CS162
Operating Systems and Systems Programming
Lecture 23

Key-Value Stores, Security

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Key Value Storage

- Can handle huge volumes of data, e.g., PetaBytes!
  - Store (key, value) tuples
- Simple interface
  - `put(key, value);` // insert/write "value" associated with "key"
  - `value = get(key);` // get/read data associated with "key"
- Used sometimes as a simpler but more scalable "database"

Key Values: Examples

- Amazon:
  - Key: customerID
  - Value: customer profile (e.g., buying history, credit card, ..)
- Facebook, Twitter:
  - Key: UserID
  - Value: user profile (e.g., posting history, photos, friends, …)
- iCloud/iTunes:
  - Key: Movie/song name
  - Value: Movie, Song

Key-Value Storage Systems in Real Life

- **Amazon**
  - DynamoDB: internal key value store used for Amazon.com (cart)
  - Simple Storage System (S3)
- **BigTable/HBase/Hypertable:** distributed, scalable data store
- **Cassandra:** "distributed data management system" (developed by Facebook)
- **Memcached:** in-memory key-value store for small chunks of arbitrary data (strings, objects)
- **BitTorrent distributed file location:** peer-to-peer sharing system
- …

Key Value Store

- Also called Distributed Hash Tables (DHT)
- Main idea: partition set of key-values across many machines



Challenges

- **Fault Tolerance:** handle machine failures without losing data and without degradation in performance
- **Scalability:**
  - Need to scale to thousands of machines
  - Need to allow easy addition of new machines
- **Consistency:** maintain data consistency in face of node failures and message losses
- **Heterogeneity** (if deployed as peer-to-peer systems):
  - Latency: 1ms to 1000ms
  - Bandwidth: 32Kb/s to 100Mb/s

Key Questions

- `put(key, value)`: where to store a new (key, value) tuple?
- `get(key)`: where is the value associated with a given "key" stored?
- And, do the above while providing
  - Fault Tolerance
  - Scalability
  - Consistency

Directory-Based Architecture

- Directory maintains mapping between **keys** and **machines (nodes)** that store the **values** associated with the **keys**
- Replicate value on several nodes for fault-tolerance
- Scale by adding nodes, replicating Directory



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

Consistency

- Need to make sure that a value is replicated correctly
- How do you know a value has been replicated on every node?
  - Wait for acknowledgements from every node
- What happens if a node fails during replication?
  - Pick another node and try again
- What happens if a node is slow?
  - Slow down the entire put()? Pick another node?
- In general, with multiple replicas
  - Slow puts and fast gets

Large Variety of Consistency Models

- Atomic consistency (linearizability): reads/writes (gets/puts) to replicas appear as if there was a single underlying replica (single system image)
  - Think "one updated at a time"
  - Transactions
- Eventual consistency: given enough time all updates will propagate through the system
  - One of the weakest form of consistency; used by many systems in practice
  - Must eventually converge on single value/key (coherence)
- *And many others: causal consistency, sequential consistency, strong consistency, …*

Quorum Consensus

- Improve put() and get() operation performance
- Define a replica set of size N
  - put() waits for acknowledgements from at least W replicas
  - get() waits for responses from at least R replicas
  - W+R > N
- Why does it work?
  - There is at least one node that contains the update
- Why might you use W+R > N+1?

Quorum Consensus Example

- N=3, W=2, R=2
- Replica set for K14: {N_1, N_3, N_4}
- Assume put() on N_3 fails



Quorum Consensus Example

- Now, issuing get() to any two nodes out of three will return the answer



What is Computer Security Today?

- Computing in the presence of an adversary!
  - Adversary is the security field's defining characteristic
- Reliability, robustness, and fault tolerance
  - Dealing with Mother Nature (random failures)
- Security
  - Dealing with actions of a knowledgeable attacker dedicated to causing harm
  - Surviving malice, and not just mischance
- Wherever there is an adversary, there is a computer security problem!

CIMPLICITY®
BlackEnergy SCADA malware

Mirai IoT botnet

Protection vs. Security

- Protection: mechanisms for controlling access of programs, processes, or users to resources
  - Page table mechanism
  - Round-robin schedule
  - Data encryption
- Security: use of protection mech. to prevent misuse of resources
  - Misuse defined with respect to policy
    - » E.g.: prevent exposure of certain sensitive information
    - » E.g.: prevent unauthorized modification/deletion of data
  - Need to consider external environment the system operates in
    - » Most well-constructed system cannot protect information if user accidentally reveals password – social engineering challenge

Security Requirements

- Authentication
  - Ensures that a user is who is claiming to be
- Data integrity
  - Ensure that data is not changed from source to destination or after being written on a storage device
- Confidentiality
  - Ensures that data is read only by authorized users
- Non-repudiation
  - Sender/client can't later claim didn't send/write data
  - Receiver/server can't claim didn't receive/write data

Securing Communication: Cryptography

- Cryptography: communication in the presence of adversaries
- Studied for thousands of years
  - See the Simon Singh's The Code Book for an excellent, highly readable history
- Central goal: confidentiality
  - How to encode information so that an adversary can't extract it, but a friend can
- General premise: there is a key, possession of which allows decoding, but without which decoding is infeasible
  - Thus, key must be kept secret and not guessable

Using Symmetric Keys

- Same key for encryption and decryption
- Achieves confidentiality
- Vulnerable to tampering and replay attacks



Symmetric Keys

- Can just XOR plaintext with the key
  - Easy to implement, but easy to break using frequency analysis
  - Unbreakable alternative: XOR with one-time pad
    - » Use a different key for each message



Block Ciphers with Symmetric Keys

- More sophisticated (e.g., block cipher) algorithms
  - Works with a block size (e.g., 64 bits)
- Can encrypt blocks separately:
  - Same plaintext⇒same ciphertext
- Much better:
  - Add in counter and/or link ciphertext of previous block



Symmetric Key Ciphers - DES & AES

- Data Encryption Standard (DES)
  - Developed by IBM in 1970s, standardized by NBS/NIST
  - 56-bit key (decreased from 64 bits at NSA's request)
  - Still fairly strong other than brute-forcing the key space
    - » But custom hardware can crack a key in < 24 hours
  - Today many financial institutions use Triple DES
    - » DES applied 3 times, with 3 keys totaling 168 bits
- Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
  - Replacement for DES standardized in 2002
  - Key size: 128, 192 or 256 bits
- How fundamentally strong are they?
  - No one knows (no proofs exist)

Authentication in Distributed Systems

- What if identity must be established across network?



  - Need way to prevent exposure of information while still proving identity to remote system
  - Many of the original UNIX tools sent passwords over the wire "in clear text"
    - » E.g.: telnet, ftp, yp (yellow pages, for distributed login)
    - » Result: Snooping programs widespread
- What do we need? Cannot rely on physical security!
  - Encryption: Privacy, restrict receivers
  - Authentication: Remote Authenticity, restrict senders

Authentication via Secret Key

- Main idea: entity proves identity by decrypting a secret encrypted with its own key
  - K – secret key shared only by A and B
- A can asks B to authenticate itself by decrypting a nonce, i.e., random value, x
  - Avoid replay attacks (attacker impersonating client or server)
- Vulnerable to man-in-the middle attack



Notation: E(m,k) – encrypt message m with key k

Administrivia

- Midterm 3 Review: **Fri 4/20 7:00-10:00PM (VLSB 2050)**
- Midterm 3 coming up on **Wed 4/25 6:30-8PM**
  - All topics up to and including Lecture 23
    - » Focus will be on Lectures 17 – 23 and associated readings, and Projects 3
    - » But expect 20-30% questions from materials from Lectures 1-16
  - LKS 245, Hearst Field Annex A1, VLSB 2060, Barrows 20, Wurster 102 **(see Piazza for your room assignment)**
  - Closed book
  - 2 pages hand-written notes both sides

BREAK

Secure Hash Function



- Hash Function: Short summary of data (message)
  - For instance, $h_1=H(M_1)$ is the hash of message M_1
    - » h_1 fixed length, despite size of message M_1
    - » Often, h_1 is called the "digest" of M_1
- Hash function H is considered secure if
  - It is infeasible to find M_2 with $h_1=H(M_2)$; i.e., can't easily find other message with same digest as given message
  - It is infeasible to locate two messages, m_1 and m_2, which "collide", i.e. for which $H(m_1) = H(m_2)$
  - A small change in a message changes many bits of digest/can't tell anything about message given its hash

Integrity: Cryptographic Hashes

- Basic building block for integrity: cryptographic hashing
  - Associate hash with byte-stream, receiver verifies match
    - » Assures data hasn't been modified, either accidentally – or maliciously
- Approach:
  - Sender computes a secure digest of message m using H(x)
    - » H(x) is a publicly known hash function
    - » Digest d = HMAC (K, m) = H (K | H (K | m))
    - » HMAC(K, m) is a hash-based message authentication function
  - Send digest d and message m to receiver
  - Upon receiving m and d, receiver uses shared secret key, K, to recompute HMAC(K, m) and see whether result agrees with d

Using Hashing for Integrity



Can encrypt m for confidentiality

Standard Cryptographic Hash Functions

- MD5 (Message Digest version 5)
  - Developed in 1991 (Rivest), produces 128 bit hashes
  - Widely used (RFC 1321)
  - Broken (1996-2008): attacks that find collisions
- SHA-1 (Secure Hash Algorithm)
  - Developed in 1995 (NSA) as MD5 successor with 160 bit hashes
  - Widely used (SSL/TLS, SSH, PGP, IPSEC)
  - Broken in 2005, government use discontinued in 2010
- SHA-2 (2001)
  - Family of SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512 functions
- HMAC's are secure even with older "insecure" hash functions

Key Distribution

- How do you get shared secret to both places?
  - For instance: how do you send authenticated, secret mail to someone who you have never met?
  - Must negotiate key over private channel
    - » Exchange code book/key cards/memory stick/others
- Could use a third party

Third Party: Authentication Server (Kerberos)

- Notation:
  - K_{xy} is key for talking between x and y
  - $(\ldots)^K$ means encrypt message (…) with the key K
  - Clients: A and B, Authentication server S
- Usage:
  - A asks server for key:
    - » A→S: [Hi! I'd like a key for talking between A and B]
    - » Not encrypted. Others can find out if A and B are talking
  - Server returns *session* key encrypted using B's key
    - » S→A: Message [Use K_{ab} (This is A! Use K_{ab})^{Ksb}] ^{Ksa}
    - » This allows A to know, "S said use this key"
  - Whenever A wants to talk with B
    - » A→B: Ticket [This is A! Use K_{ab}]^{Ksb}
    - » Now, B knows that K_{ab} is sanctioned by S

Authentication Server Continued [Kerberos]



- Details
  - Both A and B use passwords (shared with key server) to decrypt return from key servers
  - Add in timestamps to limit how long tickets will be used to prevent attacker from replaying messages later
  - Also have to include encrypted checksums (hashed version of message) to prevent malicious user from inserting things into messages/changing messages
- *Kerberos is the system that holds all CalNet IDs and passphrases*

Asymmetric Encryption (Public Key)

- Idea: use two different keys, one to encrypt (e) and one to decrypt (d)
  - A key pair
- Crucial property: knowing e does not give away d
- Therefore e can be public: everyone knows it!
- If Alice wants to send to Bob, she fetches Bob's public key (say from Bob's home page) and encrypts with it
  - Alice can't decrypt what she's sending to Bob …
  - … but then, neither can anyone else (except Bob)

Public Key / Asymmetric Encryption

- Sender uses receiver's public key
  - Advertised to everyone
- Receiver uses complementary private key
  - Must be kept secret



Public Key Encryption Details

- Idea: K_{public} can be made public, keep $K_{private}$ private



- Gives message privacy (restricted receiver):
  - Public keys (secure destination points) can be acquired by anyone/used by anyone
  - Only person with private key can decrypt message
- What about authentication?
  - Use combination of private and public key
  - Alice→Bob: $[(\text{I'm Alice})^{A\text{private}}\ \text{Rest of message}]^{B\text{public}}$
  - Provides restricted sender and receiver
- But: how does Alice know that it was Bob who sent her B_{public}? And vice versa…

Public Key Cryptography

- Invented in the 1970s
  - Revolutionized cryptography
  - (Was actually invented earlier by British intelligence)
- How can we construct an encryption/decryption algorithm using a key pair with the public/private properties?
  - Answer: Number Theory
- Most fully developed approach: RSA
  - Rivest / Shamir / Adleman, 1977; RFC 3447
  - Based on modular multiplication of very large integers
  - Very widely used (e.g., ssh, SSL/TLS for https)
- Also mature approach: Eliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)
  - Based on curves in a Galois-field space
  - Shorter keys and signatures than RSA

Properties of RSA

- Requires generating large, random prime numbers
  - Algorithms exist for quickly finding these (probabilistic!)
- Requires exponentiation of very large numbers
  - Again, fairly fast algorithms exist
- Overall, much slower than symmetric key crypto
  - One general strategy: use public key crypto to exchange a (short) symmetric session key
    - » Use that key then with AES or such
- How difficult is recovering d, the private key?
  - Equivalent to finding prime factors of a large number
    - » Many have tried - believed to be very hard (= brute force only)
    - » (Though quantum computers could do so in polynomial time!)

Simple Public Key Authentication

- Each side need only to know the other side's public key
  - No secret key need be shared
- A encrypts a nonce (random num.) x
  - Avoid replay attacks, e.g., attacker impersonating client or server
- B proves it can recover x, generates second nonce y
- A can authenticate itself to B in the same way
- A and B have shared private secrets on which to build private key!
  - We just did secure key distribution!
- Many more details to make this work securely in practice!



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Non-Repudiation: RSA Crypto & Signatures

- Suppose Alice has published public key KE
- If she wishes to prove who she is, she can send a message x encrypted with her private key KD (i.e., she sends E(x, KD))
  - Anyone knowing Alice's public key KE can recover x, verify that Alice must have sent the message
    - » It provides a signature
  - Alice can't deny it: non-repudiation
- Could simply encrypt a hash of the data to sign a document that you wanted to be in clear text
- Note that either of these signature techniques work perfectly well with any data (not just messages)
  - Could sign every datum in a database, for instance

RSA Crypto & Signatures (cont'd)



Digital Certificates

- How do you know K_E is Alice's public key?
- Trusted authority (e.g., Verisign) signs binding between Alice and K_E with its private key $KV_{private}$
  - $C = E(\{Alice, K_E\}, KV_{private})$
  - C: digital certificate
- Alice: distribute her digital certificate, C
- Anyone: use trusted authority's KV_{public}, to extract Alice's public key from C
  - $D(C, KV_{public}) = D(E(\{Alice, K_E\}, KV_{private}), KV_{public}) = \{Alice, K_E\}$

Summary of Our Crypto Toolkit

- If we can securely distribute a key, then
  - Symmetric ciphers (e.g., AES) offer fast, presumably strong confidentiality
- Public key cryptography does away with (potentially major) problem of secure key distribution
  - But: not as computationally efficient
    - » Often addressed by using public key crypto to exchange a session key
- Digital signature binds the public key to an entity

Putting It All Together - HTTPS

- What happens when you click on https://www.amazon.com?
- `https` = "Use HTTP over SSL/TLS"
  - SSL = Secure Socket Layer
  - TLS = Transport Layer Security
    - » Successor to SSL
  - Provides security layer (authentication, encryption) on top of TCP
    - » Fairly transparent to applications

HTTPS Connection (SSL/TLS) (cont'd)

- Browser (client) connects via TCP to Amazon's HTTPS server
- Client sends over list of crypto protocols it supports
- Server picks protocols to use for this session
- Server sends over its certificate
- (all of this is in the clear)



Inside the Server's Certificate

- Name associated with cert (e.g., Amazon)
- Amazon's RSA public key
- A bunch of auxiliary info (physical address, type of cert, expiration time)
- Name of certificate's signatory (who signed it)
- A public-key signature of a hash (SHA-256) of all this
  - Constructed using the signatory's private RSA key, i.e.,
  - Cert = $E(H_{SHA256}(KA_{public}, \text{www.amazon.com}, \ldots), KS_{private})$
    - » KA_{public}: Amazon's public key
    - » $KS_{private}$: signatory (certificate authority) private key
- …

Validating Amazon's Identity

- How does the browser authenticate certificate signatory?
  - Certificates of several certificate authorities (e.g., Verisign) are hardwired into the browser (or OS)
- If can't find cert, warn user that site has not been verified
  - And may ask whether to continue
  - Note, can still proceed, just without authentication
- Browser uses public key in signatory's cert to decrypt signature
  - Compares with its own SHA-256 hash of Amazon's cert
- Assuming signature matches, now have high confidence it's indeed Amazon … assuming signatory is trustworthy
  - DigiNotar CA breach (July-Sept 2011): Google, Yahoo!, Mozilla, Tor project, Wordpress, … (531 total certificates)

Certificate Validation



Can also validate using peer approach: https://www.eff.org/observatory

HTTPS Connection (SSL/TLS) cont'd

- Browser constructs a random session key K used for data communication
  - Private key for bulk crypto
- Browser encrypts K using Amazon's public key
- Browser sends E(K, KA_{public}) to server
- Browser displays 🔒
- All subsequent comm. encrypted w/ symmetric cipher (e.g., AES128) using key K
  - E.g., client can authenticate using a password



Summary

- Key-Value Store:
  - Two operations
    - » put(key, value)
    - » value = get(key)
  - Challenges
    - » Fault Tolerance → replication
    - » Scalability → serve get()'s in parallel; replicate/cache hot tuples
    - » Consistency → quorum consensus to improve put() performance
- Security:
  - Many more challenges to building secure systems and applications
  - No fixed-point solutions
  - Adversaries constantly change and adapt
  - Defenses must also constantly change and adapt
  - Take CS 161 !