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[FIPS-9.2] Multiple VULNS 22/10/25 #641
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[FIPS-9.2] Multiple VULNS 22/10/25 #641
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jira VULN-63436 cve CVE-2021-47459 commit-author Ziyang Xuan <william.xuanziyang@huawei.com> commit d9d52a3 It will trigger UAF for rx_kref of j1939_priv as following. cpu0 cpu1 j1939_sk_bind(socket0, ndev0, ...) j1939_netdev_start j1939_sk_bind(socket1, ndev0, ...) j1939_netdev_start j1939_priv_set j1939_priv_get_by_ndev_locked j1939_jsk_add ..... j1939_netdev_stop kref_put_lock(&priv->rx_kref, ...) kref_get(&priv->rx_kref, ...) REFCOUNT_WARN("addition on 0;...") ==================================================== refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free. WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 20874 at lib/refcount.c:25 refcount_warn_saturate+0x169/0x1e0 RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0x169/0x1e0 Call Trace: j1939_netdev_start+0x68b/0x920 j1939_sk_bind+0x426/0xeb0 ? security_socket_bind+0x83/0xb0 The rx_kref's kref_get() and kref_put() should use j1939_netdev_lock to protect. Fixes: 9d71dd0 ("can: add support of SAE J1939 protocol") Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20210926104757.2021540-1-william.xuanziyang@huawei.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: syzbot+85d9878b19c94f9019ad@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Signed-off-by: Ziyang Xuan <william.xuanziyang@huawei.com> Acked-by: Oleksij Rempel <o.rempel@pengutronix.de> Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de> (cherry picked from commit d9d52a3) Signed-off-by: Shreeya Patel <spatel@ciq.com>
jira VULN-70089 cve CVE-2022-50087 commit-author Sudeep Holla <sudeep.holla@arm.com> commit 689640e When scpi probe fails, at any point, we need to ensure that the scpi_info is not set and will remain NULL until the probe succeeds. If it is not taken care, then it could result use-after-free as the value is exported via get_scpi_ops() and could refer to a memory allocated via devm_kzalloc() but freed when the probe fails. Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220701160310.148344-1-sudeep.holla@arm.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.19+ Reported-by: huhai <huhai@kylinos.cn> Reviewed-by: Jackie Liu <liuyun01@kylinos.cn> Signed-off-by: Sudeep Holla <sudeep.holla@arm.com> (cherry picked from commit 689640e) Signed-off-by: Shreeya Patel <spatel@ciq.com>
jira VULN-67491 cve CVE-2023-53125 commit-author Szymon Heidrich <szymon.heidrich@gmail.com> commit d8b2283 Packet length retrieved from skb data may be larger than the actual socket buffer length (up to 9026 bytes). In such case the cloned skb passed up the network stack will leak kernel memory contents. Fixes: d0cad87 ("smsc75xx: SMSC LAN75xx USB gigabit ethernet adapter driver") Signed-off-by: Szymon Heidrich <szymon.heidrich@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> (cherry picked from commit d8b2283) Signed-off-by: Shreeya Patel <spatel@ciq.com>
🔍 Upstream Linux Kernel Commit Check
This is an automated message from the kernel commit checker workflow. |
|
With the new $ interdiff --fuzzy=0 <(git format-patch -1 --stdout fdb010fbf4767) <(git format-patch -1 --stdout e01780ea46611)
1 out of 1 hunk FAILED -- saving rejects to file /tmp/interdiff-2.7An9vf.rej
diff -u b/kernel/padata.c b/kernel/padata.c
--- b/kernel/padata.c
+++ b/kernel/padata.c
@@ -1135,6 +1135,12 @@
if (!ps)
return;
+ /*
+ * Wait for all _do_serial calls to finish to avoid touching
+ * freed pd's and ps's.
+ */
+ synchronize_rcu();
+
mutex_lock(&ps->pinst->lock);
list_del(&ps->list);
pd = rcu_dereference_protected(ps->pd, 1);The backport patch looks like this: +++ b/kernel/padata.c
@@ -1105,6 +1105,12 @@ void padata_free_shell(struct padata_shell *ps)
if (!ps)
return;
+ /*
+ * Wait for all _do_serial calls to finish to avoid touching
+ * freed pd's and ps's.
+ */
+ synchronize_rcu();
+
mutex_lock(&ps->pinst->lock);
list_del(&ps->list);
padata_free_pd(rcu_dereference_protected(ps->pd, 1));The differing context line is the very last line, where the upstream patch has I did a We already have that CVE ingested in JIRA, so it doesn't need to be added into this PR, but maybe it'd make sense to add it along? (@PlaidCat Figured you'd find this interdiff result interesting since we were just talking about it. 🙂) |
…in skb_pull jira VULN-67491 cve-bf CVE-2023-53125 commit-author Szymon Heidrich <szymon.heidrich@gmail.com> commit 43ffe6c Packet length check needs to be located after size and align_count calculation to prevent kernel panic in skb_pull() in case rx_cmd_a & RX_CMD_A_RED evaluates to true. Fixes: d8b2283 ("net: usb: smsc75xx: Limit packet length to skb->len") Signed-off-by: Szymon Heidrich <szymon.heidrich@gmail.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230316110540.77531-1-szymon.heidrich@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> (cherry picked from commit 43ffe6c) Signed-off-by: Shreeya Patel <spatel@ciq.com>
jira VULN-154361 cve CVE-2023-53186 commit-author Liang Chen <liangchen.linux@gmail.com> commit 0646dc3 Commit 1effe8c ("skbuff: fix coalescing for page_pool fragment recycling") allowed coalescing to proceed with non page pool page and page pool page when @from is cloned, i.e. to->pp_recycle --> false from->pp_recycle --> true skb_cloned(from) --> true However, it actually requires skb_cloned(@from) to hold true until coalescing finishes in this situation. If the other cloned SKB is released while the merging is in process, from_shinfo->nr_frags will be set to 0 toward the end of the function, causing the increment of frag page _refcount to be unexpectedly skipped resulting in inconsistent reference counts. Later when SKB(@to) is released, it frees the page directly even though the page pool page is still in use, leading to use-after-free or double-free errors. So it should be prohibited. The double-free error message below prompted us to investigate: BUG: Bad page state in process swapper/1 pfn:0e0d1 page:00000000c6548b28 refcount:-1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x2 pfn:0xe0d1 flags: 0xfffffc0000000(node=0|zone=1|lastcpupid=0x1fffff) raw: 000fffffc0000000 0000000000000000 ffffffff00000101 0000000000000000 raw: 0000000000000002 0000000000000000 ffffffffffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: nonzero _refcount CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Tainted: G E 6.2.0+ Call Trace: <IRQ> dump_stack_lvl+0x32/0x50 bad_page+0x69/0xf0 free_pcp_prepare+0x260/0x2f0 free_unref_page+0x20/0x1c0 skb_release_data+0x10b/0x1a0 napi_consume_skb+0x56/0x150 net_rx_action+0xf0/0x350 ? __napi_schedule+0x79/0x90 __do_softirq+0xc8/0x2b1 __irq_exit_rcu+0xb9/0xf0 common_interrupt+0x82/0xa0 </IRQ> <TASK> asm_common_interrupt+0x22/0x40 RIP: 0010:default_idle+0xb/0x20 Fixes: 53e0961 ("page_pool: add frag page recycling support in page pool") Signed-off-by: Liang Chen <liangchen.linux@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230413090353.14448-1-liangchen.linux@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> (cherry picked from commit 0646dc3) Signed-off-by: Shreeya Patel <spatel@ciq.com>
jira VULN-155413 cve CVE-2023-53354 commit-author Mohamed Khalfella <mkhalfella@purestorage.com> commit 2ea3528 Commit bf5c25d ("skbuff: in skb_segment, call zerocopy functions once per nskb") added the call to zero copy functions in skb_segment(). The change introduced a bug in skb_segment() because skb_orphan_frags() may possibly change the number of fragments or allocate new fragments altogether leaving nrfrags and frag to point to the old values. This can cause a panic with stacktrace like the one below. [ 193.894380] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000000bc [ 193.895273] CPU: 13 PID: 18164 Comm: vh-net-17428 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G O 5.15.123+ #26 [ 193.903919] RIP: 0010:skb_segment+0xb0e/0x12f0 [ 194.021892] Call Trace: [ 194.027422] <TASK> [ 194.072861] tcp_gso_segment+0x107/0x540 [ 194.082031] inet_gso_segment+0x15c/0x3d0 [ 194.090783] skb_mac_gso_segment+0x9f/0x110 [ 194.095016] __skb_gso_segment+0xc1/0x190 [ 194.103131] netem_enqueue+0x290/0xb10 [sch_netem] [ 194.107071] dev_qdisc_enqueue+0x16/0x70 [ 194.110884] __dev_queue_xmit+0x63b/0xb30 [ 194.121670] bond_start_xmit+0x159/0x380 [bonding] [ 194.128506] dev_hard_start_xmit+0xc3/0x1e0 [ 194.131787] __dev_queue_xmit+0x8a0/0xb30 [ 194.138225] macvlan_start_xmit+0x4f/0x100 [macvlan] [ 194.141477] dev_hard_start_xmit+0xc3/0x1e0 [ 194.144622] sch_direct_xmit+0xe3/0x280 [ 194.147748] __dev_queue_xmit+0x54a/0xb30 [ 194.154131] tap_get_user+0x2a8/0x9c0 [tap] [ 194.157358] tap_sendmsg+0x52/0x8e0 [tap] [ 194.167049] handle_tx_zerocopy+0x14e/0x4c0 [vhost_net] [ 194.173631] handle_tx+0xcd/0xe0 [vhost_net] [ 194.176959] vhost_worker+0x76/0xb0 [vhost] [ 194.183667] kthread+0x118/0x140 [ 194.190358] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 [ 194.193670] </TASK> In this case calling skb_orphan_frags() updated nr_frags leaving nrfrags local variable in skb_segment() stale. This resulted in the code hitting i >= nrfrags prematurely and trying to move to next frag_skb using list_skb pointer, which was NULL, and caused kernel panic. Move the call to zero copy functions before using frags and nr_frags. Fixes: bf5c25d ("skbuff: in skb_segment, call zerocopy functions once per nskb") Signed-off-by: Mohamed Khalfella <mkhalfella@purestorage.com> Reported-by: Amit Goyal <agoyal@purestorage.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> (cherry picked from commit 2ea3528) Signed-off-by: Shreeya Patel <spatel@ciq.com>
jira VULN-42475 cve CVE-2024-26704 commit-author Baokun Li <libaokun1@huawei.com> commit 55583e8 In ext4_move_extents(), moved_len is only updated when all moves are successfully executed, and only discards orig_inode and donor_inode preallocations when moved_len is not zero. When the loop fails to exit after successfully moving some extents, moved_len is not updated and remains at 0, so it does not discard the preallocations. If the moved extents overlap with the preallocated extents, the overlapped extents are freed twice in ext4_mb_release_inode_pa() and ext4_process_freed_data() (as described in commit 94d7c16 ("ext4: Fix double-free of blocks with EXT4_IOC_MOVE_EXT")), and bb_free is incremented twice. Hence when trim is executed, a zero-division bug is triggered in mb_update_avg_fragment_size() because bb_free is not zero and bb_fragments is zero. Therefore, update move_len after each extent move to avoid the issue. Reported-by: Wei Chen <harperchen1110@gmail.com> Reported-by: xingwei lee <xrivendell7@gmail.com> Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/CAO4mrferzqBUnCag8R3m2zf897ts9UEuhjFQGPtODT92rYyR2Q@mail.gmail.com Fixes: fcf6b1b ("ext4: refactor ext4_move_extents code base") CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 3.18 Signed-off-by: Baokun Li <libaokun1@huawei.com> Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240104142040.2835097-2-libaokun1@huawei.com Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> (cherry picked from commit 55583e8) Signed-off-by: Shreeya Patel <spatel@ciq.com>
jira VULN-53767 cve CVE-2025-21727 commit-author Chen Ridong <chenridong@huawei.com> commit e01780e A bug was found when run ltp test: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in padata_find_next+0x29/0x1a0 Read of size 4 at addr ffff88bbfe003524 by task kworker/u113:2/3039206 CPU: 0 PID: 3039206 Comm: kworker/u113:2 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.6.0+ Workqueue: pdecrypt_parallel padata_parallel_worker Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x32/0x50 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x6b/0x3d0 print_report+0xdd/0x2c0 kasan_report+0xa5/0xd0 padata_find_next+0x29/0x1a0 padata_reorder+0x131/0x220 padata_parallel_worker+0x3d/0xc0 process_one_work+0x2ec/0x5a0 If 'mdelay(10)' is added before calling 'padata_find_next' in the 'padata_reorder' function, this issue could be reproduced easily with ltp test (pcrypt_aead01). This can be explained as bellow: pcrypt_aead_encrypt ... padata_do_parallel refcount_inc(&pd->refcnt); // add refcnt ... padata_do_serial padata_reorder // pd while (1) { padata_find_next(pd, true); // using pd queue_work_on ... padata_serial_worker crypto_del_alg padata_put_pd_cnt // sub refcnt padata_free_shell padata_put_pd(ps->pd); // pd is freed // loop again, but pd is freed // call padata_find_next, UAF } In the padata_reorder function, when it loops in 'while', if the alg is deleted, the refcnt may be decreased to 0 before entering 'padata_find_next', which leads to UAF. As mentioned in [1], do_serial is supposed to be called with BHs disabled and always happen under RCU protection, to address this issue, add synchronize_rcu() in 'padata_free_shell' wait for all _do_serial calls to finish. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/20221028160401.cccypv4euxikusiq@parnassus.localdomain/ [2] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-kernel/jfjz5d7zwbytztackem7ibzalm5lnxldi2eofeiczqmqs2m7o6@fq426cwnjtkm/ Fixes: b128a30 ("padata: allocate workqueue internally") Signed-off-by: Chen Ridong <chenridong@huawei.com> Signed-off-by: Qu Zicheng <quzicheng@huawei.com> Acked-by: Daniel Jordan <daniel.m.jordan@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> (cherry picked from commit e01780e) Signed-off-by: Shreeya Patel <spatel@ciq.com>
jira VULN-64888 cve CVE-2025-22020 commit-author Luo Qiu <luoqiu@kylinsec.com.cn> commit 4676741 This fixes the following crash: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in rtsx_usb_ms_poll_card+0x159/0x200 [rtsx_usb_ms] Read of size 8 at addr ffff888136335380 by task kworker/6:0/140241 CPU: 6 UID: 0 PID: 140241 Comm: kworker/6:0 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G E 6.14.0-rc6+ #1 Tainted: [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE Hardware name: LENOVO 30FNA1V7CW/1057, BIOS S0EKT54A 07/01/2024 Workqueue: events rtsx_usb_ms_poll_card [rtsx_usb_ms] Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x51/0x70 print_address_description.constprop.0+0x27/0x320 ? rtsx_usb_ms_poll_card+0x159/0x200 [rtsx_usb_ms] print_report+0x3e/0x70 kasan_report+0xab/0xe0 ? rtsx_usb_ms_poll_card+0x159/0x200 [rtsx_usb_ms] rtsx_usb_ms_poll_card+0x159/0x200 [rtsx_usb_ms] ? __pfx_rtsx_usb_ms_poll_card+0x10/0x10 [rtsx_usb_ms] ? __pfx___schedule+0x10/0x10 ? kick_pool+0x3b/0x270 process_one_work+0x357/0x660 worker_thread+0x390/0x4c0 ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 kthread+0x190/0x1d0 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x2d/0x50 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 </TASK> Allocated by task 161446: kasan_save_stack+0x20/0x40 kasan_save_track+0x10/0x30 __kasan_kmalloc+0x7b/0x90 __kmalloc_noprof+0x1a7/0x470 memstick_alloc_host+0x1f/0xe0 [memstick] rtsx_usb_ms_drv_probe+0x47/0x320 [rtsx_usb_ms] platform_probe+0x60/0xe0 call_driver_probe+0x35/0x120 really_probe+0x123/0x410 __driver_probe_device+0xc7/0x1e0 driver_probe_device+0x49/0xf0 __device_attach_driver+0xc6/0x160 bus_for_each_drv+0xe4/0x160 __device_attach+0x13a/0x2b0 bus_probe_device+0xbd/0xd0 device_add+0x4a5/0x760 platform_device_add+0x189/0x370 mfd_add_device+0x587/0x5e0 mfd_add_devices+0xb1/0x130 rtsx_usb_probe+0x28e/0x2e0 [rtsx_usb] usb_probe_interface+0x15c/0x460 call_driver_probe+0x35/0x120 really_probe+0x123/0x410 __driver_probe_device+0xc7/0x1e0 driver_probe_device+0x49/0xf0 __device_attach_driver+0xc6/0x160 bus_for_each_drv+0xe4/0x160 __device_attach+0x13a/0x2b0 rebind_marked_interfaces.isra.0+0xcc/0x110 usb_reset_device+0x352/0x410 usbdev_do_ioctl+0xe5c/0x1860 usbdev_ioctl+0xa/0x20 __x64_sys_ioctl+0xc5/0xf0 do_syscall_64+0x59/0x170 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e Freed by task 161506: kasan_save_stack+0x20/0x40 kasan_save_track+0x10/0x30 kasan_save_free_info+0x36/0x60 __kasan_slab_free+0x34/0x50 kfree+0x1fd/0x3b0 device_release+0x56/0xf0 kobject_cleanup+0x73/0x1c0 rtsx_usb_ms_drv_remove+0x13d/0x220 [rtsx_usb_ms] platform_remove+0x2f/0x50 device_release_driver_internal+0x24b/0x2e0 bus_remove_device+0x124/0x1d0 device_del+0x239/0x530 platform_device_del.part.0+0x19/0xe0 platform_device_unregister+0x1c/0x40 mfd_remove_devices_fn+0x167/0x170 device_for_each_child_reverse+0xc9/0x130 mfd_remove_devices+0x6e/0xa0 rtsx_usb_disconnect+0x2e/0xd0 [rtsx_usb] usb_unbind_interface+0xf3/0x3f0 device_release_driver_internal+0x24b/0x2e0 proc_disconnect_claim+0x13d/0x220 usbdev_do_ioctl+0xb5e/0x1860 usbdev_ioctl+0xa/0x20 __x64_sys_ioctl+0xc5/0xf0 do_syscall_64+0x59/0x170 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e Last potentially related work creation: kasan_save_stack+0x20/0x40 kasan_record_aux_stack+0x85/0x90 insert_work+0x29/0x100 __queue_work+0x34a/0x540 call_timer_fn+0x2a/0x160 expire_timers+0x5f/0x1f0 __run_timer_base.part.0+0x1b6/0x1e0 run_timer_softirq+0x8b/0xe0 handle_softirqs+0xf9/0x360 __irq_exit_rcu+0x114/0x130 sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x72/0x90 asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x16/0x20 Second to last potentially related work creation: kasan_save_stack+0x20/0x40 kasan_record_aux_stack+0x85/0x90 insert_work+0x29/0x100 __queue_work+0x34a/0x540 call_timer_fn+0x2a/0x160 expire_timers+0x5f/0x1f0 __run_timer_base.part.0+0x1b6/0x1e0 run_timer_softirq+0x8b/0xe0 handle_softirqs+0xf9/0x360 __irq_exit_rcu+0x114/0x130 sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x72/0x90 asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x16/0x20 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888136335000 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-2k of size 2048 The buggy address is located 896 bytes inside of freed 2048-byte region [ffff888136335000, ffff888136335800) The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x136330 head: order:3 mapcount:0 entire_mapcount:0 nr_pages_mapped:0 pincount:0 flags: 0x17ffffc0000040(head|node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x1fffff) page_type: f5(slab) raw: 0017ffffc0000040 ffff888100042f00 ffffea000417a000 dead000000000002 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000080008 00000000f5000000 0000000000000000 head: 0017ffffc0000040 ffff888100042f00 ffffea000417a000 dead000000000002 head: 0000000000000000 0000000000080008 00000000f5000000 0000000000000000 head: 0017ffffc0000003 ffffea0004d8cc01 ffffffffffffffff 0000000000000000 head: 0000000000000008 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff888136335280: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff888136335300: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb >ffff888136335380: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ^ ffff888136335400: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ffff888136335480: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ================================================================== Fixes: 6827ca5 ("memstick: rtsx_usb_ms: Support runtime power management") Signed-off-by: Luo Qiu <luoqiu@kylinsec.com.cn> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/4B7BC3E6E291E6F2+20250317101438.25650-1-luoqiu@kylinsec.com.cn Signed-off-by: Ulf Hansson <ulf.hansson@linaro.org> (cherry picked from commit 4676741) Signed-off-by: Shreeya Patel <spatel@ciq.com>
jira VULN-65342 cve CVE-2025-22104 commit-author Nick Child <nnac123@linux.ibm.com> commit d93a6ca Previously, when the driver was printing hex dumps, the buffer was cast to an 8 byte long and printed using string formatters. If the buffer size was not a multiple of 8 then a read buffer overflow was possible. Therefore, create a new ibmvnic function that loops over a buffer and calls hex_dump_to_buffer instead. This patch address KASAN reports like the one below: ibmvnic 30000003 env3: Login Buffer: ibmvnic 30000003 env3: 01000000af000000 <...> ibmvnic 30000003 env3: 2e6d62692e736261 ibmvnic 30000003 env3: 65050003006d6f63 ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ibmvnic_login+0xacc/0xffc [ibmvnic] Read of size 8 at addr c0000001331a9aa8 by task ip/17681 <...> Allocated by task 17681: <...> ibmvnic_login+0x2f0/0xffc [ibmvnic] ibmvnic_open+0x148/0x308 [ibmvnic] __dev_open+0x1ac/0x304 <...> The buggy address is located 168 bytes inside of allocated 175-byte region [c0000001331a9a00, c0000001331a9aaf) <...> ================================================================= ibmvnic 30000003 env3: 000000000033766e Fixes: 032c5e8 ("Driver for IBM System i/p VNIC protocol") Signed-off-by: Nick Child <nnac123@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Dave Marquardt <davemarq@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250320212951.11142-1-nnac123@linux.ibm.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org> (cherry picked from commit d93a6ca) Signed-off-by: Shreeya Patel <spatel@ciq.com>
jira VULN-66676 cve CVE-2025-23150 commit-author Artem Sadovnikov <a.sadovnikov@ispras.ru> commit 94824ac Syzkaller detected a use-after-free issue in ext4_insert_dentry that was caused by out-of-bounds access due to incorrect splitting in do_split. BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in ext4_insert_dentry+0x36a/0x6d0 fs/ext4/namei.c:2109 Write of size 251 at addr ffff888074572f14 by task syz-executor335/5847 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5847 Comm: syz-executor335 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc6-syzkaller-00318-ga9cda7c0ffed #0 Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/30/2024 Call Trace: <TASK> __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:120 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:377 [inline] print_report+0x169/0x550 mm/kasan/report.c:488 kasan_report+0x143/0x180 mm/kasan/report.c:601 kasan_check_range+0x282/0x290 mm/kasan/generic.c:189 __asan_memcpy+0x40/0x70 mm/kasan/shadow.c:106 ext4_insert_dentry+0x36a/0x6d0 fs/ext4/namei.c:2109 add_dirent_to_buf+0x3d9/0x750 fs/ext4/namei.c:2154 make_indexed_dir+0xf98/0x1600 fs/ext4/namei.c:2351 ext4_add_entry+0x222a/0x25d0 fs/ext4/namei.c:2455 ext4_add_nondir+0x8d/0x290 fs/ext4/namei.c:2796 ext4_symlink+0x920/0xb50 fs/ext4/namei.c:3431 vfs_symlink+0x137/0x2e0 fs/namei.c:4615 do_symlinkat+0x222/0x3a0 fs/namei.c:4641 __do_sys_symlink fs/namei.c:4662 [inline] __se_sys_symlink fs/namei.c:4660 [inline] __x64_sys_symlink+0x7a/0x90 fs/namei.c:4660 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f </TASK> The following loop is located right above 'if' statement. for (i = count-1; i >= 0; i--) { /* is more than half of this entry in 2nd half of the block? */ if (size + map[i].size/2 > blocksize/2) break; size += map[i].size; move++; } 'i' in this case could go down to -1, in which case sum of active entries wouldn't exceed half the block size, but previous behaviour would also do split in half if sum would exceed at the very last block, which in case of having too many long name files in a single block could lead to out-of-bounds access and following use-after-free. Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller. Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Fixes: 5872331 ("ext4: fix potential negative array index in do_split()") Signed-off-by: Artem Sadovnikov <a.sadovnikov@ispras.ru> Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250404082804.2567-3-a.sadovnikov@ispras.ru Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> (cherry picked from commit 94824ac) Signed-off-by: Shreeya Patel <spatel@ciq.com>
jira VULN-66828 cve CVE-2025-37738 commit-author Bhupesh <bhupesh@igalia.com> commit c8e008b Once inside 'ext4_xattr_inode_dec_ref_all' we should ignore xattrs entries past the 'end' entry. This fixes the following KASAN reported issue: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ext4_xattr_inode_dec_ref_all+0xb8c/0xe90 Read of size 4 at addr ffff888012c120c4 by task repro/2065 CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 2065 Comm: repro Not tainted 6.13.0-rc2+ #11 Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x1fd/0x300 ? tcp_gro_dev_warn+0x260/0x260 ? _printk+0xc0/0x100 ? read_lock_is_recursive+0x10/0x10 ? irq_work_queue+0x72/0xf0 ? __virt_addr_valid+0x17b/0x4b0 print_address_description+0x78/0x390 print_report+0x107/0x1f0 ? __virt_addr_valid+0x17b/0x4b0 ? __virt_addr_valid+0x3ff/0x4b0 ? __phys_addr+0xb5/0x160 ? ext4_xattr_inode_dec_ref_all+0xb8c/0xe90 kasan_report+0xcc/0x100 ? ext4_xattr_inode_dec_ref_all+0xb8c/0xe90 ext4_xattr_inode_dec_ref_all+0xb8c/0xe90 ? ext4_xattr_delete_inode+0xd30/0xd30 ? __ext4_journal_ensure_credits+0x5f0/0x5f0 ? __ext4_journal_ensure_credits+0x2b/0x5f0 ? inode_update_timestamps+0x410/0x410 ext4_xattr_delete_inode+0xb64/0xd30 ? ext4_truncate+0xb70/0xdc0 ? ext4_expand_extra_isize_ea+0x1d20/0x1d20 ? __ext4_mark_inode_dirty+0x670/0x670 ? ext4_journal_check_start+0x16f/0x240 ? ext4_inode_is_fast_symlink+0x2f2/0x3a0 ext4_evict_inode+0xc8c/0xff0 ? ext4_inode_is_fast_symlink+0x3a0/0x3a0 ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x53/0x8a0 ? ext4_inode_is_fast_symlink+0x3a0/0x3a0 evict+0x4ac/0x950 ? proc_nr_inodes+0x310/0x310 ? trace_ext4_drop_inode+0xa2/0x220 ? _raw_spin_unlock+0x1a/0x30 ? iput+0x4cb/0x7e0 do_unlinkat+0x495/0x7c0 ? try_break_deleg+0x120/0x120 ? 0xffffffff81000000 ? __check_object_size+0x15a/0x210 ? strncpy_from_user+0x13e/0x250 ? getname_flags+0x1dc/0x530 __x64_sys_unlinkat+0xc8/0xf0 do_syscall_64+0x65/0x110 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x67/0x6f RIP: 0033:0x434ffd Code: 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 00 f3 0f 1e fa 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 8 RSP: 002b:00007ffc50fa7b28 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000107 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007ffc50fa7e18 RCX: 0000000000434ffd RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000020000240 RDI: 0000000000000005 RBP: 00007ffc50fa7be0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000001 R13: 00007ffc50fa7e08 R14: 00000000004bbf30 R15: 0000000000000001 </TASK> The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888012c12000 which belongs to the cache filp of size 360 The buggy address is located 196 bytes inside of freed 360-byte region [ffff888012c12000, ffff888012c12168) The buggy address belongs to the physical page: page: refcount:1 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x12c12 head: order:1 mapcount:0 entire_mapcount:0 nr_pages_mapped:0 pincount:0 flags: 0x40(head|node=0|zone=0) page_type: f5(slab) raw: 0000000000000040 ffff888000ad7640 ffffea0000497a00 dead000000000004 raw: 0000000000000000 0000000000100010 00000001f5000000 0000000000000000 head: 0000000000000040 ffff888000ad7640 ffffea0000497a00 dead000000000004 head: 0000000000000000 0000000000100010 00000001f5000000 0000000000000000 head: 0000000000000001 ffffea00004b0481 ffffffffffffffff 0000000000000000 head: 0000000000000002 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000000 page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected Memory state around the buggy address: ffff888012c11f80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ffff888012c12000: fa fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb > ffff888012c12080: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb ^ ffff888012c12100: fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fb fc fc fc ffff888012c12180: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc ================================================================== Reported-by: syzbot+b244bda78289b00204ed@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=b244bda78289b00204ed Suggested-by: Thadeu Lima de Souza Cascardo <cascardo@igalia.com> Signed-off-by: Bhupesh <bhupesh@igalia.com> Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250128082751.124948-2-bhupesh@igalia.com Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> (cherry picked from commit c8e008b) Signed-off-by: Shreeya Patel <spatel@ciq.com>
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@kerneltoast Don't you think it will be more complicated if we check for these kind of differences as well? I mean there can be multiple fixes missing in the file or in the same function. It might also not necessarily be related to the change we are doing. |
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LGTM
I think this kind of Fuzz in context is potentially a very bad thing which is why I called it out in another PR as to why something I found wasn't being caught initially. All of this is hints to the reviewers to speed up the review process. |
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🚢
d656db4
into
fips-9-compliant/5.14.0-284.30.1
@shreeya-patel98 Since we're only interdiff'ing patches with the standard 3 lines of context before + after each delta, that means we're just looking at code differences a mere 3 lines away from the delta. Generally, I don't think this will produce a lot of noise for us if we do a quick And interdiff gives us such a big speedup in the review process that we can leverage it like this to vastly improve review accuracy as well. For example, to review the code changes in this entire PR, I only had to look at a single tiny hunk that interdiff emitted. And that hunk was the one I put in my comment above. With the time and effort saved from not needing to manually scrutinize the code from each individual commit, I was able to use that to instead dig a little deeper into why there was a context difference for that one hunk. And although the context difference was ultimately just a fix for a CVE we've already cataloged (and therefore there was no action to take), it was technically still relevant to the commit in this PR. And even after digging a little deeper there, I still finished the code review for this entire PR much faster than before interdiff. I wrote up that comment about my finding to highlight the potential value of validating that all 3 context lines are the same. |
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