ci(security): SLSA provenance + keyless cosign signing for releases (T7)#68
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Sign and attest every released artifact with keyless Sigstore (Fulcio certs from the GitHub Actions OIDC token, recorded in Rekor — no managed key). Closes the outbound supply-chain gap left by ADR-014/015 and the Scorecard Signed-Releases check. Images (shieldoo-gate, scanner-bridge): - build-push-action with provenance: mode=max + sbom: true (BuildKit attaches SLSA provenance + CycloneDX SBOM as OCI referrers) - actions/attest-build-provenance (GitHub-hosted, push-to-registry) - cosign sign by digest (never by tag) shdg binaries: one attest-build-provenance over all 5 archives. Dogfooded SBOMs: persisted via `shdg scan --sbom-output`, attached to the release (*.cdx.json), folded into SHA256SUMS, and signed with cosign sign-blob --bundle. Same bytes the gate ingested. Permissions reduced to least-privilege: top-level contents: read, each job widens only what it needs. New actions SHA-pinned (ADR-015). Fail-closed guards reject an incomplete SHA256SUMS or an empty SBOM. Security-reviewed (no blockers; two should-fix integrity guards applied). The workflow only runs on a vX.Y.Z tag, so the first real exercise is the next release tag. ADR-018 records the decision; docs/development/ci.md documents the flow. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Second half of T7 (build provenance / signing) — completes the security-hardening plan. Builds on #67 (
shdg --sbom-output, already merged).Signs and attests every released artifact with keyless Sigstore (Fulcio certs from the GitHub Actions OIDC token, recorded in Rekor — no managed signing key). Closes the outbound supply-chain gap left by ADR-014/015 and the OpenSSF Scorecard Signed-Releases check.
What
Images (
shieldoo-gate,scanner-bridge)build-push-actionwithprovenance: mode=max+sbom: true→ BuildKit attaches SLSA provenance + CycloneDX SBOM as OCI referrersactions/attest-build-provenance(GitHub-hosted SLSA provenance, pushed to the registry)cosign signby digest, never by tagshdgbinaries — oneattest-build-provenanceattestation over all 5 archives.Dogfooded SBOMs — persisted via
shdg scan --sbom-output, attached (*.cdx.json), folded intoSHA256SUMS, and signed withcosign sign-blob --bundle. The signed bytes are the same ones uploaded to the production gate.Security posture
contents: read, each job widens only what it needs.attest-build-provenance@v4.1.0,cosign-installer@v4.1.2) per ADR-015.SHA256SUMSor an empty SBOM aborts the release.Validation
actionlintclean (only pre-existing SC2129/SC2035 style nits).vX.Y.Ztag, so it cannot be exercised by PR CI — the first real run is the next release tag. Review is the safety net.Docs
docs/development/ci.md— new "Release signing & provenance" section.cosign verify/gh attestation verifycommands per tag.Follow-up (not blocking)
Bind the dogfooded SBOM to the image digest (OCI referrer / in-predicate) so SBOM↔image correspondence is verifiable. The BuildKit
sbom: truereferrer is already digest-bound.🤖 Generated with Claude Code