[RLC-9] Rebase Custom Changes to 5.14.0-611.9.1.el9_7 #738
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jira SECO-170 In Rocky9 if you run ./run_vmtests.sh -t hmm it will fail and cause an infinite loop on ASSERTs in FIXTURE_TEARDOWN() This temporary fix is based on the discussion here https://patchwork.kernel.org/project/linux-kselftest/patch/26017fe3-5ad7-6946-57db-e5ec48063ceb@suse.cz/#25046055 We will investigate further kselftest updates that will resolve the root causes of this. Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <jmaple@ciq.com> Signed-off-by: Shreeya Patel <spatel@ciq.com> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <jmaple@ciq.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jallison@ciq.com> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <jmaple@ciq.com>
In essiv_aead_setkey(), use the same logic as crypto_authenc_esn_setkey() to zeroize keys on exit. [Sultan: touched up commit message] Signed-off-by: Jason Rodriguez <jrodriguez@ciq.com> Signed-off-by: Sultan Alsawaf <sultan@ciq.com> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <jmaple@ciq.com>
Using the kernel crypto API, the SHA3-256 algorithm is used as
conditioning element to replace the LFSR in the Jitter RNG. All other
parts of the Jitter RNG are unchanged.
The application and use of the SHA-3 conditioning operation is identical
to the user space Jitter RNG 3.4.0 by applying the following concept:
- the Jitter RNG initializes a SHA-3 state which acts as the "entropy
pool" when the Jitter RNG is allocated.
- When a new time delta is obtained, it is inserted into the "entropy
pool" with a SHA-3 update operation. Note, this operation in most of
the cases is a simple memcpy() onto the SHA-3 stack.
- To cause a true SHA-3 operation for each time delta operation, a
second SHA-3 operation is performed hashing Jitter RNG status
information. The final message digest is also inserted into the
"entropy pool" with a SHA-3 update operation. Yet, this data is not
considered to provide any entropy, but it shall stir the entropy pool.
- To generate a random number, a SHA-3 final operation is performed to
calculate a message digest followed by an immediate SHA-3 init to
re-initialize the "entropy pool". The obtained message digest is one
block of the Jitter RNG that is returned to the caller.
Mathematically speaking, the random number generated by the Jitter RNG
is:
aux_t = SHA-3(Jitter RNG state data)
Jitter RNG block = SHA-3(time_i || aux_i || time_(i-1) || aux_(i-1) ||
... || time_(i-255) || aux_(i-255))
when assuming that the OSR = 1, i.e. the default value.
This operation implies that the Jitter RNG has an output-blocksize of
256 bits instead of the 64 bits of the LFSR-based Jitter RNG that is
replaced with this patch.
The patch also replaces the varying number of invocations of the
conditioning function with one fixed number of invocations. The use
of the conditioning function consistent with the userspace Jitter RNG
library version 3.4.0.
The code is tested with a system that exhibited the least amount of
entropy generated by the Jitter RNG: the SiFive Unmatched RISC-V
system. The measured entropy rate is well above the heuristically
implied entropy value of 1 bit of entropy per time delta. On all other
tested systems, the measured entropy rate is even higher by orders
of magnitude. The measurement was performed using updated tooling
provided with the user space Jitter RNG library test framework.
The performance of the Jitter RNG with this patch is about en par
with the performance of the Jitter RNG without the patch.
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Back-port of commit bb897c5
Author: Stephan Müller <smueller@chronox.de>
Date: Fri Apr 21 08:08:04 2023 +0200
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jallison@ciq.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <jmaple@ciq.com>
I.G 9.7.B for FIPS 140-3 specifies that variables temporarily holding
cryptographic information should be zeroized once they are no longer
needed. Accomplish this by using kfree_sensitive for buffers that
previously held the private key.
Signed-off-by: Hailey Mothershead <hailmo@amazon.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Back-ported from commit 23e4099
Author: Hailey Mothershead <hailmo@amazon.com>
Date: Mon Apr 15 22:19:15 2024 +0000
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jallison@ciq.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <jmaple@ciq.com>
private_key is overwritten with the key parameter passed in by the caller (if present), or alternatively a newly generated private key. However, it is possible that the caller provides a key (or the newly generated key) which is shorter than the previous key. In that scenario, some key material from the previous key would not be overwritten. The easiest solution is to explicitly zeroize the entire private_key array first. Note that this patch slightly changes the behavior of this function: previously, if the ecc_gen_privkey failed, the old private_key would remain. Now, the private_key is always zeroized. This behavior is consistent with the case where params.key is set and ecc_is_key_valid fails. Signed-off-by: Joachim Vandersmissen <git@jvdsn.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <jmaple@ciq.com>
[ Upstream commit ba3c557 ] When the mpi_ec_ctx structure is initialized, some fields are not cleared, causing a crash when referencing the field when the structure was released. Initially, this issue was ignored because memory for mpi_ec_ctx is allocated with the __GFP_ZERO flag. For example, this error will be triggered when calculating the Za value for SM2 separately. Fixes: d58bb7e ("lib/mpi: Introduce ec implementation to MPI library") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v6.5 Signed-off-by: Tianjia Zhang <tianjia.zhang@linux.alibaba.com> Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <jmaple@ciq.com>
When FIPS mode is enabled (via fips=1), there is an absolute need for the
DRBG to be available. This is at odds with the fact that the DRBG can be
built as a module when in FIPS mode, leaving critical RNG functionality at
the whims of userspace.
Userspace could simply rmmod the DRBG module, or not provide it at all and
thus a different stdrng algorithm could be used without anyone noticing.
Additionally, when running a FIPS-enabled userspace, modprobe itself may
perform a getrandom() syscall _before_ loading a given module. As a result,
there's a possible deadlock scenario where the RNG core (crypto/rng.c)
initializes _before_ the DRBG, thereby installing its getrandom() override
without having an stdrng algorithm available. Then, when userspace calls
getrandom() which redirects to the override in crypto/rng.c,
crypto_alloc_rng("stdrng") invokes the UMH (modprobe) to load the DRBG
(which is aliased to stdrng). And *then* that modprobe invocation gets
stuck at getrandom() because there's no stdrng algorithm available!
There are too many risks that come with allowing the DRBG and RNG core to
be modular for FIPS mode. Therefore, make CRYPTO_FIPS require the DRBG to
be built-in, which in turn makes the DRBG require the RNG core to be
built-in. That way, it's guaranteed for these drivers to be built-in when
running in FIPS mode.
Also clean up the CRYPTO_FIPS option name and remove the CRYPTO_ANSI_CPRNG
dependency since it's obsolete for FIPS now.
Signed-off-by: Sultan Alsawaf <sultan@ciq.com>
Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <jmaple@ciq.com>
It is technically a risk to permit extrng registration by modules after kernel init completes. Since there is only one user of the extrng interface and it is imperative that it is the _only_ registered extrng for FIPS compliance, restrict the extrng registration interface to only permit registration during kernel init and only from built-in drivers. This also eliminates the risks associated with the extrng interface itself being designed to solely accommodate a single registration, which would therefore permit the registered extrng to be overridden or even removed by an unrelated module. Signed-off-by: Sultan Alsawaf <sultan@ciq.com> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <jmaple@ciq.com>
There is no reason this refcount should be a signed int. Convert it to an unsigned int, thereby also making it less likely to ever overflow. Signed-off-by: Sultan Alsawaf <sultan@ciq.com> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <jmaple@ciq.com>
None of the ciphers used by the DRBG have an alignment requirement; thus, they all return 0 from .crypto_init, resulting in inconsistent alignment across all buffers. Align all buffers to at least a cache line to improve performance. This is especially useful when multiple DRBG instances are used, since it prevents false sharing of cache lines between the different instances. Signed-off-by: Sultan Alsawaf <sultan@ciq.com> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <jmaple@ciq.com>
Since crypto_devrandom_read_iter() is invoked directly by user tasks and is accessible by every task in the system, there are glaring priority inversions on crypto_reseed_rng_lock and crypto_default_rng_lock. Tasks of arbitrary scheduling priority access crypto_devrandom_read_iter(). When a low-priority task owns one of the mutex locks, higher-priority tasks waiting on that mutex lock are stalled until the low-priority task is done. Fix the priority inversions by converting the mutex locks into rt_mutex locks which have PI support. Signed-off-by: Sultan Alsawaf <sultan@ciq.com> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <jmaple@ciq.com>
Like pin_user_pages_fast(), but with the internal-only FOLL_FAST_ONLY flag. This complements the get_user_pages*() API, which already has get_user_pages_fast_only(). Note that pin_user_pages_fast_only() used to exist but was removed in upstream commit edad1bb ("mm/gup: remove pin_user_pages_fast_only()") due to it not having any users. Signed-off-by: Sultan Alsawaf <sultan@ciq.com> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <jmaple@ciq.com>
When the kernel is booted with fips=1, the RNG exposed to userspace is hijacked away from the CRNG and redirects to crypto_devrandom_read_iter(), which utilizes the DRBG. Notably, crypto_devrandom_read_iter() maintains just two global DRBG instances _for the entire system_, and the two instances serve separate request types: one instance for GRND_RANDOM requests (crypto_reseed_rng), and one instance for non-GRND_RANDOM requests (crypto_default_rng). So in essence, for requests of a single type, there is just one global RNG for all CPUs in the entire system, which scales _very_ poorly. To make matters worse, the temporary buffer used to ferry data between the DRBG and userspace is woefully small at only 256 bytes, which doesn't do a good job of maximizing throughput from the DRBG. This results in lost performance when userspace requests >256 bytes; it is observed that DRBG throughput improves by 70% on an i9-13900H when the buffer size is increased to 4096 bytes (one page). Going beyond the size of one page up to the DRBG maximum request limit of 65536 bytes produces diminishing returns of only 3% improved throughput in comparison. And going below the size of one page produces progressively less throughput at each power of 2: there's a 5% loss going from 4096 bytes to 2048 bytes and a 9% loss going from 2048 bytes to 1024 bytes. Thus, this implements per-CPU DRBG instances utilizing a page-sized buffer for each CPU to utilize the DRBG itself more effectively. On top of that, for non-GRND_RANDOM requests, the DRBG's operations now occur under a local lock that disables preemption on non-PREEMPT_RT kernels, which not only keeps each CPU's DRBG instance isolated from another, but also improves temporal cache locality while the DRBG actively generates a new string of random bytes. Prefaulting one user destination page at a time is also employed to prevent a DRBG instance from getting blocked on page faults, thereby maximizing the use of the DRBG so that the only bottleneck is the DRBG itself. Signed-off-by: Sultan Alsawaf <sultan@ciq.com> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <jmaple@ciq.com>
We want to hard set the x86_64 FIPS required configs rather than rely on default settings in the kernel, should these ever change without our knowing it would not be something we would have actively checked. The configs are a limited set of configs that is expanded out when building using `make olddefconfig` a common practice in kernel building. Note had to manually add the following since its normaly set by the RPM build process. CONFIG_CRYPTO_FIPS_NAME="Rocky Linux 9 Kernel Cryptographic API" Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <jmaple@ciq.com>
Simplifies the workflow to use the reusable workflow defined in main branch. This reduces duplication and makes the workflow easier to maintain across multiple branches. The workflow was renamed because it now includes validation over and above just checking for upstream fixes Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <jmaple@ciq.com>
jira LE-3207 feature tools_hv commit-author Shradha Gupta <shradhagupta@linux.microsoft.com> commit a9c0b33 Allow the KVP daemon to log the KVP updates triggered in the VM with a new debug flag(-d). When the daemon is started with this flag, it logs updates and debug information in syslog with loglevel LOG_DEBUG. This information comes in handy for debugging issues where the key-value pairs for certain pools show mismatch/incorrect values. The distro-vendors can further consume these changes and modify the respective service files to redirect the logs to specific files as needed. Signed-off-by: Shradha Gupta <shradhagupta@linux.microsoft.com> Reviewed-by: Naman Jain <namjain@linux.microsoft.com> Reviewed-by: Dexuan Cui <decui@microsoft.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1744715978-8185-1-git-send-email-shradhagupta@linux.microsoft.com Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org> Message-ID: <1744715978-8185-1-git-send-email-shradhagupta@linux.microsoft.com> (cherry picked from commit a9c0b33) Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <jmaple@ciq.com> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <jmaple@ciq.com> Signed-off-by: Shreeya Patel <spatel@ciq.com> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <jmaple@ciq.com>
In FIPS mode, the DRBG must take precedence over all stdrng algorithms. The only problem standing in the way of this is that a different stdrng algorithm could get registered and utilized before the DRBG is registered, and since crypto_alloc_rng() only allocates an stdrng algorithm when there's no existing allocation, this means that it's possible for the wrong stdrng algorithm to remain in use indefinitely. This issue is also often impossible to observe from userspace; an RNG other than the DRBG could be used somewhere in the kernel and userspace would be none the wiser. To ensure this can never happen, only allow stdrng instances from the DRBG to be registered when running in FIPS mode. This works since the previous commit forces the DRBG to be built into the kernel when CONFIG_CRYPTO_FIPS is enabled, so the DRBG's presence is guaranteed when fips_enabled is true. Signed-off-by: Sultan Alsawaf <sultan@ciq.com> Signed-off-by: Jonathan Maple <jmaple@ciq.com>
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Update process (This kernel CentOS base for
5.14.0-611)src.rpms hosted by RESFrlc-9/5.14.0-611.X.1.el10_0branchelrelease.This is a minor version bump so we forward ported everything from RLC 9.6 to this new RLC-9.7 branch
Removed Commits
And additional code was dropped in the interactive rebasing
0f016e1 scsi: storvsc: Increase the timeouts to storvsc_timeout
This was integrated by Red Hat via but not using their standard method, we'll need to adapt our detection to include the
cherry-piked -x <sha>command:Full Backport
Rebuild Log
KSelfTests