Configuration

Configuration

Every setting is an environment variable. Nothing requires a config file.

Tool surface

Variable	Default	Meaning
CYBERCHEF_TOOL_SURFACE	index	index, curated or all — see The Tool Surface
CYBERCHEF_TOOL_ALLOWLIST	unset	Comma-separated operation names (To Base64), overriding the mode
CYBERCHEF_EXPOSE_ALL_OPS	false	Historical alias for CYBERCHEF_TOOL_SURFACE=all
CYBERCHEF_MAX_TOOL_DESCRIPTION	—	Truncates long operation descriptions in tools/list

Transport

See Transports for the full picture.

Variable	Default	Meaning
CYBERCHEF_TRANSPORT	stdio	stdio, http or socket
CYBERCHEF_HTTP_HOST	127.0.0.1	Bind address inside the container
CYBERCHEF_HTTP_PORT	3000
CYBERCHEF_HTTP_PATH	/mcp
CYBERCHEF_HTTP_MAX_BODY	—	Request body cap
CYBERCHEF_ALLOWED_HOSTS	loopback names	DNS-rebinding protection, on by default. * disables it
CYBERCHEF_ALLOWED_ORIGINS	—	Origin header allowlist
CYBERCHEF_MAX_SESSIONS	—	Concurrent HTTP sessions
CYBERCHEF_SESSION_TIMEOUT	—	Idle session reaping
CYBERCHEF_SOCKET_PATH	—	Unix domain socket, created 0600
CYBERCHEF_SOCKET_HOST / _PORT	127.0.0.1 / —	Loopback TCP instead
CYBERCHEF_SOCKET_MAX_CONNECTIONS	—
CYBERCHEF_SOCKET_ALLOW_REMOTE	unset	Required to bind off-loopback

CYBERCHEF_ALLOWED_HOSTS is DNS-rebinding protection, not access control. It checks the Host header, which a direct client simply sets correctly. It stops a browser on the victim's machine being used to reach a loopback server; it stops nothing else.

Authorization (v2.5.0)

Off unless CYBERCHEF_AUTH_ISSUER is set, and applies to the HTTP transport only — the MCP specification says stdio SHOULD NOT use OAuth and should take credentials from the environment, because a bearer token protects nothing when the client already owns the process.

Variable	Default	Meaning
CYBERCHEF_AUTH_ISSUER	unset	The authorization server's issuer URL. Setting this turns authorization on.
CYBERCHEF_AUTH_RESOURCE	unset	This server's canonical URI, e.g. https://mcp.example.com/mcp. Must be absolute and carry no fragment
CYBERCHEF_AUTH_AUDIENCE	the resource URI	Override only if your authorization server issues a fixed audience string that is not a URI
CYBERCHEF_AUTH_JWKS_URI	discovered	Skips RFC 8414 / OpenID discovery
CYBERCHEF_AUTH_REQUIRED_SCOPES	none	A baseline scope demanded on every request, in addition to the per-tool check
CYBERCHEF_AUDIT_ENABLED	follows auth	Force audit logging on or off independently
CYBERCHEF_TENANT_CLAIM	unset	Token claim naming the tenant, e.g. tid. Setting this turns multi-tenancy on, and requires CYBERCHEF_AUTH_ISSUER

CYBERCHEF_AUTH_RESOURCE is not optional in practice. It is what the token's aud claim is checked against (RFC 8707), so a mismatch — a stray trailing slash, a different host — rejects every otherwise-valid token. Getting this wrong looks like "authentication is broken" and is actually "the audience does not match".

Scopes

Scope	Grants
cyberchef:read	Pure operations — encode, decode, hash, parse
cyberchef:write	Anything that changes state: recipe create/update/delete, cache clear. Implies read
cyberchef:network	The two operations that reach the internet (HTTP request, DNS over HTTPS) and cyberchef_bake, which can run either. Implies read

network is deliberately not implied by write: an operation that reaches the internet is not adequately described as "write", and conflating them would let a token granted for local mutation drive outbound requests.

Which scope a tool needs is derived from its MCP annotations rather than a hand-maintained table, so a tool added upstream is classified the moment it is annotated. See Security for the reasoning.

A minimal setup

docker run -i --rm -p 127.0.0.1:3000:3000 \
  -e CYBERCHEF_TRANSPORT=http \
  -e CYBERCHEF_AUTH_ISSUER=https://auth.example.com \
  -e CYBERCHEF_AUTH_RESOURCE=https://mcp.example.com/mcp \
  ghcr.io/doublegate/cyberchef-mcp_v2:latest

Verify discovery works before pointing a client at it — the metadata document is served without a token, by design:

curl -s http://127.0.0.1:3000/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp | jq

Multi-tenancy (v2.5.0)

Off unless CYBERCHEF_TENANT_CLAIM is set. With it unset the server runs in a single tenant and behaves exactly as it did before v2.5.0 — which is correct for stdio, where one client owns the process, and for any single-user HTTP deployment.

Set it to the claim your authorization server puts the tenant in: tid for Microsoft Entra, org_id for Auth0, or whatever your issuer uses.

docker run -i --rm \
  -e CYBERCHEF_TRANSPORT=http \
  -e CYBERCHEF_AUTH_ISSUER=https://auth.example.com \
  -e CYBERCHEF_AUTH_RESOURCE=https://mcp.example.com/mcp \
  -e CYBERCHEF_TENANT_CLAIM=tid \
  cyberchef-mcp

Tenancy requires authorization, and the server will not start without it. The tenant is read from a claim on a token the server has already verified. Without authorization there is no verified token, so every caller would silently share one tenant while you believed they were separated — which is why this is a startup error rather than a warning.

What is isolated:

Recipes	scoped per tenant for read, list, update, delete, stats and clear()
Operation cache	tenant is part of the cache key
Concurrency slots	CYBERCHEF_MAX_CONCURRENT_OPS applies per tenant
Recipe cap	CYBERCHEF_RECIPE_MAX_COUNT applies per tenant
Audit records	carry the tenant

Upgrading an existing recipe store is safe. A recipe saved before v2.5.0 has no tenant field and belongs to the default tenant, so a single-tenant deployment sees exactly what it saw before.

A token whose tenant claim is missing, blank, or malformed is refused with 403 rather than placed in the default tenant — putting an unidentifiable caller in with everyone else is the failure this feature exists to prevent. Identifiers are validated against an allowlist (A-Za-z0-9._:@-, at most 128 characters); ., .. and default are reserved.

Health and shutdown (v2.6.0)

HTTP transport only. On stdio there is no listener to probe and no load balancer to inform.

Three endpoints, served without authentication because a kubelet probe carries no bearer token, and deliberately uninformative — a status string and nothing else:

path	200 when	503 when
/health/startup	the listener is bound	still starting
/health/ready	serving	starting or draining
/health/live	always, until the process exits	never

Liveness stays healthy during a drain, and that is deliberate. A failing liveness probe means restart me; during a drain the server is refusing new traffic while finishing in-flight work, so a liveness failure there gets the pod killed mid-drain — the opposite of what the drain is for. Only readiness flips. If you wire liveness to /health/ready, you have recreated that bug.

Variable	Default	Meaning
CYBERCHEF_DRAIN_DELAY_MS	5000	After SIGTERM: how long to keep serving while readiness reports failure
CYBERCHEF_DRAIN_TIMEOUT_MS	20000	Then how long to wait for in-flight requests before closing anyway

The delay exists because Kubernetes sends SIGTERM and removes the pod from Service endpoints at the same time, and endpoint removal has to propagate through kube-proxy and any ingress first. A server that exits on SIGTERM therefore drops the requests routed during that window: the deploy looks clean and a fraction of requests fail.

Keep terminationGracePeriodSeconds larger than preStop + delay + timeout, or the kubelet SIGKILLs the process partway through its own shutdown and the drain achieves nothing. The Helm chart sets all four consistently.

Both default to 0 being meaningful, not missing: CYBERCHEF_DRAIN_DELAY_MS=0 disables the grace window, which is what you want under Docker Compose or anywhere without a load balancer.

Observability (v2.7.0)

Variable	Default	Meaning
CYBERCHEF_METRICS_ENABLED	false	Serve Prometheus metrics at /metrics. Unauthenticated when on.

Why this one is opt-in when the health probes are not

Both are unauthenticated, and for the same reason: neither a kubelet probe nor a Prometheus scraper carries a bearer token, so gating them would make them useless to the only callers they exist for.

The difference is what they say. A probe answers "should I get traffic" in one word. A scrape reports which tools are being used, how often, how large the inputs are, and how many tenants are active — a useful reconnaissance surface. So the probes are always on and deliberately uninformative, while /metrics is off unless you ask for it, and belongs on an internal network or behind a NetworkPolicy.

When disabled, /metrics is not special-cased at all: it falls through to the ordinary 404, so a prober cannot distinguish "metrics off" from "not this server".

What it never exposes

Tenant identifiers, tool arguments, subject digests, recipe names, error messages. Tenant count is exposed; tenant names are not — a tenant identifier in a metric label is how tenant identity leaks into a surface nobody access-controlled for it, and cardinality makes it permanent. Per-tenant attribution comes from the audit log, which is access-controlled.

Tool names carry a hard cap of 1024 distinct labels, overflowing into __other__. The name reaching the counter is the name the caller asked for, so without the cap anyone able to call the server could mint arbitrary labels in a loop and explode cardinality in a shared Prometheus.

Metrics are counted even with telemetry off

CYBERCHEF_TELEMETRY_ENABLED gates the per-call records — duration, sizes, timestamp, one row per execution — which remain opt-in and privacy-first. It does not gate the per-tool counters /metrics reports. With the counters behind that flag, a default deployment would report zero tool calls forever no matter how much traffic it served, which an operator reads as an idle server or a broken endpoint.

Tracing

The server emits OpenTelemetry spans following the MCP semantic conventions, and depends on @opentelemetry/api only — not the SDK. Measured: the SDK plus exporters is 71 packages, 50 MB and +100 ms of startup, against the API's 1 package, 2.6 MB and +9 ms. With no SDK registered the instrumentation is a genuine no-op (100,000 span+metric cycles in 8 ms).

You supply the SDK, which means every OTLP backend works rather than a chosen few:

node --import ./otel-bootstrap.mjs src/node/mcp-server.mjs

Tool arguments and results are never recorded. The conventions define gen_ai.tool.call.arguments and .result as Opt-In; this server does not opt in, because the arguments to a CyberChef tool are the sensitive material — a key, a password hash, the document being decoded. error.type comes from the structured error code or the exception class, never the message, because messages quote their input.

Every log line carries trace_id and span_id when a trace is active, and no extra fields at all when one is not.

Dashboards and alerts

A Grafana dashboard, 9 Prometheus alerting rules, a metric reference, and a runnable Prometheus + Grafana stack live in deploy/grafana/. The Helm chart wires the scrape with metrics.enabled=true plus either monitoring.serviceMonitor.enabled=true (Prometheus Operator) or monitoring.podAnnotations=true (classic prometheus.io/scrape annotations).

Scaling and replicas (v2.6.0)

The server is stateless per request. MCP revision 2026-07-28 removed protocol-level sessions entirely, so replicas need no session store, no sticky routing and no affinity.

One thing is not shared: saved recipes are a JSON file, local to each process. There is deliberately no database — see Deploying for the reasoning. Two supported configurations:

1. A volume per replica — recipes are per-pod, and replicas cannot conflict.
2. A single replica with one volume.

Pointing several replicas at one shared file is not supported. The server detects it: each save carries a generation checked immediately before the commit, so a stale writer is refused rather than silently discarding another replica's recipes. It is a conflict detector, not a lock.

If you do not use saved recipes, none of this applies — scale freely.

Limits and safety

Variable	Default	Meaning
CYBERCHEF_MAX_INPUT_SIZE	104857600 (100 MB)	Rejected above this
CYBERCHEF_OPERATION_TIMEOUT	30000 (30 s)	Per call, including registry tools
CYBERCHEF_MAX_CONCURRENT_OPS	—	Quota on simultaneous operations
CYBERCHEF_MAX_REGEX_LENGTH	—	Guards the regex-taking operations against ReDoS
CYBERCHEF_RATE_LIMIT_ENABLED	false
CYBERCHEF_RATE_LIMIT_REQUESTS	100	Per window
CYBERCHEF_RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW	60000 (60 s)

Performance

Variable	Default	Meaning
CYBERCHEF_CACHE_ENABLED	true	LRU cache of operation results
CYBERCHEF_CACHE_MAX_SIZE	104857600 (100 MB)
CYBERCHEF_CACHE_MAX_ITEMS	1000
CYBERCHEF_ENABLE_STREAMING	true
CYBERCHEF_STREAMING_THRESHOLD	10485760 (10 MB)	Inputs above this stream
CYBERCHEF_STREAM_CHUNK_SIZE / _MAX_CHUNKS / _PROGRESS_INTERVAL	—
CYBERCHEF_ENABLE_WORKERS	false	Worker-thread pool, opt-in
CYBERCHEF_WORKER_MIN_THREADS / _MAX_THREADS	—
CYBERCHEF_WORKER_MIN_INPUT_SIZE / _IDLE_TIMEOUT	—
CYBERCHEF_MAX_RETRIES / _INITIAL_BACKOFF / _MAX_BACKOFF / _BACKOFF_MULTIPLIER	—	Retry policy

Batch, recipes, telemetry

Variable	Default	Meaning
CYBERCHEF_BATCH_ENABLED	true
CYBERCHEF_BATCH_MAX_SIZE	100
CYBERCHEF_RECIPE_STORAGE	—	Where saved recipes live
CYBERCHEF_RECIPE_BACKUP	—
CYBERCHEF_RECIPE_MAX_COUNT / _MAX_OPERATIONS / _MAX_DEPTH	—
CYBERCHEF_TELEMETRY_ENABLED	false	Off by default, privacy-first. Local only; nothing leaves the process unless you export it

Output and diagnostics

Variable	Default	Meaning
CYBERCHEF_BINARY_OUTPUT	latin1	Set to base64 for base64 instead of byte-lossless latin1 text
CYBERCHEF_SUPPRESS_DEPRECATIONS	false
LOG_LEVEL	info	trace, debug, info, warn, error, fatal

Logs always go to stderr, never stdout, because stdout is the protocol stream on stdio.

Setting them

Docker:

docker run -i --rm \
  -e CYBERCHEF_TOOL_SURFACE=curated \
  -e LOG_LEVEL=debug \
  ghcr.io/doublegate/cyberchef-mcp_v2:latest

In a client config (env block):

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "cyberchef": {
      "command": "docker",
      "args": ["run", "-i", "--rm", "-e", "CYBERCHEF_TOOL_SURFACE=curated",
               "ghcr.io/doublegate/cyberchef-mcp_v2:latest"]
    }
  }
}

Note that -e VAR=value must go in args before the image name, not after — Docker stops parsing its own flags at the image.