feat(data): authorized materialized views via auth fingerprint (0226)#277
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crs48 merged 6 commits intoJun 26, 2026
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Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Materialized views were disabled whenever a read-authorization evaluator was active, throwing away the cross-reload cache exactly when authz exists. Stamp each materialization with a reload-stable authorization fingerprint (subject DID + grant-state version) so a view can be authorized ONCE at refresh and served from cache without per-row re-checks — while any grant change forces an 'authz-changed' re-materialization. The persisted id list can never serve a row a revoked viewer may no longer read. - schema: add node_query_materializations.auth_fingerprint (v7 + DDL + defensive PRAGMA column guard for in-place upgrades) - adapter: inject a NodeReadAuthorizer that filters the id list at refresh; getAuthorizationStateVersion() over grants + /sys/authz; 'authz-changed' refresh reason; skip authz-blind parity audit - store: wire filterReadableNodes as the authorizer; new query() path that materializes under authz; authFingerprint() + support guard Exploration 0226. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…inspector The Data panel plan inspector now surfaces the materialized view id and, on a cache miss, the refresh reason (including the new 'authz-changed' from exploration 0226) alongside the existing hit/miss row. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add a doc comment at queryMaterializedView making explicit that a materialized view is a purely local, derived cache (id list + order), never part of the change log and never synced — it carries no authority and is safe to rebuild or drop. Add a reload test proving a fresh adapter on the same DB serves the view from persisted SQLite. Exploration 0226. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Check off the validation items proven by automated tests (reload, invalidation, authz-revocation, fingerprint coverage), note that at-rest encryption (items 6-7) is deferred to a follow-up, and add the changeset + changelog fragment for the @xnetjs/data + @xnetjs/sqlite feature. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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What
Implements part 1 of exploration 0226 — Persistent And Secure Materialized Views: the auth-fingerprint mechanism that lets a materialized view persist across reloads and coexist with read authorization, without per-cell checks.
The problem
Materialized views (
node_query_materializations, OPFS-backed) persist across reloads today — but the store disabled them entirely whenever a read-authorization evaluator was active, throwing away the cross-reload cache exactly when authz exists. The alternative the user worried about — "authorize once at login, never re-check" — is unsafe: a grant revoked between materializations would leak rows (the well-known stale-RLS-over-materialized-view bug).The fix — authorize once per materialization, not per cell and not per login
subject DID + grant-state version(COUNT/MAX(updated_at)overGrant+/sys/authznodes — ordinary data writes don't move it).NodeReadAuthorizer, wired to the store'sfilterReadableNodes), then serves cache hits with no per-row re-checks.authz-changedrefresh reason → re-materialize. The cached id list can never serve a row a revoked viewer may no longer read.Changes
@xnetjs/sqlite):node_query_materializations.auth_fingerprint(schema v7 + DDL + migration + defensivePRAGMAcolumn guard for in-place upgrades).@xnetjs/data): authorizer applied at refresh;getAuthorizationStateVersion();authz-changedreason; skip the authz-blind parity audit.@xnetjs/data): newquery()path that materializes under authz;authFingerprint()+ support guard; wires the authorizer.Tests
authz-changedre-materialization (the critical revocation test), and authz-state versioning (grants +/sys/authz, not data writes).query()path persists under authz + re-materializes excluding a revoked row; and falls back safely when storage can't fingerprint.formatPlanRowssurfaces view id / cache outcome / refresh reason.All green;
@xnetjs/data,@xnetjs/sqlite,@xnetjs/devtools,@xnetjs/data-bridge,@xnetjs/reacttypecheck.Deferred (follow-up)
Part 3 of the exploration — at-rest encryption of the local store (
nodeContentCipherwiring inapps/web+ a Settings toggle, checklist items 6–7) — is intentionally not in this PR. It's a larger, security-sensitive feature spanning identity → app → worker → store with a data-migration dimension and needs real browser/passkey/OPFS verification. The exploration stays[_]until it lands, matching the doc's "ship part 1 first" staging.🤖 Generated with Claude Code