fix(security): JWT exp, OAuth2 grant-type + constant-time secret, HttpSecurity warning (v26.06.12)

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -6,6 +6,38 @@ The format is based on [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.1.0/).
 
 ---
 
+## v26.06.12 (2026-06-05)
+
+### Security
+
+- **JWT now requires `exp`.** `JWTService.decode` (and the JWKS resource-server
+  validator) verified `exp` only when present, so a token minted with **no `exp`**
+  was accepted and never expired. `decode` now requires `exp`
+  (`options={"require": ["exp"]}`), and `JWTService.encode` auto-adds an `exp`
+  (now + `expiration_seconds`, default 3600) when the payload omits one — so every
+  issued token expires.
+- **OAuth2 client secret compared in constant time.** `AuthorizationServer`
+  compared the client secret with `!=` (a timing side-channel); it now uses
+  `secrets.compare_digest`.
+- **OAuth2 grant-type confusion fixed.** The token endpoint ignored the client's
+  registered `authorization_grant_type`, so a client registered for
+  `authorization_code` could mint `client_credentials` tokens. The
+  `client_credentials` grant now requires the client to be registered for it
+  (otherwise `UNAUTHORIZED_CLIENT`); server-unsupported grants still return
+  `UNSUPPORTED_GRANT_TYPE`.
+- **`HttpSecurity` footgun warning.** `build()` now logs a warning when
+  authorization rules are configured without a terminal `any_request()` rule
+  (paths matching no rule fall through allowed) — recommending
+  `.any_request().deny_all()` / `.authenticated()`.
+
+These surfaced in an adversarial security audit while validating the
+`implement-security` skill (which itself validated clean — enforcement proven,
+no silent auth bypass). Session-subsystem hardening (session-fixation id
+rotation, `secure` cookie default, Redis-deserialization allowlisting) plus a
+dedicated `tests/session` suite are tracked as a focused follow-up.
+
+---
+
 ## v26.06.11 (2026-06-05)
 
 ### Fixed

README.md

@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@
   <a href="https://github.com/fireflyframework"><img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/Firefly_Framework-official-ff6600?logo=" alt="Firefly Framework"></a>
   <a href="https://www.python.org/"><img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/python-3.12%2B-blue?logo=python&logoColor=white" alt="Python 3.12+"></a>
   <a href="LICENSE"><img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/license-Apache%202.0-green" alt="License: Apache 2.0"></a>
-  <a href="#"><img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/version-26.06.11-brightgreen" alt="Version: 26.06.11"></a>
+  <a href="#"><img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/version-26.06.12-brightgreen" alt="Version: 26.06.12"></a>
   <a href="#"><img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/type--checked-mypy%20strict-blue?logo=python&logoColor=white" alt="Type Checked: mypy strict"></a>
   <a href="#"><img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/code%20style-ruff-purple?logo=ruff&logoColor=white" alt="Code Style: Ruff"></a>
   <a href="#"><img src="https://img.shields.io/badge/async-first-brightgreen" alt="Async First"></a>

pyproject.toml

@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ name = "pyfly"
 # CalVer YY.MM.PATCH — package metadata uses PEP 440 normalized form (26.5.4);
 # git tag, GitHub release and human-readable display use leading-zero form
 # (v26.05.04) to match the Java/.NET/Go siblings.
-version = "26.6.11"
+version = "26.6.12"
 description = "The official Python implementation of the Firefly Framework — DI, CQRS, EDA, hexagonal architecture, and more."
 readme = "README.md"
 license = "Apache-2.0"

src/pyfly/__init__.py

@@ -13,4 +13,4 @@
 # limitations under the License.
 """PyFly — Enterprise Python Framework."""
 
-__version__ = "26.06.11"
+__version__ = "26.06.12"

src/pyfly/security/http_security.py

@@ -31,13 +31,16 @@
 
 from __future__ import annotations
 
+import logging
 from dataclasses import dataclass, field
 from enum import Enum, auto
 from typing import TYPE_CHECKING
 
 if TYPE_CHECKING:
     from pyfly.web.adapters.starlette.filters.http_security_filter import HttpSecurityFilter
 
+_logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
+
 
 # ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 # Access rule model
@@ -196,4 +199,15 @@ def build(self) -> HttpSecurityFilter:
         """
         from pyfly.web.adapters.starlette.filters.http_security_filter import HttpSecurityFilter
 
+        # Footgun guard: without a terminal any_request() rule (patterns == []), a
+        # path matching no rule falls through ALLOWED. Warn so an operator adds an
+        # explicit terminal — e.g. .any_request().deny_all() / .authenticated() —
+        # as the class docstring demonstrates.
+        if self._rules and not any(not rule.patterns for rule in self._rules):
+            _logger.warning(
+                "HttpSecurity has %d authorization rule(s) but no terminal any_request() rule; "
+                "requests matching no rule are ALLOWED through. Add .any_request().deny_all() "
+                "(or .authenticated()) to deny unmatched paths.",
+                len(self._rules),
+            )
         return HttpSecurityFilter(rules=list(self._rules))

src/pyfly/security/jwt.py

@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
 
 from __future__ import annotations
 
+import time
 from typing import Any
 
 import jwt
@@ -29,24 +30,42 @@ class JWTService:
     Args:
         secret: Secret key for HMAC-based signing.
         algorithm: JWT algorithm (default: HS256).
+        expiration_seconds: Default token lifetime; an ``exp`` claim is added on
+            :meth:`encode` when the payload does not already carry one.
     """
 
-    def __init__(self, secret: str, algorithm: str = "HS256") -> None:
+    def __init__(self, secret: str, algorithm: str = "HS256", expiration_seconds: int = 3600) -> None:
         self._secret = secret
         self._algorithm = algorithm
+        self._expiration_seconds = expiration_seconds
 
     def encode(self, payload: dict[str, Any]) -> str:
-        """Encode a payload into a JWT token."""
+        """Encode a payload into a JWT token.
+
+        Adds an ``exp`` claim (now + ``expiration_seconds``) when the payload does
+        not already specify one, so every issued token expires — :meth:`decode`
+        requires ``exp``.
+        """
+        if "exp" not in payload:
+            payload = {**payload, "exp": int(time.time()) + self._expiration_seconds}
         return jwt.encode(payload, self._secret, algorithm=self._algorithm)
 
     def decode(self, token: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
         """Decode and validate a JWT token.
 
+        Requires a valid signature **and** an ``exp`` claim — a token minted
+        without ``exp`` (which would never expire) is rejected.
+
         Raises:
-            SecurityException: If the token is invalid or expired.
+            SecurityException: If the token is invalid, expired, or lacks ``exp``.
         """
         try:
-            return jwt.decode(token, self._secret, algorithms=[self._algorithm])
+            return jwt.decode(
+                token,
+                self._secret,
+                algorithms=[self._algorithm],
+                options={"require": ["exp"]},
+            )
         except jwt.PyJWTError as exc:
             raise SecurityException(
                 f"Invalid token: {exc}",

src/pyfly/security/oauth2/authorization_server.py

@@ -116,12 +116,23 @@ async def token(
         Raises:
             SecurityException: If authentication fails or grant type is unsupported.
         """
-        # Authenticate client
+        # Authenticate client (constant-time secret comparison to avoid a timing
+        # side-channel that could leak the client secret).
         registration = self._client_repository.find_by_registration_id(client_id)
-        if registration is None or registration.client_secret != client_secret:
+        if registration is None or not secrets.compare_digest(
+            registration.client_secret.encode("utf-8"), client_secret.encode("utf-8")
+        ):
             raise SecurityException("Invalid client credentials", code="INVALID_CLIENT")
 
         if grant_type == "client_credentials":
+            # The client must be registered for the client_credentials grant to
+            # mint a client_credentials token — prevents grant-type confusion (a
+            # client registered only for authorization_code must not use it).
+            if registration.authorization_grant_type != "client_credentials":
+                raise SecurityException(
+                    f"Client '{client_id}' is not authorized for grant type 'client_credentials'",
+                    code="UNAUTHORIZED_CLIENT",
+                )
             return await self._handle_client_credentials(registration, scope)
         elif grant_type == "refresh_token":
             if refresh_token is None:

src/pyfly/security/oauth2/resource_server.py

@@ -70,6 +70,7 @@ def validate(self, token: str) -> dict[str, Any]:
                 algorithms=self._algorithms,
                 issuer=self._issuer,
                 audience=self._audience,
+                options={"require": ["exp"]},
             )
             return payload
         except jwt.PyJWTError as exc:

tests/security/test_authorization_server.py

@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ def client_repo() -> InMemoryClientRegistrationRepository:
         registration_id="test-client",
         client_id="test-client",
         client_secret="test-secret",
+        authorization_grant_type="client_credentials",
         scopes=["read", "write"],
     )
     return InMemoryClientRegistrationRepository(reg)

tests/security/test_oauth2_resource_server.py

@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
 
 from __future__ import annotations
 
+import time
 from unittest.mock import MagicMock, patch
 
 import jwt
@@ -34,7 +35,9 @@
 
 
 def _create_test_token(payload: dict, kid: str = "test-kid") -> str:
-    """Create an RS256-signed JWT for testing."""
+    """Create an RS256-signed JWT for testing (adds an ``exp`` claim by default)."""
+    if "exp" not in payload:
+        payload = {**payload, "exp": int(time.time()) + 3600}
     private_pem = _private_key.private_bytes(
         encoding=serialization.Encoding.PEM,
         format=serialization.PrivateFormat.PKCS8,

tests/security/test_security_hardening.py

@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@
+# Copyright 2026 Firefly Software Foundation.
+#
+# Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+# you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+# You may obtain a copy of the License at
+#
+#     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+#
+# Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+# distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+# WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+# See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+# limitations under the License.
+"""Regression tests for security hardening (v26.06.12).
+
+- JWTService requires an ``exp`` claim on decode and auto-adds one on encode
+  (a token minted without ``exp`` would otherwise never expire).
+- OAuth2 AuthorizationServer enforces the client's registered grant type — a
+  client registered for ``authorization_code`` cannot mint ``client_credentials``
+  tokens — and compares the client secret in constant time.
+- HttpSecurity.build() warns when rules are configured without a terminal
+  ``any_request()`` rule (unmatched paths fall through allowed).
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import logging
+import time
+
+import jwt
+import pytest
+
+from pyfly.kernel.exceptions import SecurityException
+from pyfly.security.http_security import HttpSecurity
+from pyfly.security.jwt import JWTService
+from pyfly.security.oauth2.authorization_server import AuthorizationServer, InMemoryTokenStore
+from pyfly.security.oauth2.client import ClientRegistration, InMemoryClientRegistrationRepository
+
+_SECRET = "test-secret-key-minimum-32-chars!"
+
+
+class TestJWTExpRequired:
+    def test_encode_adds_exp_claim(self) -> None:
+        svc = JWTService(secret=_SECRET)
+        payload = svc.decode(svc.encode({"sub": "u1"}))
+        assert "exp" in payload
+
+    def test_decode_rejects_token_without_exp(self) -> None:
+        svc = JWTService(secret=_SECRET)
+        # Minted directly, bypassing encode()'s auto-exp — must be rejected.
+        no_exp = jwt.encode({"sub": "u1"}, _SECRET, algorithm="HS256")
+        with pytest.raises(SecurityException, match="Invalid token"):
+            svc.decode(no_exp)
+
+    def test_explicit_exp_is_preserved(self) -> None:
+        svc = JWTService(secret=_SECRET)
+        exp = int(time.time()) + 99
+        payload = svc.decode(svc.encode({"sub": "u1", "exp": exp}))
+        assert payload["exp"] == exp
+
+
+def _server(grant_type: str) -> AuthorizationServer:
+    reg = ClientRegistration(
+        registration_id="c",
+        client_id="c",
+        client_secret="s3cr3t-value",
+        authorization_grant_type=grant_type,
+        scopes=["read"],
+    )
+    return AuthorizationServer(
+        secret=_SECRET,
+        client_repository=InMemoryClientRegistrationRepository(reg),
+        token_store=InMemoryTokenStore(),
+        issuer="https://auth.example.com",
+    )
+
+
+class TestOAuth2GrantTypeEnforcement:
+    @pytest.mark.asyncio
+    async def test_registered_client_can_use_client_credentials(self) -> None:
+        result = await _server("client_credentials").token(
+            grant_type="client_credentials", client_id="c", client_secret="s3cr3t-value"
+        )
+        assert "access_token" in result
+
+    @pytest.mark.asyncio
+    async def test_authorization_code_client_cannot_mint_client_credentials(self) -> None:
+        with pytest.raises(SecurityException, match="not authorized for grant type"):
+            await _server("authorization_code").token(
+                grant_type="client_credentials", client_id="c", client_secret="s3cr3t-value"
+            )
+
+    @pytest.mark.asyncio
+    async def test_wrong_secret_rejected(self) -> None:
+        with pytest.raises(SecurityException, match="Invalid client credentials"):
+            await _server("client_credentials").token(
+                grant_type="client_credentials", client_id="c", client_secret="wrong-secret"
+            )
+
+
+class TestHttpSecurityTerminalWarning:
+    def test_warns_without_any_request_rule(self, caplog: pytest.LogCaptureFixture) -> None:
+        sec = HttpSecurity()
+        sec.authorize_requests().request_matchers("/api/**").authenticated()
+        with caplog.at_level(logging.WARNING, logger="pyfly.security.http_security"):
+            sec.build()
+        assert any("no terminal any_request" in r.getMessage() for r in caplog.records)
+
+    def test_no_warning_with_any_request_terminal(self, caplog: pytest.LogCaptureFixture) -> None:
+        sec = HttpSecurity()
+        builder = sec.authorize_requests()
+        builder.request_matchers("/api/**").authenticated()
+        builder.any_request().deny_all()
+        with caplog.at_level(logging.WARNING, logger="pyfly.security.http_security"):
+            sec.build()
+        assert not any("no terminal any_request" in r.getMessage() for r in caplog.records)