




Moldova Infrastructure Vulnerabilities: PMESII-ASCOPE Framework Analysis for EU Accession Period

The Republic of Moldova faces critical infrastructure vulnerabilities that could be exploited by Russian influence operations to destabilize the country during its EU accession process over the next 12 months. This analysis examines Moldova's infrastructure through the ASCOPE framework (Areas, Structures, Capabilities, Organizations, People, Events) to identify key vulnerabilities relevant to external influence operations, with particular focus on Russian threats during the critical September 2025 parliamentary elections and subsequent EU integration milestones.

Moldova Critical Infrastructure Vulnerabilities



Moldova's Critical Infrastructure Vulnerabilities and Russian Influence Operations - PMESII-ASCOPE Analysis

Areas: Geographic Vulnerabilities and Strategic Chokepoints

Transnistria Region - The Primary Vulnerability Zone

The breakaway region of Transnistria represents Moldova's most critical infrastructure vulnerability. This Russian-backed separatist territory controls approximately 453.4 kilometers of the Moldova-Ukraine border and houses the **Cuciurgan Power Plant**, which has historically provided 75% of Moldova's electricity needs. The region operates outside Moldova's constitutional control, creating a permanent platform for Russian influence operations.^{[1] [2] [3] [4]}

The **Cuciurgan Power Station**, with its 2,520 MW capacity, remains under the control of Russian state-owned Inter RAO UES since 2005. Until January 2025, this facility consumed free Russian gas to generate electricity for both Transnistria and right-bank Moldova, creating an artificial dependency that Russia has repeatedly weaponized for political leverage.^{[5] [3] [6]}



Cuciurgan power station in Transnistria, a key energy infrastructure relevant to Moldova's energy security and external influence vulnerabilities.

Critical Border Infrastructure

Moldova's border infrastructure presents significant vulnerabilities, particularly along the **453.4-kilometer stretch with Ukraine that remains outside government control**. The country maintains 51 border crossing points—7 with Romania and 43 with Ukraine—with the **Otaci-Mohyliv-Podilskyi crossing** serving as the busiest cargo route, processing over 350 cargo units per day during peak seasons.^[7]

The **Galați-Giurgiulești border crossing** has become strategically critical as part of the EU-Ukraine Solidarity Lanes, handling approximately 70% of Ukrainian grain exports transiting through Moldova and Romania. This creates both opportunities for enhanced EU integration and vulnerabilities to disruption.^{[8] [9]}



Modern border crossing checkpoint infrastructure at Giurgiulesti, Moldova, showing vehicle inspection and scanning facilities under a shelter.

Energy Transmission Corridors

The **Isaccea-Vulcănești 400kV transmission line** represents a critical chokepoint, as it crosses Ukrainian territory and remains susceptible to disruption from Russian attacks on Ukraine's infrastructure. This vulnerability was demonstrated in November 2022 when Russian bombardments of Ukrainian energy infrastructure caused power outages across Moldova.^{[5] [10]}

Structures: Critical Physical Infrastructure

Power Generation and Transmission Infrastructure

Moldova's electricity infrastructure faces fundamental structural vulnerabilities. The country can only produce approximately 20% of its domestic electricity needs through facilities like

Termoelectrica and CET Nord. The remainder has historically depended on the Transnistrian Cuciurgan plant, creating a strategic dependency that Russia has exploited through energy blackmail.^[5] ^[11]

The **Vulcănești-Chișinău 400kV transmission line**, currently under construction with World Bank funding of €61 million, represents the most critical infrastructure project for Moldova's energy independence. Scheduled for completion by end-2025, this 158-kilometer line will enable direct electricity imports from Romania, bypassing Transnistrian territory entirely.^[10] ^[5]

Additional planned interconnections include the **Bălți-Suceava 400kV line** (completion by 2027) with US funding of \$110 million, and the **Strășeni-Gutinaș line** supported by USAID (completion by 2029). These projects aim to create redundant pathways for EU electricity imports.^[12]



Moldova electricity transmission towers representing key power grid infrastructure.

Gas Infrastructure and Diversification Projects

Moldova has successfully reduced its Russian gas dependency to zero as of 2025, primarily through the **Iași-Ungheți-Chișinău pipeline** completed in 2021. This 150-kilometer pipeline connects Moldova to Romanian and EU gas markets via the Trans-Balkan pipeline's reverse flow capability.^{[5] [13]}

Four major gas pipeline expansion projects are planned for 2025-2029 to strengthen Moldova's energy security:^[14]

- **Prut River-Ungheni-Todirești project** (11 km, 2025-2028)
- **Chișinău City Ring Infrastructure** (60 km, 2025-2028)
- **Cimișlia-Hîncești Branch Pipeline** (40 km, 2025-2028)
- **Ungheni-Bălți-Drochia Pipeline** (95 km, 2026-2029)



Natural gas pipeline facility connecting Romania (Iasi) and Moldova (Ungheni) illustrating key energy infrastructure relevant to Moldova's gas supply connections.

Transport and Border Infrastructure

Moldova's transport infrastructure ranks among the worst globally, positioned 126th out of 140 countries in the 2019 Global Competitiveness Report. The railway network spans 1,318 kilometers with only 100 kilometers electrified and 140 kilometers double-tracked. This infrastructure weakness creates dependencies on Ukrainian and Romanian logistics networks while limiting Moldova's ability to facilitate the EU-Ukraine Solidarity Lanes effectively.^{[15] [16] [17]}

The **Valcinet-Ungheni-Chisinau-Cainari rail corridor** is undergoing rehabilitation with €41.2 million EIB financing plus €12 million EU grant support. This project strengthens Moldova's role in Ukrainian grain transit while improving internal connectivity.^[18]

Capabilities: Infrastructure Resilience and Dependencies

Energy Security Capabilities

Moldova has achieved remarkable progress in energy diversification since 2022. The country eliminated Russian gas imports entirely by 2025, sourcing supply exclusively from EU markets through Romania, Ukraine, and Azerbaijan. Strategic gas storage arrangements in Romanian and Ukrainian underground facilities provide winter security.[\[13\]](#) [\[14\]](#)

However, electricity security remains constrained by limited import capacity from Romania—currently **315 MW through existing interconnections**. This capacity increases to approximately 400-500 MW during optimal conditions but remains insufficient during peak demand periods.[\[19\]](#) [\[20\]](#)

Cybersecurity and Digital Infrastructure Vulnerabilities

Moldova faces escalating cyber threats, with attacks on government and corporate systems more than tripling since Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine. The August 2025 cyberattack on government infrastructure demonstrated ongoing vulnerabilities in state systems.[\[21\]](#) [\[22\]](#)

The EU has responded by including Moldova in the **EU Cybersecurity Reserve** under the Cyber Solidarity Act, providing access to Cyber Rapid Response Teams and enhanced cybersecurity capabilities. A new regional cyber alliance with Romania and Ukraine was established in July 2025 to strengthen collective defense.[\[23\]](#) [\[24\]](#)

Infrastructure Implementation Capacity

Moldova's infrastructure development faces significant capacity constraints. The government has acknowledged **limited local capacities for project elaboration** and **bureaucratic procedures** that slow implementation. The **Consolidated Unit for Implementation and Monitoring of Projects in Energy Sector (UCIPE)** coordinates major infrastructure projects but requires enhanced human resources and international consultancy support.[\[25\]](#)

Organizations: Key Infrastructure Actors

Government and State Entities

Ministry of Energy, led by Minister **Dorin Junghietu** (appointed February 2025), serves as the primary coordinator for energy infrastructure development. Junghietu brings over 16 years of international experience in gas and energy project implementation.[\[26\]](#)

Moldelectrica operates as the national transmission system operator, managing the electricity grid and coordinating with ENTSO-E for European integration. The company is implementing critical interconnection projects with Romania while maintaining system stability during the energy transition.[\[27\]](#)

Energocom, the state-owned energy trading company, has become central to Moldova's energy security strategy. Established in 2005 initially as an electricity importer, Energocom now

serves as the primary gas importer from EU suppliers and manages strategic energy procurement through €400 million EBRD financing facilities.^[27]

International Financial Partners

The **European Investment Bank** provides crucial infrastructure financing, including €244 million for energy and hospital upgrades in 2025. The **European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)** maintains the largest exposure to Moldova with €830 million sovereign debt and provides critical working capital facilities to Energocom.^{[28] [27]}

The **EU Growth Plan for Moldova** represents unprecedented support, providing €1.885 billion between 2025-2027 for infrastructure development, including €385 million in grants and €1.5 billion in preferential loans. This funding specifically targets energy independence projects and transport connectivity with Romania and Ukraine.^[29]

Russian-Controlled and Adversarial Entities

Gazprom maintains control over Moldovagaz (50%+1 share) despite Moldova's efforts at market unbundling. The company continues to assert a €709 million debt claim against Moldova, though independent audits assess the actual debt at only €8.6 million.^{[11] [27]}

Inter RAO UES, the Russian state-owned enterprise controlling the Cuciurgan Power Plant, represents the most direct form of Russian infrastructure control within Moldova. The company's 51% ownership of Moldova's largest power plant creates ongoing leverage for Russian influence operations.^[3]

The **Moldova24 (MD24) media network**, operating from Russian servers with infrastructure shared with RT and TV Novosti, demonstrates how Russian entities use digital infrastructure to support influence operations. During the January 2025 energy crisis, MD24's TikTok channel posted 929 videos garnering over 17 million views to exploit the humanitarian situation.^[30]

People: Key Decision-Makers and Vulnerable Populations

Political and Technical Leadership

President Maia Sandu provides overall strategic direction for Moldova's EU integration and energy independence policies. Her administration has consistently prioritized infrastructure projects that reduce Russian dependencies while accelerating EU alignment.^[26]

Prime Minister Dorin Recean directly oversees infrastructure acceleration, emphasizing the need to "reduce bureaucratic procedures to ensure quick implementation pace" for energy projects. Recean has established clear priorities: ensuring energy supply continuity, completing the Vulcănești-Chișinău line on schedule, and shortening investment project cycles.^{[25] [26]}

Energy Minister Dorin Junghietu brings critical technical expertise to infrastructure development, having coordinated major energy projects internationally. His appointment in February 2025 signaled the government's commitment to professional management during the energy transition period.^[14]

Transnistrian Leadership and Russian Proxies

Vadim Krasnoselsky, the 'president' of the unrecognized Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic, directly controls infrastructure decisions in the separatist region. Krasnoselsky's administration has extended energy emergency declarations and coordinates with Moscow on gas supply arrangements while resisting payment for market-rate energy.^[16] ^[4]

The **Sheriff Group oligarchy** maintains significant control over Transnistrian economic infrastructure and has historically benefited from free Russian gas arrangements. The group's concerns about energy supply disruption have created potential openings for negotiation with Chișinău on reintegration terms.^[4]

Vulnerable Populations and Critical Dependencies

Approximately **2.4 million Moldovan energy consumers** face exposure to supply disruptions and price volatility during the infrastructure transition. The January 2025 energy crisis resulted in **75% electricity tariff increases**, demonstrating the immediate impact of infrastructure vulnerabilities on the population.^[5] ^[27]

The **367,000 residents of Transnistria** represent a particularly vulnerable population caught between Russian supply cuts and the region's refusal to pay market prices for alternative energy sources. Three deaths from carbon monoxide poisoning during the January 2025 crisis highlighted the humanitarian consequences of energy infrastructure manipulation.^[31] ^[3]

Events: Critical Infrastructure Developments and Threat Timeline

Recent Energy Crises and Russian Escalation

The **January 1, 2025 Russian gas cutoff to Transnistria** marked a decisive escalation in Russia's use of energy infrastructure for political coercion. This action, timed with Ukraine's refusal to renew gas transit agreements, created an immediate humanitarian crisis while forcing Moldova to import expensive electricity from Romania.^[2] ^[31] ^[32]

The crisis demonstrated Russia's willingness to sacrifice previously valuable influence assets—free gas provision to Transnistria—in favor of immediate destabilization pressure ahead of the September 2025 parliamentary elections. Moldova's electricity tariffs increased by approximately 75%, creating economic hardship that Russian influence operations exploit through disinformation campaigns.^[33] ^[5]

Cyber and Hybrid Threat Escalation

August 2025 cyberattack on government infrastructure represented a significant escalation in Russian hybrid operations. The Information Technology and Cyber Security Service (STISC) attributed the attack to foreign actors and suspended several employees suspected of complicity, indicating potential insider threat components.^[21]

Cyber threats have **tripled since Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine**, with attacks often timed to coincide with politically significant events. The establishment of EU Cyber Solidarity Act

coverage for Moldova and regional cyber alliance formation with Romania and Ukraine demonstrates the severity of ongoing threats.[\[23\]](#) [\[22\]](#) [\[24\]](#)

Critical Parliamentary Elections - September 2025

The **September 28, 2025 parliamentary elections** represent the most critical infrastructure vulnerability window. Russian influence operations are scaling up across multiple vectors—energy manipulation, cyber operations, and information warfare—to destabilize the electoral process and potentially install a pro-Russian government.[\[33\]](#)

Multiple Russia-linked influence operations including Operation Overload, Operation Undercut, and the Foundation to Battle Injustice are actively working to suppress diaspora voting, fracture pro-European political blocs, and cast doubt on electoral legitimacy. Infrastructure disruption represents a key tactic for creating conditions favorable to Russian-aligned candidates.[\[33\]](#)

Infrastructure Completion Milestones and EU Integration

December 2025 completion of the Vulcănești-Chișinău transmission line will mark Moldova's achievement of electricity independence from Transnistria. This represents a critical milestone that eliminates Russia's primary infrastructure leverage over Moldova's energy security.[\[5\]](#)

The **2027 completion of the Bălți-Suceava interconnection** will provide redundant pathways for EU electricity imports while strengthening northern Moldova's grid integration. Combined with ongoing gas pipeline expansion projects, these developments will create comprehensive energy infrastructure independence by Moldova's targeted 2030 EU accession date.[\[10\]](#)

Ongoing Sabotage and Disruption Threats

Intelligence assessments indicate elevated risks of **infrastructure sabotage targeting transmission lines, border crossings, and cybersystems** during critical political periods. The EU Partnership Mission to Moldova has enhanced monitoring capabilities while NATO's new maritime port cybersecurity policies address regional infrastructure protection.[\[33\]](#) [\[34\]](#) [\[35\]](#) [\[36\]](#)


Potential manufactured crises in Transnistria and Gagauzia represent ongoing threats as Russia seeks alternative pressure points following the loss of energy leverage. Border infrastructure disruption through Ukrainian territory attacks remains a persistent vulnerability requiring coordinated EU-Moldova-Ukraine response planning.[\[7\]](#) [\[33\]](#)

Conclusion and Strategic Implications

Moldova's infrastructure vulnerabilities create multiple vectors for Russian influence operations during the critical EU accession period. The January 2025 energy crisis demonstrated both Moldova's progress in reducing dependencies and remaining exposure to hybrid warfare tactics. The successful completion of planned interconnection projects, particularly the Vulcănești-Chișinău transmission line, will eliminate Russia's primary infrastructure leverage while creating new defensive requirements.

The September 2025 parliamentary elections represent the most critical vulnerability window, as Russian operations seek to exploit infrastructure dependencies, cyber vulnerabilities, and

information systems to destabilize Moldova's democratic processes. EU support through the Growth Plan, cyber solidarity mechanisms, and infrastructure financing provides essential resilience capabilities, but effective implementation requires sustained political will and enhanced security coordination throughout the accession process.



Moldova Infrastructure Timeline: Russian Pressure vs EU Integration (2022-2030)

**

1. <https://sceeu.se/publikationer/russias-hybrid-war-against-moldova/>
2. <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/moldova-is-the-real-loser-from-the-end-of-russia-n-gas-transit-through-ukraine/>
3. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cuciurgan_power_station
4. <https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2023-12-29/transnistria-new-international-reality>
5. <https://hagueresearch.org/between-hybrid-warfare-and-european-aspirations-moldovas-energy-challenge/>
6. <https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2025/01/10/everything-depends-on-moscow-in-separatist-transnistria-residents-await-end-to-sweeping-energy-crisis-a87566>
7. https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/system/files/2018-10/c_2018_3253_f1_annex_en_v2_p1_971039.pdf
8. https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/news/moldova-receives-additional-funding-improve-rail-infrastructure-and-advance-solidarity-lanes-2023-12-15_en
9. https://transport.ec.europa.eu/news-events/news/coordinated-romania-moldova-border-controls-facilitate-eu-ukraine-solidarity-lanes-transit-2024-11-20_en
10. <https://www.energynomics.ro/en/energy-interconnection-republic-of-moldova-romania-analysis-by-mihai-melinte-energy-analytical-studies/>
11. <https://neweasterneurope.eu/2024/10/18/the-low-hanging-fruit-of-european-integration-moldovas-election-and-the-power-play-of-energy-dependency/>
12. <https://moldova1.md/p/40886/moldova-s-energy-crossroads-balancing-dependence-and-diversification>
13. <https://hagueresearch.org/how-can-moldova-use-the-energy-crisis-to-reintegrate-the-country/>
14. <https://ceenergynews.com/interviews/interview-dorin-junghietu-minister-of-energy-moldova/>

15. <https://www.climatechangepost.com/countries/moldova/transport-infrastructure-and-building/>
16. https://www.german-economic-team.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/GET_MDA_PP_01_2023_en-1.pdf
17. https://customs.gov.md/api/media/01/03/2024/Preliminary_ESIA_Component_B_8.02.24.pdf
18. <https://www.eib.org/en/press/all/2024-340-european-union-increases-support-for-moldova-with-investments-in-forest-development-and-railway-infrastructure>
19. <https://www罗马ia-insider.com/moldova-declare-state-emergency-energy-sector=dec-2024>
20. <https://infomarket.md/en/pwengineering/359846>
21. <https://www.moldpres.md/eng/society/cyber-attack-on-government-infrastructure>
22. <https://www.csis.org/analysis/strengthening-moldovas-cyber-landscape>
23. <https://industrialcyber.co/news/eu-and-moldova-expand-digital-pact-to-counter-cyber-and-hybrid-threats/>
24. <https://www.rnbo.gov.ua/en/Dzialnist/7250.html>
25. <https://gov.md/en/press-releases/moldovan-pm-demands-speeding-carrying-out-strategic-energy-infrastructure-projects>
26. <https://www.energie.gov.md/en/content/new-minister-energy-dorin-junghietu-took-oath-office>
27. https://www.ebrd.com/content/dam/ebrd_dxp/documents/project/56466/Moldova_Energy_Security.pdf
28. <https://www.eib.org/en/press/all/2025-278-moldova-receives-over-eur244-million-in-eib-global-financing-for-energy-and-hospital-upgrades>
29. <https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2025-02-24/moldova-unprecedented-financial-assistance-package-eu>
30. <https://dfrlab.org/2025/06/03/unveiling-the-russian-infrastructure-supporting-the-moldova24-tv-channel/>
31. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2025_Moldovan_energy_crisis
32. <https://newunionpost.eu/2025/02/04/eu-strategy-moldova-energy-crisis/>
33. <https://www.recordedfuture.com/research/russian-influence-assets-converge-on-moldovan-elections>
34. <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX%3A32025D1458>
35. <https://eap-csf.eu/what-we-do/events/hybrid-warfare-and-disinformation-how-moldova-counters-russian-propaganda/>
36. <https://www.enseccoe.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/CORE-24-M-Final-Exercise-Report.pdf>
37. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/B-10-2025-0356_EN.html
38. <https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/289851/2024.10.09 Strengthening Moldova's resilience against Russian interference.pdf>
39. <https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/10/moldova-russia-strategy?lang=en>
40. https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/858717b3-f8ef-4514-89fe-54a6aa15ef69_en?filename=Moldova+Report+2024.pdf
41. <https://www.ips-journal.eu/interviews/ultimately-its-about-keeping-moldova-bound-to-moscow-8035/>
42. <https://www.government.se/opinion-pieces/2025/08/moldova-can-teach-us-about-russian-propaganda-ahead-of-parliamentary-elections/>
43. <https://euneighbourseast.eu/news/latest-news/eu-launches-major-new-initiative-to-support-moldovas-eu-integration/>

44. <https://www.irreview.org/articles/2025/3/29/transnistrian-energy-crisis-implications-on-moldovan-bid-to-join-european-union>
45. <https://politicsgeo.com/article/146>
46. <https://newunionpost.eu/2024/12/12/moldova-first-eu-accession-cluster-2025/>
47. <https://carnegieendowment.org/europe/strategic-europe/2025/02/russian-interference-coming-soon-to-an-election-near-you?lang=en>
48. <https://www.edf-feph.org/publications/the-eu-accession-process-guidance-for-organisations-of-persons-with-disabilities/>
49. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Accession_of_Moldova_to_the_European_Union
50. <https://ridl.io/energy-crisis-in-transnistria-is-russian-gas-replaceable/>
51. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/fr/statement_25_1740
52. https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2025-03/CA_Unfreezing_Transnistria.pdf
53. https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/news/european-commission-and-moldova-agree-2-year-comprehensive-strategy-energy-independence-and-2025-02-04_en
54. <https://atlasinstitute.org/energy-crisis-hits-moldova-2/>
55. <https://ceenergynews.com/electricity/moldova-ensures-electricity-supply/>
56. https://www.gem.wiki/Kuchurgan_power_station
57. <https://www.upstreamonline.com/energy-security/moldova-orders-gazprom-subsidiary-to-surrender-control-of-gas-grid/2-1-1853403>
58. <https://interfax.com/newsroom/top-stories/113852/>
59. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/cs/ip_25_329
60. https://www.ebrd.com/content/dam/ebrd_dxp/documents/project/54567/moldova-romania-power-interconnection-phase-ii-board-report.pdf
61. https://danube-region.eu/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/2024-06-20_Carolina-Novac_Rep-Moldova.pdf
62. <https://therecord.media/curly-threat-actor-targeting-moldova>
63. <https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/battening-down-hatches-moldova-s-cyber-defence>
64. https://midr.gov.md/files/shares/Moldova-Roadmap-Critical-Infrastructure-Resilience_ENG_1.pdf
65. <https://understandingwar.org/research/russia-ukraine/russia-continues-efforts-to-regain-influence-over-moldova/>
66. <https://tech-action.unepccc.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2025/03/transport-sector-tna-moldova.pdf>
67. <https://www.digitalassetredemption.com/blog/russian-cyberattacks-and-natos-new-maritime-port-cybersecurity-policy>
68. <https://platformraam.nl/uit-andere-media-geselecteerd/2825-russias-disinformation-cocktail-strengthened-by-moldovan-test-case>
69. <https://politicsgeo.com/targeted-disruption-russian-interference-in-the-2024-elections-of-moldova-romania-and-georgia/>
70. <https://www.energie.gov.md/en/content/infrastructure-projects-and-development-energy-trade-contacts-discussed-energy-ministers>
71. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_2611
72. <https://ridl.io/transnistria-another-russian-pressure-point/>

73. <https://moldova.un.org/en/292346-moldova-encouraged-implement-findings-polish-funded-critical-infrastructure-resilience>
74. <https://www.intellinews.com/separatists-in-transnistria-face-deep-economic-contraction-as-russia-restricts-subsidies-387099/>
75. https://cinea.ec.europa.eu/news-events/news/cef-transport-eu25-billion-available-infrastructure-projects-across-eu-2024-09-24_en
76. <https://www.moldpres.md/eng/economy/energy-minister-in-istanbul-says-moldova-becomes-important-player-for-regional-energy-security>
77. <https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/eng/articles/2024/10/11/7195994/>
78. https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/european-neighbourhood-policy/countries-region/moldova-0_en
79. <https://www.government.se/statements/2025/01/statement-on-energy-situation-in-the-republic-of-moldova/>
80. <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transnistria>
81. <https://eu4moldova.eu/en/the-eu-and-moldova-how-the-partnership-has-evolved-up-to-july-2025-2/>
82. <https://www.undrr.org/publication/republic-moldova-national-roadmap-critical-infrastructure-resilience>
83. <https://www.politiadefrontiera.ro/en/main/i-results-recorded-at-the-border-in-the-last-24-hours-9241.html>
84. <https://travel.gc.ca/destinations/moldova>
85. <https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/02/1133122>
86. <https://www.kmu.gov.ua/en/news/rozbudova-kordonu-z-rumuniiei-ta-moldovoiu-storony-obhovoryly-spilni-priorytety>
87. <https://cotidianul.md/en/12063/The-Republic-of-Moldova-is-interested-in-buying-electricity-from-Ukraine./>
88. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=OJ%3AL_202501444
89. <https://eubam.org/en/?newsroom-type=news>
90. <https://www.moldovamatters.md/p/upcoming-energy-crisis-sparks-political>
91. <https://euneighbourseast.eu/news/latest-news/eu-on-russias-hybrid-threats-such-malicious-behaviour-will-not-undermine-our-resolute-and-continued-support-for-ukraine/>
92. <https://www.europeaninterest.eu/the-new-frontline-safeguarding-critical-infrastructure-in-an-era-of-hybrid-warfare/>
93. <https://ppl-ai-code-interpreter-files.s3.amazonaws.com/web/direct-files/4ed409fd456c7e7f4d7aa56ee14985e4/b09da1ca-fd28-495b-b3b4-d677dd5c5393/0f3aea90.json>
94. <https://ppl-ai-code-interpreter-files.s3.amazonaws.com/web/direct-files/4ed409fd456c7e7f4d7aa56ee14985e4/b09da1ca-fd28-495b-b3b4-d677dd5c5393/c9370f71.csv>
95. <https://ppl-ai-code-interpreter-files.s3.amazonaws.com/web/direct-files/4ed409fd456c7e7f4d7aa56ee14985e4/b09da1ca-fd28-495b-b3b4-d677dd5c5393/812109a4.csv>
96. <https://ppl-ai-code-interpreter-files.s3.amazonaws.com/web/direct-files/4ed409fd456c7e7f4d7aa56ee14985e4/b09da1ca-fd28-495b-b3b4-d677dd5c5393/e8621e6f.csv>