fix(registration): rate limit the register endpoint#52
Merged
Conversation
Apply the shared per-IP and per-identity OTP limiters to POST /registration/register, which previously had no rate limiting. This closes an unthrottled path for registration/OTP spam and account enumeration. The peer /registration/phone route already used these limiters.
Codecov Report✅ All modified and coverable lines are covered by tests. 📢 Thoughts on this report? Let us know! |
This file contains hidden or bidirectional Unicode text that may be interpreted or compiled differently than what appears below. To review, open the file in an editor that reveals hidden Unicode characters.
Learn more about bidirectional Unicode characters
Sign up for free
to join this conversation on GitHub.
Already have an account?
Sign in to comment
2 participants
Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.This suggestion is invalid because no changes were made to the code.Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is closed.Suggestions cannot be applied while viewing a subset of changes.Only one suggestion per line can be applied in a batch.Add this suggestion to a batch that can be applied as a single commit.Applying suggestions on deleted lines is not supported.You must change the existing code in this line in order to create a valid suggestion.Outdated suggestions cannot be applied.This suggestion has been applied or marked resolved.Suggestions cannot be applied from pending reviews.Suggestions cannot be applied on multi-line comments.Suggestions cannot be applied while the pull request is queued to merge.Suggestion cannot be applied right now. Please check back later.
Summary
POST /registration/registerhad no rate limiting, while every other unauthenticated credential-issuing route (OTP, magic link) and the peer/registration/phoneroute already applied limiters. This left an unthrottled path for registration/OTP spam and account enumeration against the endpoint.This applies the existing shared limiters to the route:
otpIpLimiter— 10 requests / 15 min per IPotpIdentityLimiter— 5 requests / 15 min per identity (keys on the request-body email, falls back to IP)No new limiter code: it reuses
src/middleware/rateLimit.ts, whosegetOtpIdentityKeyalready readsbody.email.Security context
Found during a security survey of the passwordless auth flows. Severity: medium. This is the only unauthenticated credential-issuing endpoint that was missing rate limiting.
Testing
npm run typecheck,npm run lint— cleanNotes
Behavior change: clients exceeding the limits now receive
429. Non-contract (no route/schema/status-code changes on the success path).