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Picked and rebased from #107.

From original pull request:

This pull request contains several basic information of Phytium SOCs, including:

MAINTAINERS information,
Phytium SOC family Kconfig section,
Phytium vendor prefix and vendor ID,
arm64 Pe220x SOCs devicetrees.

Wang Yinfeng and others added 6 commits May 22, 2024 10:49
Add MAINTAINERS entry for Phytium SoC family with myself as the
maintainer.

Signed-off-by: Wang Yinfeng <wangyinfeng@phytium.com.cn>
Signed-off-by: Jiakun Shuai <shuaijiakun1288@phytium.com.cn>
Change-Id: I6482fe67fc189aa5b89ad93f16be9dd39332ac02
This patch adds supoort for the Phytium SoC family.

Signed-off-by: Chen Baozi <chenbaozi@phytium.com.cn>
Signed-off-by: Wang Yinfeng <wangyinfeng@phytium.com.cn>
Signed-off-by: Jiakun Shuai <shuaijiakun1288@phytium.com.cn>
Change-Id: Ibe06dc2e54a413a8c1257fef3aade99e6ca6480f
Add phytium to the list of DT vendor prefixes.

Signed-off-by: Chen Baozi <chenbaozi@phytium.com.cn>
Signed-off-by: Wang Yinfeng <wangyinfeng@phytium.com.cn>
Signed-off-by: Jiakun Shuai <shuaijiakun1288@phytium.com.cn>
Change-Id: I3a7339f97405ebaaa4472704c7310ac7a37a79d1
Update pci_ids.h with the vendor ID for Phytium.

Signed-off-by: Chen Baozi <chenbaozi@phytium.com.cn>
Signed-off-by: Jiakun Shuai <shuaijiakun1288@phytium.com.cn>
Change-Id: Ie0ea6afa71a8ba2f66f8426c1db063cd734d985c
Add initial device tree for Phytium Pe220x SoCs. Phytium Pe220x
series has three specs (Pe2201/Pe2202/Pe2204), distinguished by
the number of CPU core. Besides CPU cores, on-chip peripherals
also vary. Thus, we split them into three separate DTBs.

Signed-off-by: Chen Baozi <chenbaozi@phytium.com.cn>
Signed-off-by: Song Wenting <songwenting@phytium.com.cn>
Signed-off-by: Chen Zhenhua <chenzhenhua@phytium.com.cn>
Signed-off-by: Yang Liu <yangliu2021@phytium.com.cn>
Signed-off-by: Zhu Mingshuai <zhumingshuai@phytium.com.cn>
Signed-off-by: Cheng Quan <chengquan@phytium.com.cn>
Signed-off-by: Wang Xu <wangxu@phytium.com.cn>
Signed-off-by: Zhang Yiqun <zhangyiqun@phytium.com.cn>
Signed-off-by: Zhou Yulin <zhouyulin1283@phytium.com.cn>
Signed-off-by: Zhang Jian <zhangjian1300@phytium.com.cn>
Signed-off-by: Wang Min <wangmin@phytium.com.cn>
Signed-off-by: Wang Yinfeng <wangyinfeng@phytium.com.cn>
Signed-off-by: Jiakun Shuai <shuaijiakun1288@phytium.com.cn>
Change-Id: I0e56b24c45675a05b248653255429c17498adb5f
Add support for Phytium Pe220x demo boards which covers all
three variants of Pe220x SoC series.

Signed-off-by: Chen Zhenhua <chenzhenhua@phytium.com.cn>
Signed-off-by: Feng Jun <fengjun@phytium.com.cn>
Signed-off-by: Lai Xueyu <laixueyu1280@phytium.com.cn>
Signed-off-by: Chen Baozi <chenbaozi@phytium.com.cn>
Signed-off-by: Wang Yinfeng <wangyinfeng@phytium.com.cn>
Signed-off-by: Jiakun Shuai <shuaijiakun1288@phytium.com.cn>
Change-Id: I2cb696deeed73e8471491cad1baaa7abf334c711
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@opsiff opsiff merged commit 84d1576 into deepin-community:kernel-rolling May 22, 2024
opsiff pushed a commit to opsiff/UOS-kernel that referenced this pull request Jan 27, 2026
commit b45f721775947a84996deb5c661602254ce25ce6 upstream.

When loading guest XSAVE state via KVM_SET_XSAVE, and when updating XFD in
response to a guest WRMSR, clear XFD-disabled features in the saved (or to
be restored) XSTATE_BV to ensure KVM doesn't attempt to load state for
features that are disabled via the guest's XFD.  Because the kernel
executes XRSTOR with the guest's XFD, saving XSTATE_BV[i]=1 with XFD[i]=1
will cause XRSTOR to #NM and panic the kernel.

E.g. if fpu_update_guest_xfd() sets XFD without clearing XSTATE_BV:

  ------------[ cut here ]------------
  WARNING: arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:1524 at exc_device_not_available+0x101/0x110, CPU#29: amx_test/848
  Modules linked in: kvm_intel kvm irqbypass
  CPU: 29 UID: 1000 PID: 848 Comm: amx_test Not tainted 6.19.0-rc2-ffa07f7fd437-x86_amx_nm_xfd_non_init-vm deepin-community#171 NONE
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
  RIP: 0010:exc_device_not_available+0x101/0x110
  Call Trace:
   <TASK>
   asm_exc_device_not_available+0x1a/0x20
  RIP: 0010:restore_fpregs_from_fpstate+0x36/0x90
   switch_fpu_return+0x4a/0xb0
   kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x1245/0x1e40 [kvm]
   kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x2c3/0x8f0 [kvm]
   __x64_sys_ioctl+0x8f/0xd0
   do_syscall_64+0x62/0x940
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
   </TASK>
  ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

This can happen if the guest executes WRMSR(MSR_IA32_XFD) to set XFD[18] = 1,
and a host IRQ triggers kernel_fpu_begin() prior to the vmexit handler's
call to fpu_update_guest_xfd().

and if userspace stuffs XSTATE_BV[i]=1 via KVM_SET_XSAVE:

  ------------[ cut here ]------------
  WARNING: arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:1524 at exc_device_not_available+0x101/0x110, CPU#14: amx_test/867
  Modules linked in: kvm_intel kvm irqbypass
  CPU: 14 UID: 1000 PID: 867 Comm: amx_test Not tainted 6.19.0-rc2-2dace9faccd6-x86_amx_nm_xfd_non_init-vm deepin-community#168 NONE
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
  RIP: 0010:exc_device_not_available+0x101/0x110
  Call Trace:
   <TASK>
   asm_exc_device_not_available+0x1a/0x20
  RIP: 0010:restore_fpregs_from_fpstate+0x36/0x90
   fpu_swap_kvm_fpstate+0x6b/0x120
   kvm_load_guest_fpu+0x30/0x80 [kvm]
   kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x85/0x1e40 [kvm]
   kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x2c3/0x8f0 [kvm]
   __x64_sys_ioctl+0x8f/0xd0
   do_syscall_64+0x62/0x940
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
   </TASK>
  ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

The new behavior is consistent with the AMX architecture.  Per Intel's SDM,
XSAVE saves XSTATE_BV as '0' for components that are disabled via XFD
(and non-compacted XSAVE saves the initial configuration of the state
component):

  If XSAVE, XSAVEC, XSAVEOPT, or XSAVES is saving the state component i,
  the instruction does not generate #NM when XCR0[i] = IA32_XFD[i] = 1;
  instead, it operates as if XINUSE[i] = 0 (and the state component was
  in its initial state): it saves bit i of XSTATE_BV field of the XSAVE
  header as 0; in addition, XSAVE saves the initial configuration of the
  state component (the other instructions do not save state component i).

Alternatively, KVM could always do XRSTOR with XFD=0, e.g. by using
a constant XFD based on the set of enabled features when XSAVEing for
a struct fpu_guest.  However, having XSTATE_BV[i]=1 for XFD-disabled
features can only happen in the above interrupt case, or in similar
scenarios involving preemption on preemptible kernels, because
fpu_swap_kvm_fpstate()'s call to save_fpregs_to_fpstate() saves the
outgoing FPU state with the current XFD; and that is (on all but the
first WRMSR to XFD) the guest XFD.

Therefore, XFD can only go out of sync with XSTATE_BV in the above
interrupt case, or in similar scenarios involving preemption on
preemptible kernels, and it we can consider it (de facto) part of KVM
ABI that KVM_GET_XSAVE returns XSTATE_BV[i]=0 for XFD-disabled features.

Reported-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 820a6ee ("kvm: x86: Add emulation for IA32_XFD", 2022-01-14)
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
[Move clearing of XSTATE_BV from fpu_copy_uabi_to_guest_fpstate
 to kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_xsave. - Paolo]
Reviewed-by: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
(cherry picked from commit f577508cc8a0adb8b4ebe9480bba7683b6149930)
Signed-off-by: Wentao Guan <guanwentao@uniontech.com>
opsiff pushed a commit to opsiff/UOS-kernel that referenced this pull request Feb 3, 2026
commit b45f721775947a84996deb5c661602254ce25ce6 upstream.

When loading guest XSAVE state via KVM_SET_XSAVE, and when updating XFD in
response to a guest WRMSR, clear XFD-disabled features in the saved (or to
be restored) XSTATE_BV to ensure KVM doesn't attempt to load state for
features that are disabled via the guest's XFD.  Because the kernel
executes XRSTOR with the guest's XFD, saving XSTATE_BV[i]=1 with XFD[i]=1
will cause XRSTOR to #NM and panic the kernel.

E.g. if fpu_update_guest_xfd() sets XFD without clearing XSTATE_BV:

  ------------[ cut here ]------------
  WARNING: arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:1524 at exc_device_not_available+0x101/0x110, CPU#29: amx_test/848
  Modules linked in: kvm_intel kvm irqbypass
  CPU: 29 UID: 1000 PID: 848 Comm: amx_test Not tainted 6.19.0-rc2-ffa07f7fd437-x86_amx_nm_xfd_non_init-vm deepin-community#171 NONE
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
  RIP: 0010:exc_device_not_available+0x101/0x110
  Call Trace:
   <TASK>
   asm_exc_device_not_available+0x1a/0x20
  RIP: 0010:restore_fpregs_from_fpstate+0x36/0x90
   switch_fpu_return+0x4a/0xb0
   kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x1245/0x1e40 [kvm]
   kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x2c3/0x8f0 [kvm]
   __x64_sys_ioctl+0x8f/0xd0
   do_syscall_64+0x62/0x940
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
   </TASK>
  ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

This can happen if the guest executes WRMSR(MSR_IA32_XFD) to set XFD[18] = 1,
and a host IRQ triggers kernel_fpu_begin() prior to the vmexit handler's
call to fpu_update_guest_xfd().

and if userspace stuffs XSTATE_BV[i]=1 via KVM_SET_XSAVE:

  ------------[ cut here ]------------
  WARNING: arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:1524 at exc_device_not_available+0x101/0x110, CPU#14: amx_test/867
  Modules linked in: kvm_intel kvm irqbypass
  CPU: 14 UID: 1000 PID: 867 Comm: amx_test Not tainted 6.19.0-rc2-2dace9faccd6-x86_amx_nm_xfd_non_init-vm deepin-community#168 NONE
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
  RIP: 0010:exc_device_not_available+0x101/0x110
  Call Trace:
   <TASK>
   asm_exc_device_not_available+0x1a/0x20
  RIP: 0010:restore_fpregs_from_fpstate+0x36/0x90
   fpu_swap_kvm_fpstate+0x6b/0x120
   kvm_load_guest_fpu+0x30/0x80 [kvm]
   kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl_run+0x85/0x1e40 [kvm]
   kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x2c3/0x8f0 [kvm]
   __x64_sys_ioctl+0x8f/0xd0
   do_syscall_64+0x62/0x940
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
   </TASK>
  ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

The new behavior is consistent with the AMX architecture.  Per Intel's SDM,
XSAVE saves XSTATE_BV as '0' for components that are disabled via XFD
(and non-compacted XSAVE saves the initial configuration of the state
component):

  If XSAVE, XSAVEC, XSAVEOPT, or XSAVES is saving the state component i,
  the instruction does not generate #NM when XCR0[i] = IA32_XFD[i] = 1;
  instead, it operates as if XINUSE[i] = 0 (and the state component was
  in its initial state): it saves bit i of XSTATE_BV field of the XSAVE
  header as 0; in addition, XSAVE saves the initial configuration of the
  state component (the other instructions do not save state component i).

Alternatively, KVM could always do XRSTOR with XFD=0, e.g. by using
a constant XFD based on the set of enabled features when XSAVEing for
a struct fpu_guest.  However, having XSTATE_BV[i]=1 for XFD-disabled
features can only happen in the above interrupt case, or in similar
scenarios involving preemption on preemptible kernels, because
fpu_swap_kvm_fpstate()'s call to save_fpregs_to_fpstate() saves the
outgoing FPU state with the current XFD; and that is (on all but the
first WRMSR to XFD) the guest XFD.

Therefore, XFD can only go out of sync with XSTATE_BV in the above
interrupt case, or in similar scenarios involving preemption on
preemptible kernels, and it we can consider it (de facto) part of KVM
ABI that KVM_GET_XSAVE returns XSTATE_BV[i]=0 for XFD-disabled features.

Reported-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 820a6ee ("kvm: x86: Add emulation for IA32_XFD", 2022-01-14)
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
[Move clearing of XSTATE_BV from fpu_copy_uabi_to_guest_fpstate
 to kvm_vcpu_ioctl_x86_set_xsave. - Paolo]
Reviewed-by: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
(cherry picked from commit f577508cc8a0adb8b4ebe9480bba7683b6149930)
Signed-off-by: Wentao Guan <guanwentao@uniontech.com>
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