly from the market square to the city street) is the approach of the auction room. Come, gentlemen, what am I bid for one public-house gasolier, one bus stop, two public lavatories, one Underground station entrance, one manhole cover, one bend in the road to port, three brass balls, one Bass triangle, two bollards, six plane trees, Teas with Hovis, the neon sign of the flower shop, and a hundred and fifty horizontal windows in New Pelman Court. You pays your money and you takes your choice. What you take is up to you, but the principle (which is what we are interested in) is that you love or try to love them instead of trying to hate and rid yourself of them in one way or another.

From such assortments the radical planner has to

produce his practical surrealist picture. If it is good it will have what the good interior scene has, an overall character—conformity even—yet founded, not as with rational Liberal theory on the effort to achieve congruity through harmony but on the effort to achieve a new kind of organization through the cultivation of significant differences.

Not any old differences. The significant ones. By concentration on the urge of the parts to be themselves to make a new kind of whole. Remembering always that as with avenues in the old landscape so with harmonies in the new, where harmony is indicated there let harmony be.

This is radical theory. It involves, as in politics, a radical idea of the meaning of parts.

#### Sharawaggi and the radical principle

There isn't in practice, of course, always a Bass triangle or a Pub gasolier—that is to say an existing stage prop—handy for the visual planner, but why should there be? Hopelessly does he misunderstand the radical (which is also, I take it, the Sharawag) principle who takes it to be merely a recipe for mixing styles, or buildings. Here and in the pages which follow the argument has been illustrated from the familiar past only because good contemporary examples of the radical approach are so hard to find. Not really to be wondered at, this, seeing that modern planning practice can be said to be still in the Lancelot Brown phase, with Corbusier, The Professor, busy about his clumps—clumps in the twentieth century of buildings rather than trees. All the same the principle can be invoked just as surely when the planner is free to work on an empty site in the modern idiom.

As a planning technique, then, what does the radical principle amount to? A pretext for whimsy? If that were all how right would those critics be who warn us that whatever the charms of the Sharawag as a drinking companion, 'real life,' for the real architect to-day, means sitework, manipulation of specialists, study of industrial plant, and athletic efforts to push the building back into the factory. Indeed it does. Indeed they are. Each age has its own *priorities*, and ours are social and technical, living as we do in an era of advanced scientific industrialization. But each age has also its *constants*; and of these by far the most potent is that temperamental bias of a whole community which under the name of national character continually demonstrates its enormous power of survival. When the missing science, the science of Man, comes into its own, the influence of national character on the art and technics of a given society may be a matter for specialists to fix rather than for men of letters to speculate about . . . in the meantime let us state boldly our belief that a large majority of those who inherit the English tradition and temperament, technicians no less than poets, are potential radicals, potential Sharawags. And the really exciting thing is to see what variations occur when the national character weds the spirit of the Age—in this case the bashful nymph, Mechanization. Nor should the proud rationaliser assume too hastily that the good Sharawag must, *ipso facto*, be a bad technician.

<sup>5</sup> English, because we are not sure the argument applies to the Scots, the Irish or the Welsh despite Sir Uvedale Price.

And this brings us to the final recommendation of this article. As the event has proved, the battle fought out in the eighteenth century first between the axial planners of Europe and the landscape gardeners, and then between the landscape gardeners and the Picturesque literary intelligentsia, established, or rather isolated, once for all the post-mediæval English approach to OUT THERE.

It established a major generalization of immense utility, against which we are able to measure individual events, and, more, forecast probable reactions such as, for instance, the probable English reaction to modern town planning theory and practice. Ditto International Style. Also for those who have the misfortune not to be English—Scots, Germans, Americans—it provides a yard-stick against which to measure their own characteristic reactions.

Do architecture and town planning stand to gain from this generalization? If the method followed here is not incorrect, they stand to gain something as priceless as the radical political philosophy earlier word-battles have bequeathed to us, from earlier centuries, namely its complement, a *radical visual philosophy*. Without exactly that—a visual philosophy—we shall continue to be the agents and the victims of the world of the upturned dustbin. But once isolate and establish (for the society concerned) a general visual philosophy and the whole course of planning operations on the land-surface, so tangled and inconsequent before, so obscure in objective, so incapable of co-ordination or orientation, become sharp, clear, aimed, concise. It is a matter not of a technic but of a philosophy—of a philosophy which will *inter alia* bring influence to bear on technics. In this argument an effort has been made to state that philosophy; let me sum up by recapitulating it in terms of modern architecture.

Thus. The movement that used to be called Functionalism has developed an inner schism in which one party (figurehead Corbusier) has moved towards the rational or classic or crystalline solution; the other (figurehead Frank Lloyd Wright) towards the romantic or, as he would say, organic. If we like to go on with our game of nationalities and identify the former with the French tradition of thinking, we are bound, are we not, to identify the latter with the orthodox Romantic Movement (so far unaccounted for in this article) which might be called, for neatness, the German tradition of feeling—‘thinking with the blood’—psychologically surely Wright is a German.

The claim of this article is that there is a third movement so far not isolated by the critics which might be called English or Radical since it belongs to neither of the above categories, nourishing itself instead upon the embodied, the differentiated, the phenomenal world as opposed to the noumenal world of the German romantic. English artists, it is asserted, have shown an inclination throughout the styles and the centuries to treat life objectively and empirically and in the eighteenth century under the war-cry *irregular* (meaning ‘let’s have more character,’ i.e.,

significant differentiation) this urge was brought into consciousness and tricked out into the philosophy we know as Picturesque Theory which for this very reason becomes a crucial event in the history of art.

But the word Picturesque having since changed its meaning, this essay has stolen from politics another, the word *radical*, to try to establish more concisely just what the essential characteristic of that visual philosophy was: namely (to put it negatively first) a dislike which amounts to an inability to see wholes or principles and an incapacity for handling theory; but on the other hand a passionate preoccupation with independent details, parts or persons, an urge to help them fulfil themselves, achieve their own freedom; and thus, by mutual differentiation, achieve a higher organization.

The question arises, how is the true radical—for whom theory and rule of thumb, reason and revelation are taboo—to operate? With what *principia*, and from what base? Unrooted in principle where and in what is he to root himself? The answer is one, it seems to me, that architectural journalism (for one) should inwardly digest. On precedent. Meaning on the accumulating examples of individual experience, whose function is to train first the creative faculty, then to provide exemplars from which to depart. A Case-Book of *out there*.

Taking that phrase *case-book* in the lowest and most literal sense the true radical would set out to begin the long business of establishing visual planning precedents (not principles), by the collection of individual examples of civic design. How significant and idiosyncratic—how radical—is this simple act is, is seen when we remind ourselves that that is exactly the method that has been followed in the creation of this country’s greatest contribution to civil organization—the common law. One looks to see an English, a radical, modern aesthetic growing in the same way out of innumerable individual judgments—in this case aesthetic judgments based in this age on technical judgments.<sup>6</sup> I submit that the moment the thing is put in that way it becomes clear to any English mind that that is the only way an English visual tradition could be reborn. A mass of precedents gone over creatively to make a living idiom.

To bring the thing down to practical politics the section which follows tries to demonstrate in a purely token way the Case-Book idea applied to town planning as a visual art, termed by Thomas Sharp Civic Design and by the REVIEW, I think, Townscape. Technical questions can here be ignored, but it is not for this reason the subject is chosen, but rather because it demonstrates the modern conception of Landscape as the *field of vision* wherever and in whatever position one happens to be. So long as Landscape, unlike the law, has neither its case-books nor its philosophy, so long will it remain, as I see it, an art in embryo, and so long will the world out there remain a mighty dustbin in which the various humanities, elegancies and arts lie buried alive.



<sup>6</sup> Whether the aesthetic judgments are based on technical judgments depends on the spirit of the Age—ours quite rightly are, or appear to us to be.



AR DEC 1949.

Gordon Cullen

## TOWNSCAPE CASEBOOK



**a**

**b**

The crystalline object can be seen in two ways and the smaller drawings, a and b, provide the correct references for alternation.


In a there is a solid cube, standing on, and backed by, thin sheets. In b one is looking up into the corner of a room, which has been cut away to show the thickness of wall and ceiling.

In viewing the physical environment with its roads, bridges, buildings, vegetation, paving and so on, there are, similarly, two ways of looking . . . the associational and the objective. That is to say the front door can be 'home' or a rectangle of colour. As far as the urban scene goes it is nearly always the former, hardly ever the latter. There is no Art of the ensemble, and no terminology to isolate and communicate our feelings.

The previous article 'Townscape' has hinted at the kind of theory this missing art needs, and the section which follows suggests how the argument might work out in practice. It is to be treated as a series of specimen pages from a hypothetical casebook, the sort of casebook the visual planner might be supposed to compile for himself not as a crib, since in practice every problem differs, but as an aid to this particular kind of visual sensibility.


The examples are grouped under headings designed to suggest the type of vision—the particular exercise of the eye—needed to apprehend them.

### eye as fandancer




(Here vistas are likened to the poses of the dancer).

**GRANDIOSE VISTA** Of all the patterns of the Beaux Arts the vista, as might be expected, has travelled furthest. To many people it is synonymous with Civic Design. It looks its best from the air, its worst from the ground, where it tends either to be hidden entirely by traffic, or empty and monotonous.




**SCREENED VISTA** But there are other kinds of vista which are not so despotic and which reveal a more intimate contact with environment. Tree trunks and bollards contain whilst revealing: a technique common to many games, dances and courtship.

*eye as fandancer*



**VISTA BY IMPLICATION**  
The promise which may or may not be fulfilled but which changes the character of a place by the hint of vastness (as a dash of spray on a porthole emphasizes the cosiness of a ship's smoking-room)



**CLOSED VISTA** Eventually all vistas close. Some, with tired elegance, select a distant allotment. This one is swallowed up in the cathedral entrance, so that in fact it doesn't close, but is transmuted into a cave. A highly romantic notion exploited with great effect by Baroque as well as Gothic builders.

### ***eye as netter***




**SKY AND PANORAMA** Sky and panorama need no comment except that they are the lyrical material that can be drawn into our environment as air is drawn into the cells of the lungs.



**NETTED SKY** Space is usually remote, out beyond the chimney tops. There are those times when, walking up a road one is convinced that the sea is beyond the crest. Here that sense of the immediacy of infinity is caught and perpetuated in architecture as it comes down the stairs.



**NETTED PANORAMA** *The effect of screening is to relate, and thus create, detail out of the general. The everyday dull scene ceases to be utilitarian. It becomes a piece of scenery that you are attending to.*



*As though to underline the point the artist has carefully placed ships in the spaces between columns. This is the effect that netting produces, but a photograph is usually too instantaneous to capture it.*

### ***eye as agoraphobe***






**ENCLOSURE** *Enclosure is one of the most fundamental aspects of Civic Design. Quite apart from the character of enclosure, whether it be formal or intimate, medieval or modern, there is the sense of internal pressure, which we have emphasized by quoting its morbid aspects.*




**EXPOSURE** *The converse of pressure is release. The gasp of relief is much enhanced when the activities externalized are those previously associated with the world of the interior. With luck you score twice, once by the sense of release, and then again when force of habit associates sky with ceiling, river with window-box, and the Houses of Parliament with mantelpiece ornaments (see also Exterior Decorator).*

**FLUCTUATION** In a sense all urban progression is fluctuation between pressures, between enclosure and release. It is this conception of the environment (other considerations of articulation, texture, etc., are secondary) which supplies the designer with his base.



### ***eye as movie-camera***




**FREE DEVELOPMENT** As a novelist creates drama by the juxtaposition of characters, a with b, b with c, c with a, so in this example movement brings an everchanging juxtaposition of masts, towers and turrets which appear and disappear only to reappear in a quite different context.

## *eye as articulator*



**INCIDENT** The street, whether it be curved or straight, is not a means to an end but an end. That is to say, one should not feel like a pint of water in a pipe. Incidents such as towers, pediments, recesses and colour can all be exploited to articulate.



**UNDULATION** A single column in a room, by relating the various objects in the room to itself articulates space. It is in front of some, behind others, and exposes their exact positions. Undulation has a particularly strong grip of spaces due to its variation from an unseen axis.



**FLOWING LINES** Superficially the opposite of articulation, the effect of flowing lines is to weld the whole scene together so that it becomes an incident, a unit in the wider scene.



**PROJECTION AND RECESSION** Similar in effect is the more homely effect of projection and recession. The eye does not slide off the street but is intrigued by the surface. It gives scale and humanity.


## **eye as exterior decorator**




**TREES** In this quiet street the tree grows with great self-assurance. It is placed in its setting with much the same regard that one would employ in arranging a fern in one's living-room.



**PATTERN MAKER** One could easily imagine this same scene as it might have been: a high level road above, a waste of concrete below, a public convenience and dreariness. But here the floor is interesting, the change of level has been utilized, and the whole scene becomes colourful.




**ARCHITECTURAL ELEMENTS** The same process is observed in this scene where various objects are brought together to produce a unique ensemble: pediment, tree, staircase and wall.



**ORNAMENT OF FUNCTION** The decoration of this scene is supplied by flags, colours and objects. Boats and buses, for instance, are not only seen as means of transport, but as moving colours and shapes. The buses which appear and disappear high over the river are, as it were, exhibition pieces.

## *eye as matchmaker*



**SCALE** Home ground for the architect. Scale is one of the regulators in the business of juxtaposition. A town consists of a multitude of elements. What to do with them? (a) Iron out all differences.

(b) Anarchy.

(c) Differentiation with a common purpose. Proper regard to scale (including purposeful misuse of it) helps to give each element the chance to be itself; provides the common element which allows the greatest differentiation.



**FOILS** Complementary personalities enrich each other by excess of contrast. The depth to which study of landscape has sunk is demonstrated by the fact that this obvious thought is quite new to many visual planners and even now they don't act on it.



**INTRICACY** Usually most keenly felt by its absence, intricacy is the elusive quality proper to a rich diversity of function (multiple use). Not to be confused with hodge-podge, it calls for an elaboration of style which still eludes the modern movement.




**MULTIPLE USE** Zoning on paper is a colourful occupation, but in three dimensions it invites monotony. In practice the town overlaps and the greatest of all zoning principles should be the principle of Multiple Use. It is the principle of differentiation applied to function and produces variety and vitality instead of the uniformity of segregation.

## *eye as sculptor*




29

**BUILDINGS AS SCULPTURE** A church tower in a field, a staircase or a breakwater. These are a few cases where we can appreciate the purely sculptural quality of building. As a mobile differs from stone carving so architectural sculpture differs again.




30

**CHANGE OF LEVEL** The exploitation of levels, from the humble pavement to noble cliff, provides endless opportunities for the sculptor's approach. Ramps, stairs, slopes, the effects of looking down or cutting off, are all raw material for the designer.




31

**TRUNCATION** By this is meant the cutting off by foreground of part of a building, either by street or ground or steps. In itself a transient experience (like so many of the effects of civic design, which rely on the moving eye) it has the quality of making the building part of the scene and not an end in itself. It becomes a cornice to the view or an abstract painting.



32


**ROOFSCAPE** Closely linked to truncation is the roofscape. Given a little respite from power station grit, this tree-top scenery might become more popular.



33


34

In St. Paul's the double order was used so that the plinth of the top storey appeared to rest on the rooftops. The building on the left, Nottingham City Hall (seen from a public park), shows a clash of tower and roof-line.




35

**STREET FURNITURE** Four objects surprised whilst sunning themselves behind St. Benets. The photograph shows the bad effect of crowding together pieces of street furniture which in themselves are good.



37

**GEOOMETRY** Sitting on a veranda at the sea, I was able to observe the curve of the horizon by sighting it along the veranda rail. I could see the rise in the centre. This simple but astonishing sight evokes the same emotion as the perception of geometry in the environment. Planes, lines and curves which have the same infallibility.




36

**SIGNIFICANT OBJECTS** The town is full of objects, trees, steeples, lamp posts, pillar boxes, pediments. On the large scale they become means of articulation, on the small scale they provide richness and possibly strangeness (as the two eyes follow you all the way down the street).

371

### *eye as painter*



38

**FLOORSCAPE** The space between buildings is just as important in the total view as the buildings. Floors have functions to perform as well as walls, but the problem is not wholly one of convenience. If it is worth while studying the scale and texture of a wall, then it is important on floors. The type of floor can affect the scale of buildings, it can isolate a building, or make it part of a scene.



39

**TRAFFIC AND ROAD SURFACES** The use of different types of road surface is called for from both a functional and an aesthetic point of view. Lettering on roads, the demarcation of pedestrian crossings, and so on, suggest that there is room for a Highway Code in which colours and textures indicate function.



42

**ILLUSION** From the days of the Parthenon designers have employed illusion to gain effects or to offset undesirable effects. This stretch of water in the Luxembourg Gardens is made to appear sloping by the design of the surrounding walls, a surprising and charming example of exuberance.




40



41

**WALLSCAPE** Under this heading can be listed all the joys of colour, texture, creeper and weathering (soot and silver of London). As with all these points, once the attention is directed to the subject it starts to blossom (a day spent concentrating simply on walls or floors or railings establishes it as a personality).

*pleasing decay*




43

**PUBLICITY** By the use of advertising material the building has been transformed into a vivid and colourful incident. Naturally one does not recommend this as a general practice (like so many other effects it has to be employed with discrimination). But in the shopping street which is alive with bustle and barter, this effect is desirable.


## *eye as traffic cop*




**CAR PARKING** Although busy-ness, the coming and going of people, is natural and proper in a town, the wholesale blanketing of streets and views by cars is not desirable. The proper place is the car park. But let us rid ourselves of the criminal folly of pretending that car parks and city squares are synonymous.



**HAZARDS** To control cattle the squire builds a ha-ha so that his view is not disturbed by a fence. In the same way, urban hazards can be arranged for the pedestrian (who is both cow and squire). Our drawing shows the conventional railing and three variations—water, planting and change of level. The photograph shows how a given path is enforced by hazards.



**PEDESTRIAN WAY** A fragment of city wall, catwalk, alleyway, a rough track over a waste patch, sudden flight from traffic, view of backyards, steps, ramps and tunnels. All the intimacy and drama of the city are fair game for the pedestrian. The pedestrian network is to the street (traffic) plan as, in music, variation is to theme. Variety should be its first law, continuity its second.




## *eye as poet*




51

**THE METAPHOR** It should be made clear that, throughout this series, we do not advocate the actual object shown, but the idea which it illustrates, which is still valid for modern design. Under the heading of *eye as poet* we list effects which are not primarily visual but connective.




52

The classical columns of the gasholder and the castellated addition to the house (included for its clarity, not for its architectural merit) are examples of the rôle of association in design.



53

**INDIVIDUALITY** The postman in his off time, the civil servant in his garden, often have building ambitions. The results, intensely personal, demonstrate the gap between it and the architecture of responsibility.



54

**NOSTALGIA** Far removed from whimsy this window suggests sinister motives and the power of hypnosis. The wind blows carelessly and the ivy undulates. Inside, the plant grows and decays in silent stillness.