Node v0.1.0-alpha.5 — Polish + ops ergonomics

Polish + ops ergonomics on top of the alpha.4 security fix. No wire-format changes — files sealed by 0.1.0-alpha.4 decrypt cleanly on 0.1.0-alpha.5 and vice versa.

Added

• sealed-env exec --file <path> -- <command> — decrypt the sealed file in memory and run a command with each KEY=value injected into its environment. Plaintext never lands on disk. Forwards Ctrl+C, propagates exit code. Replaces the fragile decrypt > .env && cmd && rm .env recipe.

  sealed-env exec --file .env.sealed -- node server.js
  sealed-env exec --file .env.sealed -- npm start

• sealed-env rotate <file> — re-seal with a fresh salt and nonce without changing any value. Invalidates any unseal token previously minted for this file. Use after suspected token leak, on a cadence, or after operator offboarding.
• sealed-env doctor [<file>] — non-destructive diagnostic that validates env vars + file + decrypt roundtrip without printing any secret values. Each env var reports byte length and a short SHA-256 fingerprint. Safe to paste into CI logs.
• Shell-aware MISSING_KEY errors — when an env var is missing, the error includes the correct syntax for the user's shell (PowerShell, cmd, bash, Git Bash). Includes a note about the classic Windows footgun where set X=Y in PowerShell creates a PS variable, not an env var.

Changed

• qrcode-terminal is now lazy-loaded via createRequire only when init --mode enterprise actually renders a QR. Restores the "core has zero third-party imports" property for seal/unseal/decrypt and all operational commands.
• CI: npm audit --audit-level=high --omit=dev runs in Node CI.
• Workflow permissions: blocks added explicitly to node-ci.yml and node-release.yml (CodeQL).

Fixed

• CodeQL: incomplete regex escaping in init's .gitignore membership check. Replaced regex with a Set lookup over trimmed lines.

Documentation

• THREAT_MODEL.md gained a new section ("Token-payload exposure") and matrix entry T13 documenting the 0.1.0-alpha.{1,2,3} JWS-payload TOTP-secret leak (GHSA-x3r2-fj3r-g5mv). Captures three lessons:
  • JWT/JWS payloads are public — signature attests to integrity, not confidentiality.
  • Carry derived material in tokens, never raw secrets.
  • Use negative regression assertions to surface design regressions.

Dependencies

• bouncycastle 1.78.1 → 1.84 (CVE-2026-5598 + CVE-2026-0636 — neither affects sealed-env code paths)
• assertj-core 3.26.3 → 3.27.7 (CVE-2026-24400 — test-only, never called)

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Full changelog: CHANGELOG.md